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PREFACE
More than eighty years ago Maj. Gen. Philip H. 
Sheridan, a veteran commander of troops in the trans- 
Mississippi West, candidly predicted, .there is no 
subject connected with the history of the country ^which/ 
will be more interesting to the future student than the 
fate of the red man...."^ While the comparative popularity 
of historical topics may be mooted, it is certain that 
scholars, as well as casual observers, have shown extra­
ordinary interest in Indian affairs, particularly in the 
post-Civil War era. Anthropologists, ethnologists, 
sociologists and western, cultural, military, social and 
administrative historians have done extensive research in 
this field. Numerous works have been published on the 
last Indian wars, tribal and regional Indian history, the 
cultural clash between the red ana white races, the experi­
ments of humanitarians and reformers, the dispossession of 
tfEfe^ribes and the development of the government's Indian 
policy.^
^Kaj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan to Lt. Gan. William T. 
Sherman, April , 1878, ^Philip H. Sheridan Letter Book, 
General Correspondence, Sheridan Papers, Manuscript division, 
Library of Congress.
2
See the bibliography and comments in: Thomas Torrans, 
"General Works on the American Indian," Arizona and the 
West, II (Spring, I960), 79-103J William 1. Hagan, American 
Indians (Chicago, 1961). 175-183 and Frederick J. Dockstadter, 
The American Indian in Graduate Studies (New York, 1957)*
ii
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Still our knowledge of the Indian and the history
of Indian-white relations is far from complete. Until
recently, for example, little work had been done to
synthesize and interpret the role of the red man within
3
the purview of western or national development. Pleas 
have been made for a more balanced approach to various 
aspects of Indian affairs. Many standard works are one­
sided* because they present a more or less pro-Indian 
or anti-Indian point of view or concentrate upon European- 
American expansion, treating the Indian as an impersonal, 
environmental factor.^- Opportunities exist, too, for 
example, for a comprehensive examination of the impact 
of political, social and economic trends upon Indian po3 5cy.
The present study focuses upon another significant, 
but neglected, aspect of Indian history —  the inter-relation 
betv>:>,:',.a the War and Interior departments and Indian policy# 
Seme • v.alysts have briefly mentioned the difficulty entailed 
in not having a clear understanding of which branch of
^Hagan, 0£. cIt., provides a provokative overview of 
the impact of tEe Indians upon American history but does 
not exhaust the subject.
^■Jack D. Forbes, "The Indian in the West: A Challenge
for Historians,"'Arizona and the West, I (Autumn, 1959), 
206-215# Forbes contends ’that the works of Frederic L.
Paxson, Robert E. Riegel, Bay Billington, LeRoy R. Hafen,
Carl C. Rister and others —  all leading western historians —  
fail to consider the Indian as a "positive factor in the 
expansion of Anglo-American culture." He recommends an 
integration of historical and anthropological studies and 
a re-assessment of common generalizations about the red man.
ill
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government should act upon the tribes. “A cardinal error 
of the government," one prominent historian observes,
"lay in tolerating ’a vague division of authority over 
the Indians between the war and interior department."^
Those primarily concerned with the Army's campaigns 
against hostile tribes have also mentioned the inter­
departmental problem. "The Indian Eureau," one author 
states with obvious bias, "...hamstrung the Army right 
and left when it had the c h a n c e . O t h e r s  more interested 
in the Indians' side of the story have cited the same
difficulty, arraigning the Army for vindictiveness and 
7
interference.' Still others, with greater objectivity, 
have summarized the contest between the departments over
Q
control of the Indian Bureau. By examining the question 
of Indian management daring the generation after the 
Civil War in some detail, the author has endeavored to 
demonstrate the nature and significance of this dual 
system and its implications for the nation and its wards.
^Allen Nevins, The Emergence of Modern America (New 
York, 1927), lOij..
^Fairfax Downey, Indian Fighting Army (New York, 
1957), ia .
f9
fPerhaps the best example of this viewpoint is found 
in George W. Manypenny, Our Indian Wards (Cincinnati, l880)»
O
Loring B. Priest, Uncle Sam»s Stepchildren (New 
Brunswick, 19q2), Chapter ‘fwo; Donald J. D'Elia, ^The Argu­
ment Over Civilian or Military Indian Control, 1865-1880," 
The Historian, XXIV (February, 19.62), 207-225.
iv
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The period which has been chosen for analysis, 1865 
to 1887, was decisive in the history of Indian-white 
relations, for it was in these years that westward expansion 
rapidly closed the frontier and increased inter-racial 
contacts. Prom the point of view of the red man, it was 
an ora of social and cultural crisis and the last stage 
of white exploitation. For the government, it was a time 
of decision, because it was no longer possible to temporize 
with the Indian question. The passage of the Dawes Severalty 
Act of 1887, which established a general system of private 
land-ownership and citizenship for most Indians and which 
has been taken as the concluding point for this investi­
gation, has commonly been interpreted as a turning point 
in Indian history.
The writer is indebted to those who have aided in 
this study. He is grateful, first of all, to Dr. James 
C. Olson, Professor of American History at the University 
of Nebraska for his encouragement and assistance in the 
preparation of this manuscript. Professor Olson*s patient 
reading of original drafts and suggestions, based upon 
extensive familiarity with Indian affairs, have been of 
special benefit. Secondly, for financial assistance, he 
is obliged to the Addison E. Sheldon Foundation and 
Board of College Education of the American Lutheran Church. 
Fellowships from these sources enabled him to spend several
v
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weeks in Washington D.C. and elsewhere doing research. 
Thirdly, a word of appreciation is due to those who 
facilitated his search for printed and unprinted materials 
at the National Archives, Library of Congress, Hayes 
Memorial Library, Oberlin College Library, Nebraska State 
Historical Society and other depositories. Finally, the 
author owes sincere thanks to his wife, Mary Louise 
Waltmann, who patiently assisted in preliminary research 
and the final checking of this dissertation.
vi
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CHAPTER ONE
1865: AN AUSPICIOUS AND PITTING TIME
The question Is now squarely before U3.
Either the extermination of the Indian tribes 
or a humane policy which shall save them from 
so cruel a fate and at the same time secure 
from danger white emigrants* The present system 
of Indian policy has only to be pursued a few 
years longer and.*,it is certain that no Indians 
will be left to treat with,
(Maj. Gen, John Pope, May 23, 1865)
The historic ceremony at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, 
helped set the stage for a renewed assault upon the seemingly 
irrepressible Indian Question, Both Lt, Gen, Grant, who 
accepted Lee’s surrender, and Brig, Gen, Ely S, Parker, author 
of the surrender document, were destined to play leading roles 
In federal relations with the red men inhabiting vast untamed 
regions of the West, Similarly, Maj, Gen. William T. Sherman, 
who presently received the sword of Confederate General Joseph E. 
Johnston, was to spend many years commanding troops in Indian 
country. Many officers and men -- not only from the triumphant 
North —  were to fight, defend or supervise the nation’s ”wards” 
while the country labored to "bind up its wounds,”
Dumas Malone and Allen Johnson, Dictionary of American 
Biography (New York, 191+3), 219, Hereafter this source is 
cited Diet, Am. Blog. Army officers will be identified by 
brevet rank.
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2Reconstruction was barely begun when President Andrew 
Johnson told Secretary of the Interior James Harlan that he 
was anxious to solve the Indian problem. Vletory over the 
rebellious states, he contended, was proof to the tribes that 
the government was determined to maintain its honor and pv’.fer.
On June 22, Harlan relayed this message to Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs William P. Dole, explaining,
... the President deems the present an auspicious 
and fitting time for the renewal of efforts to impress 
upon the Indians in the more distant territories, the 
rapidly increasing and pressing necessity for the aban­
donment of their wild and rcving habits, and the adoption, 
in their stead, of^the more peaceful and industrial arts 
of civilized life.
The task thus described devolved upon two departments: 
the Interior Department, In charge of the Indian Bureau and 
its network of superintendencies and agencies, and War Depart­
ment, central authority for the military departments and 
scattered outposts on the frontier. In theory, most tribes, 
through treaties, were under the management of the civil branch. 
In practice, the military branch, which had been nominally in 
control of Indian affairs from 1789 to I8I4.9 , had jurisdiction 
over hostile Indians. Hostility, however, was not easily de­
fined and neither department’s interpretation was supreme. The 
result was confused and divided control, accompanied by constant
2
Secretary of the Interior James Harlan to Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs William P. Dole, June 22, 1865, Miscellaneous 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, National Ar­
chives, Record Group 75* Hereafter these records are cited 
I.O.L.R., Misc., followed by the symbols KA, RG for National 
Archives, Record Group, then the record group number.
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3bickering over whether civil or military jurisdiction was most 
conducive to permanent- solution of the Indian problem.-^
Urgency attended these inter-departmental differences, 
for the "march of empire," partially abated by the Civil War, 
was beginning to gain tempo. Each year millions of acres were 
being claimed by settlers under the Homestead Act and other 
liberal land laws. Railroad crews were busy laying track for 
the first transcontinental and shorter roads along the fringe 
of settlement. Numerous freight trains were creaking over­
land to frontier colonies. Daily more Emigrants were setting 
out for mountain valleys where they hoped to discover mineral 
wealth. Prom the south bawling herds of longhorns were being 
driven toward shipping points in Missouri and Kansas.
Many contemporaries, particularly in the East, lamented 
the effects of such intrusions upon the Indian country. Others, 
most vocal in the West, defended these developments as "mani­
fest destiny."^ Early in 1865 Minnesota’s eloquent congress­
man, Ignatius Donnelly, declared, "It is the destiny of the 
white man to overrun the world; but it is as plainly his des­
tiny to carry in his train the great forces which constitute 
his superiority —  civilization and Christianity." Precursing
^Priest, op. cit. I5ff»; D ’Elia, "The Argument Over 
Indian. Control, 2 0 7} Marvin H. Garfield, "The Indian Question 
In Congress and in Kansas," Kansas Historical Quarterly, II 
(Pebruary, 1933)# 29. 
k
Priest, 0£. clt., 86-92; Garfield, "The Indian Question," 
l+0-l|J+; Robert G, Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the 
Settlement of the West (N o r m a n ), llj..
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kaooial Darwinist arguments, Donnelly continued, "We...are a 
superior race sharing its noblest privileges with the humblest 
of mankind and lifting up to the condition of freedom and 
happiness those who from the dawn of time have been either 
barbarians or slaves,**-*
Subjugation of the Indian for his own good was an old 
and controversial argument, enlivened by post-bellum expansion. 
Before considering government relations with the tribes in the 
latter part of 1865, the writer will comment on the nature of 
the Indians, pre-Civll War Indian policy, Indian affairs during 
the war, and circumstances affecting the Interior and War de­
partments at war's end,
THE INDIANS IN 1865
In his annual report for 1865 Commissioner D, N, Cooley 
indicated that the government was in charge of nearly 308,000 
Indians belonging to over one hundred and eighty tribes and 
bands which were assigned to sixty-four different agencies and 
sub-agencies,^ Most of these native groups were governed by 
one or more treaties obligating the United States to provide 
them with annuities, "beneficial objects," schools, white 
supervisors and so forth. Many also had substantial amounts
7
of property or money held in trust by the government. The
Congressional Globe. 38th Congress,, 2 sess., appendix, 61,
^Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 1865 
(Washington, 1 8 6 5), 58^-590, hereafter these documents are cited 
CIA, followed by the year.
7Ibid., 511-9-575.
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5administration of Indian affairs, therefore, was a complex 
proposition*
<*
Relations with the tribes were further complicated by
the Indians' diverse character, economic Status, strength,
disposition and previous experiences with white men. The
assumption that an Indian was an Indian was wholly inaccurate*
"This is simple truth," one nineteenth century observer asserted*
"There is as much difference between a Pueblo and an Apache,
or a Ness Perce^ and an Arapahoe, as there is between a Broad-
,.8way merchant and a Bowery rough." In commenting on early
tribal differences, many of which were still evident in 1865,
a modern scholar discounts the "average Indian" concept as 
follows:
The Chippewas rode in a birchbark canoe, the Chicka­
saw in a dugout; the Sac slept in a bark wigwam, the
Kiowa in a akin tepee, and the Pueblo in a stone apart­
ment house* The Seminole hunted with a blowgun, the Sioux 
with a bow* Did this average Indian take his foe's head 
for a trophy, or did he content himself with just the 
scalp, and did the scalp include the ears? Did he grow 
corn, or dig camas roots, or spear salmon? Was boiled 
puppy a delicacy or a last resort to stave off famine?
The Papagoes regarded war as a form of insanity, the Co- 
manches gloried in it* The list of variations seemed in­
finite, and well it might when it is noted tha£ perhaps 
as many as six hundred cultures were involved**
There were distinctions not only among the tribes but 
between bands belonging to a certain tribe* This was evident 
in means of subsistence, political organization, military capa­
bilities or propensities and social standards* In part, these
P. Dunn, Jr., Massacres of the Mountains: A History 
of the Indian Wars of the Par <f/est,~T8l5-lb7$ (New York, 1886), 3 5.
^Hagan, 0£. clt., 3*
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6variations were based on the Indians’ response to the influ­
ences of white men, for some adopted new tools, weapons, 
techniques, customs and tastes more readily than others,
Post-war policy-makers, liowever, were seldom experts 
on tribal distinctions. Their basic consideration was whether 
tribes threatened or impeded national (white) security, ex­
pansion and progress. Hence, they gave limited attention to 
weak, peaceable and sedentary bands such as the California 
’’Diggers," the Colorado Hopis and Zunls, or the Klamaths of 
Oregon, Nor did they give extensive consideration to more 
acculturated eastern groups such as the Lake Superior Chippe- 
was, Green Bay Oneidas or Five Civilized Tribes of the southern 
plains. The tribes considered to be the crux of the Indian 
problem were the powerful, mounted, warlike and nomadic Sioux, 
Crows, Comanches, Kiowas and Apaches of the Great Plains and 
Southwest.^ Many of these red men denied federal authority, 
refused to be restricted to reservations, and effectively de­
monstrated their military prowess against Army expeditions in 
their country. These were variously identified as "non-treaty" 
or "non-agency" Indians, as "non-progressives," "hostiles,"
^®Ibid,, 3-f>» See also Frederick Webb Hodge, Handbook of 
American Indians (Washington, 1907). 2 volumes; Clark Wissler, 
The American Indian (New York, 1917)*
■^Jobn Collier, Indians of the Americas: The Lone Hone 
(New York, Mentor Series, 195^ 4-)» 133; Annual ffeport of the 
Secretary of the Interior, 1865 cited in benjamin PerTey Poore, 
Messagesrrom the Eresldent~or the United States....(Washing­
ton, lo6o"j, 3il-3l£* Hereafter these documents are cited SI, 
followed by the symbol (P) If found in the Poore series and 
the year.
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7"intractables,” or '’blanket Indians."^
Problematic as were the wild migratory Indians, others 
supposedly living at peace on reservations caused many head­
aches for Indian officials through their erratic progress toward 
civilization. Agency Indians of the Pacific Northwest, for 
instance, varied greatly in their conditions. On a visit to 
this area in the summer of 1865, Senator James W. Nesmith, 
of Oregon, was impressed by the advancement and habits of the 
Yakamas and, particularly, the Nez Perce© The latter he 
termed "the finest specimens of the aboriginal race.” The 
Walla-wallas and Umatillas appeared "comparatively wealthy,"^*- 
had good farms and comparatively high morals, and were active 
Catholics. But, Nesmith observed, the Puyallups showed a 
tendency toward ’’idleness , vagrancy, dissipation, and indif­
ference upon the subject of future wants.” The Skokomish 
Agency Indians were away ”gathering berries, catching fish,
prostituting their women, gambling and getting drunk, the latter
-15of which appears to be their favorite occupation." Pessi­
mistically the Senator concluded that all the tribesmen of 
Oregon, Washington and Idaho had "savage instincts which
12CIA and SI, 1865-1887, nassira.
^■%esmlth was a veteran of Indian wars In the Northwest 
in the period I8I4.8 to 1856 and served as Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs for Oregon from 185" to 1859* (Diet. Am. Biog.. 
XIII, 4 3 0). —  —
•^ Senate Report No, 156. 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1279), 1867, 9© Hereafter these documents are cited Sen. Rot.
l5Ibid., 5-7.
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8experience has taught us the impossibility of overcoming.”
Their condition might be Ameliorated to some extent," but real 
progress could not be expected.^
Although inclined to be optimistic or even over-opti­
mistic about the advancement of their charges, many agents too 
had their doubts. The Ponca, Delaware and Omaha agents offered
favorable evidence of enlarged farming and stock-raising opera-
17tions and growing interest in education among their Indians.
The Tulalip agent, however, lamented that youngsters were de~
18
sorting the school and fields. At Port Bridger, Agent Luther 
Mann, Jr. was disgusted by the Eastern ShoshonesT refusal to
shed leggings and breech-clothes and give up the chase. He pro-
,, . 1 9
posed that they be "corralled like wild horse3.
In general, the Indians of 1865 were an uncivilized 
people. Most of them lived in much the same way that their 
ancestors lived when the United States was founded. For every 
thousand red men there were but one hundred and sixty acres un­
der cultivation, twenty permanent dwellings and fewer than eight
students in agency schools in spite of the fact that the govern-
20
ment had long engaged in the work of reforming its wards,
i A
~ Ibid.. 16.
17CIA, 186$, 216-217, 365-366, l4.03-ij.Olw
19Ibid., 1 5 9.
20
Ibid.. $88, These figures include the civilized tribes 
of the Southern Superintendency, which improved the overall 
picture.
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9PRE-CIVIL WAR INDIAN RELATIONS
Some aspects of the government’s policy toward the various 
tribes were determined long before the adoption of the Consti­
tution, The first colonial powers uniformly recognized the 
aborigines' right of possession, yet claimed ultimate sover­
eignty and fee simple, or actual ownership of the land. Hence,
the practice of allowing the Indians to occupy certain areas
21until they formally relinquished their possessory title.
Aside from land titles, the tribes were treated as 
separate nations, free to govern themselves, provided they did 
not endanger or interfere with white settlement, British offi­
cials acknowledged the statehood of native groups through
treaties and other transactions. Colonial governments also
had independent dealings with the red men on this basis, there-
22
by complicating Indian relations. One of the earliest Ameri­
can efforts to systematize the administration of Indian affairs 
came in 1775> when the Continental Congress set up three In­
dian departments —  Northern, Middle and Southern —  each under
23three to five commissioners, J
^Laurence P. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs 
(Baltimore, 1927), 3ff,
22Ibld., 3, 12.
^George D, Harmon, Sixty Years of Indian Affairs (Chapel 
Hill, 19I4-X), 1; Journals of the Continental Congress. 177fy-17o9, 
(Washington, 190f? J, 175* hereafter the latter source is cited 
J.C.C, The British earlier sought to improve the administration 
of Indian affairs through two loose superlntendencies and 
measures such as the Proclamation of 1763. See Jack M. Sosin, 
Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial 
Policy. (Lincoln, 19&D7
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10
Various precedents for federal policy were established
in the period 1776 to 1789* Some treaties signed by Congress,
2k
for example, contained provisions common to later agreements. 
During the Revolution Indian matters were governed by a com­
mittee of Congress which acted upon recommendations from the 
Board of War,2"* After 17&3, though, illicit trade and negotia­
tions by individuals, states and foreign powers demonstrated 
the need for orderly expansion and stronger central authority 
over the tribes. Certain laws passed under the Articles of Con­
federation were designed to meet these exigencies. The Ordinance 
of 1785 provided orderly survey and sale of western land; the 
Ordinance of 1786 reduced the number of superintendencies to 
two and made Indian superintendents responsible to the‘Secre­
tary of War; and the Ordinance of 1787 included Congress’ pledge
26
to protect Indian property and rights in Northwest Territory,
If the Confederation produced an Indian policy of "con-
* n
^derable direction and energy, as one author maintains, it was
27
nonetheless an ambivalent policy. For under the a -tides of
^The first treaty with the Delawares (1778) obliged Con­
gress to provide the Indians with clothing, utensils and 
weapons, "well-regulated trade" and an "intelligent, candid 
agent" and guaranteed them possession of their land while they 
remained at peace, (United States Statutes at Large. Vol, 7, 13*) 
Hereafter this source is cited: volume number, Stat.L, and page,
^J.C.C., XIV, 600; Schmeckebier, op, clt,. 15>; Harmon, 
o p . cit,. 5-6,
26
Harmon, op. clt.. ij-6; J.C,C,, XXXI, ij.90-lj.93; Francis 
N, Thorpe, comp..Federal and State Constitutions. Colonial 
Charters. and Other OrganlcTaws of the States. Territories. 
and Colonies Now or Heretofore forming the United States of 
America (Washington. 1908). II.957ff.
^Harmon, op, clt.. 5.
4
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11
Confederation, a3 later under the Constitution, while ’’profess- 
ing to desire to civilize and settle this hapless people, the 
poliey of removing them from their homes, whenever the demands 
of white settlers,..or the schemes of speculators*..were urged...
«— Oft
/was7 persistently pursued.”
Delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 did not 
deliberate at length upon the Indian question. James Madison, 
however, expressed an opinion in Federalist Number Forty-Two 
that the Articles were faulty regarding tribal relations. He 
noted that Congress was prohibited from infringing upon the in­
ternal rights of states and trading with Indians who were ”mem-
bers” of a state. Which Indians this excluded and how those not
29excluded might be regulated was not explained.
The Constitution offered a solution to the latter problem. 
In Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 Congress was granted power 
”to regulate commerce...with the Indian tribes,” But the legal 
status of the Indian was not clearly stated. Section II,
Clause 3 of the first article excluded Indians from apportion­
ment for purposes of representation and taxation. But until 
the Dawes Act of 1887 the question of Indian citizenship was a 
highly controversial s u b j e c t . o t h e r  provisions having
^®Sen. Rpt.. No. 268, J^ lst Cong., 3 ses3. (Serial 11+43),
1870, 4 *
^Jacob E. Cooke, ed.. The Federalist (Cleveland. 1961). 
282, 284. ---------
30„
For a discussion of Indian citizenship and the effects 
of the Fourteenth Amendment see Sen. Rpt., No. 268. 4lst Cong.,
3 seas. (Serial 11+43), 1870.
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special effect upon the nation’s wards were Article II,
Section 2 and Article VI, Section 2, which empowered the 
President to make treaties ”by and with the consent of the 
Senate” and made such agreements the ”supreme law of the land.”3'*'
Significantly, from the beginning, the federal govern­
ment based its relations with the Indians upon moral as well 
as legal and traditional grounds. It recognized, first, that 
the Indians were too uncivilized to readily adopt or compete 
with the economy of white men. Secondly, it admitted that the 
untutored and inexperienced red men needed protection against
whites who sought to exploit them. Finally, as trustees of
•?
Indian land and property which was exempted from state taxation, 
it accepted responsibility for public expenses in connection 
with Indian affairs.32
Credit has been given President Washington and his 
associates for setting this moral tone while establishing many 
fundamental procedures for relations with the Indians. When 
the War Department was created in August, 1789»33 the Secretary 
was given responsibility for Indian affairs. Secretary Henry 
Knox, like Washington, advocated humanitarian treatment of the 
Indians.3^ The first President signed into law many landmark
3 ^ James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902, (Washington, 190? J ,I,'217f.
^Sehmeckebier, ojc. clt., 9-11.
331 St at. L., ij-9*
3I1
Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Claire Clark, eds., Amer­
ican State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive...1759- 
ltil%. Indian Affairs (Washington, 1032), n ,  S Y *
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bills. One provided, the first appropriations to negotiate new 
treaties (1789), ^ another made territorial governors Indian 
superintendents (1789); a third introduced a series of inter­
course laws with the tribes (1790); and a fourth furnished the 
general appropriations for supporting the Indians (1793)* Wash­
ington also stressed the importance of selecting "qualified and 
trusty" Indian a g e n t s , F i n a l l y ,  he signed a treaty in 1790 
with the Creeks which became a pattern for later treaties by 
promising the Indians annuity payments and gratuitous issues 
of livestock and farming equipment for land cess ions,^7
From the end of Washington’s administration until the 
latter 1820*s the government continued what has been termed a 
policy of "persuasion and negotiation."3® The purchase of 
Louisiana in 1803 greatly enlarged the scope of Indian rela­
tions. Subsequently, the expediency of removing the tribes 
to a single large reservation beyond the Mississippi occurred 
to President Jefferson and was implemented by succeeding Presi­
dents. Until about the time Jackson entered the White House,^9 
removals were ostensibly voluntary. In reality, tribesmen were 
subjected to a series of "land grabs" which were, one critic ob­
serves, "veiled by the quasi-legal expedient of transactions
•^Joseph Gales, comp.. Annals of the Congress of the 
United States (Washington, lo3i}J, 66; 1 Stat. L.. 5k.
•^Schmeckebier, op. clt.. 17-20; Harmon, 0£. cit.. 10-19, 
377 Stat. L., 35.
^®Harmon, o£. cit.. 169*
39
Ibid., Harmon dates the beginning of a "new coercive 
policy" with the J. Q, Adams administration.
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Nefarious negotiations such as the Delaware and Potawatomie treaty
of 1809 and Indian Spring Treaty of l825>, relieved the red men
of millions of acres.^
Even more severe treatment was accorded many eastern 
Indians in the 1830’s and lSL^s. Although President John Q.
Adams and his Secretary of War, James Barbour, criticized past 
injustices to the natives, their proposed "solution” was coloni­
zation in the trans-Mississippi country.^ Under President 
Jackson, a former Indian fighter, an act was passed "to provide 
for the exchange of lands with the Indian tribes in any of.the 
States or Territories and for their removal west of the river 
Mississippi."^ This program was executed forcibly by Jackson 
and sanctioned, to a degree, by the Supreme Court. In the fa­
mous case, Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia (I83I), Chief Justice 
John Marshall denied a Cherokee appeal for an Injunction against 
removal by the State of Georgia, characterizing the tribes as 
"domestic dependent nations" with a relation to the government
^■®Walter H. Blumenthal, American Indians Dispossessed;
Fraud in Land Cessions Forced upon the Tribes (Philadelphia.wnrki.
‘U ln the former negotiations the Indians gave up three 
million acres for seven thousand dollars and one thousand seven 
hundred and fifty dollars in annuities. After the latter trans­
action, some of the Creeks assassinated Lower Creek Chief 
William McIntosh for treason. (Ibid., 35-37).
^House of Representatives Report No. 9 3, I^th Cong.,
3 sess. (Serial i8 60), 1879, 5* Hereafter these documents 
are cited HR Rpt.
Stat. L., lj.ll.
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like that of a ward to his guardian* Eventually the "wards”
were exiled to their big "permanent” reservation beyond the
Mississippi, but episodes such as the Black Hawk War (1832),
the ”death march" of the C-herokees (1836), and the Seminole
War (1835-4-2) left indelible blots on the annals of American 
li£history* ^
On the positive side of the ledger, the Twenties and the 
Jacksonian Era witnessed significant changes in Indian adminis­
tration* In 182lj. Secretary of War Calhoun created the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, staffed by a head of the bureau, a chief 
clerk and an assistant*^ On July 9, 1832, Congress authorized 
President Jackson to appoint a Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
to head the Bureau and carry out policies of the War Department.^ 
Two years later, after investigators described the Indian sys­
tem as "expensive, inefficient, and irresponsible," two other 
important laws were passed. One enlarged and reorganized the 
"Department" (Bureau) of Indian Affairs*^ The other empowered
^ 5  Peters, 16-17* In 1832 the Court ruled Georgia could 
not act upon individual Indians, but Jackson refused to inter­
fere with the state’s forcible removal policy.
45See, for example, Blumenthal, op* cit*, 81-85 and passim* 
In the Seminole War a bounty of two hundred dollars was offered 
for dead Indians and twenty million dollars were spent fighting 
the red men.
^ H R  Document No. 146, 19th Cong., 1 seas* (Serial 138). 
1826, 6. -----------
^74 Stat. L., 564*
^ 4  Stat* L., 735* The Reorganization Act of I83I4. primarily 
affected the superintendencies and agencies. In 1837 the "Depart­
ment" was again classified as a bureau of the War Department*
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the President to regulate Indian trade by prohibiting certain 
goods and issuing and revoking l i c e n s e s I n  addition, the 
Secretary of War in 1836 and 183? issued elaborate directives 
prescribing the duties of the Commissioner and other officers 
who handled Indian funds, supplies and subsistence,"^
Contrary to the later claims of military spokesmen about 
the efficiency and purity of the Indian service under War De­
partment control, abuses occurred. In 18^2, for example, an 
investigation revealed "an almost total want of method and punc­
tuality" in business affairs. Millions had been spent without 
proper accounting, to the "great loss" and "heavy responsibility" 
of the government. Likewise, appropriations had been wasted or 
expended so as to "degrade" and "demoralize" the Indians,^
To reform the Indian service, Congress in 181^ 7 passed 
laws requiring that annuities and other funds be distributed 
to the heads of families or individual Indians, not chiefs, 
and that tribes be given an opportunity to apply resources to 
purposes conducive to their "happiness and welfare," Hence­
forth, no money or goods might be given red men under the influ­
ence of alcohol, and parties at the agencies might not hold 
liens on annuities,^2 Still malpractices continued, as critics 
of the Array recalled most vividly in the Seventies,
Stat. L., 729.
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In 184.9, after sixty years under tbe War Department, the 
administration of Indian affairs was transfered to the newly- 
created Department of the Interior. A principal advocate of 
this change, Ssci*s of the Treasury Robert J. Walker, pro- 
pQgg/j jrj 18)1.8 that the burdensome Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
other offices of the Treasury, War and Navy departments be placed 
under a new executive department.^3 This was accomplished by 
the Act of March 3, l8ij.9, creating the "Home,” or Interior De­
partment This change, it should be observed, was little 
more than a shift in "supervisory and appellate" jurisdiction. 
With few exceptions, the existing administrative machinery was 
retained —  Indian superintendents and agents were civilians, 
as in most prior instances.
Yet military leaders were quick to take exception to 
the loss of executive authority over the Indian Bureau. In 
annual reports and public statements, particularly in the Six­
ties and Seventies, they joined the chorus of frontier editors 
and politicians who often condemned the Indians and Indian 
officials. Reports-^ 0f frauds and corruption by the "Indian 
ring" became commonplace. The grounds for criticism were 
plentiful, but the transfer of 181}.9 could hardly be represented 
as the advent of a sweeping moral degeneration In the Indian
^3HR Doc. No. J . t 30th Cong., 2 sess., II (Serial 538), 
18I|.8, 36-37*
^ 9  Stat. L., 395.
55
Schmeckebier, o£. cit.. lj.2-i|.3.
-^Priest, on. cit., 15-17; Garfield, "The Indian Ques­
tion," 29ff.
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service. In the first place* the Interior Department did not 
inherit a system that was chaste or faultless. Secondly, the 
transfer coincided with the beginning of a period of accelerated 
expansion which taxed the administrative system and generalized 
disregard for Indian "rights" on the frontier.
In the l850’s gold rushes, emigration to the territories 
acquired during and after the Mexican War and competition be­
tween slavery and anti-slavery interests exacerbated the Indian 
problem. To an ever-increasing extent, whites expropriated 
Indian lands before the native occupants relinquished their 
rights. In California, for example, treaties were negotiated 
but never ratified. The Indian Bureau could do little more 
than try to "legalize" white expansion and minimize the dangers 
of inter-racial conflict.-^ In 1856, Commissioner George W # 
Manypenny reported that within three years fifty-two treaties 
had been negotiated —  thirty-two ratified and twenty pending 
ratification —  whereby the red men gave up claim to one hundred 
and seventy-four million a c r e s T h e s e  treaties Indicated a 
shift from the old policy of one big reservation to a policy 
of concentrating tribes away from the main lines of travel and 
centers of settlement.
To deal with the rapidly increasing number of treaty 
Indians, the Indian Bureau added many new agencies and sub­
agencies. but the scope of operations soon became so large and 
contacts between frontiersmen and natives so frequent that wars
Schmeckebier, op. cit., lj-3-ljlj.o 
^0CIA, 18^6, 20.
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and serious conflicts could not be prevented. The "Grattan 
Massacre" (l851p); the Klickitat, Yakima and Rogue River wars 
(1855-1858) and the Apache campaigns of the Fifties were but 
a few of the hostilities which developed,Meanwhile, Congress 
was preoccupied with a multiplicity of problems related to 
slavery. The noble cause of educating and civilizing the Indian 
was all but forgotten. Impressed by how little was done to 
promote the welfare of the red men after I81j.2, one authority 
states, "For over a quarter of a century, or until the be­
ginning of Grant's administration, there was practically no 
contribution to the betterment of Indian relations on the part 
of either the executive or legislative branches of the govern­
ment
INDIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Indian affairs were in a particularly unsettled state 
during the Civil War, Shortly after the firing on Fort Sumter, 
Confederate leaders pressured and cajoled many tribes west of 
Arkansas and Missouri into severing relations with Washington.
Some of the Indian nations, including the civilized Creeks,
Choctaws and Chickasaws, gave military aid to the seceded states,^ 
Secretary of the Interior John P, Usher felt that these develop­
ments were to be expected. In his annual report for 1861
£9see, for example, Dunn, 0£, cit.. 167-215, 3IO-3I4.I.
^°Schmeckebier, ojd. cit.. if2-1^ 3,
6lSI (P), 1865, 318.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 0
he wrote:
Cut off from all Intercourse with loyal citizens; sur­
rounded by emissaries from the rebels, who represented that 
the government of the United States wa3 destroyed, and who 
promised that the rebel government would assume the obli­
gations of the United States and pay their annuities; 
assailed by threats of violence, and seeing around them 
no evidence of the power of the United States to protect 
them, it is not surprising that their loyalty was unable 
to resist such influences.62
Unusual difficulties were reported in remote parts of 
the Indian country, Kiowas and Comanches imperiled emigra­
tion between the Upper Arkansas and Texas, and Apaches and Nava- 
joes created havoc in the Southwest,^3 In the far Northwest 
and on the Northern Plains miners, farmers and freighters were 
attacked by renegades. Union spokesmen generally attributed 
these troubles to the absence of an effective military de­
terrent and the conspiracy of ”disloyal persons,
One of the most shocking wartime uprisings occurred in 
southern Minnesota, What began as an isolated incident became 
a bloody massacre in which six hundred and forty-four citizens 
were killed. On August 17, four intoxicated Sioux killed five 
whites some distance from their agency. Fearing reprisal, some 
of the Sioux fled westward, while others under Little Crow in­
discriminately murdered white neighbors and destroyed homesteads. 
The town of New Ulm was devastated and Fort Ridgley besieged
62CIA; 1861, 3-1;.
61■'An especially active campaign was in progress in New 
Mexico Territory between 1662 and 1865* Col, Kit Carson per­
sonally participated in over one hundred battles and helped to 
force thousands of Navajoes and Mescaleros onto Bosque Redondo 
Reservation on the Pecos River. (Sen. Rot, No. 156. 39th Cong., 
2 sess. (Serial 1279), 1867, 98-2lST.
^CIA, 1861-1865. passim.
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before General Hs H. Sibley’s troops subdued the rampaging 
warriors.^
The outbreak had drastic consequences for the Sioux and 
other tribes of Minnesota. The public was indignant and many 
openly advocated extermination of the natives. Even the Sioux 
agent declared it was time for "force and hard blows," not 
"moral suasion, sugar plums and the like."^ But when three 
hundred Sioux were court-martialed and sentenced to die,
Commissioner Dole and others protested v i g o r o u s l y P r e s i d e n t  
Lincoln responded by pardoning all but thirty-nine who, with 
one exception, were sent to the gallows at Mankato on December 26,
1 862.^  Later, not only the Sioux, but the Chippewas and peace­
able Winnebagoes were expelled from the state. In addition, the
military launched a series of expeditions into Dakota Territory
6<5to teach the red men that they could not defy the government. 7
The Sioux Massacre of 1862 was the extreme instance of 
Indian hostility during the period 1861-1865. Those who later 
argued for military control and a coercive Indian policy often 
cited this affair as "proof" that ,the Indians were irredeem­
able savages who could not be trusted to comply with peace treaties.
65
See CIA, 1862, 13-21, 59-68. For a fuller discussion 




Fdchardson, 0£. cit.. VI, ll4l}.-lij.5. One of the Indians 
died before the execution. (Oehler, oj>. cit.. 221)
^CIA. 1865, 210; Sen. Rpt. No. 156. 39th Cong., 2 sess. 
(Serial 1279), 1867, 363.
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Toward the end of the Civil War, another "massacre" in South­
eastern Colorado Territory gave the post-war advocates of civil 
control and conciliation an equally potent point of argument.
In I86I4. the beginning of construction on the Union Paci­
fic Railroad made federal officials especially conscious of the 
necessity of placating hostile tribes of the Central Plains. 
Secretary Usher proposed to end administrative and commercial
relations along the rail and mail routes and commit all Indians
70off specified reservations to the Army for punishment. 1 The 
military, however, was too undermanned to adequately protect 
transportation and settlements without trying to restrict rest­
less bands to limited reservations.
That spring and summer Arapaho and Cheyenne renegades 
left Sand Creek Reserve in Colorado and preyed upon trains and 
homesteads along the Platte as far east as the Blue River. In 
September, after unsuccessful pleas for military relief, Gover­
nor John Evans of Colorado obtained permission to organize a 
regiment of hundred-day v o l u n t e e r s E v a n s  then notified the 
tribes under his jurisdiction to move to the vicinity of the 
nearest military po3t or suffer the consequences. Complying 
with thi3 order, about five hundred Cheyennes under Black Kettle
and over six hundred Arapahoes under Little Raven encamped near 
72Port Lyon.
70SI cited in CIA, 1861|, 1-2.
7^Sen. Rpt. No. 156, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Ser. 1279), 
1867, 83-3^7
72
Various estimates of the Indians’ losses were given 
by eye-witnesses. See Ibid., 26ff.
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Early on November 29, Col. John M, Chivington, a Methodist 
minister- turned commander of the Colorado militia, led a bloody 
surprise attack on Black Kettle’s camp on Sand Creek. His nine 
hundred volunteers cornered and slaughtered about four hundred 
and fifty Indian men, women and children.7-^ The red men were 
killed In a barbarous manner remembered in infamy as the "Chiving- 
ton p r o c e s s . T h e  Commander of Fort Lyon later stated, "...the 
most fearful atrocities were committed that was ever heard of; 
women and children were killed and scalped, children shot at 
their mother’s breast, and all the bodies mutilated in the most 
hor-r-ible manner*^
Both congressional and military Investigations condemned 
Chivington for the indiscriminate massacre. Some army officers 
a minority, insisted that Black Kettle’s band was technically 
at war, having recently scalped and plundered settlers, and 
deserved to be dealt with In Indian fashion. Chivington’s 
critics, however, contended that the Cheyennes, even if guilty 
of crimes —  and most doubted this —  had voluntarily surrendered 
and were acting in good faith under a flag of truce when the 
slaughter took place. This example of military excess and bru­
tality was repeatedly cited by reformers, philanthropists and 
friends of the Indian who believed the Army’s "solution" to the 
Indian question to be extermination. But this was no more true 
than the allegations of Indian-haters about the Minnesota Sioux.
73Ibid., 82, 9 2.
7^ Ibid., 63.
7^See Dunn, 0£. cit.. 3lj.2-382.
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D. N. Cooley. It took both new officers some time to get acquainted 
with their duties. 79
Some of the difficulties confronting the Indian service 
in 1865 have already been noted. Many tribes were disregard­
ing treaties, threatening communication and emigration, carrying 
on depredations and committing acts of violence. These activi­
ties, although generally traceable to bad faith and aggravation 
by white men, had to be suppressed. Other tribes were making un­
satisfactory progress toward the agricultural and pastoral pur­
suits which were considered fundamental to civilization. Even 
under ideal circumstances —  with diligent and undivided efforts 
by talented and conscientious men, encouraged and supported by 
the general public. Congress and other branches of government -- 
these and related problems defied easy solution.
There were many obstacles. In the first place, there 
were physical and administrative problems in supervising thou­
sands of diverse Indians at extensive reservations far from 
sources of supply, lines of communication, agencies of law and 
order, and the comforts of civilised life. Secondly, there were 
often discouraging or evil influences to contend with: patron-
age-mongers; underpaid, inexperienced, incompetent or dishonest 
agents; unethical contractors; selfish settlers and miners; vi­
tuperative editors; critical and often uncooperative soldiers; 
over-zealous reformers and humanitarians and economy-minded 
congressmen. Furthermore, most agencies were set upon by predatory
79CIA, 1865, 1*
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whiskey-peddlera, gun-runners, traders, hunters, thieves, gam - 
tilers, wenchers and speculators. Small wonder that Commissioner 
Cooley, even with bis limited experience, was able to propose a 
long list of reforms and laws needed to improve the administra­
tion of Indian affairs.®0
While these difficulties of the civil department were 
formidable, military leaders probably believed their situation 
more perplexing. The mighty force which defeated the Confederacy 
was rapidly being demobilized. By November 15, 1865, eighty per 
cent of the over one million volunteers in uniform the previous 
May were back in civilian life.®^ A year later the remnant 
numbered less than fifty-five thousand, with fewer than half 
that number available for field duty. It was a ’'skeleton” army 
which manned the one hundred and thirty-four posts in the South
Op
and more than eighty forts and camps in the sprawling West.
Initially the post-war Army, headed by General-in-Chief 
Grant, was divided into five divisions and nineteen departments. 
Three divisions included trans-Mississippi Indian country. The 
Division of the Mississippi under Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, In­
cluded the vast Department of the Missouri, commanded by Maj.Gen. 
John Pope and comprised of three Upper Mississippi Valley states,
8oibid:; l-i*.
8lsw (p), 1865, 561, 563.
8^William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States 
Army (New York, 1921jJ, 301; T.H.S. Hamersley, Complete Regu­
lar Army Register of the United States: (1779-1879) (Washing­
ton,"IMo), 122-162.
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Kansas and the territories of Colorado, Utah, Nebraska, Dakota,
New Mexico and Montana. The Division of the Gulf, commanded by 
Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan, included the Department of Texas, or 
State of Texas. Finally, the Division of the Pacific, headed 
by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, was divided into the Department 
of the Columbia, commanded by Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele and 
made up of the State of Oregon and territories of Washington 
and Idaho, and Department of California, commanded by Maj. Gen. 
Irwin McDowell and comprised of the states of California and 
Nevada and Arizona Territory.®3
In the first months after Appomattox, General Grant was 
preoccupied with the occupation of the South and Army reorgani­
zation. Admitting his ignorance of Indian affairs, he gave 
broad discretionary powers tc his western commanders.®^- In some 
cases division commanders also gave subordinates much latitude
in dealing with the Indians. For instance, General Sherman,
85though well acquainted with the West and untamed Indians, 
allowed General Pope and the latter’s district commanders to 
proceed with planned expeditions along the vital Missouri River,
O/
Platte River valley, Smoky Hill and Santa Fe routes. Perhaps 
these ambitious field commanders at times acted like nleashed
83SW (p), 1865, 528-529.
®^Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant to Maj. C-en. W. T, Sherman, Janu­
ary 15, 1867, Letters Sent, Commanding General, NA, RG 108.
These records are hereafter cited as C.G.L.S,
®^Athearn, op. cit., xii-xiv.
O /
Sherman to Gen. John A. Rawlins, August 25, 1865, Letters 
and Telegrams Sent, Military Division of the Mississippi, NA.
RG, 98.
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hounds, straining to break away for the hunt,” as one author
4  4- V \ » » 4 "  T . < A Y i a  a  a » » 4 »  n  ^  r>*l t t  y *  r \ ^  rv w a  A w 4 - * k * w > _^/uuu j.w ^  u u u  v u v  ji nvJ> v  v o x  v a  j u(y v v x  ^ u v  m i x u u  a w \ / u v  o a  w v x  a
minuting the hostiles, as some peace associations alleged.®^
Like the Indian Bureau, the post-war Army of the West
was beset by a host of internal and external problems. Officers 
were frustrated by the usual dissensions between commands and
echelons units were undermanned and over-ranked and troops were
88underpaid. Also, the well-armed, hard-fighting, elusive red
men proved fearsome foes in their own environment. Nature added
obstacles in the form of mountainous and desertous terrain,
great distances which slowed communication and supply and extremes
89
in temperature and weather. Moreover, soldiers were harassed 
by both the enemies and friends of the Indian. The former, 
especially frontier settlers, agitated for more aggressive 
action, sounded false alarms, misrepresented incidents, offi­
cial reports and public statements, trespassed on reservations 
and engaged in illegal trade with the tribes. The latter seemed
to apologize for everything the Indians did and likewise mis-
90
stated military views. Army operations, like the Indian ser­
vice, were repeatedly impaired by congressional attempts to
91further reduce the Army and cut appropriations. Finally, as
^Athearn, ££• £!£•» 28.
®®Leonard D. White, The Republican Era: 1869-1901 (New 
York, 1958). lij.0; Gance, op. cit,, Downey, op. cit.,
19-26. ' ---
897Ganoe, op. cit., 352; Athearn, o d . cit., 15; Downey, op. 
cit., 30-31.
90Athearn, og. cit., 29-32; Downey, ojo. cit., 31,
^Athearn, ag. cit., 15-16; White, og. cit., 13I4..
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already indicated, the frontier force was handicapped and em­
barrassed by having only partial jurisdiction over Indian affairs.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Earlier, attention was invited to Secretary Harlan’s 
letter of June 22, 1865, to Commissioner Dole. Harlan went on 
to instruct Dole to proceed "with all convenient dispatch" to 
Dakota, Idaho, Montana and Colorado territories to negotiate 
new treaties with various tribes. The Indians were to consent 
to move to out-cf-the-way reservations and there support them­
selves by civilized means. There was no alternative,^
Commissioner Dole had often advocated such treaties in 
the interest of "humanity, economy and efficiency," but at this 
moment he felt too busy to go west. Besides, he replied, there 
was no money to buy presents for negotiations and no "new 
general policy" ought to be adopted until a congressional com­
mittee, now in Indian country, issued its report. Meanwhile, 
let the territorial governors do what they could to extinguish 
Indian titles,^3
The congressional committee mentioned by Dole was a 
joint committee appointed in March, after a heated debate over 
Indian policy. Headed by Senator J. Rs Doolittle of Wisconsin, 
this group was assigned to study the condition of the tribes,
^Harlan to Dole, June 22, 1865, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 75.
93Acting Commissioner Charles E. Mix to Secretary of the 
Interior J« P. Usher, January 21, 1865 and Dole to Harlan, July 6, 
1865, Office of Indian Affairs, Report Book No. lip, NA,RG 75. 
Hereafter these records are cited I.O.R.B.
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giving particular attention to their treatment by civil and 
military authorities. Of special interest to Congress were 
the circumstances of the Chivington affair and the business
Oil
procedures of the Indian Bureau, ^ Some findings were released 
in 1865, but the full report was not to be published until 1867o 
In the meantime, the civil and military branches got 
into a lively dispute over what tactics to use toward the roving 
Indians of the plains. While politicians were counseling with 
various tribes and territorial officials were preparing for 
peace talks, military expeditions were seeking to overawe and 
punish some of the same Indians, With such cross-purposes and 
contradictory methods, confusion and misunderstanding was al­
most inevitable.
One of the most controversial situations developed in 
Dakota Territory, In March, Governor Newton Edmunds notified 
Commissioner Dole that he was anxious to utilize $20,000 Con­
gress appropriated for peace negotiations with the hostile 
Sioux, An early peace, he declared, was of ”pararaount impor­
tance” for two reasons. In the first place, road-building 
crews hoped to complete trails through Sioux country during 
the summer. Secondly, an end to the expenditure of millions 
for military campaigns was long overdue,^5
A month later Dole approved Edmunds’ treaty plans, ”The
^ 1 3  Stat. i., 572; Dole to Indian Superintendents and 
Agents, March 13, 1865, Office of Indian Affairs Letter Book 
No, 76, NA RG 75* Hereafter these records are cited I,0,L.B.
^CIA, 1865, 191-192,
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valley of the Platte river, and all the country south," he ad-
monished, "must be entirely abandoned by the Indians with whom
you treat*" Agent W. A. Burleigh had authority to purchase
flour, bread and presents to attract the Indians, A final note,
though. If negotiations were to succeed, cordial cooperation
by the military authorities of the northwestern department was 
96essential.
But the Army officers were not ready to cooperate.
Angrily, Agent Burleigh on May 9 informed Senator Ben Wade of
Ohio that district commander Alfred Sully would "neither assist
nor permit" negotiations with the Sioux and allied bands. The
military authorities, he added profanely,
,,,appear determined that this grand farce.,,this grossest 
Imposition and damndest swindle that was ever practiced 
upon any government or people, shall not be brought to a 
close, not withstanding the Congress of the U.S., has de­
clared it shall be done if possible by peaceable means and 
the interests of our Territory demand it,97
Perhaps Wade could persuade the President to get rid of Sully, 
Next day the department commander, General John Pope, in 
a letter to Governor Edmunds, declared his opposition to nego­
tiation with the Upper Missouri Sioux, Ee maintained that the 
Indians were at war with the United States and, like bands along 
the Platte, were committing depredations and murders. Generals 
Conner and Sully had orders to send cavalry against the outlaw 
Indians north and west of the Black Hills this summer, "When
96Ibld,. 192-193.
97
W, A. Burleigh to Senator Ben Wade, May 9, 1865>, Letters 
Received, Department of Interior, NA, RG 75. Hereafter these 
records are cited D,I,L,R.
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they signify a desire for peace,” Pope concluded, ”it will be
_.q8
tisie enough for the Indian Department to act*
Soon the feud was discussed in the cabinet. Secretary 
Harlan reminded Secretary Stanton that Congress had empowered 
Governor Edmunds to conciliate Indians of his territory. Thou­
sands of tribesmen were reported gathering for peace parleys 
and a conflict of action must be avoided. ”lt is," stressed 
Harlan, ”of the highest importance that the civil and military 
authorities should alike conform to the policy adopted in re­
lation to the Indian tribes.
But differences persisted. On June llj. General Pope, in 
a letter to General Grant, bitterly criticized the treaty-making 
policy. The Indian Office, he said, had followed the "unvary­
ing practice" of briijing savages to cease hostilities. Treaties 
of this sort were worthless. "It is a common saying with the 
Sioux," he complained, "that, whenever they are poor and need 
powder and lead, they have only to go down to the Overland route 
and murder a few white men, and they will have a treaty to 
supply their wants." If the Army treated with these extortion­
ers, it would be on the basis of peace or war alone «« no 
annuities or other gifts. Unfortunately, though, soldiers not 
only had to yield to the peacemakers, but were invariably blamed 
for every treaty violation. "Either the War or the Interior De­
partment should have the sole management of Indian Affairs,"
- —
Maj. Gen. John Pope to Governor Newton Edmunds, May 10, 
186^, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
99
Harlan to Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, May 29, 1865, 
Record of Letters Sent, Department of Interior, NA, RG 75, Here­
after these records are cited D.I.L.S.
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Pope demanded* "This divided jurisdiction tends to nothing but
» — — m
Although he usually restricted grievances to military 
channels, General Pope a few days later corresponded with Secre­
tary Harlan. To prove he had the Indians’ interests at heart, 
the outspoken general enclosed copies of some of his earlier 
statements on Indian policy. His thesis was that the Indians, 
abused by the constant encroachment of frontiersmen, should be 
moved to the rear of settlement and taught to live like white 
men*^^- For the present, though, the problem was more specific. 
Admitting that inter-departmental differences were "not at all
surprising," Pope called for an end to the public vilification
102and abuse of Army officers by Indian service personnel.
Another western commander, Maj. Gen. Grenville -M. Dodge, 
corresponded with the Secretary of the Interior on civil- 
military relations. Late in June, Dodge complained to Harlan 
that the Doolittle committee was trying to prevent him from 
punishing marauders from the Southern Superintendency. While 
rejecting the Chivington method, he was convinced that no lasting
103peace could be achieved until these warriors were soundly whipped.
The Increasing evidence of civil-military antipathy over
^-®®Pope to Grant, June llj., 1865* I.O.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 75.
^•^^Pope to Stanton, February, l861|, D.I.L.R., NA, RG 75.
102
Pope to Harlan, June 19, 1865, D.I.L.R., War Depart­
ment, Indian Division, NA, RG 75.
10^Maj. Gen. G.M. Dodge to Harlan, June 22, 1865, D.I.L.R., 
Misc, NA, RG, 75.
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Indian affairs eventually prompted the Interior Department to 
clarify its position vis-a-vis the War Department, to clear the 
way for better relations. Secretary Harlan first communicated 
with Pope, In a long message, dated July 6 , he explained that 
rtuncbaritable strictures” against the military were without 
Msanetion or approval”; that treaties were laws no department 
could disregard; that, when practicable, the Indians would be 
removed from the frontier as suggested; and that, in selecting 
reservations, Interior officers would henceforth take advantage 
of the ”great knowledge” of military commanders In the West,
Then, summarizing the Inter-departmental understanding he pro­
posed, Harlan announced that in the future Indian officials 
would accept the policy of the War Department with respect to 
the red men at war and expect the military to support their 
policy regarding those at. peace.
Five days later, In a memorandum to bis new Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, D, N, Cooley, Secretary Harlan enlarged upon
105
this basis for relations with the War Department, On July 17, 
Cooley sent a circular to all Indian superintendents and agents, 
directing them to accept military authority over all hostile 
Indians and to follow normal procedures with the peaceable tribes­
men, No goods, money or property were to be distributed and no 
trade or intercourse permitted with the hostiles without per­
mission from the Army, Finally, if troops Interfered with or
^°^Harlan to Pope, July 6, 1865, D.I.L.S., NA, RG 75.
^■^Harlan to Commissioner D. N. Cooley, July 11, 1865,
I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
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failed to properly support civil policy toward peaceable Indians, 
the matter was to be referred to the department but not dis­
cussed in tbe press,
Unfortunately, this directive left many questions un­
answered and was never strictly enforced. In particular, it was 
vague about how "hostility" was to be determined and who was 
to make the determination. It also failed to explain when mili­
tary control was to begin and end, how renegades living among 
peaceable Indians were to be treated, or what should be done with 
agency Indians aiding warlike brethren. Nor was It clear how and 
to what extent soldiers were expected tp assist civilian au­
thorities, Problems of this nature were to confuse Indian 
relations for many years.
For the time being, though, War-Interior relations seemed 
to improve. In the late summer and fall Army officers and civil­
ians worked together to negotiate treaties and preliminary agree­
ments with various Upper Missouri, Upper Arkansas and southwestern 
tribes. Having stalled off the treaty-makers long enough for his 
commanders to carry out planned expeditions, General Pope notified 
Secretary Harlan on August 16 that a peace commission might be 
sent to Fort Rice to await further word from Maj, Gen, Alfred 
Sully, Perhaps there was still time to council with the Siouxs 
and Cheyennes this autumn. If not, arrangements could be made 
to meet again in the spring.10^
^■®^CIA, l865> 202-203, $ h - 3 »  Note that conflicting dates 
are assigned to the circular,
10^Pope to Harlan, August 16, 1865, D.I.L.S., NA, RG 75,
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General Sully was still in the field in August, having 
a discouraging campaign. For weeks his troops hunted hostiles 
before locating their main camp about sixty miles south of 
Fort Berthold. But with only eight or nine hundred men to fight 
an estimated ten thousand warriors, he decided not to risk an 
attack —  failure would greatly strengthen the war party.
In mid-September, with the Northwest Expedition garri­
soned at Fort Sully, General Sully reflected upon past and future 
Indian policy in a report to department headquarters. The ex­
peditions of the past three years, he contended, had had a 
salutary effect upon the bad Indians- It was now too late In 
the season for effective negotiations, although perhaps two- 
thirds of the hostiles would "touch the pen" to get presents.
"But what would such a treaty be worth?" he queried. At the same 
time, it was no longer practical to try to track down scattered 
bands of hostiles with large bodies of soldiers. Hereafter the 
government should give food to the friendly Indians, small gifts 
to the cooperative headmen and rewards to the red men who cap­
tured hostiles or brought In their scalps. -^09
The peacemakers nevertheless proceeded with their parleys. 
In October a six-member commission, headed by Governor Edmunds, 
negotiated treaties with most of the Sioux b a n d s , T h e  terms,
lo8Ibid., 20!j.-209,
109Ibid.. 209-211,
^ 9The other commissioners were Edward B. Taylor, Henry 
W. Reed, Orrin Guernsey, and Generals S, R. Curtis and Henry 
H, Sibley.
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however, were not as conclusive as hoped. The Minneconjous, 
for example, agreed to recognize the authority of the govern­
ment, cease hostilities against whites and other Indians, pre­
vent crimes by other bands and stay away from overland routes 
through their country. But their "unmistakable tokens of dissent" 
dissuaded the negotiators from pressing the issues of farming 
and civilized pursuits. These subjects and discussions with 
other bands were deferred until the following May0^ ^
That same month other treaties were signed with certain
tribes in the Kansas and Upper Arkansas vicinity. There had been
civil-military misunderstandings in that region too. In May,
for example, Superintendent Jesse Leavenworth was informed that
General James H, Ford planned to make war on hostile bands,
following orders*to "pay no attention to any peace movements
w112
or propositions, Leavenworth insisted he had no thought
of interfering with Ford's expedition against the Kiowas, who 
"needed to feel the strong arm of the government," But most 
Comanches and Arapahoes had been well behaved and must not be 
harmed. 113
Later in May Senator Doolittle and some of his fellow 
investigators entered the discussion of policy toward the 
Indians threatening the New Mexico routes. They asked Presi­
dent Johnson to call off military operations and authorize peace 
discussions with the Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes and Arapa­
hoes, It would take, they estimated, t9n thousand troops and
1 U CIA, 1865, 538, 5*2.
112Ibid„ 389-390,
113Ibid., 390-391.
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forty million dollars to achieve peace by f o r c e , T h e i r  re­
quest was granted. In August Superintendent Leavenworth and 
Maj. Gen, John B. Sanborn, commander of the District of the 
Upper Arkansas, procured pledges from several tribal headmen to 
’’cease all acts of violence and injury” and meet representa­
tives of the government in October to establish a "perpetual 
peace.
On October llj. Cheyenne and Arapaho leaders signed a 
treaty with a commission beaded by General S a n b o r n . T h e s e  
tribes, the commission reported, had suffered "most gross and 
wanton outrages" at the hands of the military in the Cbiving- 
ton massacre. In view of past injustices, their sacrifice of 
valuable mineral lands, the importance of uninterrupted over­
land travel and the cost of military action, these Indians were 
promised substantial annuities,11*^
Presently similar negotiations were concluded with the 
Eastern Apaches, Comanches and Kiowas. The Apaches were con­
federated with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, receiving the same
n d
terms as the latter. A "generous course" was also followed 
with the more troublesome Comanches and Kiowas because, the com­
mission rationalized, peace was absolutely essential in their
country and "costly hostilities" could not bring about that re- 
119suit. Finally, informal talks were held with representatives
llii. 119
Ibid., 392. Ibid., 393-396
"^^The commission included James Steele, William S. Harney, 
Kit Carson, William W. Bent, Thomas Murphy and J. H. Leavenworth.
^^CIA, 1869, 919-916. The proceedings are reported on 
pages 917 to 527.
ll8ibid., 527-928 119ibid., 527-53 9.
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of the Wichita and Osage bands, with the commissioners advising
120them to consolidate and settle south of the Arkansas River,
Still a third commission, appointed about the same time
as the others and headed by Commissioner Cooley, met with several
tribes from Kansas and the Southern Plains at Port Smith, Ar- 
"121kansas, The Indians involved —  Creeks, Ogages, Quapaws,
Senecas, Shawnees, Cherokees, Seminoles, Wyandotts, Chicka- 
saws and Choctaws —  were not actively hostile and were ready 
to convene in September, The chief purpose of the talks was 
the restoration of relations severed during the Civil War, This 
was accomplished through several agreements repudiating con­
federate treaties and reaffirming obligations to the United 
122
States, Through "preliminary arrangements" these tribes
also abolished slavery and ceded lands outside of the area 
which was formally organized as Indian Territory in 1866,
By the time that the peace commissioners had completed 
negotiations with various plains and western tribes, the year 
was drawing to a close. Candid observers now realized that a
120Ibid., 5 3 6,
121
See the instructions to the commission In Harlan to 
Commissioners, August 16, 1865, Letters Sent, Indian Division, 
Department of Interior, NA, RG lj.8,
122
Several of the tribes protested against the government's 
nullification of former treaty commitments during the Civil War, 
Their "disloyalty," they maintained, was involuntary. In addi­
tion some of the tribal leaders expressed dissatisfaction regard­
ing the commission's condemnation and con-reeognition of wartime 
leaders such as the Cherokees' John Ross,
123
Schmeckebier, op, cit.. 101; Harlan to Commissioners, 
August 16, 1865, Letters Sent, Indian Division, Department of 
Interior, NA, RG 1*8; CIA, 1865, 296-353.
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permanent solution to the Indian question was not in the im­
mediate offing. While talking of a new and vigorous approach, 
federal officials had resorted to the traditional expedients -- 
new treaties and military expeditions. Neither measure was con­
clusive, but borrowed time for the policy-makers. Tacitly, the 
government was following Commissioner Dole’s advice to delay any 
new general policy until the Doolittle Committee completed its 
study of Indian affairs
Still, the leaders of both the Interior and War depart­
ments cited evidences of progress and expressed optimism to­
ward an improvement of relations with the nation’s wards. The 
Army, in the process of being reorganized and redeployed, served 
notice to hostile bands that it was determined to protect prin­
cipal settlements and lines of travel. At the same time, 
military strategists learned important lessons in the tech­
niques of Indian warfare and laid plans for future campaigns. 
General Sherman, for example, proposed to strengthen such out­
posts as Ports Smith, Riley, Kearney and Pierre by colonizing 
them with settlers to produce subsistence for sustained field 
operations*^-*
Spokesmen for the Interior Department claimed ’’gratifying 
progress” in reforming agency Indians, despite numerous trials
■^^Dole to Harlan, July 6 , l86£, I.O.R.B., No. 11+, NA,
RG 75*
12tr
-'Sherman visited Omaha and Wyandotte, Kansas, in the 
fall and was much impressed with the potential of railroad 
construction at these points for aiding military operations. 
(Athearn, o£. cit., 18-21}.).
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and disturbances. The recent peace talks, they maintained, 
were a victory, not only for humanity and Christianity, but for 
common sense and economy. For it was impracticable to exter­
minate the whole Indian race, and the cost of maintaining a regi­
ment at war with the Indians was estimated at two million a 
year,^2*^ Still another hopeful development was the informal 
arrangement with the Army regarding jurisdiction over the tribes.
There were indications, however, that inter-departmental 
differences would continue to encumber Indian affairs. Many 
military officers had no faith in treaties with hostile tribes. 
One colonel told the editor of the Chicago Tribune that such 
agreements would last only until ”the grand processions of treaty
1 OR
makers shall have reached Washington.” Senator Samuel C. Pom­
eroy of Kansas agreed. Late in the year be introduced a reso­
lution stating,
...the mild, conciliatory, and even magnanimous conduct 
of our government towards these savages not being under­
stood or appreciated by them, but only construed to be 
weakness and cowardice, should now be followed by the most 
vigorous and measures until those hostile tribes
are effectually punished for their crimes, and whipped into 
a wholesome restraint and submission to the authority of 
the United States.
Beyond the question of conquering or negotiating with
126SI (p), 1865, 311.
12?Ibide, 312-313*
■^2wLt. Col. James F, Tappan to Harlan, September 23, 1865. 
D.I.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
129
Sen. Miscellaneous Document. No. 1 *  39tb Cong., 1 sess. 
(Serial 1239), loo5, 1. fiereafter these documents are cited 
Sen, Misc. Doc.
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warlike red men, contention between the civil and military de­
partments was evident in discussions of whether to restore the 
Indian Bureau to the War Department, In a circular sent to 
Army and Indian authorities in May, 1865 > Senator Doolittle in­
quired, "Under what department of the government, the War Depart­
ment or the Interior, should the Bureau of Indian Affairs be 
placed, to secure the best and most economical administration 
of it?"^30 Every Army officer who replied was in favor of trans­
ferring the Indian Office to the War Department, But the civil­
ians, with few exceptions, opposed t r a n s f e r , T h i s  division 
of opinion was to be the basis for repeated disputes over the 
control of Indian affairs, "There have been and must continue 
to be conflicts between commanding officers of Posts, and of ex­
peditions and Indian Agents, traders etc.," General Sherman 
accurately predicted in November,^ 2
Thus, before the year was out, there were prospects of 
a long and wearisome controversy over both the Indian question 
and Indian administration. The Johnson administration, which 
had declared 1865 an "auspicious and fitting time" to settle 
these issues, was neither the first nor the last to make such 
announcements without definite results. Part of the explanation 
for the persistence of these problems can be found in the dnstable 
and inconsistent leadership of the War and Interior departments,
~*~^ S e n , Rot, No, 156, 39th Gong,, 2 sess, (Serial 1279), 
1867, U 2 M S * .  —
131
J  The civilians favoring transfer included Governor Evans 
of Colorado, two former agents and a native of New Mexico,
(Ibid., 1*29-1*92).
^"^Sherman to Grant, November 6, 1865, William T, Sherman 
Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Vol. 1 7,
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CHAPTER TWO
LEADERSHIP OF THE INTERIOR AND WAR DEPARTMENTS, 1865-1887
Comprehensively speaking, it may be said 
that hitherto the Indian Bureau has bribed them 
/the Indiana/into temporary peace, while the War 
Department has desired to frighten them into 
permanent quiet; and between the two they have 
been nearly exterminated.
(The Nation. January 25, 1865)
"It is manifest that any branch of the public service 
cannot be efficiently and economically managed by two depart­
ments," said Secretary of War John M. Schofield with reference 
to the administration of Indian affairs in 1868,^ This opinion 
was often reiterated by officials of the Interior and War Depart­
ments in the period 1865 to 188?. But their agreement seldom 
exceeded the notion that two-headed government of the Indians 
was undesirable. Like competitors for a coveted prize, spokes­
men of each branch demanded full control and criticized the 
policies and methods of the other. Meanwhile, the Indians won­
dered who really spoke for the Great Father in Washington.
To understand the setting of the debate over management 
of the nation's wards, it is necessary to know something of the 
administrative machinery and problems and, especially, the lead­
ers of the rival branches of government. In some respects,
XSW, 1868, XVII.
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the two departments contended with common external influences 
and internal problems. Their personnel and activities were 
substantially affected by industrialization, civil service 
reform and political fragmentation —  developments of the 
publican Era” only indirectly related to Indian policy. Organic 
disunity, pressure from special interest groups and inadequate 
funds, facilities and qualified employees hampered the opera­
tions of both branches. In addition, each department had a rapid 
turnover in leadership. The following discussion will include 
a brief comment on departmental organization and special refer­
ence to the key policy-makers, the secretaries, Commissioners 
of Indian Affairs and Generals-in-Chief.
THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT AND INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
The Interior Department has been variously described as 
the ttDepartment of the Great Miscellany,” a ”hydra-headed raon-
p
ster," and the ”slop-bucket of administrative fragments.” 
Established to relieve the bureaucratic burdens of the Treasury, 
State, War and Navy departments, by the post-Civil War era it 
had burdens of its own. In addition to the Indian Bureau, it 
included sub-divisions responsible for land, patents, pensions, 
education, railroads, geological survey, census, Capital Build­
ing improvements, hospitals and institutions, territories, the 
District of Columbia and national parks.^ Although an Assistant
^White, op. clt., 175>$ Horace S. Merrill, William Freeman 
Vilas; Doctrinaire Democrat (Madison, 19^), 134®
3
White, op. clt., 176.
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Secretary and bureau chiefs aided in policy decisions and a 
chief clerk handled various office duties, the secretaries were 
unable to devote much time to any one of these heterogeneous 
obligations.
All routine administrative and policy matters concerning 
Indian affairs devolved upon the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
The commissioners, in turn, were so heavily burdened with paper­
work and responsibilities regarding treaties, trust funds, con­
tracts, schools, agency employment, annuities and so forth that 
they often complained of being overworked, under-staffed and 
underpaid,^- Reformers, notably Secretary Carl Schurz, recom­
mended that the Bureau be made a separate department. Failing 
in this, Schurz and Commissioner Ezra A, Hayt set up an exten­
sive staff of thirty to forty clerks, copyists, messengers, 
laborers and other employees assigned to administrative divisions 
for finance, accounts, land, civilization and records,^
Indian policy was usually worked out between the Secre­
tary and the Commissioner, But another central agency, the 
quasi-official Board of Indian Commissioners, attempted to 
influence their decisions, especially in the period 1869 to 
lo7U* The ten-member non-partisan, non-salaried board was es­
tablished in 1869 to "exercise joint control" with the Secre­
tary over Indian appropriations.^ Until I87I4. this group sought
"^CIA, 1865^1887, passim; Schmeckcbier, o]o. clt., 1)|)| 0 
^CIA, I878, LI-LXIV,
^16 Stat. L,, 1|0.
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to enlarge Its authority, but was opposed by the political 
appointees of the department. Then six of the Board members 
resigned, and the reconstituted organization confined its 
activities primarily to the purchase of supplies and annuities 
and inspection of agency affairs.?
Inconsistency was an unmistakable feature of federal 
relations with the tribes in the twenty-two year period under 
examination. To a large extent this is explained by frequent 
changes in administration, for no fewer than ten different 
secretaries and twelve commissioners held office in that time. 
While President Cleveland favored ho ”fixed and unyielding 
plan of action, most students of Indian policy have criti­
cized the ’’convenient makeshifts for tiding over temporary 
difficulties.”9
Of the secretaries who served between the Grant and 
McKinley administrations, one author states:
With the exception of Columbus Delano (1870-75)» 
they were men of character and high integrity, although 
not particularly successful executives. All were caught 
in the /"department/ machine and none seemed to sur­
mount it. The post normally went to a westerner...
Most of the Secretaries had studied and practiced law.,. 
Several were bankers or interested in railroads and in­
vestment. Almost all were active in politics and public
?White, 02,a cites 189-1911 Annual Report of the Board of 
Indian Commissioners (Washington. l&7ij.), lj!. Hereafter the latter 
source is cited BIC. The six members resigned in l87l| out of 
protest against Secretary Columbus Delano’s disregard for their 
recommendations and a proposed removal of their headquarters 
from New York to Washington. The Board and lower echelons of 
the Indian service are discussed in Chapter Six.
g
Richardson, op. cit., VIII, 357.
9Ibid., 55.
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life, attending national conventions (a mark of the pro­
fessional), sitting in state legislatures and Congress, 
serving as governors,
This analysis might be extended to include the two secretaries 
who served under President Johnson. Only one of the "western­
ers," though, came from a state as far west as Nebraska. 
Furthermore, prior to 1887, all but one were Republicans, and, 
with regard to relations with the War Department, half had seen 
military duty.1^
The twelve commissioners, mostly "indifferent” leaders, 
also had varied backgrounds. Their occupations included the 
ministry, civil engineering, teaching, farming, banking and the 
legal profession. A few had Army experience, only two or 
three were Democrats and none were from the Deep South or a 
state west of the Mississippi Valley. Several were accused of 
incompetency or graft and left office in disgrace. Finally, 
because of various personal factors, some played a greater de
facto role in the formulation and implementation of policy 
12than others,
THE SECRETARIES OF THE INTERIOR
The head of the Interior Department at the end of the 
Civil War was John P. Usher, a prominent Republican from In­
diana. After stepping up from the assistant secretaryship in 
March, 1862, Usher launched an earnest but unrewarding campaign
10White, 0£. cit., 180-181.
11Ibld.. 192.
12Pict. Am. Biog., passim.
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to obtain larger appropriations for the Indian service. In his 
annual reports, he outlined a program whereby the Indians con­
senting to withdraw from the main arteries of white expansion 
were to be given extensive reservations and liberal treatment
while those molesting emigrants and frontier residents were to
13be summarily punished, J  About a month after Lincoln's assassina­
tion, because of disagreement with President Johnson's recon­
struction plan, the Secretary submitted his resignation.*^-
Usher's successor was Senator James Harlan of Iowa, close 
friend of Lincoln and, later, father-in-law of Robert Todd 
Lincoln.*^ Experienced as a State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, lawyer, and president of Iowa Wesleyan College 
before entering politics, Harlan had a stormy fifteen-month 
administration. One of his primary aims with respect to Indian 
affairs was to achieve “unity and harmony of action" between 
the civil and military department,*^ But he soon came under 
widespread criticism. He was accused of making "spoils" 
appointments and fraudulently disposing of Indian and rail­
road lands. His drastic economy program, by which as many as 
eighty department employees lost their Jobs in a single day,
13CIA, 1864, 1-2,
^ D i c t , Am, Blpg.. XIX, 134-135; William H, Smith, History 
of the Cabinet of the United States of America (Baltimore, 1925),
454-555«
15
Raymond J, Chadwick, "Abraham Lincoln and his Friends," 
The Palimpsest, Vol. I4.I (March, I960), 161-172; William J. Peter­
sen,"^TameF^Sar lan," The Palimpsest, Vol. I4.I (March, I960), 
145-160,
^Harlan to Stanton, December 16, 1866, D.I.L.S,, Indian 
Affairs, NA, RG 75 o
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balso made e n e m i e s I n  time, Harlan also broke with Johnson 
over reconstruction* After resigning, in August, 1866, he re­
turned to the Senate as a leader of congressional reconstruc- 
18
tion*
Next to direct the department was Orville Hickman Brownii 
of Illinois, Browning had many prominent friends in Washingtoi 
and had been Johnson’s patronage advisor for his state,^9 His 
administration, which lasted until President Grant took office 
covered a period in which important efforts were made to re­
strict the tribes to limited reservations where they were suppi 
to be protected and taught to become self-sufficient farmers a]
laborers. This he called the "best, if not the only, policy
»20that can be pursued to preserve them from extinction.” His 
recommendation contributed to the formation of the well-known 
civil-military Peace Commission which negotiated with many na-
PT
tive groups in 1867 and 1868, Browning attempted to improve 
the workmanship of his office force by, among other things, 
threatening to strike from the rolls any employees found at
1 ^Petersen, "James Harlan," 158j Diet. Am. Blog.. VII, ; 
Harlan had the dubious distinction of being the Secretary who < 
missed Walt Whitman, who had been employed as a $l,600-a-year 
clerk in the Indian Bureau, Allegedly Harlan considered the c '.  
Leaves of Grass indecent, j."Walt Whitman and James Harlan." Am 
of Iowa. VI /October, 190J/, 225-227,) ’
^®3mith, op. clt.. ij.55“i|56,
19Ibid,, l+56;_Dict. Am. Blog,. Ill, 175.
20CIA, 1866, i.
^Secretary 0. H. Browning to the President, January 15, 
1867, D.I.L.S., Indian Affairs^, NA, RG 75,
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also made enemies.^ In time, Harlan also broke with Johnson 
over reconstruction. After resigning, in August, 1866, he re­
turned to the Senate as a leader of congressional reconstruc- 
18tion.
Next to direct the department was Orville Hickman Browning 
of Illinois. Browning had many prominent friends in Washington, 
and had been Johnson's patronage advisor for his state,19 His 
administration, which lasted until President Grant took office, 
covered a period in which important efforts were made to re­
strict the tribes to limited reservations where they were supposed 
to be protected and taught to become self-sufficient farmers and
laborers. This he called the "best, if not the only, policy
20that can be pursued to preserve them from extinction. His 
recommendation contributed to the formation of the well-known 
civil-military Peace Commission which negotiated with many na­
tive groups in 1867 and 1868.^1 Browning attempted to improve 
the workmanship of his office force by, among other things, 
threatening to strike from the rolls any employees found at
1 ^ Petersen, "James Harlan," 158; Diet. Am. Biog.. VII, 268. 
Harlan had the dubious distinction of being the Secretary who dis­
missed Walt Whitman, who had been employed as a $l,600-a-year 
clerk in the Indian Bureau. Allegedly Harlan considered the clerk's 
Leaves of Grass indecent. j^Walt Whitman and James Harlan," Annals 
of Jowa. Vi /October, 190J/, 225-227.) '
^83mith, op. clt., ij.55-i4-5 6.
1/Ibld.. ij.56: Diet. A m . Blog,. Ill, 175*
20CIA, 1866, i.
?T^Secretary 0. H. Browning to the President, January 15,
1867, D.I.L.S., Indian Affairs^ NA, RG 75.
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22their desks under the influence of alcohol. Throughout his 
term he remained a staunch supporter of President Johnson, de­
spite heavy criticism from Congress,2^
When Grant first entered the White House, he chose General 
Jacob D. Cox, former governor of Ohio, to fill the Interior 
post. As an organizer of Ohio’s Republican Party, and a war 
hero, Cox was a typical partisan choice. But he turned out 
to be a reformer, much to the discomfort of his party’s spoils­
men, He devised a set of competitive exams in "Arithmetic, 
History, Geography, Grammer /slc.7. Penmanship and Orthography” 
to give applicants for department positions,^ Moreover, he
refused to permit political assessments of Indian service per-
25sonnel, ^ His reforms were, to a large extent, the basis for
26
the Indian policy popularized as ’’Grant’s Peace Policy,” Cox 
was not willing, however, to let the non-political, philan­
thropic Board of Indian Commissioners dictate to the head of 
27
the department, 1 Eventually the "backstairs influences" which 
pervaded the Grant administration so hampered his administra­
tion that, on October 31» 1^70, be resigned, "The trouble was",
^Browning to Office Force, December 27, 1867, I,0,L,R., 
HA, RG 75.
23
Smith, oj>. cit., ij-56.
2 k
Secretary J, D. Cox to Commissioner, July 7 , 1870,
I,0,L,R., HA, RG 7^.
2^Smith, op. cit., Ij.56-i4.57; Diet. Am. Blog,. IV, l4.76-ij.78; 
Mary Hinsdale, A History of the President’s Cabinet (Ann Arbor. 
1911), 213.
2^See Chapter Five.
2^Cox to Felix R. Brunot, July 5, 1869, D.I.L.R., Indian 
Misc., NA, RG 75.
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Grant later argued, nthat General Cox thought the Interior De­
partment was the whole government, and that Cox was the Interior 
D e p a r t m e n t T h e  Stalwarts tried to misrepresent Coxfs
departure from office as a dismissal brought on by his mismanage-
29ment of a California mining claim.
Grant picked Columbus Delano, another Ohio Republican 
(but a Radical) and former general, to fill the vacancy left by 
Cox, Although noted for having reorganized the Bureau of In­
ternal Revenue, Delano proved an incompetent, if not dishonest, 
Secretary, During his five-year term the annual reports gave 
optimistic accounts of Indian progress under the "humane policy” 
of the government, "Industry,” the Secretary declared In 1872,
"is the great civilizer; without it no race can be permanently 
30benefited," During his administration the Indian policy placed 
emphasis upon providing adequate subsistence, protection, edu­
cational assistance and faithful administrators for the tribes,^ 
But this program was implemented so unsatisfactorily that the 
Indian service was widely censured and underwent a number of in­
tensive investigations.^ In l873» for example, the Bouse 
28Hamlin Garland, Ulysses S. Grant: his life and character 
(New York, 1 8 9 8), ip27• ""
^ S e n . Rot, No, 261, l^ Oth Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial 1362), 1869; 
HR Rpt. rip, 2it, 111 at Cong,, 2 sess, (Serial II4.6I4.), 1871; HR Rpt,
Noa 951. afjtb Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1826), 1878; See also Serap- 




See. for example, HR Rpt. No. 5)8 , 42nd Cong., 3 sess. 
(Serial 1578). 1873; HR RptT^No. 77*87 l|3rd Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 
No. 1627^ 1874; Report of the special Commission Appointed to 
Investigate the Affairs of the Red Cloud Agency. July. 1875 
(Washington, i875)• Hereafter this source will be cited RSC.
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Committee on Indian Affairs reported that "avaricious and un­
principled" persons were plundering both the Government and the 
Indians»^3 Finally, in September, 1875* amid widespread criti- 
disrtis-Dver malpractices in the letting and execution of Sioux
oil
contracts, Delano r e s i g n e d . O n e  biographer states that he was
"woefully lacking in high ideals of service or an appreciation
of the responsibility of the Department Chief. ^
In a move signifying the "tightening of the grip of the
politicians," Grant next chose Zacbariah Chandler of Michigan
36to head the department. Chandler was then Republican Party
"boss" of his state, and a man of wealth, having commercial,
banking and land speculation interests. For fourteen years he
had chaired the Senate’s "pork-barrel" dispensing Committee on 
37Commerce, Many, including military officers, were enthusias­
tic about his appointment. In a letter marked "personal,"
General Pope asserted, "We can now count upon a vigorous and 
business administration of the office especially of that portion 
yet with which we have most concern, viz. the Indian Bureau."3®
A semblance of reform was achieved. Chandler freely dismissed
33S  RPt. No. ^8, lj-2nd Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1578), 1873, 1*
^Delano to President Grant, July 20, 1875, D.I.L.S.,
NA, RG 75.
ffipjct. Am. Biog., V, 218.
-^Hinsdale, op. cit., 21ij..
3"^Wbite, op., cit.. 181; Smith, pp. clt.. 1j.58-Ij.59* 
38
Pope to Z. Chandler, December 3* 1875* Zacbariah 
Chandler Papers, Manuscripts^Division, Library of Congress.
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clerks for "dishonesty and looseness” and relieved "unsavory” 
Indian officials. He emphasized the need for excellent agency 
teachers. Still many reformers were not convinced that Chand­
ler did enough to revamp the Indian system and root out evils
39that cropped up time and again,
When President Hayes took office, in March, 1877, the 
portfolio of the Interior Department was passed to an out­
standing political reformer, Carl Schurz of Missouri,^® A Ger­
man political exile, experienced as American minister to Spain, 
commander of volunteers in the Civil War and leader of the 
Liberal Republican movement, Schurz became an energetic Secretary, 
A whole chapter might reasonably be devoted to his efforts to 
purify the Indian service and maintain civil control of the 
Indians, He fought the spoilsmen, streamlined bureaus, intro­
duced detailed regulations for the purchase and distribution of 
supplies, investigated and removed unreliable employees, pro­
moted Indian education and advocated land allotments through 
procedures later formalized in the Dawes Act of 1887,^
Secretary Schurz encountered much opposition and made
^George P, Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New 
York, 1903), II, 75? SmltHT bp. clt., U.^0-k6l: C. to. Feuss, 
Carl Schurz. Reformer (New lork, 1932), 21^ .1,
kO
Hinsdale, o£. cit., 221-222. Having solicited much 
independent backing for Hayes, Schurz was given a choice of 
the Post Office or Interior Department jobs.
^ D l c t .. Am. Blog.. XVI, i4.66-l4.7O; Smith, 0£. clt., I4.6I— 
1*63; Priest, op. cltTT68. 130, 11*2-1^3, 188; SI, lSTPlSSo, 
passim. Schurz’s role in the ultimate defeat of the transfer 
proposition was particularly significant and will be discussed 
In a later chapter.
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some embarrassing mistakes in bis zeal to reform the Indian 
policy and administration. His failure to interdict a sche­
duled removal of the peaceable Poncas from Southeastern Dakota 
to Indian Territory, for example, resulted in bitter condem­
nation by humanitarians Another time, his removal of Chief 
Clerk Samuel Galpin, who had referred to him as the "dam dutch 
secretary,” was vigorously disputed by influential persons 
Toward the end of his four year term, Secretary Schurz summarized 
his experiences in a letter of advice to President-elect James 
A.Garfield:
The Interior Department is the most dangerous branch 
of the public service. It is more exposed to corrupt 
influences and more subject to untoward accidents than 
any other. To keep it in good repute and to manage its 
business successfully requires on the part of its bead a 
thorough knowledge of its machinery, untiring work and 
sleepless vigilance. I shall never forget the trials I 
had to go through during the first period of my Adminis­
tration, and the mistakes that were made before I had 
things well in hand. It Is a constant fight with the 
sharks that surround the Indian Bureau, the General 
Land Office, the Pension Office and the Patent Office, 
and a ceaseless struggle with perplexing questions and 
situations, especially in the Indian Service. Unless the 
head of the Interior Department well understands and 
performs his full duty, your Administration will be in 
constant danger of disgrace...44-
Mindful of this admonition to choose wisely, Garfield
l.p
See Schurz Scrapbook, filed with Carl Schurz Papers, 
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Schurz later ad­
mitted that the Ponca removal was a mistake.
^Charles Ellison to Schurz, May 2, 1877, Schurz Papers, 
Former Commissioner Francis A.Valker and the president of Am­
herst, Julius H. Seelye, were among those who opposed Galpin1s 
removal. (Priest., 0£. clt.. 69*)
^Carl Schurz, Speeches. Correspondence and Political 
Papers. (New York, 1 9 1 3 8I-B2I
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appointed Samuel J. Kirkwood of Iowa as Secretary of tbe In­
terior, Kirkwood, a Republican who had served two terms as 
governor of Iowa and many years in the Senate, failed to live 
up to expectations With some insight he diagnosed the short­
comings of the government's Indian program —  false economy 
in appropriations, too little patience in the area of Indian 
labor, frequent removals or changes in the size of reserva­
tions and the absence of civil and criminal law for tbe natives,^ 
He, like other secretaries, had suggestions to make, but ad­
mitted the methods by which the Indian question was to be 
settled was "not yet fully recognized,"^-7 Unable to resist 
the "legions" of office-seekers, he selected Hiram Price of 
Iowa for Commissioner of Indian Affairs and added twenty-six 
other Iowans to the department r o l l s P r i o r  to Garfield's 
assassination, Kirkwood became only "partially acquainted" 
with his job; afterwards his tenure was too indefinite to 
warrant "distinctive policies," In fact, it was reported that 
he allowed his work to slide so much that correspondence buried 
his desk and awaited attention in adjoining r o o m s I n  February, 
1882, after thirteen months in office, the sixty-eight-year 
old Secretary handed In his resignation,
“r"Dict, Am. Blog.. X, i|.36-ij.37; Smith, 0£. clt,, lj-63.
^6SI, 1881, IV-VII.
^7Ibid,, Ill,




Ibid.. 368;Smitb, 0£, clt.. I|.63»
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Senator Henry M, Teller of Colorado, remembered as a 
leader of the "free silver" movement of 1896 and the author of 
an 1898 amendment concerning American intervention in Cuba, 
accepted President Arthur's appointment to succeed Kirkwood,
Then a Republican, Teller was the first Secretary to be se­
lected from a state west of Iowa, He had helped to defend 
Denver against Indian attack during the Civil War and advo­
cated the purchase of Indian lands,for a fraction of their 
real value,'’1 It was not surprising, therefore, that some of 
his views and policies did not coincide with those of the 
theorists of bis day. Strong measures must be taken to disarm 
the Indians, he argued. Not even Indian police could be trusted 
with long-range weapons. Moreover, allotments of land in 
severalty would be a "crime" against the Indians' savage in­
stincts, Indian education was fine if it was practical and not 
"literary education," "Heathenish" practices must be abolished. 
These and other steps he defended in the Darwinian conclusion:
Civilization and savagery cannot dwell together; 
the Indian cannot maintain himself in a savage or semi­
civilized state in competition with his white neighbor, 
and he must adopt the fwhite man's ways'or be swept 
away by the vices of savage life, intensified by contact 
with civilization. Humanity revolts at the idea of his 
destruction, yet it is far better that he should disappear 
from the face of the earth than that he a hould remain in 
his savage state to contaminate and curse those with whom 
he must necessarily eoiae in contact in the future,"52
At the beginning of Cleveland's first term, the secre­
taryship again changed hands. The new head of the Interior
51
PIct, Am. Blog,, XVIII, 362-363; Smith, op, cit,, 14.61}., 
*2SI, 1883, iii.
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was a Mississippi Democrat and ex-Confederate army officer 
with the distinctive Latin name, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus 
Lamar, Lamar had a varied background, having taught mathe­
matics, political economy, social science and law at the Uni­
versity of Mississippi, served in the House and Senate, and 
acted as Confederate envoy to Russia and Judge Advocate Gen­
eral during the Civil W ar.^ He accepted the appointment re­
luctantly -- only to "impress the country with the desire of 
the South faithfully to serve the interests of a common 
country,"^ Lamar’s ambition was to obtain a seat on the Su­
preme Court, so it was with special regret that he observed:
I eat my breakfast and dinner and supper always in
the company of some two or three eager and hungry 
applicants for office; go to bed with their importun­
ities in my ears,,,I have no time to say my prayers,,,
I expect you think that I am in a bitter mood.,,but I
am not; only in a jocose one after an engagement with 
eight office seekers before breakfast,55
With regard to Indian policy, Secretary Lamar took the 
position that the fate of the Indian race depended upon rapid 
civilization. Incorporation of the red men into the politi­
cal and social system of white society would be, he asserted, 
"the crowning glory of our Government,"^ But there were cer­
tain prerequisites. The nation’s wards must be educated, 
taught to appreciate individual land-bolding and brought under
'Diet. Am. Blog., X, 551-553; Smith, o£. cit., U6I4.-I4.65. 
■Edward Mayes, Lucius Q. C. Lamar. His Life. Times and^Edwar , 
Speeches (New York, 1896), 471e
^Ibid., l4.80-ij.8l. 
^6SI, 1886, Lj.,
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civil laws,-^ As for citizenship, the experience in the South 
should be considered, "After incorporating into our body 
politic four millions of blacks in a state of slavery and in-
II II
vesting them with citizenship and suffrage, he tioted, we need 
not strain at the gnat of 260,000 I n d i a n s . B u t  such mis­
guided zeal would do more harm than good. The "slow-moving, 
philosophical*1 Secretary maintained this somewhat conservative
point of view throughout his administration, Finally, in early
t o
1888 he got his wish —  an appointment to the Supreme Court,
THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
At the close of the Civil War the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs was William P, Dole, a little-known Illinoisan,^*0 Al­
though Dole headed the Indian Office from the beginning of 
Lincoln's first term until early July, 1865, be is not mentioned 
in standard national and state biographical sources. One may 
assume from his official reports and correspondence, however, 
that he was well-informed about the intricacies of Indian re­
lations and concerned about the welfare of the government's 
wards. He complained, for example, that Indian relations had 
long been governed by "the course of events" rather than by a 
"well-settled policy,"^ It was his opinion that the key
5?Ibld.. i^ -10,
£®BIC, 1885, 115-116j SI, 1885, 2l*-25.
^Lamar died before he could be installed. There were 
divided views on his abilities as an administrator. For a 
criticism of his work see Merrill, op, cit.. I3I4.,
^Register of the Department of the Interior (Washington, 
I8 8 3), 2, Hereafter this source is cited Register.
6lCIA, 1861*., 3,
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to this situation was scrupulous adherence to a program of con­
centration. Only in areas protected from white intrusion could
the ”rising generation” acquire the skills and habits essential
62to the preservation of the red race.
Dole’s successor was Dennis N 0 Cooley, a Dubuque, Iowa,
lawyer. Clearly a partisan appointee, Cooley served in 18614. as
a special commissioner for the sale of confiscated lands in
South Carolina and as secretary of the National Republican Com-
6 ?
aittee during Lincoln’s second campaign. ^  He was one of several 
Commissioners who entered office with very little knowledge of 
Indian affairs. At the outset he became involved in Secre­
tary Harlan’s program for improving relations with both the 
tribes and tbe Army. His principal contribution, however, was 
an effort to reform the administrative procedures and conditions 
of the Indian service. He demanded punctual reports, careful 
accounting and book-keeping and devotion to duty by staff and 
agency personnel,^ After less than fifteen months In office,
Cooley resigned to practice law in Washington, D.C.^
Until November first, the office of Indian Commissioner 
was vacant. Then President Johnson selected Louis V. Bogy, a 
St. Louis Democrat to fill the post. Also a lawyer, Bogy was 
a veteran of the Black Hawk War and a pro-soutberner who had
62Ibid., 5-8.
^The United States Biographical Dictionary and Portrait 
Gallery oFlSmlnent and Self-fltade Men (Chicago. 1878). 3^-37.
^See, for example, Cooley's recommendations in CIA, 1866, 16
^The U.S. Biographical Dictionary. 37. Cooley resigned 
in September for hpolitical reasonsw; namely disagreement with 
Johnson’s moderate reconstruction program.
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”kept very quiet” during the Civil War* Because of his poli­
tical affiliations, the new Commissioner began bis assigned 
duties without senatorial confirmation of his appointment.^Ee 
was, however, an energetic leader and fought against widespread
public criticism of the Indian Bureau following the tragic
67
Fetterman Massacre in Wyoming in December, 1866, His pleas 
for justice for peaceable Indians and views concerning the 
need to negotiate new treaties with various western tribes con­
tributed significantly to the establishment of the Peace Commission 
of 1867-1868.68
A fourth Commissioner to serve under President Johnson, 
Nathaniel G, Taylor of Tennessee, was appointed March 29, 1867.
A graduate of Princeton and former member of Congress, Taylor 
is described by one biographer as a man of ”much erudition and
polish, who distinguished himself both as statesman and prea- 
69cher0“ Perhaps his most lasting contribution was his work 
as president of tbe Peace Commission of 1867-1868, An outspoken 
opponent of military control, he listed and explained eleven
reasons for not transferring the Indian Bureau to the War De-
70partment in 1868. Summing up, he stated:
66Plct. Am, Blog** II, lp.O-lp.1; D.I. Register, 2.
67
The Petterman Massacre is discussed in the next chapter,
/ O
°°L, V. Bogy to Browning, January 3, February 11 and 
March 2, 1867, I.O.R.B. No. 16, NA, RG 7
^^D.I. Register, 2: The National Cyclopedia of American 
Biography (New York, 1898), VlII, 3&6.
70CIA, 1868, 7-H4..
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It is beyond question our most solemn duty to pro­
tect and care for, to elevate and civilize them, ^the 
Indians/, have taken their heritage, and it is a 
grand and magnificent heritage. Now is it too much that 
we carve for them liberal reservations out of their own 
lands and guarantee them homes forever?,,,It remains 
for us,,.to blot out their remembrance of wrongs and 
oppressions by deeds of God-like love and benevolence,'
Probably the most colorful person ever to act as Indian 
Commissioner was Brig, Gen. Ely S. Parker, who was appointed 
shortly after Grant*s inaugural in 1869* Parker was a full- 
blooded Seneca and a sachem of his tribe. Educated in engineer­
ing and law, he obtained a commission and became aide-de-camp 
for his old friend Grant In 1863* This position he held until 
he resigned to enter office as Commissioner*7^ While head of 
the Indian Bureau he became a leading critic of the decadent 
treaty system and an advocate of reforms such as tbe establish­
ment of the Board of Indian Commissioners and the selection of 
agents nominated by religious organizations. But in early 1871 
he was denounced by a House investigating committee for having
been indiscreet in letting private contracts for some Sioux
73agencies* Parker resigned in disgrace in July, 1871* and 
for about four months thereafter Henry R. Clum, a former assis­
tant, acted as Comnissioner,7^




Diet. Am. Biog.. XIV, 219-220.
73Ihid., 220*
^Clura had acted as Commissioner during Parker’s frequent 
absences, inconspicuously following the policies of his superior*
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an ambitious young statistical expert, took charge of the Indian 
Office* A Massachusetts Republican, well-educated in several 
fields, Walker acquired the commissionership while serving as
jd
Superintendent of the Census Bureau.'^ Few commissioners were 
able to keep up with the many responsibilities of the Indian 
Bureau without double-duty, but he achieved a good record never­
theless. His yearly report for 1872 set forth the thesis that 
tbe Government, for good reasons, was following two distinct 
Indian policies —  one for "potentially hostile" red men and 
one for traditionally friendly and weak tribes. He contended:
It is not a whit more unreasonable that the Government 
should do much for hostile Indians and little for friendly 
Indians tbafc it is that a private citizen should, to save 
bis life, surrender all the contents of his purse to a high­
wayman; while on another occasion, to a distressed and 
deserving applicant for charity, ha would measure his con­
tribution by his means and disposition at tbe time. "76
Admittedly, the government was "temporizing with an evil,"
but expansion and national progress made this necessary.77 At
the same time, the nation was duty-bound temporarily to support
its wards, "The freedom of expansion which is working these
results is to ua of incalculable value," he pointed out,78"To
the Indian it is of incalculable cost," Among those who were
nd
'•'Walker had had a brilliant war record, rising from 
private to Assistant Adjutant General of tbe Union Army. After 
the war he taught Latin and Greek at a seminary before assuming 
the duties of Superintendent of the Census Bureau in 1870. 
Apparently Grant gave him the appointment as Commissioner be­
cause there were no more funds to pay him for bis work in the 
Census Bureau. (Diet. Am. Blog.. XIX, 3 k 3 - 3 h 3 » )  He also served 
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able to leave the Indian Office without a bad reputation, Walker, 
in March, 1873? resigned to teach economics at Yale.*^
Next to head the Indian Bureau was Edward P. Smith, a 
Congregational clergyman who had served as agent at White Earth 
Agency In Minnesota, As an "agent in the woods" Smith was recog­
nized as a "moderate, sensible and truthful man," anxious to
obtain increased funds for houses, farms, stock and a school
80for his subjects. Upon taking over his new job, he termed 
his duties an enormous "terra incognita," but soon generalized 
about the problems and needs of the Indian service,8-*- He 
recommended a revision of outdated treaty provisions, allot­
ment of lands In severalty, stepped-up training and education
Q p
for the young and "vigorous treatment” of wild bands. In bis 
opinion, transfer of the Bureau to the War Department would de­
feat the government's purpose of civilizing the natives. With 
limitations, however, temporary military control over unco-
O ^
operative tribes was a practical expedient, ^
In December, 1875? after various investigating committees 
criticized bis judgments and accounting procedures, Smith turned
79pjct.. Am. Blog.. XIX, 3lUw
®^alker to Delano, December 23, 1872, and Clum to Delano, 
January 11, 1873? I.O.R.B, No, 22, NA, RG 75; Walker to Smith, 
July 2 b , , I872, I.O.L.B. No. 107, NA, RG 75.
8^See HR Rpt. No, 778. ii3rci Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1627) 
187^, 220-221pR3c7 1H75, 6?7-678.
82CIA, 1873, 3-9.
83cia, 187^, 13-15; cia, 1875,* 19-20.
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in bis resignation.®^-
Another Smith, John Q, Smith of Ohio, headed the Indian 
Bureau from December, l875» until late September, 1877* The 
Department of Interior appointment files contain some interest­
ing information about his selection and role as an administrator. 
Ohio's Senator John Sherman, brother of General W. T. Sherman, 
solicited Secretary Chandler in Smith's behalf. He mentioned 
the latter's experience as a member of Congress, described him 
as being "honest as the day is long" and emphasized that he 
was presently disengaged.®^ An unsigned statement, obviously 
written by a contemporary observer acquainted with the Indian 
Office and its personnel, disputes Senator Sherman's views about 
Smith's qualifications and integrity, stating:
When Mr. Smith came here to take charge of tbe Indian 
Office he questioned several persons who knew the facts 
respecting that office, and he was very fully informed 
about it, but of all the men who were anxious for reform 
in, and the purification of that office he has not taken 
one of them Into bis confidence, but has struck at them 
directly and indirectly at the same time keeping and pro­
moting and preferring the men who are either known to be, 
or suspected of being in league with the ring that has 
been but half exposed,
^Report of Commission to Investigate Certain Charges 
against Honorable E. P. Smith TWashlngton. 187b-) i Mlsc'. Doc.
No. 1 6 7. With Cong.. 1 sess.(Serial 1702). Reformers such as 
X7 C, Barstow of the Board of Indian Commissioners insisted that 
Smith was not dishonest. After resigning, he became president 
of Howard University and later died in Africa on a visit spon­
sored by the American Missionary Association, (James G, Wilson 
and John Piske, ads., Appleton'3 Cyclopedia of American Biography 
2&ew York, l88o7, 561.)
-M0 Sherman to Z. Chandler, December 5» 1875 > Appoint­
ment Pile, of the Department of the Interior, NA, RG 75. Hereafter 
this source is cited D.I.A.P.
®6"Anonymous Charges against J. Q. Smith et. al.,M D.I.A.P. 
NA, RG 75* A. note on the outside of these records says the 
charges were by a Dr. Curtis.
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As far as the author of these charges could determine, Smith’s 
only concern was how the Commissioner and other officers made 
their "dividends,"®7
Judging from his published statements, though, Commission­
er J. Q. Smith was much interested in the welfare of the Indians, 
He expressed the reformers’ sentiment that "the adventurous, 
grasping Anglo-Saxon race" had dispossessed the aborigines and
therefore ought to care for them through "good moral and Chris-
88tian" officials. Unfortunately, however, there was no "well- 
defined, clearly-understood, persistent purpose on the part of 
the G o v e r n m e n t such high-sounding judgments did not deceive 
Secretary Schurz, who finally invited Smith to resign. Later, 
in answer to the Commissioner’s protest, Schurz affirmed, "The 
fact is, you never knew what was going on in the office under 
your charge, and your clerks were well aware that you did not 
know it,"9® Revealingly, General of the Array Sherman took ex­
ception to the removal of his brother’s nominee, Sherman in­
sisted, however, that he was most concerned with whether a 
Commissioner would cooperate with the Army, In this respect, 
Smith was "the best Commissioner with whom I had come in con­




9°Schurz to J, Q. Smith, January 15, 1878, Schurz Papers, 
and Schurz Scrapbook,
^■Sherman to Schurz, January 25, 1878, Schurz Papers,
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The search for another Commissioner ended in the appoint­
ment of Ezra A. Hayt, a New Yorker formerly on the Board of 
Indian Commissioners, Hayt, too, came to office with good 
recommendations For example, the well-known Indian reformer,
William Welsh, studied Hayt’s background and encouraged Secre-
93tary Schurz to seek his appointment. On the other hand, former 
associates.on the Board of Indian Commissioners did not think
Oil
Hayt would be an asset to Schur-z's reform program. ^ For a time
it seemed that Hayt’s critics were quite wrong. He cooperated
with Secretary Schurz by dismissing many officials of doubtful
reliability, As a result, reformers and ousted personnel alike
sought to disgrace the Commissioner, William Leeds, a Chief
Clerk who was pressured out of office, conspired with members of
the Board of Indian Commissioners to gather evidence that Hayt
was delinquent in accounts, arbitrary in his removals and corrupt
q c
in private business transactions.
While these maneuvers were in progress, Commissioner Hayt
qp
The head of the Board of Foreign Missions for the Re­
formed Church once characterized Hayt as a diligent Christian 
who had made a ”handsome fortune” in dry goods and trade before 
assuming the presidency of International Trust Company, In 
addition, he was identified as a nfirm, courageous, clear-headed 
and hearty Republican.” (The Reverend Mr, J, M. Ferris to Delano, 
undated, NA, RG 75,
93.
Welsh to Schurz, October 27, 1877, Schurz Papers,
9k
E, Whittlesey to B. R, Roberts, September 2fy, 1877, 
Letters Sent, Board of Indian Commissioners, Series II, Vol. IV, 
NA, RG 75. Hereafter these records are cited B.L.S. 
q C
^W. Leeds to C, Fisk, December 6 , 1879, Correspondence, 
Board of Indian Commissioners, NA, RG 750 Hereafter these re­
cords are cited B.C.
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was apparently busy trying to accelerate the civilization of 
the Indians, "...it is indispensable at the outset to throw 
aside the sentimentality that is so fashionable in our day, and 
to treat the subject in a practical and common sense way...n<^ he 
sSBerted. Accordingly, he advocated a code of laws for the 
reservations, Indian police, land allotments, compulsory edu­
cation and other reforms. To implement the Indian policy,
Hayt sought business-minded individuals, not politicians, 
preachers or soldiers who lacked functional ideas Moreover,
he was in the forefront of debate against transfer of the
Q8Bureau to the War Department.7
All of Hayt’s efforts to defend and invigorate the Indian 
service, however, could not extenuate his implication in a shady 
deal to acquire a silver mine near San Carlos Agency in Ari­
zona Territory. In 1879 Inspector J. H. Hammond discovered 
that Agent H. L. Hart and others were guilty of "gross frauds 
and dishonesty" concerning Indian cattle shipments. Hart had 
a substantial interest in the Washington Mine, and Hammond 
offered to repress this evidence if he and some of the Com­
missioner’s friends were allowed to buy the mine at a discount. 
Hayt's son closed the transaction, acting under the assumed 
name, "Edward Knapp” (his first and middle names)#^  When the
96CIA, 1877, 1.
^ S e n . Misc. Doc. No. 93. lj.5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
1835), 1879, 313-3H 4T  Representatives of various religious 
groups were disgruntled by Hayt's disposition to oppose the 
appointment of individuals with only theological training as 
agents.
98Ibid., 312-338. 99bio> i8?9j 68_n >
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Commissioner was not able to justify this action to Secretary 
Schurz, he was dismissed. This scandal, publicized late in 
January, 1880, touched off renewed criticism of the Indian 
Bureau and induced Schurz to pay even closer personal attention 
to Indian affairs
Secretary Schurz was understandably cautious about sug­
gesting a successor for Kayt, For a time Indian affairs were 
directed by Assistant Attorney-General Edgar M, Marble, but 
by mid-March President Hayes was anxious to settle the matter, 
and gave the position to Rowland E. Trowbridge, a leading agri­
culturist and former Republican congressman from Michigan,
This turned out to be an unfortunate selection, for Trowbridge
was suffering from sciatica and was ill so much that he was
1 OPunable to attend to many of his duties. Most of the business 
of the Indian Office continued to be handled by Secretary Schurz 
or by Marble, On April 20, l88l, a little over a year after 
taking office, Trowbridge died,10^
In May, leadership of the Indian Bureau passed to Hiram 
A,Price, an elderly Republican banker from Iowa, Although he 
turned seventy while in office, Price carried on an active
3.°°Priest, op< cjt., 72,
101President Hayes to Schurz, February 19, 1880- Schurz 
Papers; Priest, 0£ e cite,71; 0*1, Register, 1; S.D# Bingham, 
comp,, Early History of Michigan with Biographies of State 
Officers, Members of TSongress, Judges ana Legislators' (Lans­
ing, 1 8 8), Wjlu
102
S, Trowbridge to Schurz, October 16, 1880, D.I.A.F.
NA, RG 75.
103
Bingham, op. cit.. 61^ j..
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administration,-*"^' He laid special stress upon the Indians’ 
need to learn to earn their own living and wrestled with the 
age-old problem of procuring able agents. On the latter point 
he declared, "The impression seems to prevail to a great extent 
that almost any man will do for an Indian agent, and as a con­
sequence to this belief, men who are broken down physically, 
financially, or politically are frequently recommended for that 
p o s i t i o n , T h e  Commissioner also had his differences with 
the Army, While denying any intention to start a controversy, 
he entered a vigorous protest against the "reckless consumption" 
of reservation timber by military detachments,^-^ Touching 
upon another more general problem and an Issue with special 
appeal to his prohibitionist proclivities, Price severely criti­
cized an Army order excluding lager beer and malt liquors from 
the list of "intoxicating liquors" banned at military posts, 
Sarcastically he commented:
,.,at one of the military posts, where the troops number 
less than 2 0 0 ,  7 2 ,0 0 0  pints of lager beer were consumed In 
three weeks, which is about 17 pints per day for each man,
I am also informed that most of the lager beer which Is 
sold at these military posts is made expressly for spirits, 
instead of the 5 to 12 per cent of proof beer, I am there­
fore constrained to believe that until the right to dispose 
of liquor of any kind, under whatever name or subterfuge 
Its sale or introduction on or near an Indian reservation 
may be attempted, is forbidden by law, its sad and de-
^Qf y p ic t ." Am, Biog,, XV, 2 1 2 -2 1 3 .  Price had served 
several years in Congress,
10^CIA, 1883, VIIIj CIA, 1881, III.
lo6CIA, 1881, XXX,
107In 1855 Price used cannon to defend prohibitionists 
in Davenport, Iowa, against an angry mob, (B.F, Gue, "The Pub­
lic Services of Hiram Price," Annals of Iowa, Series 3, I 
(January, 1895 ) ,  591,
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moralizing effects among the Indians will continue to
exist»10o
At the beginning of Cleveland's administration, the Commissioner 
asked to be relieved,
The final Commissioner in the period 1865? to 1887 was 
John D, C, Atkins, a Tennessee Democrat, Before entering office 
the former Confederate Colonel chaired the Eouse Appropriations 
Committee, and during his term he was a partner of a telephone 
company which Republicans tried to depiet as a "Democratic 
Credit Mobilier."^0 His annual reports reveal Atkins as an 
eloquent, if opinionated, spokesman of a policy of paternal re­
straint toward the country's original inhabitants. In terms 
which would have stirred the hearts of Populists, he emphasized 
the value of Indian homesteads and farms.
Historians, philosophers, and statesmen freely admit 
that civilization as naturally follows the improved arts 
of agriculture as vegetation follows the genial sunshine 
and the shower, and that those races who are in ignorance 
of agriculture are also ignorant of almost everything 
else. The Indian constitutes no exception to this poli­
tical maxim,111
10BCIA, 1883, vi.
^■^A number of the Indians friends asked Price to remain 
in office, (D.I.A.F., NA, RG 75),
11®In 1883 Atkins joined the Pan-Electric Telephone Com­
pany headed by former Confederate general Joseph E, Johnston, The 
Bell Telephone Company sued Pan-Electric for infringing upon its 
patent rights. Congress also investigated the firm in 1886, 
Attorney-General Garland, Solicitor General Goode, Railroad Com­
missioner Johnston, Senator Harris of Tennessee, Secretary of the 
Interior Lamar and Atkins were all exonerated of dishonest or cen­
surable acts by the Democratic majority of the investigat lug com­
mittee, But the minority report of the Republican members condemned 
them for bribing the press and taking improper advantage of their 
political influence, {Frank B. Williams, "The Pan-Electric Tele­
phone Controversy," Tennessee Historical Quarterly. Il/Tune, 191*37, 
11*4-162.)
111CIA, 1885, III,
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Also,in his last yearly report, he eulogized the Allotment Act 
of 1887, contrasting it with the government’s previous "pauper­
izing” policy. The Commissioner affirmed that, subjected to 
similar circumstances and treatment —  lands in common, annui­
ties, and ministerial teachers, preachers, farmers and physicians
—  even the "enterprising Yankees" of New England would degen­
ii?erate to parasites upon the community. ^
TEE WAR DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY POLICY
The transition from full-scale war in the period 1861- 
1865 to limited quasi-war and garrison activities in the South 
and West presented many difficulties for the leaders of the 
War Department and its lower echelons. A shortage of manpower, 
inadequate financial support, public opposition to a standing 
army and unattractive duty assignments were among the more ob­
vious obstacles to effective Army operations. Equally hamper­
ing, although less apparent to the casual observer, were central 
administrative and organizational problems. In the first 
place, there was rivalry for authority between the politically- 
appointed Secretary of War and the top military official, the 
General-in-Chief. Secondly, both of these officers struggled 
to maintain control over semi-autonomous staff agencies, such 
as the Ordnance and Quartermaster departments,^^ Finally,
112
CIA, 1887, IX. The Dawes Severalty Act Is discussed 
in Chapter Nine.
113
See Raphael P. Thian, comp., Legislative History of 
the General Staff of the Army of the United States Tv/ashineton.
1 9 0 177^
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
72
coodination between upper echelon authorities and field commands, 
which were frequently reorganized, left much to be desired.-^4
In the military branch, as in the Interior Department, 
policies affecting Indian affairs varied from one administration 
to another. While field commanders exerted considerable influ­
ence upon their superiors and had much latitude in implementing 
directives, the Secretary or General-in-Chief, in varying de­
grees, made the important decisions. Excluding three ad interim 
appointees, the War Department, like its civilian counterpart, 
had ten different leaders in the twenty-two years after the Civil 
War. The secretaries* backgrounds included business, banking, 
law, state and national politics and professional military 
service. Most were Republican and all but one came from states 
presently considered part of the Midwest. In contrast to the 
War Office, the office of General-in-Chief was quite stable? 
only three persons were in charge between the -Johnson and Harri­
son administrations. All were West Pointers of proven ability, 
and the last two were well-experienced in Army-Indian relations. ^
THE SECRETARIES OP WAR
One of the best known Secretaries, Edwin M. Stanton of 
Ohio, headed the military department from January, 1862, to May, 
1868, except for two ad interim interruptions. Stanton’s 
political ties shifted during the Civil War from Unionist to
11^Wbite, on. cit.. 134* 137-144* In 1866 the Army had 
five divisions and seventeen departments; twenty years later, 
three divisions and eight departments.
n ^White, op. cit., 137-11*4; Diet. Am. Blog., passim.
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Radical Republican.11 *^ By 1865 he had a reputation as a vigorous 
and efficient Secretary, President Johnson retained him to 
handle the problems of demobilization, but in 1867 Stanton and 
Johnson clashed over reconstruction policy. The Secretary be­
came the key figure in the President’s dispute with the Radical- 
controlled Congress over the Tenure of Office Act. First, in 
August, Johnson tried to replace Stanton with General-in-Chief 
Grant, designating the latter as Secretary ad interim. For 
about four months Grant reluctantly acted in that capacity, but 
Stanton refused to leave his desk,11^ Again in February, 1868, 
Johnson tried to oust the "Black Terrier” of the War Office, 
appointing General Lorenzo Thomas as Acting Secretary. There­
upon Stanton ”boled up” in the War Department building and re-
l *i O
mained there during the weeks of Johnson’s impeachment trial.
The crucial events of the latter part of Stanton’s term 
obviously distracted him from the question of military relations 
with the Indian tribes. To the extent that he commented on the 
Indian affairs, it was clear that he had little sympathy for 
the religious reformers’ approach. For instance, in antici­
pation of a visit from the avid Indian reformer, Bishop Henry 
Whipple, he told an acquaintance:
^^Dict. Am. Blog., XVII, 517-519? Smith, op. cit., 286- 
291. (Earlier Stanton was a Democrat and served as Attorney 
General under Buchanan.)
117'L, D. Ingersoll, History of the War Department (Wash­
ington, 1879), 53l+-535>? Diet. A m / Blog., XVll, 5l&-5>20. Stanton 
originally declared the Tenure of Office Act unconstitutional.
ll8Pict. Am. Blog.. XVII, 520-521.
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If he has come here to tell us of the corruption of 
our Indian system, and the dishonesty of Indian agents, 
tell him that we know it* But the Government never re­
forms an evil until the people demand it. Tell him 
that when he reaches the heart of the American people, 
the Indians will be saved* °
Little more than passing reference to the need for military
protection of emigrants against hostile bands is found in his
annual r e p o r t s , 1 ^  Although opinionated and strong-willed,
Stanton considered the Senate's failure to convict Johnson a
personal vote of "no confidence,” and on May 26, 1868, he sub-
1 Pi
mitted his resignation*
Little comment is necessary concerning the ad interim
Secretaries, Grant and Thomas, Their terms were so brief and
tenuous that they made little impression upon departmental
policies. Later, as President, Grant was to gain special
acclaim as a friend of conciliatory measures toward the tribes.
More will be said of his pre-presidential role as General-in-
122
Chief momentarily. General Thomas was a headstrong and argu­
mentative person whose ”comic opera” attempt to ”boot” Stanton 
out of the War Office cost him a week in jail at the latter's 
request,
Another short-term Secretary, General John A. Schofield,
^Henry B, Whipple.Lights and Shadows of a Long Espis- 
copate (New York, 1902;, ll|5,
IPO
SW (P), 1866, 68, Biographical sources do not indicate 
that Stanton was concerned about Indian affairs,
121Hinsdale, o£. eit., 195-198; Diet, Am, Biog., XVIII,$21, 
122
Smith, 0£. cit., 514-1.
123pict, Am. Bjpg. XVIII, I4I4.I— s
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headed the Department from May, 1868, to March, 1869. A West 
Pointer who had fought the Seminoles and commanded various 
military departments, Schofield was nominated for the cabinet 
by Senator William Evarts of New York,^^ He had definite 
opinions about the management of Indian affairs and did not 
miss the opportunity to speak his mind on the subject in the 
annual report for 1868, "For the sake of economy to the govern­
ment, for the sake of more efficient protection to the frontier 
settlements, and for the sake of justice to the Indians,” he 
commented, ”1 recommend that the management of Indian affairs 
be restored to the War Department, with authority to make regu­
lations for their government and for their protection against 
lawless whites.”'*'2'’ An able and industrious Secretary, Scho­
field nevertheless preferred an active command to a desk job 
in Washington, A week after Grant's inauguration he resigned 
to return to duty as commander of the Department of the Missouri, 
President Grant selected General John A, Rawlins to take 
charge of the War Department, Rawlins, formerly a Douglas Demo­
crat, had been a close friend and advisor to Grant during the 
Civil War, At the time of his appointment he was suffering
from a tubercular condition which continued to limit his acti- 
127vities. Not in office long enough to submit an annual report
12i*Hinsdale, op. cit., 203; Smith, op. cit., 291-293; 
Diet. Am. Biog., XVl7452-I|5l|.»
125SW, 1868, xvii-xviii.
126
Hinsdale, op. cit., 203-208, Schofield has been given 
credit for helping to restore peace between the executive and 
legislative branches.
127Smith, 0£. cit., 291^-295; Diet. Am. Biog. XV, Ij.02-1*03; 
Hinsdale, ££. cit.. 210-211.
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which might sum up his views on control over the Indians, the
Secretary succeeded, however, in stirring up dissension over
authority within the military branch. Much to the chagrin of
General-in-Chief Sherman, he prevailed upon Grant to remand an
order routing all official business through the head of the 
123Army. Early in September Rawlins succumbed to his lingering 
illness. His death, one author contends, meant the loss of a 
"salutary influence" upon Grant, who was subsequently controlled 
by political and military "minions.
For about a month and a half, Rawlins’ vacancy was filled 
by General-in-Chief S h e r m a n . On October 25, 1869, another 
Civil War general, William W. Belknap of Iowa moved into the 
War Office. A former member of the Iowa legislature, Belknap 
left a position as collector of internal revenue in his state 
to assume the cabinet post. His six and a half years in office 
covered a period in which the civil-military dispute over con­
trol of Indian affairs was particularly lively. Still his 
official reports contain surprisingly little personal comment 
on the subject. He usually endorsed the views of the General 
of the Army and department commanders who, as a rule, deprecated 
the actions of the Indian B u r e a u . A p p a r e n t l y  he, like most
^^Athearn, 0£. clt..2H0-2li2.
■^^Hinadale, 0£. cit., 211.
^■^Sherman earlier declined to serve as Secretary under 
President Johnson. He hated the political furor of Washington 
and happily unburdened himself of this extra duty. (Diet. Am. 
Blog.. XVII, 93ff,) ~
131SW, 1869-1875, passim.
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of his successors, was less interested in getting embroiled in 
the onerous Indian service than military subordinates whose 
reputation and efficiency reports hinged upon relations with 
the tribes.
Ultimately, though, Belknap was ruined by his involve­
ment in a scandal over the Indian tradership at Port Sill, In­
dian Territory, In 1876 the House impeached him for receiving 
bribes amounting to about $ 2 5 ,0 0 0  from Caleb P , Marsh, the 
nominal trader. Only a hasty and disgraceful resignation pre­
vented the Senate from bringing in a verdict of guilty,^32 Coming 
at a crucial time in the contest between departments for au­
thority over Indian matters, the ”Belknap Scandal” and a resul­
tant investigation of the transactions of the War Department
138strengthened the cause of civilian administrators.
The departure of Belknap brought an end to the succession 
of generals in the War Department, The next Secretary, who held
132Dict. Am, Biog.. II, 1^7-348;Smith, op. cit., 295-296; 
Hoar, op. cit.. T7 35^-368; HR Rot, No, 186, hl£th Cong,, 1 sess, 
(Serial 17087; HR Rpt. No, 22^,“~i})|th CnngtJ 1 sess, (Serial 1708); 
HR Rpt. No. 3li.5T~hii.th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709); HR Rpt. No. 
79lTBith Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1713); Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 9?
W t h  Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1665). Apparently Belknap * s wife 
in 1870 arranged to get an appointment for Marsh, a New Yorker, 
for half of the income from the lucrative Port Sill tradership. 
Marsh then persuaded the incumbent trader to pay him $12,000 
annually for not taking over the job. Quarterly payments of 
$1,500 went to Mrs, Belknap. After her death the money was sent 
directly to Secretary Belknap, who lavished it on his second 
wife, the sister of his first wife. See William B, Hesseltine, 
Ulysses S. Grant: Politician (New York, 1957), 395-396. For a 
discussion of continuing questions about the affair see Philip 
D. Jordan, ”The Domestic Finances of Secretary of War Vf. W. Bel­
knap,” Iowa Journal of History.Vol. 52 (July, 195h-)> 193-202.
133HR Rpt. No. 799. hh-th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1715), 1876,
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office only ten weeks, was Judge Alphonso Taft, Ohio Republi­
can and father of William Howard Taft, His stay in the War 
Department was too brief to substantially affect policies or 
procedures. But General of the Army Sherman expressed plea­
sure at having a less meddlesome s u p e r i o r , A s  planned in 
advance by Republican patronage managers, Taft was soon trans­
ferred to the Attorney General’s Office, a position "more suited 
to his genius and tastes
Political repercussions followed Grant's announcement 
that Taft’s successor was to be James D, (Don) Cameron, son of 
the Pennsylvania Republican Party boss, Senator Simon Cameron,1^  
Young Cameron had inherited both business and political "know­
how" from bis father. Before turning thirty-five, he demon­
strated "large business capacity" as a bank president and head 
of the Northern Central Railroad of Pennsylvania,^37 During his 
ten-month term he achieved greater efficiency in military busi­
ness activities and cut the cost of operations considerably. His 
yearly report for 1876 included an endorsement of a strict 
policy of disarming and dismounting all agency Indians. "De­
prived of their arms and ponies it is reasonable to expect,"
T. Sherman to J. Sherman, March 14-, 1876, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. I42.
^■^Smith, op, cit., 296-297? Ingersoll, op. cit.. 571+? 
Diet. Am. Blog.. XvIlTT""261^-265,
1 ^6
Simon Cameron had been Secretary of War under Lincoln. 
Ingersoll contends that the older Cameron had no advance know­
ledge of his son’s appointment. Nevertheless, partisanship was 
involved,
137Smitb, 0£. cit., 297-298j Diet. Am. Biog., Ill, 1435.
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he declared, "that on the next outbreak of hostilities the 
anomaly will not again be presented of the Government forces 
being met in summer by hostile Indians sheltered and cared for
T Oft
at Government expense during the previous winter,” Because 
Cameron made federal troops available to the Republicans in Loui­
siana and Florida during the investigation of disputed election 
returns that fall, Pennsylvania Republicans expected President 
Hayes to retain him in the cabinet. But they were disappointed. 
Consequently, it is said, Simon Cameron resigned his Senate 
seat, giving it to his son as a "consolation prize."3-39
While refusing to compensate Cameron, Hayes repaid a 
political debt to the author of the electoral commission bill, 
Representative George W. McCrary of Iowa, by naming him to head 
the War Department, A former justice of the Iowa Supreme Court 
and congressional investigator in the Credit Mobilier scandal, 
McCrary accepted the appointment only because he could not head 
the Justice Department,3^ -0 Nevertheless, he proved an indus­
trious and able executive. Previous experience on the legisla­
tive committee on Indian affairs gave him insight respecting 
military difficulties with hostile bands, "It is undeniable," 
he concluded,"that most if not all the disasters attending
138SW, 1876, 6.
139Pict. Am. Biog., Ill, 1*35-1j.36,
■^■^McCrary had disqualified himself from the Attorney- 
General' s position by public statements about a pending mineral 
land claim. Judge Charles Devens of Massachusetts would not 
consent to act as provisional Attorney-General until that case 
was settled. (Smith, 0£, cit,, 298; Diet., Am. Biog.. XII,
2-3; Hinsdale, op, cit.. 223-221}..)
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Indian hostilities are the result of inadequacy of force on our 
part."1^1 To be effective the Army must be enlarged and given 
adequate appropriations0 In December, 1879, McCrary resigned 
to find "satisfaction for his judicial aspirations in a Circuit 
Judgeship."3^ 2
Next to head the department was Senator Alexander Ramsey. 
Ramsey bad been governor of both the territory and state of 
Minnesota and an organizer of the Republican Party in his re- 
gion.^He had first hand knowledge of the problems of dealing 
with red men on the warpath, having had executive responsibility 
for calling out the militia and summoning federal troops at the 
time of the Sioux Outbreak of l862,x^' In the Senate, too, he 
had agitated for greater military protection for roads and 
frontier communities.3^  With some understanding, then, Secre­
tary Ramsey called for additional funds to improve the conditions
and salvage the esprit of his unden|aanned and overworked western
lii6 army, ^
At the beginning of the Garfield administration Ramsey 
was replaced by Abraham Lincoln's son, Robert Todd. Before his 
appointment young Lincoln was not very active in politics,
^ S W ,  1879, iiio
■^^Hinsdale, oj>. cit., 226-227.
^•^For the background of Ramsey's apointment see Rhoda 
R. Gilman, "Ramsey, Donnelly, and the Congressional Campaign of 
1868," Minnesota History. Vol. 36, (December, 193>9), 300-308; 
Smith, op. cit., 299.
Dili
Diet. Am. Blog.. XV, 3^-l-3^2.
■^^Atbearn, oj>, c i t . ,  lj.l-ij.2.
^ S W ,  1880, iil-v.
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He attracted the President's attention, however, by swinging 
a delegation of Grant supporters to his support at the 1880 
Republican Convention0^ ^  Despite the tragedy which abbre­
viated Garfield's term, Lincoln served a full, if uneventful 
and unimpressive, four years in the cabinet. He was popular 
with his father's old generals, particularly because he was so 
indifferent toward bis job that they generally had their way.*^ 
Each year Indian resistance seemed to lessen until in l881j. 
Secretary Lincoln was able to report that the Army had "enjoyed 
almost complete rest from active field operations
Last in the succession of secretaries in the period 186|? 
to 1887 was William Crownlnshield Endicott, wealthy Massachu­
setts Democrat appointed at the beginning of Cleveland's first 
term,^^ Like Lincoln, Endicott was experienced as a lawyer.
But the latter's record as an administrator was more impressive. 
He was noted, especially, for his diligent efforts to improve
the Army’s efficiency and morale. For instance, he succeeded
1^1
in establishing higher pay for enlisted men, ^ Although active
operations against the Indians had generally ceased, it was 
during Endicott's term 
were finally defeated.
that Geronimo and his Apache followers
152
■^■^Hinsdale, op. cit,, 23t|.-235,
^W h i t e ,  o£. cit,, 139; Smith, 0^  cit., 299-300; Diet. 
Am. Biog.. XI, 265-267.
* 9W ,  I88I4., 5 .
i9o
Endicott was a direct descendant of the Massachusetts 
colonial governor, John Endicott.
^Smitta, on, cit.. 300-301.
^ 2SW, 1886, 7.
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GENERALS-IN-CHIEF
General Ulysses S. Grant, supreme commander of the Union 
forces during the last thirteen months of the Civil War, re­
mained in charge of the Army the first four years of Recon­
struction, A West Pointer, Grant’s pre-war service included 
duty under General Zachary Taylor in the Mexican War and at 
outposts on the Pacific Coast, but no active operations against 
hostile Indians, After Lee’s surrender a succession of mili­
tary and personal involvements prevented the General-in-Chief 
from devoting much attention to Indian affairs. Initially, 
he concentrated upon disbandonment of the Army, the French 
threat in Mexico and the complex question of the S o u t h I n  
1866 he toured the erstwhile confederacy and struggled with 
the unpleasant task of implementing the Army Reorganization
Act, which cut the military force to a fraction of its wartime
1E>5
strength. In August, 1867, after the Tenure of Office Act 
and Supplementary Reconstruction Act convinced President John­
son that his chief antagonist was Secretary of War Stanton,
Grant was temporarily assigned the additional position of Secre­
tary ad interim. The next spring, following Johnson’s near­
conviction on impeachment charges, Grant became the Republican^1
l53Dict. Am. Biog., VII, l4.92-lj.93; Hesseltine, op, cit,, 
12-15; Grant to Snerman, January 16, 1867, Letters Sent, Eead- 
quarters of the Army, NA, RG lOo, Hereafter the latter source 
is cited H.A.L.S.
^^Hesseltine, pp. cit., 52-51+.
15£SW (P), 1866, 1+65.
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candidate for the presidency, Finally, in the ensuing months 
he was elected and became involved in the selection of cabinet 
and other appointive officials.^^
On a few occasions, though, General Grant expressed his 
views on Army-Indian relations. Significantly, as Commander 
of the Army his attitude did not suggest that he might someday 
be considered a humanitarian Indian reformer. In his annual 
reports, he echoed and underscored the demands of subordinates 
who favored the transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War De­
partment, By abolishing agencies and licensed trading and 
appointing a few inspectors to work with military leaders, be
argued, the government could save money and minimize conflict
197between the red and white races. In February, 1867, he 
declared:
If the present practice is to be continued, I do 
not see that any course is left open to us but to with­
draw our troops to the settlements and call upon Congress 
to provide means and troops to carry on formidable hos­
tilities against the Indians until all the Indians or 
all the whites on the great plains and between the settle­
ments on the Missouri and the Pacific slope are exter­
minated, ^ 58
No wonder General Sherman shook his head disbelievingly upon
learning two years later that Grant wanted to pacify the red
igq
men through church-nominated agency officials I 
1^6
Hesseltine, 0£, cit., 93-11(4.
1^7
See, for example, SW, 1866, 17-18,
^®Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 13, l+Oth Cong., 1 sess, (Serial 
1316), i^O-IpT
159
Sherman to Sheridan, April 10, 1869, Sheridan Papers0
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Grant's successor as Commander-in-Chief, General William 
T, Sherman, was much more experienced in Indian affairs and 
considerably more verbose about Indian policy. Also a graduate 
of the Military Academy and a Union war hero, Sherman had con­
tacts with numerous native groups before the war and had cam­
paigned against and negotiated with scattered western tribes 
in the period 1865-1869 While commander of the Division 
of the Missouri, he frequently proposed complete military 
control over the red men. The Army, he complained, was not 
consulted about land sales, railroad projects or other forms 
of expansion, yet was nleft in the breach to catch all the 
kicks and cuffs of a war of r a c e s , C r i t i c s  often accused 
Sherman of wanting to wipe out the Indians, but he insisted, 
"Indian wars are all work and no glory'.*^2 On the other hand, 
he could not stand to be told that, because he signed the 1868 
Peace Commission report which denounced military subjugation 
of the Indians, be was obliged to make concessions to hostile 
bands,
Sherman's term of over fourteen and a half years was 
punctuated by innumerable intra and inter-departmental crises.




■^^Sherman to S. P. Tappan, July 21, 1876, Semi-official 
Letters Sent by William T. Sherman, Manuscripts Division, Li­
brary of Congress,
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He was much exasperated, for example, when secretaries Rawlins 
and Belknap by-passed him with directives to staff leaders 
and field commacders. This was a ’’double if not a treble­
headed machine,*1 he later recalled, " ...tbs general often 
reading in the newspapers of military events and orders before 
he could be consulted or informed in 187U- Sherman got so
disgusted with this situation that be moved his headquarters 
to St, Louis and did not return to Washington until after Bel­
knap's embarrassing exit from office in early 1876, Even then,
he deprecated the "flatterers and clerks rnd orderlies" cring-
165ing and bowing before each Secretary,
Vexed by his administrative duties, life in Washington, 
congressional attempts to further reduce the Army and public 
criticism in the East and on the frontier, and agitated by In­
dian wars and incidents, Sherman sometimes made some caustic 
remarks about Indian affairs in his reports and endorsements,
"The Indian Bureau should take care of their own Indians," he 
replied to a query about sending Indian prisoners to Florida,
Of agents who called for military aid and then changed their
minds, he once fumed, "It is this habit of blowing hot and blow-
167ing cold which all soldiers complain of in the Indian Bureau,”
161+U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S^ Grant (Hew York. 
1886), 1+1+3. '
-^^Sherraan to John Sherman, March 1+ and 10, 1876, Sherman 
Papers, Sherman had less difficulty with Belknap's successors,
• ^ E n d o r s e m e n t  by General W, T, Sherman, March 5, 1879,
W, T, Sherman of Congress, Herafter these records are cited 
End,, Sherman, followed by the date, the symbol E.M, and the 
volume number or inclusive dates,
^ ^Ibid.. December 11, 1878
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Again, despairing over Indian campaigns, the General grumbled, 
",,*it is a waste of life and waste of money to hunt down no® 
madic Indians like the Sioux to be turned over to the Indian 
Bureau, and then turned loose well supplied with food and the 
means of renewing the war," Still another time, with refer­
ence to government support for warlike Apaches, he inquired,
169
"Does not this magnanimity verge on the borders of folly?"
Yet General Sherman persevered and found satisfaction
in the Army's relations with the natives. Upon retiring from
active duty, in November, 1883, he observed, "I now regard the
Indians as substantially eliminated from the problem of the
Army," In the "great battle of civilization with barbarism,"
the military, together with railroads and emigrant farmers and
«170
miners, bad been a large factor,"
Sherman's successor in the top military post was another 
prominent and experienced Indian fighter, General Philip H. 
Sheridan, After graduating from West Point in 18£3» Sheridan 
had an opportunity to test his tactical skills against hostile 
tribes in both the Southwest and Northwest, Achieving an im­
pressive record and the rank of Major General in the war between 
the states, the Irish-born officer later commanded the Division 
of the Gulf and Fifth Military District before filling Sherman’s
171
vacancy as head of the Division of the Missouri,
l68Ibid,, March 16, 1878* 
l69Ibid., March 23, 1880,
170SW, 1883, lj.5-46,
17lDict. Am, Blog., XVII, 79-80,
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While in charge of this division, Sheridan became known 
as a leading exponent of military control and forcible sup­
pression of nomadic Indians, Some of his caustic comments about 
the "peace policy" made Sherman’s remarks seem quite innocuous.
He called the program established by the Peace Commission in 
1868 an "inhuman farce," leaving "too many fingers in the pie."17  ^
The Indian, he generalized, was a "lazy, idle vagabond," 
schooled only in the art of taking scalps. Yet the govern­
ment persisted in giving these outlaws blankets and sending
173white criminals to penitentiaries. As for the Indian 
Office’s common practice of repeatedly relocating its agencies, 
the motive was usually "a desire tc cheat and defraud the In­
dians by avoiding the presence of officers who would naturally 
see and report it."^7^-
It would be Incorrect, however, to characterize Sheri­
dan as an adherent of the principle "the only good Indian is 
a dead one." To him, the "baulky team" of civil-military con­
trol and the failure to impress upon the Indians the difference 
between right and wrong defeated an otherwise "liberal and hu­
mane" program of Christianizing and civilizing the Indians.
179Transfer would make more work for the Army but was necessary.
172SW, 1868, 20-21.
173SW, 1869, 37-38;
^^"Endorsement by General P. H. Sheridan, September lip-
1878, Sheridan Endorsement Book, November 27, 1877-^ecember 18,
1879, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Hereafter 
these records are cited End,, Sheridan, followed by the date, 
the symbol E. B. and the inclusive dates of the volume.
175SW, 1868, 21; SW, 1872, 35-36,
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At times the General also petitioned for better treatment and 
more supplies for the red men. For instance, in 1878, he com­
pared the pitiable condition of the White River TJtes to that of
176
prisoners at Libby and Andersonville prisons. On many 
other occasions Sheridan’s actions and statements belied the 
stereotyped "Indian hater" label Indian friends gave him, par­
ticularly after a rather personal dispute with reformer Carl
177Schurz in the late Seventies,
As General-in-Chief, Sheridan took up Indian matters 
left unsettled at the time of Sherman’s retirement. Impor­
tantly, certain hostile bands of the Southwest bad to be sub­
dued and confined to reservations, This problem was finally 
solved through temporary military control0 Sheridan also gave 
special attention to a plan to help the Indians "take up the 
white man’s road," Describing the natives as the "richest 
people in this country, as communities," he recommended that 
the government locate each Indian family on half a section and 
sell the balance at $1.25 an acre. Interest on the proceeds, 
invested in government bonds, would more than pay for annui­
ties, subsistence and a program of civilization.^7® Although 
this scheme was not adopted, the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 
was based on some of the same principles,
i7®End., Sheridan, January 3, 1878, E, B., November 27, 
1887 - December 18, 1879*
•*-77The Sheridan-Schurz feud is discussed in Chapter
Seven,
178SW, 1885, 62-6 3; SW, 1887, 76-78.
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An examination of the succession of secretaries, com­
missioners and Army commanders reveals certain practical aspects 
of the government's difficulty in seeking a solution to the 
Indian problem. For various reasons, many of the leaders lacked 
the talent, desire or opportunity to deal effectively with In­
dian affairs. Significantly, the process by which the political 
appointees were selected was not designed to benefit the Indian 
service, but political parties. Preference was given to per­
sonal friends of the Presidents and party bosses, to G.A.R. 
veterans and residents of certain sections of the country. 
Moreover, the appointees, with few exceptions, followed the 
practice of using their office for political ends. Secretary 
Kirkwood, for example, dispensed patronage to many Republicans
from his home state. Others, such as Zachariah Chandler, uti-
179lized their position to make political assessments, ' Despite
the Pendleton Act of 1883 and reforms designed to bring about
more "businesslike administration," the spoils system pre- 
180vailed.
The leaders of the two branches were, by and large, no
better suited for their jobs than Secretary of War Daniel S.
Lamont (1893-1897), of whom Woodrow Wilson wrote:
The only criticism which his appointment prompts 
Is, that he was, so far as we are able to ascertain, no 
more fitted for the War Department than for any other.
He is, in short, simply a very capable man of unusual
“^ ^White, op, cit,, 332-335* This problem was less 
prominent in the late“"Eigbties, 
l8°Ibld.. 379-388.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9 0
executive talents* He has had no special training to 
be War minister,
Still it is difficult to determine what training would have 
most effectively prepared these men for their diversified 
duties. The Generals-in-Cbief, though trained and experi­
enced in military matters, were baffled by bureaucratic 
involvements. Presumably an ideal Secretary of the Interior 
should have been an efficiency expert, statistician, lawyer, 
geologist, business administrator, diplomat, economist, 
engineer, sociologist, architect, conservationist, educator, 
and politician. Certainly the heads of the departments were 
not, and could not be expected to be, experts on Indian 
affairs. Some such as Commissioner Parker, Secretary McCrary 
and General Sherman, had more talent along that line than 
others. Yet all were subject to an established complex sys­
tem of Indian administration which not even reformers like 
Secretary Schurz could completely overcome. For the Indians 
and those who dealt with them, the implications were 
momentous,
t At
Woodrow Wilson, ''Mr, Cleveland’s Cabinet," Review 
of Reviews. VII (1893), 291,
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CHAPTER THREE
OLIVE BRANCH AND CARBINE:
JANUARY, 1864 TO JULY, 1867
The white man owes the Indian nothing* He is 
in the way of the evolutions of progress* and when 
the government pays what is to him a reasonable 
compensation for his title to the territory, or 
for privileges in it, the debt is as perfectly 
cancelled as when a corporation pays the assessed 
value of the site of a public school*
(Maj. Gen* William B* Hazen, December 1, 1866)
Our people, full of the Anglo-Saxon blood*., 
powerful, increasing, spreading, aggrandizing, press 
in upon the plains and the prairies****Is it 
in the sight of God or men for us to say that we owe 
nothing to these people whose land we are appropriat­
ing to our pleasure?
(Senator James R. Doolittle, April 18, 1866)
In 1878, duriDg a personal feud between Secretary of 
the Interior Carl Schurz and General Phil Sheridan over the 
relative merits of military or civil management of the 
Indians, General William T* Sherman aptly observed, "...the 
present conflict between the two systems is such that he 
^Schurz7 and General Sheridan look at the same fact from oppo­
site directions; both are equally honest, yet both cannot be 
r i g h t . I t  was standard practice for the War and Interior 
departments to draw contrary conclusions from the same "facts" 
where the Indians were concerned. Certainly this was a theme
^Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 53, 45th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
1835),'"1B797“227.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9 2
of civil-military relations between January, 1866, and July 20, 
1867, the period to be considered in this chapter. To some 
extent, the two branches of government disagreed about the In­
dians because of conflicting policies. At the same time, their 
policies differed because of diverse views. The dual nature 
of the Indian policy was suggested by the Army and Navy Journal, 
a leading military organ, when it observed, ”We are now approach­
ing the red man with the olive branch in one hand and carbine 
in the other0"^
The present discussion takes the study of War-Interior 
Indian relations to July 20, 1867, when President Johnson was 
empowered to appoint a special civil-military commission which 
helped to found a general rtPeace Policy” toward the tribes.
To appreciate the factors which influenced the government to 
adopt this ”new” approach it is necessary to understand some 
of the trials and errors of the preceding year and a half of 
Indian affairs. In most respects these months witnessed a 
continuation of the difficulties of 1865, particularly with 
respect to divided authority over the tribes. The policy­
makers also continued to concentrate upon the situation on 
the Great Plains, although increasing interest was shown in 
problems in the Southwest. At the same time, growing frontier 
pressures, new crises and unprecedented issues devalued past 
experience as a guide for action.
p
The Army and Navy Journal. Ill (September 9, 1865), 
33* Hereafter this source is cited A&N Jnl.
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PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE AND WAR IN 1866
During the winter of 1865-1866 leaders of the War and 
Interior departments anticipated problems to be met when the 
snow melted and emigrants resumed their march to the frontier. 
Their common objective was to maintain peace with the natives, 
Indian Bureau spokesmen were confident this could best be 
accomplished through conciliatory means, particularly through 
the implementation of existing treaties and others pending 
ratification or to be negotiated. Most military officers were 
skeptical of this approach. When the grass grew, they ex­
pected to have to once more demonstrate the power of the govern­
ment to unruly tribesmen.
General Sherman, commander of the vast territory stretch­
ing from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains and from 
Mexico to Canada had a plan of operations as early as January 
13*^ Settlement would naturally extend as far west as the soil 
supported profitable farming, he figured, and beyond that point 
it would be necessary to designate two or three routes of 
travel and guard them as well as his limited forces allowed.
If travel was restricted to key lines, blockhouses and small 
cavalry patrols might provide at least a degree of security.
When the weather permitted, he would make a tour of military 
posts and the territories to Inventory facilities and deter­
mine where troops were most needed. For economic reasons,though,
3SW (P), 1866, l|.8l.
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he would have to be "circumspect" about building new forts.^
Meanwhile in the Indian Office, Commissioner Cooley was 
contemplating unfinished business in connection with treaties 
made the previous fall with various western tribes. These 
agreements would have to be confirmed before he could decide 
on agency officials, appropriations and supply contracts.
Also, treaty commissions would have to council with a number 
of tribes this coming season. For instance, the Northwestern 
Commission would have to meet with tribes along important 
routes to Montana, It was time, moreover, to organize a 
separate territory for the Five Civilized Tribes and other 
native groups living on the Southern Plains.'’
As the two departments set to work, the durability of 
their Informal division of authority between hostile and 
peaceable Indians was put to the test. Inter-departmental 
relations began, though, on a note of cordiality. Secretary 
Harlan was unhappy that General H. H. Sibley was mustered 
out of the service before completing duties with the Sioux 
commission, but made no Issue of it.^ On February 28 he 
thanked Secretary Stanton for the "material aid" his depart­
ment gave the peace commissioners in 1865* and added,
^"Sherman to Bowers, January 13. 1866, Letters Sent,
Division of the Mississippi (NA, RG 98). Hereafter these 
records are cited Div, Miss. L.S.
'’CIA, 1865, 28, 35,
^Harlan to Stanton, February 23, 1866, D.I.L.S., In­
dian Affairs, NA, RG 75,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
95
I...aa3ure you it will be my desire and careful in­
structions to my subordinates to conform the actions of 
this Department with your purposes, especially with,., 
remote wild tribes, and as far as possible secure such 
unity and harmony of action as to best secure the in­
terests of our country and humanity.?
For the next few months the peacemakers were very active.
By July the Senate bad approved treaties with twenty-three dif-
g
ferent tribes or bands. In the mean time, agreements were 
made with fifteen other tribal groups and forwarded to the 
Senate or Indian Office in preparation for ratification.9 Com­
missioner Cooley was so pleased by these results that he con­
cluded that these treaties made 1866 a "memorable” year.^
While Indian officials and the "Peace Party" were opti­
mistic about Indian treaties, most military leaders and frontiers­
men considered them mere legal fiction. Such agreements were 
often unenforcible for a variety of reasons. The Indians, in 
the first place, seldom fully understood the documents upon 
which they "touched the pen" in exchange for presents. The 
chiefs and headmen who signed were frequently unable or dis­
inclined to bind fellow tribesmen to treaty provisions. Sig­
nificantly, non-treaty Indians, who caused the most diffi­
culty, completely disregarded bargains with the white men by 
other Indians. Furthermore, the government sometimes made uni­
lateral revisions or failed to fulfill its treaty commitments. 
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freely violated the government’s pledges, even some of the 
most conscientious red men acted without regard to agreements 
with tbenWhite Father in Washington,
Various faults of the treaty-making system may be illus­
trated by an examination of negotiations with tribes in the 
upper reaches of the Platte, Missouri and Yellowstone rivers 
in the spring of 1866, Nowhere was it more urgent to estab­
lish peace with the Indians, for Montana was in the midst of 
a gold rush reminiscent of earlier rushes in California and 
Colorado, Aware of this situation, the Indian Bureau organized 
two peace commissions, comprised, is part, of treaty-makers 
who bad visited the Plains in l865>,^
One commission, including Governor Newton Edmunds of 
Dakota, Maj. Gen. S. R, Curtis, Orrin Guernsey and Henry W. 
Reed, was assigned to treat with tribes on the Upper Missouri, 
In May, Curtis and Reed asked General Sherman to provide ra­
tions for their sessions at northern forts. Sherman, who 
disdained such proceedings, at first declared he would be 
damned if he would allow his posts to be eaten out of house 
and home by hungry savages. Later he relented and authorized 
a loan of limited amounts of stores,^ The obstacle overcome, 
the commission traveled to Fort Berthold and signed a treaty
^ I b l d .. 168-176; HR Ex. Doc., No. 165, l+Oth Cong.,
2 sess. (Serial 1339)* 18'^ H’, 2, 11; Frederic L, Paxson, History 
of the American Frontier
12CIA, 1866, 13-34,
13Athearn, ojo. clt., 1^ 9-ij-O.
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with the Arickarees, Gros Ventres and Mandans by which the 
Indians ceded about 61+0,000 acres and granted right of way for 
roads to the mines in return for annuities and other payments. 
Later they went to Port Union and made separate treaties with 
the Assinaboines and Grows, who, for similar considerations, 
ceded lands between the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers and 
agreed not to bother traffic to Helena,"^
On August 25, in a report to Secretary Harlan, the com­
missioners generalized about their experiences. After two 
seasons in Indian country and conferences with sixteen or 
eighteen tribes, they were somewhat sympathetic toward the 
buffalo-hunters of the rolling prairies. To these Indians, 
agriculture was completely "alien" and peace between tribes 
was "quite preposterous,” They relied solely upon game for 
existence and naturally opposed intrusions by trains, stages, 
boats and white people who scattered and diminished their 
sources of subsistence. Moreover, they had earlier been abused 
by "material” changes in a treaty with the government,^ duped 
by persons posing as government representatives, excited by 
false accounts of the Santees* expulsion from Minnesota and 
cheated by whites, including agents of the Indian Bureau, 
Therefore, they yielded the right of way for roads through 
their lands with "some regret” and "strong protests" against
■^CIA, 1866, 13-li+.
^The Port Laramie Treaty of 1851 specified fifty 
annuity payments, but the Senate cut the number to fifteen 
without giving the Indians a choice In the matter,
l6CIA, 1866, 168-170,
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subsequent Invasions* These people, the commission concluded,
were more "sinned against than sinning," and the United States
must henceforth take every precaution against subjecting them
to general hostilities because of raids by a few marauders or
false rumors by "malicious, designing and heedless persons."^7
The second peace commission, consisting of Colonel
Henry E* Maynadier, Superintendent E. B. Taylor, Thomas Wistar
and Colonel R. N. McLaren, journeyed to Port Laramie in June
to negotiate with the Ogallala and Upper Brule Sioux and North-
T A
ern Cheyennes and Arapahoes# A treaty with these Indians 
was top priority because their favorite hunting grounds were 
crossed by the shortest route to the Montana diggings. The 
Bozeman Trail, or Powder River Road, which ran from Port 
Laramie northwest into Powder River country, east of the Big 
Horns and then across the Yellowstone to the gold fields, was 
about four hundred miles shorter than the route by way of Port 
Hall and Virginia City.1^
Numbered among the tribes which gathered at Port Laramie 
to participate in the peace t'lks were some of the most ar­
dent opponents of white expansion* The Cheyennes and Arapahoes 
were not involved in the 1865 treaty made by their southern
brethren, and the Sioux bands were not among those who signed
POtreaties at Fort Sully the previous autumn. Opposed to
17Ibid., 171-173*
l8Ibid., lij..
^Grace R. Hebard and A. R. Brininstool, The Bozeman 
Trail, (Cleveland, 1922), Vol. I, 120-123.
20CIA, 1866, 2, k *
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white encroachments of any sort, many of the red men were much 
disconcerted by the commission's announcement that the Great
Father wished to build forts on the trail through their
4. 21 country.
During the course of the discussions Brig, Gen, Henry
B, Carrington arrived with about seven hundred troops. On
June 17 Carrington was tactlessly introduced to the chiefs as
the "White chief going up to occupy Powder River, the Bighorn
22country and the Yellowstone." This was too much for some 
of the "non-progressive" Sioux, and presently Red Cloud and 
Man-Afraid-of-His-Korses stalked away from the council. Red 
Cloud left, according to one report, brandishing his rifle 
and proclaiming, "In this and the Great Spirit I trust for the 
right."23
Undeterred, the commission distributed food and gifts
and collected the "X's" of a number of Fort Laramie "Loafers,"
2ii
agency Indians and less belligerent Sioux and Cheyennes.
Without waiting for the outcome of the negotiations, much less 
the time-consuming process of ratification, Carrington's command
2^Sen. Ex, Doc. No. 2 1 *  50tb Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 
2J?0lj.), 1887, 3-S; tfebard and Brininstool, on. clt.. 367*
22
Sen. Ex, Doc. No. 33. 50th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 
25010, 1887 , 67“
^^erbert E, Kahler, "Relations Between the United States 
and the Indians Along the Platte River and Bozeman Trail, 
1866-1868," Unpublished Master's Thesis (University of Ne­
braska, 1930), 3J+, Ufff.
^ “The commission reported a "partly perfected" treaty 
with the Cheyennes and a "favorable prospect" of similar 
terms with the Arapahoes, (CIA, 1866, 208),
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left, as ordered, to begin construction of forts on Powder 
River Road. Although the treaty gave ,!as much satisfaction 
to the parties concerned.. .as .. .could have been expected," 
the fort-builders were soon to learn that it did not eliminate 
Indian resistence to their mission.
Like the first commission, the Port Laramie negotia­
tors made some general remarks about the difficulties of 
obtaining effective treaties. Particularly discouraging, 
they asserted, were rumors circulated by persons "interested 
in keeping up an agitation for the purpose of keeping freights 
at high rates." A greater challenge to the permanence of the 
treaty than the refusal of certain Indians to come to terms, 
was the behavior of white men living in Indian country or 
passing through it.2^
With an eye on the Indian Bureau and the peace talks at 
various locations, the Army spent most of the year getting 
reorganized and established on the frontier. Late in Feb­
ruary, General Sherman announced that it would take months 
to recruit and train replacements for "clamorous” volunteers 
who had to be mustered out as soon as winter permitted them 
to come in from scattered o u t p o s t s , L o o k i n g  over his map, 
he also recognized that General Pope's Department of the Mis­
souri was too large and unwieldy to be properly administered.
2%bid.
26Ibid., 208-209.
27'Sherman to J. Sherman, February 23, 1866, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 18.
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In March, at Sherman’s advice, the War Department cut down 
Pope’s command by creating the Department of the Platte for 
the region north of the Platte. General-irKJhief Grant assigned 
Maj. Gen. Philip St, George Cooke, a western veteran, to head
pQ
the new command.
As the weeks progressed, representatives of states in the
upper Mississippi Valley began to exert pressure on the mili-
2°tary to safeguard sundry routes to Montana. ' Still Sherman 
insisted that his ’’long, thin line" could protect only the 
main routes. These would Include the Missouri Diver, the 
Platte River and Bozeman Trail and the Port Pierre road through 
the Black K i l l s , I n  mid-April Maj. Gen, D. B. Sackett was 
directed to examine these routes and posts, settlements and 
natural resources as far west as Idaho, "I regret to say that 
...we do not now possess a force adequate to the wants of this 
extensive region of country," Sherman informed Sackett, "but 
you may assure the people...that their safety and the pro­
tection of their interests will command our attention as soon 
as Congress increases the regular army, and as soon as,.,we 
can act with due regard to the interest of all alike.
The following month General Sherman made a preliminary
Sherman objected to Cooke’s selection, feeling that 
the latter was not firm enough to handle hostile Indians. 
(Sherman to Grant, March 10, 1866, Div. Miss. L.S., NA,RG 9 8).
29
Sherman to G, K. Leet, April 17, 1866, Div. Miss,, 
L.S., NA, RG 9 8.
80
HR Ex. Doc. No. 23. 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1288),
1866, 20.
31Ibld.
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inspection trip of his own. He visited the Kansas and Union 
Pacific railroad construction camps, examined the condition 
of Ports Riley and Kearny and observed emigration along 
various routes. The progress of the railroads pleased him, 
for they "much simplified” the logistical problems of the 
Array. It looked as though most overland traffic would be 
along the Platte River, heavy wagon trains on the south bank 
and lighter conveyances on the north.
While at Port Kearny Sherman conferred with General 
Carrington, who was then organizing newly-inducted troops 
and building crews for his fort-building expedition on Powder 
River Road. Carrington planned to take approximately the same 
route Maj. Gen. Patrick Connor had taken on a foray into Sioux 
country the summer before.33 His assignment was to build four 
forts along the five hundred and forty-five mile trail from 
Bridger's Perry, on the North Platte, to Virginia City, Mon­
tana Territory.
After meeting with Sherman, Carrington and his command 
proceeded with their duties. During July and August, they 
enlarged Camp Connor, renaming it Port Reno, and began work 
on Forts Phil Kearny and C. P. Smith. With the completion 
of these small outposts, the Array believed it could meet most
32Ibid., 2.
33Kahler, '‘Relations Along the Platte River and Boze­
man Trail.”
3ii
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5>0th Cong., 1 sess, (Serial
2501^ ), 18BT7 2.
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exigencies in the region between Port Laramie and Virginia 
City, Events were soon to prove, however, that military pre­
cautions were no more infallible than the Indian Bureau's
35treaties and conciliatory measures.
While these fortifications were taking shape, Army head­
quarters took further steps to improve military control over 
the Plains and Southwest, On August 6 the Division of the 
Mississippi was redesignated the Division of the Missouri and 
divided into four departments. The Department of the Platte 
was split into the departments of the Platte, under Maj. Gen, 
Cooke, and Dakota, under Maj, Gen, Alfred Terry, Further south 
were the departments of Missouri, commanded by Maj, Gen, Win­
field S, Hancock, and Arkansas, headed by Brig, Gen, E, E, C. 
Ord.36
Shortly after this reorganization, General Sherman made 
a tour of the central and western part of his command. Accom­
panied by his brother John, he first journeyed to Port Laramie, 
Enroute, the General became suspicious of rumors about Indian
dangers on the eastern slope of the Rockies, for in five days
37
on the road he saw no Indians, At Port Laramie he gave spe­
cial attention to conditions on the Powder River Road, After 
talking with various Indian and white observers, Sherman con-'■ 
eluded that there was no danger of a general war if the new
^ Ibld,. Thirty-three whites were reported killed in the 
Powder River area before the end of August,
36,SW (P), 1866, 533.
^HR Ex, Doc, No, 23 
1866, 308; Athearn, 0£, cit,, 56-66,
37 . . 39th Cong., 2 sess, (Serial 1288),
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forts were kept in readiness* Most of the older chiefs he 
interviewed made repeated declarations of friendship, hut la­
mented their inability to restrain their young braves. Treaties 
with these tribal leaders, he thought, were just so much
"waste-paper," for neither frontiersmen nor Indians adhered
■59
to them unless their interests were served. '
In September Sherman arrived in Denver and was met by 
local dignitaries who promptly requested a military post to 
protect their thriving little town from bloodthirsty savages.
He emphatically denied these petitions, arguing that Denver 
could raise a thousand men in an hour and should be able to 
protect neighboring settlements.^ This experience helped 
to convince him that the Array had to worry about not only the 
Indians, nawful distances" and interference from Utopians in 
the Indian Bureau, but frontiersmen and interested parties who 
exaggerated Indian dangers.
After visiting Denver, Sherman inspected posts in West­
ern Colorado and New Mexico. The latter territory was a 
peculiar problem. "There appears to be a civil government 
there," he commented,"but as useless as possible, and the 
military is expected to do all the dirty work."^ Not much
38Ibid., 9,
3^Ibid.. 11 j Athearn, ojd. clt.. 69.
^ H R  Ex. Doc., No. 23,' 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1288), 1 8 5 5 , 1 3.
^Ibld-, 15.
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could be done this year, though. The troops would concentrate 
on building up the "great central belt of security,” and next 
year, perhaps, the division would be strong enough to provide 
more comprehensive defense,^
Having obtained much first hand information and some 
strong impressions about the military situation in the West, 
General Sherman returned to his headquarters in St, Louis0 
Most of the year had now been spent in studying frontier needs 
and furnishing stopgap protection for vital settlements and 
overland routes. Now it was time to analyze the reports of 
field commanders and prepare his annual report and recom­
mendations for 1867©
Several other officers had also made inspection tours 
and submitted reports to Sherman's office. Some of their 
findings were similar to those of the division commander.
Brig. Gen, Orville E, Babcock, for example, traveled to the 
Pacific Coast and back without annoyance from hostile Indians,
In Denver, Babcock, too, was pressed for military protection 
by special interest groups, ”0ne man said in my presence," he 
remarked, "'money was never so plenty / a l e * 7  as when there was 
an Indian war.'"^ In the Par West the Indian situation was 
not critical; there were occasional raids, but nothing small 
cavalry units could not handle
Another investigator, Maj, Gen, John Pope, generalized
^Ibid., 16.
^ 3Ibid., k ,  12, 33-31*.
W -Ibld.. 3o
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about the Army’s ability to cope with the Indians of the Plains 
and Southwest and had plans for improving protection for rail- 
road-builders, emigrants, miners and settlers in the coming 
season,^*9 closing, Grant seconded the appeal of his fron­
tier commanders for military control over Indian affairs.
Such a change would save the government money and benefit
50
both the Indians and white people.
Most Indian officials were also engaged in the pre­
paration of annual reports in the fall. Many shared the 
optimism of military commanders about the development of 
Indian affairs over the past several months, '’Peace appears 
to have been the rule, and hostilities the exception, between
the Mississippi river and Rocky mountains," Secretary Brown- 
<1
ing affirmed," Commissioner Cooley concurred, extolling the
52success of the treaty-makers at length, Cooley and his
subordinates also maintained that, for the most part, 1866
was a year of progress In the civilization of agency Indians,
Much work remained to be done, however, especially in the
53Northern Plains and Far Southwest,
Those in charge of the Indian service, at least at the 
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policies of the military branch than vice versa. The Army had 
been quite critical of illicit trade by Indian traders and the 
administration of the agencies. Attention needed to be given 
to both problems, Commissioner Cooley admitted. At the same 
time, he suggested that the military might keep closer check 
on the trade between post sutlers and Indians,'' He also re­
called past misunderstandings about supplies for the peace com­
missioners, but conceded that the War Department "doubtless 
bad good reasons for its course Finally, glossing over
many inter-departmental differences during the past year, the 
retiring Commissioner remarked:
It gives me great pleasure to state that, for the 
most part, indeed almost without exception, the relations 
between the civil and military officers upon the frontier, 
necessarily thrown into connexion in Indian matters during 
the year, have been of the most cordial character, and 
that our superintendents and agents have had frequent 
occasions to express their thanks to military commanders 
for prompt and efficient assistance,
THE FETTERMAN MASSACRE
The War and Interior departments’ annual reports, sub­
mitted to President Johnson late in November, were mutually 
optimistic about Indian relations and more or less sanguine 
toward Interdepartmental relations. This was, however, the 
calm before another civil-military storm. Presently a vigorous 
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publicized Fetterman Massacre of December 21, 1866, near Fort 
Phil Kearny, Montana Territory* Lt, Col. William J. Fetter­
man and a detachment of seventy-six men, two officers and two 
civilians were ambushed and savagely slaughtered by Sioux, 
Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors while enroute to relieve a wood
train. So shocking was this affair that officers of the two
57
departments found it hard to accept official reports.
Colonel Fetterman, a glory-bent recent- arrival at Fort 
Phil Kearny, had previously stood off a large band of Sioux
with a small detachment and had a low regard for their
»
fighting ability. Hence, he eagerly volunteered to command 
the relief party, and, violating orders from the post com­
mander, recklessly led his troops into a well-laid trap. Post 
physician C, M. Hines later related the sickening details of 
the scalped and torn bodies which were brought in "like you 
see hogs brought to market."'’®
General Carrington immediately sent an urgent appeal 
for reinforcements, declaring that his troops had experienced 
a fight "unexampled in Indian warfare."^ In response, De­
partment of the Platte Commander Cooke dispatched Brig, Gen, 
Henry W. Wessells to take charge of Fort Phil Kearny and
57
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 16,39th Cong,, 2 sess. (Serial 
1277), 18£77 9. —  —
< f >
Ibid., 8, 10; Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 33, $0th Cong., 1 
sess, (Serial 250[}.), 18877 ^0, 1+1, 61j.j Hebard and Brinin- 
stool, 0£. cit., I, 303-305; George B. Grinnell, The Fighting 
Cheyennes (^ew York, 1915). ------ -----
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60
conduct a winter campaign against the hostiles. Meanwhile, 
excited accounts of the massacre circulated throughout the 
country.^ Congress, the Indian Bureau and the Army were put 
under great pressure to explain the tragedy, revenge the death 
of Fetterman*s command and eliminate the causes of the out­
break.
Commissioner Lewis V, Bogy's first reaction was that 
the Indians involved were on a "friendly visit" to Fort Phil 
Kearny when met by Colonel Fetterman's force. The latest 
word from that vicinity described the red men as peaceable, 
and there was no apparent reason why they should have suddenly 
gone on the warpath. "Now under these circumstances, the 
question is presented," he asserted, "whether it is not the 
duty of this Office, with the view of putting the blame where
Ap
it properly belongs, to have an investigation." Generaliz­
ing about the Army's treatment of the Indians, Bogy added:
The policy of the Government and particularly of 
the military has heretofore been to chastise the In­
dians when any white men were killed, regardless of the 
fact whether they were assailants, or defending them­
selves, and I am informed that this is the disposition 
of the military in this very case...This policy I con­
ceive to be very mischievous and has heretofore led to 
a great deal of trouble.
Military leaders had various views about the causes of
60The winter campaign proved abortive because of ex­
tremely bad weather. (Dunn, op, clt.. I4.3 0) •
^Hebard and Brininstool, op, pit,, I, 323,
62 — —
Bogy to Browning, January 3, 1867, I.O.R.B. No. 16,
1866-1867, NA, RG 750 
63Ibid.
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the massacre. General Cooke blamed the Interior Department 
for failing to check the sale of arms to the hostiles.^ Gen­
eral Sherman, embarrassed and irate about the disaster, 
criticized General Carrington for taking insufficient pre­
cautions and recommended that he be removed. But he also 
announced, ”We must act with vindictive earnestness against 
the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and chil­
dren. Nothing else will reach the root of this case.”^  
Finally, General Grant, also convinced that the post commander 
was at fault, demanded a thorough investigation.^
While the Army recognized some of its own mistakes, the 
severest censure came from the Indian Bureau. On January 23, 
1867, Commissioner Bogy told Secretary Browning that he was 
certain Military interference had caused the Phil Kearny up­
rising. General Cook had agitated the Indians, he argued, 
by preventing them from buying arms and ammunition for hunt­
ing purposes. General Sherman was also mistaken in his plan
^ S e n . Ex. Doc. No. 16, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1277)* iB577 Athearn, 0£. clt.. 99*
69Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 16. 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1277)> 1867, Jj-J AtFearn, 0£. clt.. 9 9.
66
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 16. 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1277)» 1867, ^be Army had erred in various ways in this 
case. Fresh recruits had been stationed in an area where In­
dian relations were most volatile, Colonel Fetterman was cul­
pable for violating orders and Carrington was too preoccupied 
with fort construction to maintain accurate intelligence on 
the build-up of hostile strength near Fort Phil Kearny. Further­
more, Generals Carrington and Cooke had been at odds for some 
time, and this, too, hampered military operations and prepared­
ness. (Kabler, ^Relations Along the Platte River and Boze­
man Trail,” 72; Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 13, I|.Oth Cong., 1 sess,
(Serial 1277), lHFf, 33.)
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to deal "summarily” with tribesmen outside restricted areas, 
Unmolested overland travel was essential, but the way to ob­
tain this privilege was through treaties, annuities and "judi­
cious management,” not military action, ”1 think the greatest 
difficulty I encounter, in administering the affairs of this
Bureau," Bogy complained, "is the constant interference on
„67
the part of the military with all Indian affairs,"
A few days later Bogy commented further on the massacre. 
Although the military exaggerated the affair, he observed, 
many soldiers had lost their lives and the country demanded 
to know why. Showing his prejudice and underestimation of the 
hostiles’ strength and disposition, Bogy set forth the follow­
ing "explanation":
,,,the Indians, almost in a state of starvation, having 
made repeated attempts at a conference, that they might 
make peace and obtain supplies for their families, and 
the rescinding of the order prohibiting them from ob­
taining arms and ammunition, were rendered desperate, 
and resorted to the strategem which proved too success­
ful, It seems as if the officer commanding could have 
avoided the catastrophe; and it seems also that men thus 
armed could have repelled an attack by all the Indians 
in Western Dakota,
On February Ip, looking beyond the present controversy 
to the general problem of Indian-white relations, Commissioner 
Bogy outlined a program for the future. The first step to­
ward remedying existing difficulties, he suggested, was to 
appoint several commissioners of "high character" to spend the 
coming summer studying the possibility of locating all tribes 
on one or two reservations where they could farm, raise live-
67Sen. Ex, Doc, No. 16, 39th Cong,, 2 sess, (Serial 1277), 
1867, 12-147 —  —  m ,
68Ibld.» 11.
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69stock, attend school and overcome uncivilized habits.
Congress was not to act on this proposal for several months,
but a special commission was soon dispatched to Montana to
investigate the Fetterman affair and the feasibility of new
70treaties with tribes in that territory. While this group 
was engaged in its duties, civil and military authorities 
continued to wrangle over the question of how to manage the 
Indians,
EARLY DEBATE OVER TRANSFER OF THE INDIAN BUREAU
One result of the publicity given the Fetterman disaster 
was a heated congressional debate over which executive de­
partment should control Indian affairs. Periodically, since 
before the Civil War, bills had been introduced to restore 
War Department authority over the Indian Bureau.^ The sub­
ject was widely discussed in 1865, and in 1866 two attempts 
were made to accomplish transfer, or re-transfer, of the 
Bureau, The first came in May, when Senator W. M. Stewart
of Nevada introduced a transfer bill which was killed In the
72
Committee on Indian Affairs0 Later Senator John Sherman of 
Ohio, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and brother of 
General Sherman, tried to attach a transfer amendment to the 
annual Indian appropriation bill. Senators Sherman and 
Stewart engaged in a lively argument with transfer opponent
73-Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess., 1677*
^ C ong. Globe. 39tb Cong., 1 sess., 2613,
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James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin before the Senate defeated the
73amendment by a 21 to 12 vote.
In the early part of 1867 many observers maintained 
that the troubles in Dakota and Montana were not due to mili­
tary provocation, as Commissioner Bogy claimed, but the system 
of divided jurisdiction over the Indians, On January 17 The 
Nation presented a caustic editorial on the recent Indian
hostilities, declaring, nOur whole Indian policy is a system
_7liof mismanagement, and in many parts one of gigantic abuse," ^ 
It would not do to "deny or gloss /over/" the red men’s raids 
and massacres or excuse the outrages which aggravated them. 
Under the present policy neither civilian nor military author! 
ties could be held responsible for the behavior of the nation’ 
wards. This "dlvlsum imperium,t ought to be replaced by War 
Department control. Then the Army could "corral" the tribes­
men, keep them in a "healthful state of non-intercourse," and 
effectively protect vital overland routes, ^
A week later Brig, Gen, Ely S, Parker, later a Com­
missioner of Indian Affairs, gave General Grant a detailed 
list of legislative proposals relating to Indian affairs.
First and foremost on the list, which was to be forwarded to 
the House Committee on Military Affairs, was a recommendation 
that the Indian Office be re-transferred to the War Department
?3lbid., 3506-3^07; 3#2-3559.
7^ h e  Nation, IV (January 17, 1867)» 5l«
7^Ibld,, 51-52.
76
For a full discussion of Parker’s proposals, see Sen, 
Ex. Doc. No. 13. i|.0th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1308), I|.5-ij.9*
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Parker contended that with the military branch in control of
the Indians there would be more forcible and faithful fulfill
ment of treaties, honest expenditure of Indian funds, less
illicit trade and better r elations between government authori
77ties and their charges.
Accompanying Parker’s letter of recommendations was 
one by General John Pope, the Array’s leading theorist on 
Indian management. Pope first pointed out the fallacies of 
divided jurisdiction. Two sets of officials, responsible to 
different superiors, he stated, naturally could not act in 
harmony0 When hostilities occurred (and what constituted 
hostilities was not clear), the military usually ended up 
making fruitless and costly chase. If the Indians were 
cornered, they would-go to some agent and persuade him to pro 
tect them with a peace treaty, MWhlle the army is fighting 
the Indians at one end of the line,” he lamented, "Indian 
agents are making treaties and furnishing supplies at the 
other end, which supplies are at once used to keep up the
,.78
conflict. Transfer the Indians to Army control, and this 
frustrating game would be over, because the natives knew and 
respected force. At the same time, soldiers, more than any 
other group, wanted to keep the peace and avoid "arduous and 
harassing field service," If a military agent cheated the 
Indians, he would quickly be court-martialed. "The military 
are necessary," the General concluded, "— the civil officers
77Ibid., 2*2-1*$.
78Ibld., $0,
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are not; and, as it is essential that the one or the other be
displaced, I cannot see what doubt can exist as to which party 
79must give way."
At the end of January, armed with evidence such as the
letters of Parker and Pope, advocates of transfer in the House
of Representatives sought to achieve their goal by amending a
80
Senate bill to reorganize the Indian service. The bill in 
question was basically the handiwork of Senator J, R, Doo­
little’s 1869 joint special committee on the condition of the 
8l
Indian tribes. Among other things, it called for the estab­
lishment of five inspection boards with circuit court authority,
division of the Indian country into inspection districts, and
82
annual investigations by the boards*
Leading the fight to amend this bill were Representa­
tives Robert C. Schenck of Ohio, Chairman of the Committee on 
Military Affairs, John A. Kasson of Iowa, William A. Darling of 
New York and Andrew S. Sloan of Wisconsin. They appealed to 
the emotions and providence of the House, presenting lurid 
accounts of Indian barbarities and characterizing the administra­
tive procedures of the Indian Bureau as corrupt, wasteful and
79Ibid., ij.9-^ 2.
^°Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess. 898.
SlGeneral Parker’s proposals were also introduced by 
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, a long-time advocate of 
transfer. The section pertaining to transfer, however, was 
dropped in the Senate Military Committee, because it was known 
that the House planned to amend the Doolittle bill. (Cong.
G l o b e , 39th Cong., 2 sess., 1677; Garfield, "The Indian Ques­
tion, 31.)
Sen. Rpt. No. 196, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279), 
1867, 8-9c
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brother John that he soon expected to be very busy taking 
charge of the Indians,
But now the bill was returned to a tougher arena, the 
Senate, Some of the same leaders who defeated similar pro­
posals in 1866 were prepared to present a barrage of reasons 
why the Army should not control the Indian service. The most 
formidable opponent was Senator Doolittle, a ten-year veteran 
of the Committee of Indian Affairs, He could be counted upon 
to cite evidence from the voluminous testimony appended to the
O O
joint committee report which had just been completed.
The Doolittle Committee had given extensive considera­
tion to the question of civil or military control of Indian
89
affairs. It reported that arguments on each side were "not 
without force,'’ Army administration would eliminate inter-de- 
partmental conflicts, facilitate necessary operations against 
hostile bands and provide agents who could be court-martialed 
for dishonesty. But agency supervision required personnel who
O
Sherman to J, Sherman, February 1, 1867, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 20,
88
The report of the Joint Special Committee appointed 
under the joint resolution of March 3, 1865, was accompanied 
by a five hundred and twenty-seven page appendix, (Sen. R-pt.
No. 156, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279),
fiq
7The joint committee also concluded: first, that the 
tribes, except in Indian Territory were rapidly decreasing in 
population because of disease, intemperance, wars, white en­
croachment and the ’’irrepressible conflict between superior 
and an inferior race1’; second, that most Indian wars were caused 
by white aggression; and third, that the evils of the Indian 
system could ’’never be remedied until the race is civilized or 
shall entirely disappear.” To alleviate interim abuses, though 
Congress was asked to provide an inspection system of the type 
in the bill now before the Senate. (Ibid., 308)0
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were not subject to orders which might suddenly take them else
where. Besides, soldiers were notorious for demoralizing
Indian women and precipitating costly wars, and Indian treatie
and lands were closely connected with other services under the
90Interior Department. In the final analysis, the committee 
decided, the current system of divided control was not without 
its advantages.
The inconveniences arising from the occasional con­
flicts and jealousies between officers appointed under the 
Interior and War Departments are not without some bene­
fits also; to some extent they serve as a check upon each 
other; neither are slow to point to the mistakes and a- 
buses of the other* It is therefore proper that they 
should be independent of each other, receive their 
appointments from and report to different heads of de­
partments. Weighing this matter and all the arguments 
for and against the proposed change, your committee are 
unanimously of the opinion that the Indian Bureau should 
remain where it is
Besides the curious argument for divided control over 
the Indians as a check upon administrative abuses, the anti- 
transfer faction of the Senate presented numerous reasons why 
the military might not be depended upon to improve Indian- 
white relations. The Army, they contended, often spent too 
much for supplies and transportation, and its officers were 
not bonded like civil agents. Moreover, War Department con­
trol in the pre-l81|9 period had not been effectual, and many 
Indian chiefs opposed a resumption of military rule. Against 
these considerations, transfer opponents, led by Nevada’s 
Stewart, stressed the pride and responsibility of military
9°Sen. Rpt. No. l£6 , 39th Gong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279), 
91Ibld.. 7 .
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officers, the ill-effects of joint jurisdiction and the preee-
92dent of military control in the South, But a majority
favored the status quo, and, on February 22, transfer was
93again rejected by a vote of 2i| to 13,
The defeat of the transfer amendment brought a sigh of 
relief from the Interior officials and their humanitarian 
supporters, but negative reactions from military leaders and 
frontiersmen. Civilian authorities, busy negotiating new trea­
ties even while the congressional debate was in progress, were 
now hopeful that the coming season would bring a flowering of
Q|i
civilization by tribes recently assigned to reservations. On 
the other band, western commanders now expected further frus­
trations as their little army resumed its police duties in 
Indian country. General Sherman, already agitated by recent 
reports that the Indian Bureau was allowing its traders dis­
cretion in selling arms and ammunition, struggled to retain 
his composure, "It simply postpones the agony," he wrote John 
Sherman, "But I don’t intend to distress myself, but will try 
and let the Indian Bureau fulfill their destiny. We surely 
cannot be held responsible for the peace of the Frontier if 
it is adjudged we are trespassers everywhere in Indian country 
and have no right to pursue and prevent collision and
------- 92---------
Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess., 1712-1719
93
Ibid., 1720, Many senators opposed transfer because 
they regarded it as a proposal designed to pressure the upper 
house into relinquishing its treaty power over the Indian 
"nations." See below.
9k
For a discussion of treaties negotiated in February 
and March, see CIA, 1867, 35, Charles J, Kappler, Indian Affairs: 
Laws and Treaties , (Washington, 190i|), Vol. II, 951-976.
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troubles,” Before long the peace-makers and war-makers were 
busy at their respective tasks,
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST
In the early post-Civil War period the government’ 3 
Indian policy was geared especially to meet problems of tribes 
inhabiting the Great Plains, During the debate over transfer 
of the Indian Office to the War Department in February, 1867, 
however, considerable attention was given to civil-military 
relations in a second trouble zone, the Southwest, There the 
military played a prominent role, because many warlike bands 
persistently preyed upon mining camps, settlements and over­
land transportation. In New Mexico, by 1866, the Mescaleros, 
Navajoes, Mahuache and Capote Utes and peaceable Pueblos were 
assigned to reservations, and only a few groups, such as the 
Gila Apaches, were on the warpath. But the administration of 
Indian prisoners at Bosque Redondo Reservation caused many 
headaches for officials of both the War and Interior depart­
ments, Meantime, in Arizona, where until 1866 "a definite 
policy,..remained to be charted,” there were differences of
opinion about how to deal with the warlike Hualapais, Yava-
q6
pais, Mimbrenos and other wild Apache bands.
The situation at Bosque Redondo, officially under War
^Sherman to J. Sherman, February 21;, 1867, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 20.
96 
Ralph Hedrick Ogle, Federal Control of the Western 
Apaches, 181;8-1S66 (Albuauerque, 19^0) , 5>7;CIA, lff66, 27-28, 
31-33J CIA, 1867, 10-13.
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Department control until November, 1867, was a favorite topic 
with those who opposed military control of Indian affairs.
This small reservation was established near Port Sumner during 
the Civil War to accommodate Mescalero and Navajo prisoners
97brought in by volunteers under Maj. Gen. James H. Carleton. 
While guarding the reservation, soldiers began the '’noble ex­
periment” of teaching the Indians to irrigate, farm and improve
98
their livestock. As critics observed, though, the cost of 
food, clothing and labor for the seven thousand Navajoes was 
about $1,£00,000 a year as compared to less than $2,500 ,000
99for all the Indians under the control of the Indian Bureau,
Bosque Redondo was not only expensive; it was an admin­
istrative problem. Although the Army had final authority, a 
civilian agent was supposed to handle much of the paperwork, 
"The division of authorities makes trouble constantly," Com­
missioner Cooley complainedo^^ Civil authorities frequently 
found fault with the Army administrators, and one superin­
tendent, Michael Steck, even refused to send an agent to the 
reservation.^^ To further confuse matters, "anti-Bo3que"
citizens of New Mexico Territory, continually agitated for the
TO?removal of the Indians.xwc- The tribesmen, too, disliked the
^ S e n . Rpt. No. 156, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279), 
1867, 101-102.
98CIA, 1866, 1^8-150.
99,k Ibig.. ll|6. The Indian Bureau’s appropriation for 1866 
was $2,i}.68,656,00. For a discussion of graft and corruption in 
Army expenditure of funds at Bosque Redondo, see Edward E. Dale, 
The Indians of the Southwest (Norman, 19i|9)* note, 58.
f S f m ,  1866, 31.
lulDale, o£* clt.. 56.
102cia, 1866, 131.
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location and were not quieted until the reservation was finally 
abandoned in 1868, ^^
Meanwhile, in Arizona expediency governed the action of 
both Army and Indian service officials. Early in 1866 Maj,
Gen0 Irwin McDowell, commander of the Department of Cali­
fornia, ordered a series of expeditions to ’’overawe” the 
Apaches, hoping they would surrender and settle on reserva­
tions, This policy was criticized, on one hand by Superin­
tendent of Indian Affairs George W, Leihy, who believed such 
operations "fruitless” and expensive, and, on the other hand, 
by territorial officials and residents who wanted an "extermina­
tion policy."10^
Late in 1866, after a campaign deep into Tonto country, 
Colonel Guido Ilges of Port Grant signed a peace treaty with 
headmen of the Aravapa, Tonto and Pinal Apache bands. These
Indians agreed to live at peace on a designated reservation
10<
except when hunting or gathering food, ^ But high-ranking 
officers of both the War and Interior departments rejected the 
treaty. General McDowell reprimanded Ilges for making "ir­
regular, injudicious and embarrassing" commitments, declaring 
that Army officers could negotiate only armistices,
^■®^Por conflicting reports on physical conditions at 
Bosque Redondo see Ibid,, 131-1^2 and Dale, 0£, clt.. 57-58.
10k
Ogle, 0£, clt,, 58-60,
10^Ibld,. 62-6 3.
Ibid., 63« Although abortive, this treaty encouraged 
Indian officials to make other attempts to conciliate hereto­
fore intractable Apaches,
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In the early part of 1867 inter and intra-departmental 
differences continued to plague government-Indian relations. 
Superintendent George W. Dent, General Grant’s brother-in- 
law, favored more vindictive punishment of the red men than 
the department commander was prepared to deliver. Dent advo­
cated ’’active, offensive, persistent, combined and simultaneous 
war,” not ’’ostensible d e m o n s t r a t i o n . S o m e  district com­
manders, such as General J. E. Gregg of the District of Pres­
cott and Upper Colorado, wanted to make war on all Indians 
off specified reservations, but General McDowell opposed 
’’wholesale war against a large body of friendly Indians, 
facing starvation because of congressional negligence, ”^®8 
Subsequently, Army operations were limited to minor "spirited” 
engagements which, in tbs opinion of Acting Commissioner 
Charles Mix, did little to improve the state of affairs,^-®9
FURTHER DIFFICULTIES ON THE PLAINS
During the early months of 1867 General Sherman was 
again preparing to defend emigration and overland trans­
portation in the Division of the Missouri. This year he 
planned to protect four principal routes: a new road from
Minnesota to Montana, the Platte Valley road, the Smoky Hill
^®^Ibid., 65o Dent arrived at his post on December 19, 
1866, to find that his predecessor had been murdered by 
Apaches. Undoubtedly this experience affected the policy 
he proposed.
108Ibid., 66.
109CIA, 1867, 1 0.
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trail to Colorado and New Mexico, and the Arkansas route through 
Kansas to Port Union, New Mexico, Travel would be restricted 
in accordance with an order put out by General Pope, Among 
other things, there would be specific rendezvous points for 
each route, trains would have to consist of at least twenty
wagons and thirty armed men, and escorts would be furnished
c
111
upon formal notification,^^ In the absence of other forms of
law, the Army would govern and "use the musket pretty freely,' 
Sherman had other plans, too, "I will remark," he 
affirmed, "that defensive measure. / J i s J  will not answer
Tip
against Indians," There are many hostiles northwest of 
Port Laramie and on the Central and Southern Plains who needed 
to be brought to terms, chastised perhaps, for crimes and vio­
lations of treaties. General Alfred Sully with about two 
thousand troops would deal with the hostile Sioux and Northern 
Cheyennes and Arapahoes in the northern theater and General 
W, S. Hancock with the Cheyennes and Kiowas in the South, 
Certainly military officers were the proper judges of Indian 
hostility; civil agents did not live among the roaming bands. 
There was but one effective way to treat warlike red men, 
Sherman concluded. Troops "must get among them, and must 
kill enough of them to inspire fear, and then conduct the
•^^ S e n . Ex, Doc. No, 2, l^ Oth Cong,, 1 sess, (Serial
1308), 1867, 2-£7 ~
1:L1Sherman to G. K. Leet, March 1 3, 1867, Letters Re­
ceived, Military Division of the Missouri, Special Pile, NA, 
RG 98, Hereafter these records are cited Div. Mo. L,R#
112Ibid.
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remainder to places where Indian agents can and will reside 
among them, and be held responsible for their conduct
The implementing of these plans, however, proved dif­
ficult First of all, there was the ever-present problem of 
intervention by the Interior Department, which was hesitant to 
recognize a state of hostilities. In some cases agents seemed 
to fabricate reasons for wanting a truce to parley with the 
natives. "So long as the Indian Agents have the disburse­
ment of annuities,” Sherman exclaimed, "Indians are meant to 
be killed, and citizens are forced to expose themselves 
It would much "simplify the game," he told Secretary Stanton 
in June, if the President would consign the nomadic plains 
Indians to the Army, As matters stood, fifty braves wandering 
between the Platte and Arkansas rivers could "checkmate" 
three thousand soldiers by forcing them to guard every train,
lid
station and railroad crew, To really do an effective 
job, the military ought to have five thousand mounted volun­
teers and authority to invade north of the Platte and south 
of the Arkansas, where the hostiles took refuge from Army 
patrols
Handicapped by a shortage of manpower, division of 
authority and treaty restrictions, the Army was also harassed
•^ Ibid.
^■^Sherman to J. Sherman, April 3, 1867, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 21,
1-^Sherman to Stanton, June 17, 1867, I.O.L.R., Cen­
tral Superintendency, Vol. I,
^^Sherman to Grant, June 2£, 1867, Div. Mo. L.R., 
Special File, NA, RG 98.
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by tha actions and antagonism of territorial leaders and resi
dents. Frontiersmen never seemed to be satisfied that the
military was doing enough to protect their settlements and
embryonic enterprises. Governors, such as Acting Governor
Thomas Francis Meagher of Montana Territory- were constantly
11?sounding the alarm and demanding more regulars. Sometimes
the complaint was that Army officers did not understand or 
appreciate the dangers facing border towns. For example, a 
citizen of Denver who grieved the plight of his "unfortunate 
and used up community” sarcastically advised General Sherman 
against judgments based upon "flying visits” to the West,^® 
In addition, westerners often agitated the tribes or spread 
disconcerting false rumors about military disasters, such as 
the "Fort Buford m a s s a c r e L i k e  it or not, the terri­
tories bad to provide much of their own defense in 1867,
While Sherman and his subordinates wrestled with the 
problems of guarding an extensive frontier, officials of the 
Indian Bureau, temporarily caught up in their treaty-making, 
busied themselves with sundry routine duties. The letting of 
contracts for annuities, supplies and miscellaneous purchases 
the appointment of agency officials, the planning of building
■'"^Athearn, op,, cit., 139-li|iu 
XlS
M. K, Delano to Sherman, June lip, 1867, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 21,
119There was a false rumor in the spring of 1867 that 
the entire force at Fort Buford, Dakota Territory,had been 
wiped out. (Robert G. Athearn, "The Fort Buford 'Massacre,'" 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLI /March, 195^7,
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educational and economic programs and the handling of stacks 
of correspondence and records were unglamorous but vital as­
pects of federal Indian relations. At remote reservations, 
agency employees, most of them honest, underpaid and over­
worked, labored to teach their subjects to sow wheat or raise
cattle, speak English, care for the sick or improve sanita-
120
tion and overcome superstitions and vices.
During the spring, special commissioners visited the 
Northern plains to inspect the progress and problems of the 
government’s wards. Father P, J, DeSmet, who traveled to 
various agencies along the Missouri, found most of the Indians 
well-disposed and interested in "stirring up the ground," 
Likewise, Generals Parker and Sully were gratified by the be­
havior and ambition of certain tribes in Nebraska and Dakota 
1 PITerritory, Encouraged by such reports and signs of im­
proved relations under a policy of conciliation, Interior 
Department spokesmen expressed a continuing concern over in­
discriminate military expeditions. Secretary Browning set 
the tone for critics of the war policy, maintaining that the 
Army should confine itself to the protection of roads and let
civilian negotiators take care of the establishment of peace
122between the Platte and Arkansas,
120CIA, 1867, 30-37ff.
121Ibid., 2l].l-2i^ .
•^^Browning to ott°, June 3, 1867, Div, Mo, L,R.,
Special File, HA, EG 98,
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THE PAWNEE PORK INCIDENT AND 
ESTABLISHMENT OP THE PEACE COMMISSION
Relations between the civil and military branch were 
again strained by an incident which took place about thirty 
miles west of Port Larned, Kansas, in the spring of 1867* On 
April 19, after unsuccessful attempts to council with Southern 
Cheyenne and Sioux leaders, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, 
commander of the Department of the Missouri, ordered his 
troops to destroy their villages on Pawnee Pork. Two hundred 
and seventy-two lodges were burned or removed and great 
quantities of supplies and equipment were destroyed or con­
fiscated as punishment for the Indians* "bad faith.”123 
a result of this arbitrary action, Hancock was criticized 
by Indian officials and high-ranking Army officers alike*
The details of this affair were later revealed by a 
congressional investigation. For months the government had 
attempted to persuade the Cheyennes to leave the vicinity of 
the Republican and Smoky Hill rivers in compliance with their 
treaty of October, 1865* But many influential red men had 
not signed that agreement and refused to be bound by it.^*
While no serious difficulties arose in 1866, settlers and 
military officers complained of the presence of armed tribes­
men in the path of Kansas Pacific construction crews* Ulti­
mately, frontier pressure led Congress to appropriate #150,000
Ex. Doc. No. 2k0, ijlst Cong., 2 sess* (Serial li*25)> 
1870, 29, 657 B5*
■^■^Grinnell, ££. clt., 2ij5-2lf6.
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for a military expedition into the Central Plains, and in
February, 1867, General Sherman directed Hancock to put his
troops in readiness.12'’
Hancock sent advance notification of his plans to
Colonel E. W, Wynkoop, agent for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes,
and Colonel J. R. Leavenworth, agent for the Kiowas and Co-
manches. The expedition, he explained, did not necessarily
mean war, but was intended to "show the Indians,,,we are able
to chastise any tribes who may molest people who are traveling
126
across the plains," Thus, with professions of peace —  if
the Indians wanted it —  Hancock marched a fourteen-hundred-
127man force to Fort Larned in early April,
On the 12th, after delays caused by bad weather, a few 
Cheyenne leaders came to the post and listened to the soldiers 
demands that they leave Kansas, Professing their intention 
to remain at peace, the chiefs then returned to Pawnee Fork, 
where their people and a party of Sioux were camped. There­
upon Hancock, disappointed by the turn-out for his council, 
led his command to the vicinity of the Indians’ villages. Be­
fore further talks could be held, though, many of the red men 
hastily packed up and fled. The tribal spokesmen apologized, 
saying that their followers feared another Chivington massacre
12^
£bid,, 2)4.6 ; Sherman to Grant, February 18, 1867> 
Telegrams Received, Office of the Secretary of War, 1867, NA, 
RG 9 8, Hereafter these records are cited W.D.T.R.
126HR Ex. D o c . Ho . 2liQ. 1+1 Cong., 2 sess. (Serial llj.25) 
1870, 92.
127
A 'Grinnell, o£0 cit., 21+7-2)4.8 .
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But Hancock insisted that they were anxious to get away be­
cause they had been plotting to make war and sent Maj. Gen# 
George Custer with a detachment of cavalry to try to cut off 
their escape*
Custer had a fruitless chase. He found only the results 
of recent raids by a war-party —  several murdered whites and 
burned buildings. Although there was no specific proof,
Custer informed his commander that there was "no doubt” that
the Indians from Pawnee Fork were responsible for these
129crimes, Hancock then proceeded to destroy the villages, 
having previously written,- "It is a cheap victory to burn 
this camp, but I feel it a.e imperative duty to do so. Its 
destruction will be of great loss to the Indians, unless the 
Indian Department restores it, as I understand it has done in 
other cases heretofore,n^30
Hancock was right about the reaction to be expected 
from the Interior Department. He was severely criticized by, 
among others, Acting Commissioner Charles E. Mix and Agents 
Leavenworth and Wynkoop. In Wynkoop1s opinion, for instance, 
the expedition had been a "mistake" from start to finish. The 
troops had given every indication of re-enacting the Sand 
Creek massacre to the very Indians who recalled that in­
famous affair most vividly. In short, Wynkoop commented:
-L28
HR Ex, Doc. No. 240. i^ Ist Cong., 2 seas. (Serial 
1425), 1870, Fo-82}' Grinnell, op. cit.. 248ff.
129
HR Ex. Doc. No, 2k0, i).lst cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1425), 1870, £ 9.
13°Ibid., 67, 85.
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The nation knows and I know who General Hancock is —  
know him for the good, brave, faithful soldier, who has 
won the proud position he now holds through gallant and 
meritorious services; but the Indians were not aware of 
General Hancock's antecedents, and had no means of dis­
criminating between him and Colonel Chivington, or dis­
tinguishing the man from monster0131
Such censure greatly irritated Hancock, He defended 
his actions in a letter to Army headquarters, maintaining that 
the Indians were in effect at war. Nothing had been shown to 
prove that they were not to blame for the crimes discovered 
by General Custer, In addition, a long list of unprovoked 
murders and depredations in 1866 and 186? justified the punish­
ment which had been meted out. Lastly, because the peaceable 
intentions of the expedition had been announced, there was no 
excuse for the behavior of either the Indians or their agents,^32 
In General Sherman’s view, the military report on the 
Pawnee Pork affair was ’’satisfactory.”^33 yet General Han­
cock later heard rumors that the division commander had
1 %
changed his mind and requested another vote of confidence,
Even more distressing to Hancock, though, was General Grant’s
reaction. Grant rejected his explanation and proposed to
reimburse all the Cheyennes and Sioux who could not be con-
13^victed of specific crimes against white people,
131lbid,, 4,-26, 37-41.
132Ibid,, 111-118,
133sherman to Leet, July 1, 1867, Letters Received, Ad­
jutant General’s Office, NA, RG 94, Hereafter these records are 
AGO, L,R.
-^Hancock to Sherman, May 24, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23,
-^Hancock to Grant, May 23, 1867; Grant to Hancock,
May 23, 1867, Div, Mo, Special Pile, Selected Documents on 
Indian Affairs, 1867-1869, NA, RG 9 8.
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In the wake of VTar-Interior contention sover the Pawnee 
Pork episode, Congress took steps to secure peace and more 
systematic management of Indian affairs. On July 8, the 
Senate requested the Interior Department to submit reports 
and information pertaining to existing difficulties and the 
disposition of different tribes, along with suggestions on 
how to achieve a ”speedy termination of pending hostilities 
and prevent Indian wars in the future,” A few days later 
Acting Secretary W. T, Otto forwarded investigation reports 
on the Fetterman and Pawnee Pork incidents and recommendations 
by the new Commissioner, N, G. Taylor,
The report on the Port Phil Kearny affair exonerated
all living military officers, but questioned General Cooke’s
judgment in not sending more troops to the unsettled Powder 
137River region. It was especially critical of certain non- 
military groups which seemed to encourage Indian wars. 
Freighters, contractors and speculators wanted hostilities, 
because they profited from shipping army supplies. For ex­
ample, Union Pacific Railroad officials and employees favored 
war, since the government paid two cents a pound for freight 
and ten cents a mile for troops carried from Omaha to North 
Platte, In fact, two-thirds of the Union Pacific’s business
T oA
was with the War Department,
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Maj. Gen, John B, Sanborn's report on the treatment of 
the Sioux and Cheyennes at Pawnee Pork was a denunciation of 
General Hancock, western interest groups and the war policy. 
Imagining how Hancock’s speeches may have sounded to the rela­
tives of Sand Creek massacre victims, Sanborn stated, "You 
Indians permitted our army to visit your villages, supposing 
it friendly, and we killed your women and children and old 
men, captured and drove away your ponies, burned your lodges, 
How^.we are going to visit your village again, and if you do 
not trust us, and dare leave before our arrival, we will burn 
it up and wage a war of extermination against you."1^  This 
"revolting" war policy was not in the public interest, he con­
tended j it was a mockery practiced by contractors, ranchers 
and certain military leaders. The argument for war to safe­
guard travel and transportation was an "absurdity," for the 
prerequisite of safety was peace,
Summing up these and other reports, Commissioner Taylor 
further deprecated the use of force. Most Indian troubles 
could be traced to white injustices, he argued. To prevent 
a tragic and expensive general war, the government must ter­
minate military operations and conclude new, comprehensive 
t r e a t i e s , T h e s e  agreements should consolidate all the 
tribes on a few large reservations where the natives could be 
educated, trained to provide for themselves through industrial
139Ibld., 112.
^ I b i d . ,  11-113.
^Ibid., 1-5.
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pursuits and prepared for citizenship. It was advisable to 
locate these reservations north of Nebraska and west of the 
Missouri for Indians living north of the Platte and east of 
the Rocky Mountains; south of Kansas and west of Arkansas for 
Indians living south of the Platte and east of Arizona and 
at other selected points west of the mountains for far west­
ern tribes
Congress was impressed by Taylor’s suggestions. Most 
of his proposals were encompassed in the act of July 20 which 
authorized President Johnson to appoint a special commission
•> I a
to negotiate peace treaties with hostile tribes. The re­
nowned ’’Peace Commission” was to include Commissioner Taylor, 
John B. Henderson, chairman of the Senate Committee on In­
dian Affairs, S. P. Tappan, Maj. Gen, Sanborn, Maj• - >n.
' William S. Harney, Lt, Gen, Sherman and Maj. Gen. A, H, Terry.
This group, destined to spend many weeks in Indian country in
1867 and 1868, was instructed tot
...make and conclude with said /Eiostile/ bands of tribes 
such treaty stipulations, subject to the action of the 
Senate, as may remove all just causes of complaint on 
their part, and at the same time establish security for 
person and property along the lines of railroad now being 
constructed to the Pacific and other thoroughfares of 
travel to the Western Territories, and such as will most 
likely insure civilization for the Indians and peace 
and safety for the whites.*45
The degree to which these objectives were accomplished would be
a decisive factor in future relations of the War and Interior
departments with the red men,
I^bid., 5-6.
l!+3i5 Stat. L t , 17.
^Ml-Maj. Gen. Christopher C. Augur filled in for Sherman 
on various occasions. See next chapter,
i^5l5 Stat. L., 17.
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CHAPTER POUR
OUR MOST SOLEMN DUTY 
JULY, 1867, TO MARCH, 1869
For nearly three hundred years our people have 
blundered on this Indian question.••eFame consists 
in doing what has not been done before....
(Samuel P. Tappan, July 20, 1868)
It is more humane and economical to subsist 
Indians than to fight them. A wise and just policy 
will soon relieve us from either necessity.
(Secretary 0. B. Browning, November 30, 1868)
For more than two years after the close of the Civil 
War, the Interior and War departments pursued semi­
independent, stopgap programs toward the hostile Indians 
who challenged westward expansion. The small western army 
sent out expeditions, built forts and struggled to police 
the principal overland thoroughfares and settlements. Repre­
sentatives of t-he Indian Bureau counciled with tribal leaders, 
concluded treaties and promised to subsist the natives who 
moved to scattered reservations where they were less likely to 
collide with white men. But neither approach to the Indian 
question was more than partially successful, and tragic, 
costly conflicts continued, Moreover, as Indian disasters 
recurred, the two departments were often openly critical of 
each other and the Indian ^system.”
Meeting in special session in the summer of l867>
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Congress was under great pressure to find an effective means 
of pacifying the warlike red men of the Plains and Southwest, 
President Johnson called for an early termination of frontier 
wars, westerners clamored for more protection and freedom to 
expand and easterners and humanitarians demanded justice for 
the natives and restraint upon the Army, Acting upon the re­
commendations of Indian officials and special commissions, the 
law-makers passed a bill which was supposed to serve the 
interests of all parties, including the Army and the Indians,
The Act of July 20, 1867* provided for the appointment 
of a civil-military commission to work toward three principal 
goals: first, elimination of the causes of conflict with the
Indians; second, greater security for frontier settlements and 
railroads being extended toward the mountains and, third, per­
manent settlement of the natives on small reservations where 
they might take up the white man’s ways,"^ In theory, this 
program would bring peace between the races, help the Indians 
to achieve a higher level of civilization, open new regions 
for settlement and travel, improve the administration of In­
dian affairs and relieve the Army of many dangerous and onerous 
responsibilities. In practice, for a variety of reasons, it 
was of limited success.
Many of the shortcomings of the government's efforts 
to solve the Indian problem by conciliatory means are beyond 
the scope of the following discussion. Consideration will be
^Stat. L,, CIA, 1868, 26, See also Browning to Tavlor, 
August 87"TH67, D.I.L.S., NA, RG 75,
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given to civil-military Indian relations during the last twenty 
months of' the Johnson administration. Traditionally this has 
been interpreted as a period in which the War and Interior 
departments resolved their differences and agreed upon the 
principle that it was cheaper and more effective to feed hos­
tile Indians than to fight them. Actually, the truce between 
the two branches was very tenuous, and bickering continued 
even while their representatives worked together on the peace 
commission. Shortly before Grant entered the White House, 
the inter-departmental controversy became particularly heated. 
While Commissioner N, G. Taylor insisted that the nation
p
could fulfill its Mmost solemn duty” of uplifting the red 
men only through civil control, advocates of military control 
disagreed and made another concerted effort to transfer the 
Indian Bureau to the War Department.
THE PEACE COMMISSION OF 1867-1868
To a large extent, the future of federal Indian rela­
tions and administration depended upon the views of the 
heterogeneous group selected to serve on the Indian Peace 
Commission. At first glance, there was more or less a balance 
of civil and military representation, with three civilians, 
known to be Indian sympathizers; two —  later three -- active 
military officers who favored a coercive policy; and two 
former military officers believed to have divided opinions about
2CIA, 1868, 19.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
138
the tactics to be used against the wild tribesmen of the West. 
As it turned out, the commission, by a split vote, supported 
a conciliatory policy and civil administration until the 
course of events changed their minds.
Heading the commission, which was to be engaged in its 
various duties for about fifteen months, was Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Nathaniel G. Taylor. Taylor, a Methodist mini­
ster by profession, was described by some as a man with a 
”warm heart” and sympathy for the red men but criticized by 
others as a ”simpering White House courtier."^ His humani­
tarian inclinations and concern for his position made him the 
leader of the faction that voted for liberal treatment of the 
Indians and civil control. Another ardent, at times fanatical, 
friend of the Indians was Samuel P. Tappan of Colorado. A 
transplanted Bostonian, Tappan was described by one author 
as a "mysteriously inclined g e n t l e m a n . H e  had long been
identified with the Indian reformers, and there was no doubt
5
how he would vote.
^Carl C. Rister, Border Command: General Phil Sheridan 
in the West (Norman, 194H-), 571 quotes from '"Bohemian" of the 
Leavenworth Bulletin. See also A&N Jnl., V(December 7.
1867), 251.
^Rister, c>£. clt., 57*
^In 1876 Tappan explained his views on Indian affairs to a 
reporter for the Philadelphia Daily Press, indicating that his 
sympathy for the red man dated from his own misfortunes as an 
early "free-stater" in Lawrence City, Kansas. In i860 he moved 
to Colorado and, during the Civil War, commanded volunteers at 
different posts in the Indian country. Colonel Tappan observed 
the Htes, Comanehes, Apaches, Cheyennes and other tribes during 
this tour of duty. In 1865 he appeared before a joint committee 
of Congress and proposed a bill *to establish civil law among 
the Indians similar to the "English system” used in Canada.
The scheme received support in the Senate but was blocked by the ;
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A third Peace Party member of the commission was Senator John 
B. Henderson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs and author of the bill creating the commission, A 
wealthy bachelor-lawyer, Henderson was the ”student" of the 
group; while others nfelt inclined to indulge in barroom philo­
sophy, he was up and stirring, taking notes, receiving and 
analyzing evidence.”^ The Army and Navy Journal stated of 
him, ”.,.tbe peace makers in the East may thank their stars
•7
that he was on the Peace Commission,”
Aligned against these civilian Indian enthusiasts were
three generals characterized as ”true members of their pro-
,,8
fession —  alert, watchful, meticulous." Leading this group 
was Lt, Gen, Sherman, commander of the Division of the Mis­
souri and opponent of ’’bribing” treaties, Sherman served on
the commission because be was detailed by the President and 
q
General Grant, Not an advocate of all-out Indian extermina­
tion, as some maintained, he nonetheless was ready to use force 
against marauders who defied the government, molested travel and
^(continued) Military Committee of the House, While
on the Peace Commission, Tappan’s favorite plan was a separate
Indian Department, Failing in this and disappointed in efforts
to conciliate the hostiles, he later advocated military con­
trol, (Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 5>3> l+^th Cong., 3 sess. /Serial
183^7* 203-21277" —  —
^Rister, op,. cit.. £7; Athearn, op. clt.. 172.
7A & N Jnl., V (December 7, 1867), 2£l.
O
Rister, op. cit., £7*
9SW, 1868, 381.
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endangered the construction of the Pacific railroads Siding
with Sherman was Maj, Gen, Alfred H. Terry, commander of the
Department of Dakota, Terry, a handsome, forty-year-old
bachelor and former law student at Yale, had an outstanding
military record and a reputation for getting along with other
Army leaders. He shared Sherman's views about the necessity
of whipping intractable red men before coming to t e r m s , T h e
third professional soldier was Maj, Gen, Christopher C, Augur,
commander of the Department of the Platte, Called upon at
first to substitute for Sherman at certain talks, Augur later
12served as a regular member of the group. He, too, believed
the War Department should control the Indians and that force
13was necessary where wilder bands were concerned, .
Tne two commissioners who held the ttswing vote” were 
retired General William S. Harney and former Maj, Gen, John 
B, Sanborn, Harney made his home in St, Louis and was a well- 
to-do cotton and sugar plantation owner. Nearly seventy years 
old, he had fought against the Indians, but probably had more
IQa & N Jnl,, V (December 7» 1867), 2£l; Atbearn, op. 
cit,, 172ff. Sherman expressed bis views about the other 
commissioners in a letter to his brother, Senator Sherman. He 
observed: "Henderson is the best and most thoughtful man on 
this Commission. Sanborn does very well. Commr. N. G. Taylor 
is a good-hearted man but a perfect stereotyped edition of the 
old Indian policy. Gen, Terry is a first rate office, but 
Harney is of no account. Tappan /is" J a mere nothing, (Sher­
man to J. Sherman, September 28, 1867> Sherman Papers, Vol. 21)
"^Athearn, o£. cit., 173;
12
Athearn, up. cit,, 184-199.
13SW, 1868, 356.
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personal Indian friends than any other member of the commission.
It was questionable where the old gentleman’s sympathies would
lie,^ Sanborn, a native of Minnesota, had a lucrative law
practice in Washington, D.C. He was the nbusiness man” of the
commission, hiring helpers, purchasing supplies and "sitting
up all night to look after things..."1^ Some questioned his
sympathies, but his vigorous condemnation of General Hancock’s
action at Pawnee Pork in April suggested his opposition to
17military control and the use of force.
Most of the peace commissioners convened at the South­
ern Hotel in St, Louis on August 6, There, they threshed out 
questions about making contact with the scattered hostile 
bands. One problem was whether or not to travel in the company 
of troops, for their intentions might thus be misinterpreted 
by the Indians, Ultimately a "p’erfect concert of action" was 
worked out. General Sherman and Commissioner Taylor were to 
notify their respective subordinates of plans to meet the 
western Dakota tribes at Port Laramie on September 13 and the
tribes south of the Arkansas near Port Larned, Kansas, on or
18about October 13, Only a limited number of troops would go
Ik
A & N Jnl.. V (December 7, 1867)* 2£l; Athearn, op. 
cit., 173.
l^General Sherman told bis brother John that be expected 
Harney to vote with him against the other four civilians —  
Taylor, Tappan, Henderson and Sanborn. (Sherman to J. Sherman, 
August 3* 1867, Sherman Papers, Vol. 21).
16A & N Jnl.. V (December 7, 1867), 2£l,
17Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 13, i^ -Otb Cong., 1 sess (Serial 
1308), 18S-7, 111-113.
l8CIA, 1868, 27-28.
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along, and, for the duration of the negotiations, General 
Sherman announced, operations by departmental commanders would 
be "purely defensive,"^9
Before going to Port Laramie, the peacemakers journeyed 
to Port Leavenworth to interview General Hancock, Governor 
Crawford, Father DeSmet and others and stopped at Omaha to 
discuss the Indian situation with General Augur. They then 
sailed by steamboat up to Port Randall to pick up General 
Terry and observe the progress of tribes along the Missouri.
At Ports Sully and Thompson and at Yancton, Ponca and Santee 
reservations the commission held talks with the Indians.
Many tribesmen were found in need of "prompt and serious 
attention" because of inappropriate provisions under current 
treaties. Moreover, some of the agents, the commission decided,
needed to be replaced by persons with greater honesty and ambi-
,, 20 tion.
On September 11 the government's delegates headed west 
on the Union Pacific. Eight days later at North Platte, the 
end of track, they parleyed with Spotted Tail, Man-Afraid-of- 
Eis Horse, Swift Bear, Pawnee Killer and other Sioux and Chey­
enne spokesmen. The Indians soon announced that they came to
receive powder and lead and still opposed travel on the Powder
21River and Smoky Hill roads. On the 20th Sherman was stern 
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and wagons ruined hunting and reminding them of agreements
22with other commissioners. Little was accomplished. Scouts 
reported Red Cloud and the northern Sioux busy fighting in 
the Powder River region, too occupied to come in to Fort Lara­
mie for some time. Therefore, the would-be treaty-makers 
postponed the Laramie meeting until November first and, after 
some objection by the military commanders, passed out limited 
amounts of powder and ball to the chiefs whose followers had 
been best behaved. The commission rationalized the distri­
bution of ammunition on the basis of the Indians’ need for 
meat and the biblical injunction, (this may have been Taylor’s
contribution) "do good to them that hate us,'* J
2 L
The commissioners minus Sherman, then headed south 
to try their luck with the southern tribes. Their caravan 
consisted of several hacks, a few howitzers for display, and 
wagons heaped up with ten thousand dollars worth of presents 
for the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Apaches and Comanches, 
Accompanying the party were interpreters such as George Bent 
and a number of reporters representing Boston, New York,
25
St, Louis and western newspapers,
pp
Atbearn, 0£. cit.. 180-181, An interested spectator 
at the North Platte parleys was Henry Morton Stanley, who later 
gained fame for finding Dr, Livingstone in Africa, See Henry 
M, Stanley, My Early Travels and Adventures in America and 
Asia (New York, 1895), Vol. I, 197-^16.
23CIA, 1868, 29.
^•Sherman was called to Washington by the President 
and Augur was sent to fill in for him.
2^Rister, op. cit.. 53» 56,
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mArriving at Port Larned before the scheduled meeting 
date, the negotiators waited for Superintendent Thomas Murphy, 
agents Leavenworth and Wynkoop and interpreters and runners 
to assemble the tribesmen at Medicine Lodge Creek, about se­
venty miles to the south* For several days the main body of 
red men camped at a distance, leery of another "talk" such as 
General Hancock conducted in April. Finally, the stage was 
set and the peacemakers moved to the council site with gifts 
and ready-made treaties.^
A number of preliminary meetings were necessary before 
the formal discussions got under way on October 19. Then 
Senator Henderson, dressed in the latest eastern fashion, 
announced the Great Father's wish that the Comancbes, Kiowas 
and Kiowa-Apaches settle down and farm on a three-million-acre 
reservation between the Red and Washita rivers and ninety- 
eighth and one hundredth meridians. The Cheyennes and Ara- 
pahoes were to occupy a reservation about half again as large 
further north. The United States, Henderson and others ex­
plained, would provide beef, flour, coffee and sugar; blankets 
and clothing; farm tools and seed; teachers, carpenters and
blacksmiths —  everything the Indians needed to become happy
27and prosperous like white men.
One by one the blanketed Indian headmen rose to object
to the terms offered. Ten Bears, an influential Comanche, de­
cried the loss of his prairie homeland. Satanta, the Kiowa
26CIA, 1868, 30; Grinnell, o£. cit., 273-271}-.
2^Rister, op. cit., 55, 57; Grinnell, op. cit.. 27k*
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"Orator of the Plains," complained long and bitterly about the 
wrongs suffered by his tribe before consenting to the govern­
ment’s demands. After Black Kettle of the Cheyennes, Little
Raven of the Arapahoes and others made their speeches, the
28ceremony of touching the pen was held. On October 21 two
separate treaties were concluded with the Kiowas and Oomanches
and with other Kiowa, Comanche and Apache bands. A few days
29later the Cheyennes and Arapahoes came to terms. In ex­
change for their "signatures" the red men collected more
30blankets and other gifts than they were able to carry away.
The Medicine Lodge treaties were reported as "very 
11 31
satisfactory , yet further trouble was forecast by some of 
the documents' provisions. Tribes which had for generations 
roamed the buffalo country of the plains were suddenly re­
quired to confine themselves to relatively limited areas, 
forego hunting and revolutionize their way of life. There 
was, though, no effective barrier against renewed excursions 
into Texas or Kansas, and, as one author put it, "...the 
-commissioners did little more than create an unworkable 
arrangement.
^Rister, 00. cit., 58-5 9.
29jCappler, 0£. cit., II, 977-989.
30Grinnell, 033. cit.. 275J CIA, 1868, 30. Among the 
items distributed were annuities which had been delayed at 
military posts since spring. Rister adds, "The commissioners 
winked at other gifts of whiskey, guns, and ammunition."
(Rister, 0£. .cit., 59).
31CIA, 1867, lj..
32Rister, 033. cit.. 59; Atbearn, 033. cit.. 183.
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Leaving Medicine Lodge Creek, the commission returned 
to North Platte and then proceeded to Port Laramie, where they 
hoped to meet Red Cloud and other leaders of hostile Sioux 
and Northern Cheyenne bands. The only Indians found at Port 
Laramie, however, were Crows, most of whom had not been at war*
Of Red Cloud’s absence the commissioners stated, "We greatly 
regret the failure to procure a council with this chief and 
his leading warriors. If an interview could have been ob­
tained, we do not for a moment doubt that a just and honorable
33
peace could have been secured.” In fact, Red Cloud noti­
fied the commission that he would not give up his war until 
the Bozeman Trail forts were removed. Again frustrated, the 
peacemakers re-scheduled their meeting with the Sioux and 
other northern tribes for spring, appealed to the Indians to 
live at peace, and adjourned,3 "^ It seemed, Acting Commis­
sioner Mix noted in his annual report for 1867, that the work 
of the treaty-makers would take "longer...than was at first
35supposed *
During the ensuing winter the commission bad time to 
review its initial efforts and plan future sessions with the 
hostiles. Encouragingly, the frontier remained relatively 
quiet. Still, General Sherman made preparations to reinforce 
his outposts in the spring, believing that if these installa­
tions were not needed for defense, they could become "nuclei"
33qia, 1868, 30.
3 ~^Ibid.. 31.
3^ cia, 1867, 5.
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for new settlements. The troops would remain "as much on the 
defensive as possible.
Meanwhile various observers commented upon the work of
the peace commission. The Nation, taking a conciliatory line,
pointed out that it was easier, cheaper and more honorable to
37"regenerate" the nation’s wards than to coerce them. On the 
other hand, Maj. Gen. Henry K. Sibley, veteran of many cam­
paigns against the Sioux, argued against not only civil con­
trol and "purchased peace," but also against defensive or 
limited military operations. He demanded a full-scale Indian 
war, with the Army capitalizing upon the natural enmities 
within the red race. "Eight or ten millions wisely expended, 
would," Sibley figured, "...suffice to close the war within 
two years...."
On January 7, 1868, the peace commission made its offi­
cial report to President Johnson. The report was deceptively 
sympathetic with the Indians and civil control. It mentioned 
the "heartrending" consequences of the Chivington massacre; 
the "utter futility of conquering a peace;" the illogic of 
punishing whole tribes for the crimes of a few; the wrongs 
which "compelled" Indian outbreaks such as the Fort Phil Kearny 
affair; the provocative action of General Hancock at Pawnee
36SW, 1867, 381.
^ The Nation. V (October 31, 1867), 356. The journal 
estimated that it cost seventy thousand dollars to kill each 
Indian.
•^Sibley to Sherman, December 6, 1867, I.O.L.R., 1867, 
NA, RG 75.
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39Pork and the ’’many noble qualities” of the Indian. It placed 
emphasis upon the necessity for prompt congressional action 
to ratify and fulfill the provisions of peace treaties. Also, 
it made the following suggestions for improving the Indian 
service: (1 ) revision of the laws on intercourse with the
Indian tribes; (2) continuation of Interior Department juris­
diction over the Indians, except for temporary military control 
over "unmanageable" tribesmen; (3 ) dismissal of all incompe­
tent and unfaithful agents and superintendents by February 1,
1869; (i|-) creation of a new Department of Indian Affairs; (5>) 
prohibition of organized Indian war by state or territorial 
governments; (6 ) tighter restriction upon licensing of In­
dian traders; (7) new laws to authorize the Army to oust 
white intruders from Indian reservations; (8 ) removal of the 
Bosque Redondo Indians; (9) appointment of Indian inspectors 
and (1 0 ) appointment of a new commission to meet with the 
Sioux, Navajoes and other tribes, including some "confessedly 
at peace,
The commission’s comments on the "much mooted ques­
tion" of civil or military control of the Indian Office were 
quoted time and again by defenders of the status quo In 
Indian management because Generals Sherman, Terry and Augur 
and former Generals Harney and Sanborn all signed the report. 
Particular note was given to the statement:
We have the highest possible appreciation of
39cia, 1868, 26 3^.
^°Ibid., V / H 8 .
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the officers of the army, and fully recognize their 
proverbial integrity and honor; but we are satisfied 
that not one in a thousand would like to teach Indian 
children to read and write, or Indian men to sow and 
reap. These are emphatically civil, and not military, 
occupations .4-1
But these remarks did not represent the views of the 
entire peace commission. A year later General Sherman ex­
plained to Senator E. G, Ross of Kansas how the members voted 
on the document. Although General Augur signed the re­
port, only the seven original commissioners had a vote.
Henderson, Tappan, Taylor and Sanborn supported it, and 
Sherman, Terry and Harney opposed it. "We did not favor the 
conclusion arrived at, but being out-voted," the General 
explained, "we had to sign the report."**2
On one thing the commission was unanimous, however.
They believed it was necessary to collect the Indians east 
of the Rockies on reservations north of Nebraska and south 
of Kansas as rapidly as possible.**^ As soon as the Senate 
confirmed the Medicine Lodge Creek treaties, measures could 
be taken to implement the concentration program on the South­
ern Plains. But negotiations still had to be completed in 
the North, and success there depended to a large extent 
upon whether or not the government would give up the forts 
on the road to Montana.
Already in August, 1867, General Grant suggested to
^Ibid., I4.7-I4.8 .
^Sherman to Ross, January 7, 1869, Div. Mo. L.S.,
NA, R G  98.
^ S W ,  1868, 331*-.
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Sherman that the extension of the Union Pacific was beginning 
to delimit the value of the Powder River road and that it 
might be practical and diplomatic to retract the posts north­
west of Port Laramie.^ But Sherman demurred* To give in to
• k 5the hoatiles was to encourage their resistance, he thought.^
In the January report, the Peace Commission proposed to 
route travel to Montana from a more western point on the Union 
Pacific and along the west side of the Big Horns By late 
February Sherman, too, was in accord with the removal scheme 
and solicited General Augur’s suggestions on how to proceed*^ 
Finally, on March 2, Grant wrote Sherman, ”1 think it will be 
well to prepare at once for the abandonment of the posts,
Phil. Kearny, Reno and Fetterman and to make all the capital 
with the Indians that can be made out of the change,"^®
As soon as the weather permitted,yarious "ehief- 
catchers,” including Father DeSmet, Reverend S. D # Hinraan, 
and a number of traders and interpreters, were sent out to 
invite the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes to
JiQ
Fort Laramie for a big council in April, 7 Sherman announced




^Athearn, op. cit., 19U-*
^•®Grant to Sherman, March 2, 1868, Letters Sent, Com­
manding General, NA, RG 108. Grant also indicated that other 
posts might be ooeded west of the Powder River region.
^George E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk (Norman, 1937), 163- 
l61i. See, for example, Taylor to Rev. P. DeSmet, February 17, 
1868, I.O.L.B., No. 17, HA, RG 7$.
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that he would go along with further attempts to pacify the
hostiles, holding his troops in reserve until the agents had
S6n&*to confess an inability to manage their Indians... y
tor Henderson made the necessary business arrangements, and
in early April the treaty-makers again set out to try to
51rendezvous with the warriors of Powder River country.
Once more the warlike bands failed to meet the appoint­
ment set by the Great Father. Nevertheless, the commission 
was determined to negotiate treaties. Dispensing liberal 
amounts of rations, blankets, utensils, arms and ammunition, 
they induced many leaders of the friendly Brule and non­
belligerent Sioux bands to sign the white man's paper on 
April 29*^^ The agreement pledged peace between the white 
and red races; fixed the boundaries of the Sioux reservation; 
authorized the natives to hunt north of the Platte and in the 
Republican and Powder River regions nso long as the buffalo 
may range therein in numbers as to Justify the chase”; 
offered awards and financial and technical assistance to 
Indians taking up farming; promised rations to all settling 
on the reservation and, finally, provided for an annual
^Sherman to J. Sherman, March lij., 1868, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 22.
^Sherman was called to Washington to testify in John­
son's impeachment trial and did not go west until later.
52
Brule, Ogallala, Minieonjou, Yanktonnai, Hunkpapa, 
Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arc and Santee Sioux 
bands and a few Arapahoes eventually signed the treaty. Many 
of the signatures were collected at Forts Rice and Sully or 
at scattered Indian camps weeks after the formal council was 
held* (Kappler, 0£. cit.. II, 998; Hyde, o£. cit., 16lj.-l67)*
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clothing allowance and cash-equivalent annuities for thirty 
53years
While awaiting the appearance of Red Cloud and headmen 
of the various hostile bands, the commission on May 7 con­
cluded treaties with the Mountain Crows and on May 10 came 
to terms with the Northern Arapahoes and Cheyennes. The 
latter agreement was similar in most respects to the Sioux 
treaty; the former provided for a different reservation and 
hunting restrictions.^
It soon became evident that it would be difficult to 
treat with the wilder Sioux, who were the chief concern of the 
government. The decision to withdraw the Bozeman forts had 
been announced, but Red Cloud1s Bad Paces and some of the 
Oyuhkpe and Miniconjou Sioux were unwilling to come to terms 
until the soldiers left their bunting grounds." The dis­
mantling of the posts began on June 1 and took several weeks.
A few of the hold-outs were coaxed into signing the Sioux 
treaty during the summer, but the leading Northern Sioux, no­
tably the Influential Red Cloud, did not sign until November, 
after the vacated forts bad been burned to the ground.^*
-^Kappler, pp. cit., II, 998-1007.
^ I b i d ., 1008-1015. The Crows were to live along the 
Yellowstone and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were given a 
choice of settling on the Sioux Reservation or with their 
relatives in the South.
55e x. Do c. No . 239. ij.0th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 13I4-I)»
1868, 1-3.
^Hydo, op. cit.. 166-167.
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General Sherman, who arrived at Port Laramie in early 
May, was irritated by the uncompromising attitude of some of 
the red men* He did not believe, for example, that they de­
served the privilege of hunting outside their reservation. ”1 
think it would be wise to invite all the sportsmen of England 
and America there for a Grand Buffalo hunt," he suggested,
"and make one grand swap of them all. Until the Buffalo and 
consequent Indians are out from between the roads we
_*7
will have collisions and trouble. ^
There was little time for second-guessing, however.
The peace commissioners, together with other treaty-makers, 
bad a great deal of negotiating to do before the end of summer. 
Some went south to treat with the Osages and Chippewas; others 
journeyed to Montana Territory to meet with the Blackfeet,
Gros Ventres, Missouri River crows and Northern Bannocks and 
Shoshones; still others traveled to Utah Territory to confer 
with other Bannock bands and the Eastern Shoshones and to 
Idaho Territory to talk with the Nez Perce*! The chief ob­
jectives of the treaties made with these tribes were, Com­
missioner Taylor reported, "the binding the Indians,
parties, thereto, to keep the peace, the providing for the 
several tribes a suitable reservation, and the means for their 
education and civilization."^
Commissioners Sherman and Tappan drew the assignment
£7sherman to Sheridan, May 10, 1868, P. H. Sheridan 
Autograph Letters, Sheridan Papers.
£8CIA, 1868, iw
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of parleying with the Bosque Redondo Navajoes and Utes of New 
Mexico, They began talks with the former at Fort Sumner on 
May 28, From personal observation and the comments of Bar- 
boncita and other Navajo headmen, both decided that Bosque 
Redondo was a miserable location, Sherman tried to persuade 
the red men to select a reservation in Indian Territory, but 
encountered such strenuous objections that he concluded 
”nothing less than absolute force” would get them to move 
east.^ On June 1 the Navajoes signed an agreement to re­
locate on a six-million-acre reservation in their homeland, 
west of the Rio Grande, At that location they were entitled 
to one hundred and sixty-acre farms, up to five dollars 
worth of clothing and goods apiece each ysar^ a hundred dollars
worth of seeds and tools per family and a total of fifteen 
60
thousand sheep.
In mid-June the two peace-makers conferred with Ute
leaders north of Fort Union, Representatives of the Colorado
Utes had visited Washington in March and made a treaty which
allowed the Capotes, Weminuches and Mobnanebes of New Mexico
to share their reservation in southwestern Colorado Terri- 
61
tory. But the New Mexico Utes objected to this arrange­
ment, Reluctant to settle down and unhappy that the com­
missioners had talked with the Navajoes first, they refused
62
to make specific commitments, Sherman’s one consolation 
Si EJx. Doc. No. 308. IpOth Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
131*5), 1*
6oKappler, op. cit., II, 1015-1020; CIA, 1868, 16I}-165. 
6lKappler, op, cit., II, 990-996; CIA, 1868, 182.
62CIA, 1868, 167-169.
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with reference to these natives was that time was on the aide
6 ^
of the government*
By late summer Sherman, Tappan, and others had nearly 
completed the treaty-making phase of the governments program 
to conciliate hostile tribes, and major peace agreements, 
except those with the Sioux, N©z Perc©/ and the Eastern Sho­
shones and Bannocks, had received senatorial approval*^ The 
Peace Party was enthusiastic, anticipating a new era in In­
dian relations* Before the year was out, however, events 
were to dampen their optimism. In the meantime, the policy­
makers endeavored to implement the concentration scheme 
recommended in the Act of July 20, 1867*
EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OP THE PEACE TREATIES
Both civil and military officials recognized the need 
for early, adequate appropriation of funds to implement the 
peace treaties of 1867 and 1868. In his annual report for 
1867 Secretary 0. H. Browning urged, w*..no consideration of 
the**,expenditure likely to be required should be suffered 
to defeat an object ^peace7 of such surpassing impor­
tance*5^  In its January, 1868, report the commission gave 
special attention to the necessity of congressional action 
to finance the reservations and civilisation programs it
^Sherman to J. Sherman, June 11, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23.
^Kappler, o£. cit., II, 977-102£.
^Quoted in CIA, 1867, II*
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proposed,^ After mid-February, Commissioner N. G. Taylor 
repeatedly commented on the ”grave importance” of pro­
curing money at an early date ”in order that the faith of the 
Government and the promises of the Indian Peace Commission, 
may be kept good...."^7 Taylor insisted that his office 
should not be held liable for hostilities or depredations by
/ Q
needy red men* Finally, General Sherman informed his brother
John, "I feel reluctant to go further in these,..promises as
I fear our Government is becoming so complicated that it is
n 69very venturesome to make promises in advance.
At last, on July 27, the annual Indian appropriation 
bill was passed. One clause provided that half a million 
dollars was to be disbursed under the direction of General 
Sherman,
...for carrying out the treaty stipulations, making 
and preparing homes, furnishing provisions, tools and 
farming utensils, and furnishing food for such bands 
of Indians with which treaties had been made and not yet 
ratified, and in defraying the expenses of the commission 
in making such treaties and carrying their provisions 
into effect.78
This was not the kind of transfer of authority Sher­
man had so often recommended, but it was not unexpected. A 
few days earlier he learned from Samuel Tappan that Congress-
66CIA, 1868, l*l(.-lj.6.
^Taylor to Browning, April 6, 1868, I.O.R.B. No. 17,
NA, RG 75.
68CIA, 1868, 52-53.
^Sherman to J. Sherman, April 26, 1868, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 23o
70SW, 1868, 338.
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Ben Eutler of Massachusetts was supporting the appropriation 
bill on condition that the General would hold the purse 
strings.^'1' On August 6 Secretary Browning delicately ex­
plained Sherman*a duties* "I have neither the right nor wish 
to give you instructions,® Browning stated, before listing ex­
penditures to be made* The subordinates of the Interior 
Department, still in general control of the Indians, would do 
everything to cooperate* "There is no reason why there
should be interference or conflict between you and the Agents
72
of this Department," the Secretary added somewhat hopefully,
Sherman realized that it was essential to expend the
Indian funds as promptly and judiciously as possible* The
season was growing late, and in many places there were signs
that the Indians were losing faith in the government's treaty
promises* For example, Superintendent Thomas Murphy some
time earlier reported the Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Apaches of
the Southern Plains near starvation and in a state of un-
rest. In addition, the Sioux, now being coaxed and cajoled
toward agency sites along the Missouri River, would be very
upset to find that no preparations had been made for their
7k
settlement and subsistence*
^Tappan to Sherman, July 20, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23.
72Browning to Sherman, August 6, 1868, D.I.L.S., In­
dian Misc. BA, RG 75.
73cia, 1868, 60.
^Ray H. Mattison, "The Indian Reservation System on 
the Upper Missouri, 1865-1890," Nebraska History. XXVI (Sep­
tember, 1955)* 145-114-6 ; Hyde, on. clt.T~l69-17o.
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To meet th e se  p r e ss in g  needs and govern Ind ian  d i s ­
bursem ents, G eneral Sherman issu e d  General Order No, i|., dated  
August 10 , 1 8 6 8 , Department, d i s t r i c t  and p o st commanders 
were d ir e c te d  to  a c t  tem p orarily  as agents fo r  the purpose o f  
moving tr ib e s  to  th e ir  new homes and is s u in g  s u p p lie s .  Regu­
la r  agen ts were not to  be in te r fe r e d  w ith , but "any n e g le c ts  
or i r r e g u la r i t i e s ” by Agency o f f i c i a l s  or t h e ir  su b je c ts  were 
to  be r e p o r te d , Maj, Gen, W. S , Harney was to  be in  charge 
o f  exp en d itu res fo r  r e lo c a t in g  the Sioux n a tio n ; Maj, Gen,
W# B, Hazen th e  Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Klowas, and Comanches; 
Maj, Gen, George W. Getty the N avajoes; Major R, S , LaMotte 
the Crows and Maj. Gen, C. C, Augur th e  Shoshones, Snakes and 
a l l i e d  t r i b e s .  Purchases o f  r a t io n s ,  c lo th in g  and su p p lie s  
were to  be handled through the Army’ s quarterm aster and commis­
sary  ch a n n els , and is s u e s  to  Ind ians were to  be w itn essed  by 
two o f f i c e r s  w ith  th e  rank o f  ca p ta in  or above.
In  h is  y e a r ly  r e p o r t , Sherman exp la in ed  th e  breakdown 
o f d isbursem ents by h is  a s s i s t a n t s .  F ir s t ,  th e  h a lf  m ill io n  
d o lla r s  was reduced by $150 ,000  to  s e t t l e  ou tstan d in g  accounts  
a g a in s t  the peace com m ission. The rem aining $350 ,000  was 
s p l i t  up, a llo w in g  General Harney $200 ,000  and G eneral Hazen, 
G eneral Augur and Major LaMotte $ 50 ,000  each . General G etty  
handled s u b s ta n t ia l  sep ara te  funds fo r  r e lo c a t in g  and pro­
v id in g  fo r  th e  Navajoes o f New M exico, While the Indians were
75Quoted in  Browning to  S c h o f ie ld , August 2 1 , 1868 , 
D#I ,L ,S , ,  Ind ian  M isc ,, NA, RG 7 5 , The e x p ir a tio n  d ate  fo r  
th e  order was to  be June 30, 1869*
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due to  r e c e iv e  "the b e n e f it  o f  every c e n t,"  th ere  was not 
enough money to  p rop erly  p r o v is io n  the p eaceab le  red men during  
th e  w in te r . I t  was " in d isp e n sa b le ,"  Sherman contended , to  
have an a d d it io n a l a p p rop ria tion  o f  $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  fo r  Harney and 
$ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  fo r  G eneral Hazen,
Many m ilita r y  lea d ers  r e g r e tte d  t h i s  temporary e x p e r i­
ence in  managing p art o f  th e  fin a n c e s  and l o g i s t i c s  o f  the  
In d ian  s e r v ic e .  In the f i r s t  p la c e ,  d e s p ite  S ecreta ry  Brown­
in g 's  c a l l  fo r  c o o p era tio n , c i v i l  a u th o r it ie s  fr e q u en tly  com­
p la in e d  about tb s  ariay?s v ir t u a l  "care and con tro l"  o f  t h e ir  
77w ards,  S econ d ly , G eneral Sherman r e a l iz e d  th a t  th e  Indian  
funds were n ot always p rop erly  managed, "Harney never reads 
a n y th in g ,"  he grumbled, "I saw a t  once he was g iv in g  out 
orders o f  purchase fa r  in  advance o f  h is  m o n e y ,,,I  d id  not 
and do not approve h is  la r g e  purchases / a l t h o u g h  I do b e -  
l i e v e  he w i l l  thereby prevent s u f fe r in g ,"  In February,
1869, When Harney asked fo r  a d e f ic ie n c y  ap p rop ria tion  o f  
over $i|.85,000 and alm ost $ 2 ,^ 0 0 ,0 0 0  fo r  the coming year and 
G eneral Sanborn req u ested  a d e f ic ie n c y  payment o f  $ 2 3 ,0 0 0  and 
allow ance o f  $365,000 fo r  the southern  In d ian s fo r  th e  y e a r ,  
th e  House Committee on A ppropriations was in  a quandary. Of 
th e  d e f ic ie n c y  r eq u ests  they rep o rted , " , . , t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s , , ,
76sw, 1868, 339; CIA, 1868, 62-63, 
77cia, 1868, 231, Taylor to Browning, January 9, 1869, 
I.0.R,B, No, 18, NA, RG ?5.
7®Sherman to  S c h o f ie ld , January 28, 1869, L e tte r s  Re­
c e iv e d , S ecre ta ry  o f  War, NA, RG 107, H ereafter  th e se  records  
w i l l  be c i t e d  S.W,L,R.
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are so  g r e a t , the amounts asked fo r  so  la r g e ,  th e  e s t im a te s
are so  c o n tr a d ic to r y , and th e  ev id en ce  so u n s a t is fa c to r y  th a t
g7 •**aro unable to  make any recommendation in  which the
com m ittee f e e l  any c o n s id er a b le  degree o f  confidence**"^ With
a sen se  o f  r e l i e f ,  Sherman in  A p r il req u ested  a f i n a l  rep o rt
on In d ian  exp en d itu res by the m ili ta r y  so  th a t  he m ight " c lo se  
80th a t  b u sin ess*"
THE RENEWAL OP HOSTILITIES
For about a year  the Peace Commission’ s crusade to
con vert th e  Ind ians in to  " p ea cefu l sh ep h erd s, herders and
81farm ers" seemed to  have p o s i t iv e  r e s u l t s *  “ C o ll is io n s  b e -  
tween the w h ite  and red races co n tin u ed , bu t th ere  were no 
major In d ian  outbreaks or m il i ta r y  campaigns* The Army, as 
announced, m aintained a se m i-tr u c e  by ca rry in g  on la r g e ly  de­
f e n s iv e  o p era tion s*  T e r r i t o r ia l  v o lu n te e r s , a lth ou gh  in c l in e d
toward a g g r e ss iv e  a c t io n , were checked by a la c k  o f  p e r so n n e l,
82fu n d s, reso u rces  and fe d e r a l support* W hile c e r ta in  n a t iv e  
bands p e r s is t e d  in  d ep red ation s and a c ts  o f  v io le n c e ,  many
h e r e to fo re  w ar lik e  groups con sen ted  to  l i v e  on r e se r v a t io n s
and e a t  th e  w h ite  man’ s food* By November, 1867# accord in g
7^HR RPt * No* 2 9 , l|.0tb Cong*, 3 s e s s *  (S e r ia l  1 3 8 8 ) , 
1869, 1 , ^ 7  ““
80Sherman to  S h erid an , A p r il 1 0 , 1869 , Sheridan Auto­
graph L e t te r s ,  Sheridan Papers*
83.SW, 1868 , 33k*
82SW, 1867,  376-379*
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to General Sherman, peace prevailed except on the Arkansas 
and Smoky Hill, and there, too, prospeots for a settlement 
were good.0^ Secretary Browning later reported nnot a single 
act of depredation or violence” by Indians subsisted by the 
government during the winter of 1867-1868.0^ Finally, General 
Grant, in May, 1868, stated his belief that the peace commis­
sion was doing ”real and lasting good” as well as ”incidental 
good” by distracting tribesmen and frontiersmen during ”the 
season practicable for making war.
But In the latter part of 1868 the illusion of per­
manent peace was abruptly dispelled by renewed war with the 
Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Elowas and Comanches. Before the year 
was over, General Sherman again ordered his field commanders
n M 86
to obliterate the hostiles. Likewise, some of the Indians1
friends, including members of the Peace Commission, changed 
their minds and called for a policy of coercion and military 
control over Indian affairs.
The war with the Southern Plains tribes was touched off 
by an outbreak on August 10 on the Saline and Solomon rivers 
in Kansas. A party of two hundred Cheyennes, together with a 
few Arapahoes and Sioux, unexpectedly went on a rampage, 
killing fifteen men, violating women, capturing children and
03Ibia.. 381.
®^CIA, 1868, I.
0^Grant to Sherman, May 19, 1868, C.G.L.S., NA, RG 108.
86
Sherman to Gen. Hazen, September 20, 1868, Semi- 
Official Letters Sent, W„ T. Sherman, Vol. 1,
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destroying property* Civil and military officials did not 
agree in all respects on why the Cheyennes became violent* 
Commissioner Taylor believed that their action, although in­
excusable, was based on a "spirit of revenge" over not 
receiving arms and ammunition promised by the Peace Commission 
and disgust over insufficient supplies.88 General Sherman was 
convinced that they had heard of the government's concession 
to the Sioux on the Bozeman forts and hoped to achieve similar 
results along the Smoky Hill. The atrocities were "premedi­
tated crime." he insisted* Investigations proved "beyond
M Qo
dispute" that whites had not provoked the uprising*
E. W, Wynkoop, the Cheyenne and Arapaho agent, ad­
mitted that the Cheyennes were guilty and needed to be punished* 
In response to a letter from General Phil Sheridan, commander 
of the Department of the Missouri, he tried unsuccessfully to 
get his charges to deliver up the guilty parties. "Let those 
who refuse to respond to my call and come within the bounds
prescribed be considered at war," the agent proposed, "and
„qo
let them be properly punished."
Although he believed war "inevitable," General Sheridan 
notified the Cheyennes and the Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches 
several times to move to the vicinity of Port Cobb, Indian
87
SW, 1868, 335* There were four Arapahoes and twenty 
Sioux with the Cheyennes when they left Pawnee Pork on 
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Territory, to avoid conflict with the military. Young hostiles, 
growing bolder every day, spurned these instructions and com­
mitted murders and depredations all along the Smoky Hill and 
91
Arkansas roads. Soon, in General Sherman’s words, there was 
"open war, all the way from Port Wallace to Denver...,” On 
August 27, the acting governor of Colorado reported Denver 
"completely surrounded" by hostiles. Eight days later 
Governor S. J. Crawford of Kansas declared scalping and 
burning "an almost? daily occurrence" in his state, adding 
"I cannot sit by and see our people butchered...."9^
Tinder pressure of this sort, General Sheridan requested 
additional cavalry and prepared to conduct a vigorous campaign 
against the hostiles. The Indian Bureau and its superinten­
dents and agents supported this move, provided precautions be 
taken not to harm innocent Indiana.93 One of the few objec­
tions to war came from S. P. Tappan, who warned General 
Sheridan that a southern "conspiracy" was seeking to involve 
bis troops in a general Indian war to "compromise the generals
of the Army and carry the South against Grant" in the coming 
9k
election.
By late September, Sherman was anxious to put an end
Q1
SW, 1868, 336. A total of seventy-nine deaths were




Tappan to Sheridan, August 26, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23.
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once and for all to Indian resistance along the southern routes#
"I propose that Gen, Sheridan shall prosecute the War with 
vindictive earnestness," he wrote, ",,,all who want peace must 
get out of the theater of war. Troops would keep after 
the wild braves right up through the winter if necessary, "We 
must not let up this time," he told Senator Sherman, "but 
keep it going till they are killed or humbled,"^
In answer to repeated protests from the "fanatic,"
Tappan, Sherman sent a scorching letter, "Of course our views 
on this Indian question are irreconcilable," Sherman asserted.
The reformer’s judgments amounted to "mono-mania," Even the 
Indian Bureau admitted there was not a "jot or tittle of provo­
cation" by whites against the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, Forty 
million people could not be "cowed" by a few thousand savages. 
Moreover, this business about a southern conspiracy was utter 
nonsensel "At our meeting of Oct, 7th in Chicago you can
produce your evidence in one case, and I in the other," the
97General concluded.
The Chicago meeting was a session at which the peace 
commission was to review its work and make final recommenda­
tions to the President, Before squaring off, Tappan sent Sher­
man another letter. He thought the general’s plainness and
^Sherman to Hazen, September 20, 1868, Semi-Official 
Letters Sent, W. T. Sherman, Vol. 1,
^Sherman to J, Sherman, September 25, 1868, Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 21#,
^Sherman to S, F. Tappan, September 21#, 1868, Semi- 
Official Letters Sent, W. T, Sherman, Vol, 1,
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"decidedly refreshing*" But could Sherman not understand 
that Indian wars inevitably brought harm to innocent Indians 
and were as unjust as hanging another member of the white 
race for John Wilkes Booth*a crime? Maybe he was mistaken 
about some of the persons involved in the Indian war plot, 
for It was "the work of more daring and desperate politicians." 
Finally, Tappan admonished Sherman to avoid those trying to
"trap" him into becoming another Chivington and to prevent the
n „qR
army from becoming a curse."7
This kind of talk only made General Sherman all the 
more determined to present a strong case against the concilia­
tory policy at Chicago. All the commissioners except Senator
Henderson were present when the peace commission convened on 
99October 7* The discussions went on for three days, but from 
the outset it was evident that all but Taylor and Tappan were 
convinced that force and military control were the only 
effective means of dealing with the wilder Indians.
Completely reversing itself in some respects, the com­
mission on October 9 passed six resolutions. The first recom­
mended that provisions and supplies be furnished to eleven 
tribes which had settled or were scheduled to settle permanently 
on "agricultural reservations." The second proposed recog­
nition of only those treaties, ratified or pending, which
98
S. F. Tappan to Sherman, September 29, 1868, Sher­
man Papers, Vol. 2I4..
^^Athearn, on. cit.. 227-228. General Grant sat in on 
the meetings and supported Sherman's recommendations for a 
coercive policy toward hostile tribes.
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affected these same tribes. The third called for an end to the 
recognition of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" 
(except in implementing current treaties) and the application 
of civil law to Indians. The fourth recommended that, because 
of treaty violations, tribes under the Medicine Lodge Creek 
treaties no longer be permitted to roam and hunt outside their 
reservations. The fifth proposed the use of military force to 
compell unwilling natives to move to reservations after due 
notice and provision for rations and protection. Signifi­
cantly, the last resolution stated: "...in the opinion of
this commission the Bureau of Indian Affairs should be trans­
ferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department 
of War«"^°^ Commenting on these resolutions, one of Sherman's 
biographers remarks, "Sherman went back to St. Louis with 
several scalps, including Taylor's and Tappan's hanging from 
his belt."101
As president of the peace commission, Commissioner
Taylor signed these resolutions, but he did not personally
approve of some of them. Like Sherman, Terry and Harney in
102
January, 1868, he was outvoted. The Commissioner was still 
upset six weeks later when he commented upon the results of 
the Chicago meeting in a letter to Secretary Browning. Among
100CIA, 1868, 371-372.
^^Athearn, op. cit.. 228,
102HR Rpt. No. 351i. i&th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709), 
1876, 212. Sanborn later said that only Taylor opposed the 
resolutions.
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other things, he had become convinced that the Army was engaged
in an unnecessary war against the tribes of the Southern Plains,
Only a few Indians were guilty of atrocities, and, given more
time, the chiefs would have turned the criminals over to
Agent Wynkoop. In summary Taylor remarked:
..,1 must take occasion to say to you that while I 
regard Lieut. Genl. Sherman and the gallant officers 
commanding under him utterly incapable of for one moment 
entertaining the disgraceful idea of perpetrating a 
massacre upon peaceful Indians invited to our protection, 
nevertheless this Department as their lawful guardian is 
bound to take every necessary precaution to shield the 
Innocent and helpless against the fearful punishment now 
pursuing the actual oriminals,l°3
A few days after writing this the Commissioner was to wonder 
whether some of Sherman’s officers were so "gallant” after all*
THE BATTLE OP THE WASHITA
In late November, when the weather turned cold and 
snowy, General Sheridan decided it was time to launch the 
vigorous winter campaign prescribed by General Sherman. On 
November 21 he arrived at Camp Supply, Indian Territory, to 
find Maj. Gen. George Custer’s Seventh Cavalry making final 
preparations. Two days later, although Colonel S. J. Craw­
ford’s Nineteenth Kansas militia regiment had not yet 
arrived, Sheridan ordered Custer to set out against any Chey­
ennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas or Comanches off their reservations. 
With eleven companies and Osage scouts, Cnster headed south
103
Taylor to Browning, November 21, 1868, I.O.R.B.
No. 18, 1868-1869, NA, rg 7 5.
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through a fresh twelve-inch blanket of snow.^^-
The morning of the 26th the expedition struck a day-old 
trail, left by a Cheyenne war party returning from a raid on 
the Smoky Hill River. Leaving wagons, tentage and heavy equip­
ment, the cavalry set out in "rigorous pursuit." The chase 
lasted on into the night, and at 1:30 a.m. the Osage trackers 
spotted a large encampment of Cheyennes, Ar&pahoes and Kiowas 
along the banks of the Washita River, about one hundred and 
twenty miles upstream from Port Cobb.^^ Situated nearest to 
the advancing troops was the village of Black Kettle, the 
Cheyenne leader whose village four years earlier, almost to 
the day, had been overrun by Colonel Chivington’s volunteers 
at Sand Creek.^0^
After withdrawing to avoid discovery, the officers of 
the command reconnoitered the Cheyenne village and planned the 
attack. At dawn, four columns would strike simultaneously; 
Custer would lead the frontal assault. Meanwhile the Indians 
were oblivious of the presence of white soldiers, their sen­
tries having gone to their lodges to escape the bitter 
cold.10?
At last the hour for the attack arrived, and, with the 
band striking up "Garry Owen," the troops rushed Black Kettle’s 
settlement from several directions. "Caught napping," the
^■^Grinnell, op. cit., 298-300; HR Ex. Doc. No. 2k0«
2j.lst Cong., 2 a ess. TSerial 12*25), 1870, 162-163®
1q5hR Ex. Doc. Nq. 2ii0. l*lst Cong,, 2 sess. (Serial 
Hi25), 1870, 163.
lO^Rister, 0p o cit.. lQl*, 107.
iftvn IFf** %  21^ 0, M a t  Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 11*25)
1870, 163; Rister, 0£. cit.. 101*. ^  ’
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the red men grabbed up their arms and ran for cover, some to 
the underbrush and nearby ravines, others into the ice-filled 
river. While the soldiers "gallantly" charged again and 
again, the red men fought back in a manner "rarely, if ever... 
equaled in Indian warfare.” By mid-afternoon the battle was 
over, and Custer was able to inventory the "fruits of vic­
tory.” Black Kettle and one hundred and two ”warrlors” were 
dead; fifty-three women and children were taken captive and
n aD
fifty-one lodges were destroyed. Eight hundred and seventy- 
five horses, ponies and mules; a vast amount of robes, equip­
ment and clothing; and a whole "winter supply" of meat and 
food were seized and/or d e m o l i s h e d , A l s o  found in the 
village were four white captives, but two were killed before 
they could be rescued. Almost Incidentally, Custer added in 
his report, "In the excitement of the fight, as well as in 
self-defense, it so happened that some of the squaws and a few 
children were killed and wounded."^5
The Battle of the Washita produced another violent dis­
pute between the officers of the War and Interior depart­
ments. Almost two weeks before Custer’s attack, Superintendent 
Thomas Murphy of the Central Superintendency stated his concern
HR Ex. Doc. No. 2k0« lp.st Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
llj.25), 1870, T6 3. RIster, op. cit.. 108. RIster estimates 
that a third again as many were found dead miles from the camp.
109
HR Ex. Doc., No. 2k0. Ijlst Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1 ) & $ ) ,  1870, 153-155.
^ ^Ibld.. 16k. Custer's losses were two officers and 
nineteen men killed and three officers and eleven men wounded.
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over military movements while he made preparations for peace 
and promises of protection." Murray had no doubt that A. G. 
Boone, agent for the Kiowas and Comanches, and E. W, Wynkoop, 
agent for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, could persuade their 
charges to move peaceably to Fort Cobb. But he wondered what 
would be in store for them there.
In all these military movements I fancy I see another 
Sand Creek massacre. If these Indians are to be congre­
gated at Fort Cobb or elsewhere, under promises of pro­
tection, and then pounced upon by the military, it were 
far better that they had never been sent for, or any such 
promises made*111
Just before learning of the Washita affair, Agent Wyn­
koop, too, sensed an impending crisis. No friend of the hos- 
tiles, he nevertheless had special reasons for wanting to 
protect the innocent Cheyennes. In l86ij., as the military 
officer responsible for bringing Black Kettle’s people to 
Sand Creek, he found it very difficult to convince the Indians 
that he had no part in the disaster that followed. Again, 
after Hancock’s expedition in April, 1867, be had to talk fast 
to regain the confidence of the Cheyennes. Now undisciplined 
volunteers and TJtes and Osage scouts, the "deadly enemies of 
the plains Indians," were headed for the vicinity where he was 
supposed to gather his subjects. "...I most certainly refuse
to again be the instrument of the murder of innocent women
T T ?
and children," he exclaimed prophetically*
In his initial report on the Custer expedition, General
m ibid., 3-if*
112Ibid., 5.
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Sheridan was laudatory. After recounting the losses imposed
upon the Indians, he remarked, "The highest credit is due
General Custer and his command. They started in a furious
snow-storm and traveled all the while in snow twelve inches
deep.“ The Black Kettle band had been justly punished for
depredations on the Saline and Solomon rivers in Kansas. "We
will soon have them in good condition," Sheridan predicted.
"If we can get one or two more good blows there will be no
«113more Indian troubles in my department.
Superintendent Murphy r ead of what Sheridan called "the 
opening of the campaign against the hostile Indians" in the 
newspaper and became, as he put it, "sick at heart." Most of 
the Indians killed in the village were not involved in the 
crimes in question. Particularly appalling was the killing 
of Black Kettle, "one of the truest friends the whites have 
ever had among the Indians of the plains." Black Kettle, even 
after Sand Creek, had intervened to prevent widespread trouble 
in the spring of 1867 and had worked "assiduously" to make the 
Medicine Lodge Creek negotiations a success. Probably there 
would now be an alliance between formerly friendly and hos­
tile tribes and a costly and bloody war.^3^
Reverberations of the argument over Custer’s action were 
heard from the Plains to the Potomac and lasted for many weeks.
113Ibld.. 347.
* ^ Tbid.. 5-6. Murphy reported the Cheyenne village 
within seventy miles of Port Cobb, figuring land miles in­
stead of distance by boat, as cited by the military*
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One of the first to attack the Army, of course, was Samuel 
Tappan. On December l\. he condemned the "stupid and criminal 
blundering” of the officers involved. By waging war on 
villages inhabited by women and children, they left no doubt 
in the minds of the Indians that extermination was the govern­
ments objective. The only hope for salvaging the work done 
by the Peace Commission lay in "immediate and unconditional 
abandonment of the present war policy” and the discharge of 
volunteers, control of the Army and its field officers and
H <
just fulfillment of treaties.
Presenting a contrary view was General W. B, Hazen, 
the officer in charge of implementing the Medicine Lodge Creek 
treaties. The military’s strong stand was just beginning to 
have a "salutary effect,” he noted. The victory over the 
Cheyennes was fine, but General Sheridan should not relax his 
campaign. To have a lasting effect, the work of subduing 
the tribes of the Southern Plains must be done " thoroughly
On December 23, shortly after the Senate had begun an 
investigation of the V/aahlta attack, Sau6i;al Sherman Informed 
Generals Sheridan, Hazen and Grierson that he was behind Custer 
one hundred per cent. He wanted them to "go ahead, kill and 
punish the hostile, rescue the captive white women and children, 
capture and destroy the ponies, lances, carbines, etc..,"
1X% I  (P), 1868, 1012-1016.
•i i c__
iSL iS* Dge« Ho. 2ii.0.iilst Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1h2$), 1870, Uj.8-150. In fact, Sheridan on December 19, 1868, 
indicated that he would have acted more vigorously, particu­
larly against the Xiowas, but for Hazen's appeal in their be­
half. (Ibid., 151}.).
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One of the first to attack the Army, of course, was Samuel 
Tappan, On December Ij. he condemned the ‘’stupid and criminal 
blundering” of the officers involved. By waging war on 
villages inhabited by women and children, they left no doubt 
in the minds of the Indians that extermination was the govern­
ment's objective. The only hope for salvaging the work done 
by the Peace Commission lay in "immediate and unconditional 
abandonment of the present war policy" and the discharge of
volunteers, control of the Army and its field officers and
11<
just fulfillment of treaties.
Presenting a contrary view was General W, B, Hazen, 
the officer in charge of implementing the Medicine Lodge Creek 
treaties. The military's strong stand was ju3t beginning to 
have a "salutary effect," he noted. The victory over the 
Cheyennes was fine, but General Sheridan should not relax bis 
campaign. To have a lasting effect, the work of subduing 
the tribes of the Southern Plains must be done "thoroughly."-5-^ 
On December 23, shortly after the Senate had begun an 
investigation of the Washita, attack, CouCi-al Sherman informed 
Generals Sheridan, Hazen and Grierson that he was behind Custer 
one hundred per cent. He wanted them to "go ahead, kill and 
punish the hostile, rescue the captive white women and children, 
capture and destroy the ponies, lances, carbines, etc,,,"
13^SI (P), 1868, 1012-1016.
116
HR Ex, Doc. No. 2ii0.li.lst Cong,, 2 sess, (Serial 
ll\2$), 1870, -150. In fact, Sheridan on December 19, 1868,
indicated that he would have acted more vigorously, particu­
larly against the Hiowas, but for Hazen's appeal in their be­
half. (Ibid.. I5i|-).
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Tappan, Taylor and company were making "bald and naked asser­
tions** in the papers about Black Kettle's friendliness, but most
of the public would not be "humbugged," If there were re-
117percussions he would accept full responsibility,
A refutation of the charge that Black Kettle's camp 
was friendly was issued by General Sheridan on January 1, 1869, 
There were two major flaws in the allegation, he maintained.
In the first place, the Oheyenne village was not near Port 
Cobb, as claimed, but far up-river. Secondly, there was 
definite proof that a number of young bucks from the village 
were raiding at Dodge at the very time the camp was wiped out. 
Evidence that they used the Washita settlement as a base of 
operations included stolen mules, mail and photographs found 
by Custer's men. In addition, the Indians’ own illustrated 
history of murders and depredations (drawings on hides and so 
forth) had been found and would be at the "service of any
n n O
one desiring information on the subject,"
As the mutual recriminations continued, General Sherman 
was at times tempted to declare war on the Indian BureauI 
Such was the case when Agent Wynkoop, through channels, asked 
President Johnson to direct the Army to release the widow of 
"guiltless" Black Kettle from imprisonment at Port Hay3,
117'Among other things, Sherman said that he did not 
want agents to have charge of the Cheyennes and Klowas until 
Bull Bear and Satanta, leaders of the respective tribes, had 
been killed, (Sherman to Sheridan, Hazen and Grierson, Decem­
ber 23, 1868, Letters Sent, Division of the Missouri, NA, RG 
98), Hereafter these records are cited Div, Mo. L.S.
Ex. Doc. Ho. 2lt0. l*lst Cong., 2 sess, (Serial
11*25), 1870,
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It would be but a "small tribute” to the memory of the great
cbief, Wynkoop submitted, to send her to her daughter, Mrs.
119George Bent, on Purgatory River, Colorado Territory. Com­
missioner Taylor and Secretary Browning endorsed the appeal,
120and Johnson Issued an Executive Order for the woman's release.
Sherman declared that Wynkoop had gone "out of his way" 
to send such a petition to the President. The agent's 
reference to the "murdered" chief and Taylor's comment about 
the former's "manly and magnanimous appeal" were simply cal­
culated to embarrass the Army. They knew that the squaw was
in good keeping. But, if George Bent would have her, she
121
would be released.
Only time and new controversies quieted the charges 
and counter-charges. The Washita "battle" or "massacre" was 
neither the first nor the last occasion for dispute between 
leaders of the War and Interior Departments over the question 
of punishing large groups of Indians for the action of un­
manageable young tribesmen. A factor which made civil and 
military authorities especially critical of one another in 
this case, though, was the concurrent resumption of congres­
sional debate over which branch should control the Indian 
service.
^•^Ibid., 9. George Bent was a son of "Colonel"
William Bent, founder of Bent’s Port, Colorado Territory.
For further information see Allen H. Bent, The Bent Familv 
in America (New York, 1900).
129sherman to Townsend, January 28, 1869, Div. Mo.
L.S., NA, RG 98.
121Ibid.
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REVIVAL OP THE TRANSFER ISSUE
The advocates of military control over Indian affairs 
remained relatively quiet for many months after their trans­
fer proposal failed in the Senate, In February, 1 8 6 7 * They 
assumed a wait-and-see attitude toward the joint efforts of 
top civil and military officials to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement with the hostile tribes. Some were skeptical about 
the Peace Commission’s report of January, 1868, which rejected 
the transfer proposition. But the fact that Generals Sherman,
Terry and Augur signed the statement prevented any attempt
123
to revive the Indian control Issue.
The turn of events in the fall of 1868, however, led 
many policy-makers to reconsider the government's system of 
Indian administration. Once more the threats and violence 
of native war parties endangered westward expansion and de­
velopment. With some tribes, at least, peace treaties seemed 
a waste of time and money* In October, disillusioned by the 
apparent failure of conciliatory measures and civil control, 
the Peace Commission recommended the use of force and War 
Department control over the Indian service.*^-
On November 1, in his annual report, General Sherman 




Priest, op. cit., l4.7-ii.8j Cong. Globe. i|.Otb Cong.,
3 sess., 17.
12i<-CIA, 1868, 371-372; see above.
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for transfer* Only the War Department, he argued, had the 
requisite force to carry out the commendable objectives of 
the Peace Commission* Many people, especially in the East, 
thought that whites always caused Indian wars, but this was 
not the case in recent developments on the Plains* Transfer 
and early appropriations were the "only hope” for ending this 
"eternal” conflict on the frontier.^ 5
Commissioner Taylor delivered a nine-page rebuttal in 
his yearly report* "In view of probable action upon that 
/£ransfer7  recommendation, and impelled by solemn convic­
tions of duty, I feel called upon to offer some facts and 
arguments," he began. First, the proper management of Indian 
affairs was "too large, onerous, and Important a burden" to 
add to the Secretary of War*s many dutie3* Second, transfer 
would necessitate a large, expensive standing army in peace­
time, and a "magnificent array of bayonets" was not the way to 
safeguard the nation* Third, in contradiction to the "true 
policy" of peace, transfer was "tantamount.**to perpetual 
war." Fourth, military management had been tried for a long 
time without success* Fifth, military government would entail 
"inhuman and unchristian" treatment and would "destroy a 
whole race by*..demoralization and disease*.•" Sixth, In­
dian affairs were "incompatible" with the training and ob­
jectives of military men. Seventh, transfer would offend the 
Indians and, as a consequence, bring injury Upon their white 
neighbors* Eighth, the Peace Commission in January, 1868,
12^SW (P), 1868, 338.
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advocated an independent department in preference to military
control. Ninth, it was impossible for the Army to fulfill
the "sacred and responsible" trust of Indian guardianship.
Tenth, war management would be much more expensive than the
existing system. Lastly, the change would violate republican
126
principles of civil supremacy and personal liberty.
The Reverend Mr, Taylor was most anxious to save the 
"unlettered children of the wilderness" from the "blighting 
sceptre of military despotism," His solution to the Indian 
problem was an independent department, presumably governed 
by men of high Christian character and missionary zeal,*2^ 
Others also advocated a separate Indian Department or other 
reforms, but in terms less offensive to those connected with 
the military. The Commissioner1s idealistic and Impassioned 
argument may have swayed some in Congress, but westerners and 
practical-minded politicians undoubtedly felt the Indians 
could do without "friends" such as Taylor.
In late November and early December the inter-depart­
mental altercation was lively. President-elect Grant threw 
his support behind War Department control, stating that the
necessity for a change was becoming "stronger and more evi-
126
dent every day," General Sheridan complained of agent 
absenteeism, charging, "...the whole Indian management is a 
notorious fraud." In reply, Commissioner Taylor asserted
126CIA, 1868, 7-15>.
12?Ibld.. 13-15.
^2®Grant to Schofield, November 21j., 1868, C.G.L.S.,
NA, RG 108.
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that Sheridan’s '’ungenerous attack" was false and "discredit- 
able to its author*
On December 8 the controversy was shifted to the House 
of Representatives. Congressman James^A. Garfield of Ohio, 
chairman of the House Military Committee, introduced H,R.
Ilj.82, a bill to restore the Indian Bureau to the War Depart­
ment as of January 1, 1869* Among other things, the bill 
proposed to empower the Secretary of War to detail military 
superintendents and agents and to appoint a colonel or higher 
ranking officer as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. This 
change, Garfield argued, would eliminate expenses for the 
salaries of many civil officials and prevent corruption, by 
making Indian authorities subject to courts-martial. "Gen­
eral Grant, General Sherman, and General Sheridan, and nearly 
all the leading officers of the Army connected with the Indian 
service," he argued, "recommend this as the initial step,""^0
Representatives Sidney Clarke of Kansas, Robert C, 
Schenck of Ohio and Halbert Paine of Wisconsin were among 
those who backed the bill. Clarke said that the Indian 
question was not a matter of philanthropy, but practical 
administration, that expansion was Inevitable and that the 
government was obliged to protect it, Schenck insisted that 
nine out of ten Indian wars were caused by "conniving" 
agents, sub-agents and contractors, rather than by troops
7Taylor to Browning, December 5, 1868, I.O.R.B.
No. 18, NA,RG 7^.
*30 Cong. Globe. lj.0th Cong., 3 sess., 17,
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stationed in the Indian country. Paine qualified his support
by suggesting that military agents be bonded like quarter-
131master or pay officers#
The leading opponent of the measure was William Windom 
of Minnesota, chairman of the House Committee on Indian 
Affairs. ”1 believe if there is any Department of this govern­
ment in which we find the great maelstrom of the treasury, 
where money is sunk by millions and never accounted for, it 
is the War Department,” be contended. To Windom, transfer 
meant all-out war on the Indians, and in his own state, six 
millions were spent In I86ij.-l86'> to kill two red men I But 
this case was weakened when he admitted ignorance of the latest 
peace commission resolutions.'*'3^
Pew others disputed the bill. Representative William 
Higby of California debunked the idea that Army officers were 
more virtuous than civil agents, and Representative William 
Munger of Ohio charged that Congress had itself caused the
recent Indian war by delaying the 1868-1869 Indian appropria- 
133
tion bill. These arguments were to no avail, for the 
House passed the Garfield bill by the overwhelming margin 
of 116 to 33.13^
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its fate waa determined by a vote on committee reference. 
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts moved that it be referred 
to the Committee on Military Affairs because it originated in 
the House military committee and would not get a fair hearing 
in the Committee on Indian Affairs, Senators Orris Perry of 
Connecticut and Roscoe Conkling of Hew York agreed that 
reference to the latter committee would be fatal,  ^ During 
the discussion, Senator William Stewart of Nevada, long-time 
advocate of transfer, offered his views on the evils of di­
vided authority in the West, "All over that country there is 
a jealousy between the two Departments," he observed, ”,,,each 
laying all the blame on the other, and it is difficult to 
investigate and ascertain where it really is."*3^
Senator John Thayer of Nebraska countered with a mo­
tion to send the bill to the Committee on Indian Affairs, 
remarking that any other course would be "irregular,n Sena­
tor Lot Morrill of Maine concurred, criticizing Wilson’s 
comment that the measure was "recommended by the generals 
of the Army," Strong objection to the inference that the 
Indian Committee would "smother" the bill came from Senator 
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois,and Senator James R, Doolittle 
of Wisconsin, head of the special committee which investigated 
Indian affairs in the period 1865-1867* Finally, Senator 
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"It Is known.,.that It has cost this government much more to 
fight the Indians than to feed them —  very much more; and I
„1 “37
think this a question whether they shall be.,.fed or fought.
When the debate ended, the Senate voted to send the bill to
its grave, the Indian Committee.'*■3®
The session was not over, though, and proponents of
military control hoped to accomplish their goal by other
means. Senator E. G. Ross of Kansas sounded out General
Sherman on certain alternatives. He asked, for example, if
the same purpose could not be served "without incurring any
of the responsibilities" if a pro-military man, such as
Governor S. J. Crawford, was made Indian Commissioner and
139Army cfficers were utilized as agents.
Sherman, who was busy with other matters, including a 
"grand" army re-union in Chicago, did not reply for some time. 
Then, on January 7, be sent Ross a detailed explanation of 
his views on the Indian problem. The worst part of the pre­
sent system, he asserted, was that the Array was unable to 
forestall hostilities. Agents always lived as far as possible 
from their charges and ministered to their "savage wants."
The alternative of an independent department would not remedy 
this, for politicians would still have the upper hand. "No 
amount of virtue or intelligence seated in Washington," Sherman
137Ibld., 1(2.
138Ibid. Senator John Sherman voted for submission of 
the bill to the Military Committee.
■^^Ross to Sherman, December 12, 1868, Sherman Papers, 
Vol. 21*.
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emphasized, "will change the state of facts on the Plains or 
in the Mountains...and the men who are to save any part of 
the wild tribes of America must live among them. Our Army 
is there and we have the power to keep them there....”* ^
New maneuvers were tried by Ross and his associates.
In February attempts were made in both the House and the 
Senate to achieve transfer by amendment. On February 
Representative Garfield resubmitted his December bill as an 
"amendment” to H.R. 1738, the Indian appropriation bill. 
Garfield blasted the existing control of the Indian service, 
alleging that in all branches "fraud ’creams and mantles’ 
and is a stench in the nostrils of all good men."^^ Windom 
discounted the amendment as not "germane" to appropriations 
and sarcastically asked why soldiers "clamored" to take over 
such a corrupt bureau. Significantly, Ben Butler, in opposing 
the amendment, suggested that the time might come when the 
House would resort to withholding Indian supplies to "wrest"
Dip
power from the Senate. Although most of the members of 
the House favored transfer, they did not accept legislation 
by amendment* The proposal lost by a vote of 93 to
Two weeks later Senator Stewart introduced a similar 
amendment to the Indian appropriation bill in the upper house.
^■°Sherman to Ross, January 7, 1869, Div* Mo. L.S.,
NA, RG 98.
• ^ Cong. Globe. I^ Oth Cong., 3 sess., 879, 881.
^Ibld.. 879-882.
^ 3Ibid., 883.
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Trying to  e s t a b l i s h  a co n n ectio n  betw een War Department con­
t r o l  and th e  measure under c o n s id e r a t io n , he contended th a t  
one-departm ent a d m in is tra tio n  would reduce the "mountain 
h igh ” sta ck  o f  money b i l l s  Senator M o r r ill  was p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  c r i t i c a l  o f  S tew a rt’ s argum ents, rem inding the l a t t e r  
th a t  i t  was "not a decorous th in g ” to  s o l i c i t  v o te s  by de­
s c r ib in g  h is  p rop osa l as the w ish  o f  the P r e s id e n t - e le c t ,
The v o te ,  36 to  9 a g a in s t  th e  amendment, l e f t  no doubt th a t  
the Senate was a bulwark a g a in s t  t r a n s f e r .
The d e fe a t  o f  Senator S te w a r t's  tr a n s fe r  amendment 
e lim in a ted  any chance th a t the War Department would g e t  
a u th o r ity  over In d ian  a f f a ir s  during th e  F o r t ie th  S e ss io n  
o f  C ongress. S t i l l  the ad vocates o f  m ilita r y  c o n tr o l were 
o p t im is t ic .  In two weeks G eneral Grant was due to  be In­
augurated as P r e s id e n t , and he had o fte n  spoken in  favor  o f  
the a d m in is tr a t iv e  change they  proposed . The Grant adm in is­
t r a t io n  was to  b r in g  reform s In Ind ian  p o l i c y ,  but n ot the  
kind most ob servers e x p ec ted .
m
ii£
I b i d . ,  1376-1377 . 
I b i d . .  1377-1378 .
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CHAPTER FIVE
INAUGURATION OF TEE "GRANT PEACE POLICY": 
MARCH, 1869 TO MARCH, 1871
I***hop© th e  p o lic y  now pursued w ill* * *  b r in g  
a l l  th e  Ind ians upon r e s e r v a t io n s , where th ey  w i l l  l i v e  
in  h ou ses, have sch oo lh ou ses and ch u rch es, and w i l l  
be pursuing p e a c e fu l and s e l f - s u s t a in in g  a v o c a tio n s ,  
and where th ey  may be v i s i t e d  by th e  la w -a b id in g  w h ite  
men w ith  th e  same im punity th a t  he now v i s i t s  th e  
c i v i l i z e d  w h ite  se tt le m e n ts*
(P resid en t G rant, December 5>, 1870)
«00t h i s  governm ent•••has p r a c t ic a l ly  exempted th e  
red men from th e  op era tion  o f  th a t  law which says  
"In th e  sw eat o f  thy fa c e  s h a lt  thou e a t bread*" 
he i s  regarded , in  o f f i c i a l  c i r c l e s ,  not on ly  as a 
n a tio n a l pauper but a n a t io n a l pet*
(Denver D a lly  Rocky Mountain News,
March 20 , lB59T
On March ij., 1869 , a f t e r  ta k in g  th e  oath  o f  o f f i c e ,  
P resid en t U ly sse s  S* Grant read , " in  low v o ic e ,"  a b r i e f  
in au gu ra l address*^ The l i s t e n e r s  who knew th a t  he had p re­
v io u s ly  advocated a m il i t a r y -c o n tr o l le d , c o e r c iv e  Indian  
p o lic y  and th a t  he planned to  appoint former g en era ls  Jacob  
D. Cox and E ly S . Parker as S ecre ta ry  o f  th e  I n te r io r  and 
Coimalssioner o f  Indian A f f a ir s ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  were probably  
su rp r ised  by h is  remarks* "The proper treatm ent o f  th e  
o r ig in a l  occupants o f  t h i s  land — the Indians — i s  one
^ H e sse lt ln e , op.* c i t *, llj.3*
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d eserv in g  o f  c a r e fu l  s tu d y ,” Grant a s s e r te d . ”1 w i l l  favor
p
any course toward them which ten ds to  t h e ir  c i v i l i z a t i o n . ”
The s o ld ie r -P r e s id e n t  was vague, but was not r a t t l i n g  sa b r e s .  
”Any co u rse” d id  not exclude th e  m il i ta r y  th eory  th a t  th e  
p r e r e q u is ite  fo r  reform ing Ind ians was to  make them f e e l  th e  
power o f  th e  governm ent. But contemporary In d ian  sym pathizers  
thought s o ,  and se v e r a l sc h o la r s  have s in c e  a s s e r te d  or im­
p l ie d  th a t  th e se  inaugural remarks were th e  prelude to  a 
b en ev o len t, en lig h ten ed  Indian  program known as th e  "Grant 
Peace P o l i c y .”3
Volumes have been w r it te n  on th e  governm ent’ s s h i f t  
to  a more p a t e r n a l is t ic  and c o n c i l ia to r y  approach to  th e  In­
d ian  problem during G rant’ s a d m in is tr a t io n . Grant h im se lf  
has sometimes been d ep ic ted  as th e  le a d in g  s p i r i t  in  a move­
ment to  spare th e  n a t io n ’s wards from th e  ”f i r e  and sword" 
p o lic y  o f  th e  Army, th e  co rru p tio n  o f  th e  "Indian r i n g , ” and 
th e  e x p lo it a t io n  o f  fro n tier sm en . The q u estio n a b le  im p li­
c a tio n  o f  t h i s  in te r p r e ta t io n  i s  th a t  he not on ly  underwent 
a sudden and dram atic con version  a f t e r  le a v in g  th e  o f f i c e  o f  
G en er a l- in -C h ie f  but fo llo w ed  standards in  In d ian  ad m in istra ­
t io n  in  s t r ik in g  c o n tra s t  to  th e  g r o ss  frauds and mismanage­
ment he e v id e n t ly  condoned in  o ther phases o f  governm ent.
^R ichardson, £2* c i t . , V II, 8 .
^ S ee, fo r  example, Manypenny, op. c i t . ; E ls ie  Rushmore,
The Indian Policy During Grant’s Admlnls tratIona (Jamaica,
New York, l 9 l 4 ) ; F l o r a  W. Seymour, Ind ian  Agents of th e  Old 
F r o n tie r  (New York, 1 9 k l) and Lawrie Tatum, Our Reel Brothers  
and t h e “Peace P o lic y  of P resid en t u ly ssea  S. Grant (P h ila d e lp h ia .
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
185
The fo llo w in g  d is c u s s io n  w i l l  d e a l ,  b r i e f l y ,  w ith  th e  
o r ig in  and e a r ly  developm ent o f  th e  le a d in g  fe a tu r e s  o f  the  
fe d e r a l In d ian  p o l ic y  o f  the p er io d  March, 1869, to  March,1871* 
The l a t t e r  d a te  c o in c id e s  w ith  the adop tion  o f  one o f  the  
l a s t  major a sp e c ts  o f  th e  s o - c a l le d  peace p o l i c y ,  a b o l i t io n  
o f  th e  Ind ian  tr e a ty  system * While c o n c e n tr a tin g  upon th e  
in te r a c t io n  o f  the War and I n te r io r  departm ent In th e se  two 
y e a r s , the w r ite r  w i l l  attem pt to  q u a lify  the t r a d i t io n a l  view  
th a t  th e  "Grant Peace P o licy "  was an in s t i t u t io n a l i z a t io n  o f  
C h r is t ia n  and p h ila n th r o p ic  Id e a ls  and a c r e d i t  to  th e  s t a t e s ­
manship and bum anitarianism  o f P r e s id e n t Grant*
I n i t i a l l y ,  I t  should  be n o ted , however, th a t  contem­
porary and modern a n a ly s ts  have used th e  term "Grant Peace 
P o licy "  in  v ar iou s w ays. Some have r e fe r r e d  to  th e  c o n c i l ia ­
to r y  elem ents o f  the In d ian  p o l ic y  a t tr ib u te d  to  Grant 
p e r s o n a lly , o th ers to  a l l  n o n -b e llig e r e n t  methods used w h ile
he was in  o f f i c e  and s t i l l  o th ers to  the g en era l p o l ic y  a f t e r
k
1869# In c lu d in g  c o e r c iv e  and p a c i f i c  m easures* H erein the  
b ro a d est d e f in i t io n  w i l l  be u sed , fo r  the government sought 
peace through a mixed program which combined o ld  and new ta c ­
t i c s  and d i f f e r e n t ia t e d  between th e  treatm en t o f  p eaceab le  and
x t
h o s t i l e  Ind ians*
^■Hyde, on,  c i t . . fo r  exam ple, em phasizes th e  word "peace" 
and d a tes  the p o lic y  from 1865 , w h ile  Seymour, op* c i t *. 
t y p i f i e s  th o se  who s t r e s s  G rant’ s' p erso n a l r o l e .  Robert M, 
U t le y ,  "The C eleb rated  Peace P o lic y  o f  G eneral G rant," North 
Dakota H istory  * XX (J u ly , 1953)# I 21-U4.3 and Lucy E. Text o r ,  
6‘f f l c l a l  R e la tio n s  Between th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S ioux In ­
d ian s (P a lo  A lto ,  1896) ,  g iv e  more com prehensive in te r p r e ­
ta t io n s *
* S I , 1873,  I I I - I V .
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THE PEACE POLICY
An Initial feature of the peace policy was the estab­
lishment of an unpaid, non-partisan Board of Indian Com­
missioners to advise the Secretary of the Interior and "exercise 
joint control" with him over Indian appropriations.^* This 
organization, comprised at first of nine leading philan­
thropists, was more the result of humanitarian pressure and 
political exigencies than the charitable ingenuity of Presi­
dent Grant, Long before it was created, Colonel Ely S, Parker, 
Grants military aide, the Doolittle Committee of 1865-1867 , 
the Peace Commission of 1867-1868 and others recommended such 
an agency to improve and exert a "moral influence" upon the 
Indian service. The immediate impetus for the organization 
of the Board, though, was a House-Senate dispute over the 
Indian appropriation bill for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 
18 6 9 .
At the end of the fortieth session of Congress, the 
House refused to approve a Senate amendment to add to a pro­
posed Indian appropriation of $2,312,21^.0,12 over four and a
^16 S t a t ,  L*, lj.0.
^Parker to  Grant, January 21+, 1867 , I.O.L.R., M is c .. NA, 
R£ 75; Sen , R p t. No, 1 56 . 39th  C ong,, 2 s e s s .  (S e r ia l  12791, 
1867 , 8 -1 0 ; HR Ex. Doc* No. 9 7 . lj.0th C ong,, 2 sess. (Serial 
13371, 1867,  22; S l i p ) ,  1869,  613; P r i e s t ,  03.  c i t . ,  1^2. One 
o f  th e  o r g a n iza tio n s  which brought p ressu re  upon th e  govern­
ment to  e s ta b l i s h  such a board was th e  "United S ta te s  In d ian  
Commission," a twenty-member group o f  prom inent clergym en and 
refo rm ers , .This group in c lu d ed  P eter  Cooper, founder o f  Cooper 
Union in  New York, Henry Bergh, o rg a n izer  o f  th e  S o c ie ty  fo r  
th e  P reven tion  o f  C ruelty  o f  A nim als, James A R o o se v e lt , Rev­
erend Henry Ward Beecher and s e v e r a l  welHioown r e l ig io u s  and 
form er a n t i - s la v e r y  c r u sa d e r s , (CIA, 1869,  9 5 -9 6 ) ,
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th ir d  m il l io n  d o lla r s  to  f u l f i l l  the peace t r e a t i e s  o f  1867-  
1868 . The House, jea lo u s o f  th e  S e n a te ’ s tr e a ty  and r e la te d  
powers over Indian a f f a i r s ,  h e ld  out so stu bb orn ly  th a t
Q
Congress adjourned w ithou t p a ssin g  an Indian b i l l*  E arly  in  
th e  f o r t y - f i r s t  s e s s io n ,  the House re -in tro d u ced  i t s  o r ig in a l  
b i l l ,  and th e  Senate again  amended i t  to  a llow  fo r  implementa­
t io n  o f the peace t r e a t ie s *  As a compromise, Congress f i n a l l y  
passed  th e  measure w ith  a supplem entary, u n a llo t te d  $ 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  
and an a d d it io n a l $2f>,000 fo r  the e sta b lish m en t o f  a board 
o f  "not more than te n  com m issioners*. .em inent fo r  th e ir  
in t e l l ig e n c e  and philanthropy" to  h e lp  su p e rv ise  In d ian  e x -
Q
p en d itu res*
A ccord in g ly , on June 3 ,  Grant is su e d  an e x e c u tiv e  
order ap p o in tin g  th e  Board o f  Ind ian  Commissioners and v e s t in g  
i t  w ith  vague, s e m i - o f f i c ia l  d u t ie s .  The Board was in s tr u c te d  
to :  e s t a b l i s h  i t s  own o rg a n iza tio n ; examine record s and
in form ation  p e r ta in in g  to  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the Ind ian  O ff ic e ;  
in sp e c t  a g e n c ie s , w itn e ss  an n u ity  d is tr ib u t io n s  and con fer  
w ith  f i e l d  o f f i c i a l s ;  su p erv ise  the purchase o f Indian  goods; 
a d v ise  the heads o f  th e  department and bureaii on appointm ents 
and purchases} and make recommendations on Indian management*
^Cong. G loba, ifOth C ong., 3 s e s s . ,  1698, 1813, 1891. 
H e s s e lt in e ,  op*' c i t . , and A thearn, ojd. c i t . , are in  error  in  
s ta t in g  th a t  two m il l io n  d o lla r s  were appropriated  in  th e  f o r t i e t h  
s e s s io n  and th a t  Grant had a f r e e  hand in  expending i t*  The 
House and S en a te , as shown by debates over tr a n s fe r , had lon g  
d if fe r e d  over th e  l a t t e r 1s power to  approve t r e a t i e s  and In­
d ian  appointm ents and to  c o n tr o l Indian land c e s s io n s .  See 
below*
916 S t a t .  L .,  ij.0*
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In abort, it was to bave a auperviaory, not an executive,
10role*
Among the first commissioners were some outstanding 
humanitarians: William Welsh of Philadelphia, John V, Par-
well of Chicago, William E. Dodge of New York, Silas E. Tobey 
of Boston, Nathan Bishop of New York, Robert Campbell of 
St* Louis, Henry S. Lane of Indiana, Felix Brunot of Pitts­
burgh, George H, Stuart of Philadelphia and Vincent Colyer 
of New York, These men had such varied professional experience 
as manufacturing, retailing, shipping, education, real estate 
and banking* Several were prominent in the Y,M,C,A. movement 
and the organization of Sunday school, Bible and missionary 
societies* Lane, the only active politician, had served in 
the House of Representatives. Robert Campbell, a colorful 
Irish Immigrant who had been a partner in the Sublette and
Campbell fur-trapping firm, was the only "westerner” in the 
11group*
Although the Board was active in Indian affairs until 
193^, it had difficulty from the very beginning over its 
powers and responsibilities. Secretary Cox, Commissioner Par­
ker and their successors often complimented the philanthropists
10CIA, 1869, k k - h $ *
^Marshall Dwight Moody, "A History of the Board of 
Indian Commissi Ouw !Tw aud Its Relationship to the Administration 
of Indian Affairs, 1869-1900.” (unpublished master's thesis, 
American University, undated), 7-H* Campbell's fur company 
was active near Fort Laramie, and he was one of the commis­
sioners who negotiated the Sioux treaty of l8£l* See LeRoy 
R. Hafen, Fort Laramie and the Pageant of the West. 1 83b.-lo90 
(Glendale, 1938).
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for their advice and assistance, but always insisted upon
keeping them in a subordinate position."^ William Welsh,
first president of the Board, resigned when the Indian Bureau
13purchased some Indian goods without consulting his group*
All of the original commissioners except Bishop unsuccess­
fully agitated for coordinate control of the Indian service*
"The commission," they reported in November, 1869, "••.considers 
itself clothed with full power to examine all matters apper­
taining to the conduct of Indian affairs Secretary Cox
maintained, however, that President Grant had not intended to 
create a "double-headed" administration.^*
This intra-departraental feud continued for many months 
because Congress failed to clarify the Board's powers. The 
commission Interpreted the Indian appropriation act of July 
1 5, 1870, as giving it supervision over "all expenditures;" 
Commissioner Parker said it could consider only annuities 
In 1871 the organization's executive committee was authorized 
to revise, approve or disapprove all accounts, but the Secre­
tary of the Interior retained the right to reject their
12SI, 1869, x-xi; White, oja. cit., 189-191.
■^3j* p. Cox to Win. Welsh, June 2, 1869, D.I.L.S.,
Indian Misc., NA, RG 75.
^CIA, 1869, l£.
^Nathan Bishop to Cox, July 2, 1869, D.I.A.F. and 
Cox To Felix R. Brunot, July 5, 1869, D.I.L.S., Indian Misc.,
NA, RG 75.
^ 1 6  Stat, L., 335; BIC, 1873, 8 ; N.p, Chipman, "Argu­
ment of N. P. Chipman on Behalf of Honorable E. S. Parker," 
(Washington, 1870), 105-108.
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recommendations. While struggling to gain official stature, 
the Board, in 1871, discovered that Commissioner Parker had 
approved some large beef and flour contracts without adver­
tising them. Its subsequent investigation induced Parker to 
resign.1^
But this "victory” was short-lived. In January, 18?2, 
Secretary Delano flaunted the opinions of Vincent Colyer, the
ng
Board secretary, so openly that the latter resigned. Further­
more, in May, l Q 7 k $  when Delano tried to bring the Board under 
closer restriction by moving its headquarters from New York 
to Washington, six members submitted resignations. The Secre­
tary, they explained, overruled so many decisions and recom­
mendations that their labor was rendered "as useless as it is
»19
arduous and vexatious." 7 After 18714. the Board consisted of
persons more amenable to the rule of the politicians and acted
20
in a strictly advisory capacity.
The Indian Commission also had other problems to contend 
with. Much criticized by westerners and military control
. ^ S e n . Ex. Doc. No. 39. 14.1st Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
II440), 1871, 5 } Priest, op. cit., ij.5; Moody, "History of the 
Board,” 63.
TO
Brunot to Delano, January 13, 1872, and Brunot to
Vincent Colyer, January 19, 1872. B.C., Tray 2, NA, RG 75.
19
7Brunot et. al. to President Grant, May 27, I87I4.9 Board 
of Indian Commissioners Miscellaneous Correspondence, Tray 
117, NA, RG 7 5. Hereafter these records are cited B.C.M.
Those resigning included Brunot, Campbell, Bishop, Dodge, 
Farwell and Stuart. Among the proposals Delano rejected was 
one to create an Independent Indian Department.
Priest, op. cit.. I4.8 .
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
advocates in Congress, it had considerable difficulty getting
funds for operational and travel expenses, "Congressional
opposition to the commissioners,11 one author observes, "was
abandoned only after the Board had been reduced to impotence
/about 18827 by lack of authority and f u n d s S t i l l  the
Board made significant contributions to Indian administration
through its publicity of the Indian problem, Investigations and
22
reform of contracting and accounting procedures.
Relations between the commission and the military were,
as a rule, less than amicable. The Board at times accused
the Army of wanting to slaughter the Indians, In its first
annual report it commented:
Against the inhuman idea that the Indian is only 
fit to be exterminated, and the influence of the men 
who propagate it, the military arm of the government 
cannot be too strongly guarded. It is hardly to be 
wondered at that inexperienced officers, ambitious for 
distinction, when surrounded by such influences have 
been Incited to attack Indian bands without adegnate 
cause, and involve the nation in an unjust war, 3
Some western commanders, on the other hand, regarded the east­
ern Indian sympathizers as crackpots, General Sherman once 
shocked a group of New York philanthropists by declining to
appear before them unless they retired to Ports Sully or Rice,
2 k
where the "poor Indians" lived. Speaking for the military
21Ibid., ^0,
22tfhite, on. cit.. 190; Moody, "History of the Board,"
15-29.
23ciA, 1869, 1*7-48.
^■Denver Dally Rocky Mountain News. May 19, 1870,
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profession, the Army and Navy Journal asserted that the 
“ignorant” humanitarians succeeded only in "harassing” Gen­
eral Sheridan and others who understood the Indian problem
29and wanted to take positive steps to solve it,
A second aspect of the peace policy, one which grati­
fied contemporary humanitarians and reformers, was the nomina­
tion of Indian officials by religious societies. Like the
appointment of the Board of Indian Commissioners, this measure
26
was designed to purify the Indian service. Actually, the
government had informally consulted church groups in selecting
agents for many years. Moreover, in February, 1867, transfer
opponents discussed the possibility of a formal religious
27
nomination system in both houses of Congress, But only the
Society of Friends, or Quakers, had the initiative to request
regular appointment responsibilities. In January, 1869, a
delegation of Orthodox Friends visited President-elect Grant
in Washington and offered to assist him in agency appointments
28
by submitting a list of trustworthy persons. This group
also memorialized Congress, citing their success with the red 
men since the days of William Penn, ",,.we are confident," 
they remarked, "that the faithful exercise of the principles of
2% & N  Jnl, VII (May 28, 1 8 7 0), 63 7.
^CIA, 1869, x-xi; Peter J. Rahill, The Catholic Indian 
Missions and Grant1a Peace Policy, l870-188k TWasfalngtono 1993. 
32,
^Priest, op, cit., 29; Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess., 
892-898, 17Hu
28Rahill, 0£. cit., 32-33«
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our Lord Jesus Christ will be found sufficient to solve the
29
Indian question without military aid*”
t
Soon after Grant was inaugurated, the Quakers asked
30
the Indian Bureau how many agents it could use. The In­
terior authorities, supposing that religious agents might 
provide honest and more economical administration, encouraged
the President to appoint Friends for the agencies in Nebraska,
31Kansas and Indian Territory, Meanwhile, though, Grant 
appointed sixty-eight Army officers, rendered "surplus" by
an act of Congress approved March 3, 1869, as superintendents
32and agents,-^ Since about four times as many military men 
as Friends filled key agency positions, the President, at this 
point, was hardly following a “Quaker policy," as is sometimes 
suggested,^ On March 29, 1870, Commissioner Parker explained 
the basis for appointing a military agent for the Cherokees 
in this way:
29
HR Mlsc, Doc, 29. lj.0th Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial 1385)* 
1869, 1-3, For a summary of the views of the Central Executive 
Conanittee of the Seven Yearly Meeting of the Friends Society 
see Sen. Misc. Doc. No. $3. tb Cong., 3 sess, (Serial 1835)* 
1879, 397-399.
^John Butler to N. G. Taylor, March ll|, 1869, I.O.L.R., 
Indian Affairs, Misc., NA, RG 75,
^ S e n . Misc. Doc. No. 93. i|5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
1835)s 1879s 396-397; CIA, 1869, 5. These states comprised 
the Northern and Central superintendencles which Included, ex­
cept for the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Comancbes and Kiowas, peace­
able and sedentary tribes,
^William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sher­
man (New York, 1891), II, 1+36; Ganoe, op,, cit.. 32i}.«
^Schmeckebier, op. cit,, for example, while mentioning 
the military appointments, states that Grant "...promptly adopt­
ed a new policy...by delegating...nomination to the several 
religious organizations interested in mission work among the 
Indians."
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This has been done in conformity with the policy now 
in force, to appoint Officers of the Army to such posi­
tions, in preference to civilians, except the Indian 
Agencies embraced within the Northern and Central Superin­
tended ies, which are In charge of members of the Society 
of Friends *34-
In his annual message of December 6, 1869, Grant com­
mented on the "most satisfactory" results of his "new policy" 
of appointing Friends to manage a few agencies* Their "strict 
integrity and fair dealings," he said, fitted them for such 
service* At the same time, for superintendents and agents 
"not on the reservations," Army officers worked best* They 
were needed in Indian country anyway, held positions for life, 
were most anxious to avoid war and could be court-martialed 
for fraud*
Still, a few months later, Grant and his advisors ex­
panded the "Quaker policy," giving the right to nominate all 
Indian officials to various religious denominations* Grant*s 
reasons for making this change, however, were evidently more 
personal and political than humanitarian. Congress had taken 
exception to the appointment of military agents, because the 
Indian service was a favorite outlet for patronage* To pre­
serve this power, the politicians passed the army appro­
priation act of July l£, 1870, which stipulated that officers 
accepting civil appointments had to relinquish their
^•Parker to John B, Lawley, March 29, 1870, I.O,R,B,
No* 9k, NA, RG 75.
^Richardson, og* cit*, VII, 38-39*
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■3A
commissions. Sherman's memoirs give a secondhand account 
of the President's reaction to this move. When the sponsors 
of this act visited Grant and announced their design to pre­
vent the use of Army officers as agents, he replied: "Gentle­
men, you hav© defeated my plan of Indian management; but you 
shall not succeed in your purpose, for I will divide these 
appointments up among the religious churches, with which you 
dare not contend."37 Subsequently, the agencies were appor­
tioned among the Quakers, Methodists, Catholics, Episco-
OQ
palians, Presbyterians and other groups. "This may be good 
politics," General Sherman later complained, "but surely is
bad statesmanship."39
Prom the viewpoint of westerners and military leaders, 
church-nominated officials were little better than those 
chosen under the old spoils system. General Sheridan insisted,
3 16 Stat. L. 319* Apparently the bill was also backed 
by certain former volunteer officers who failed to gain per­
manent rank at the end of the Civil War. (Athearn, op. cit.. 
2514.-257 )•
37sherman, 0£. cit.. II, lf.37*
3®In 1872 the Hicksite Friends were in charge of six 
agencies; the Orthodox Friends, ten; Baptists, five; Presby­
terians, nine; Christians, two; Methodists, fourteen; Catholics, 
seven; Reformed Dutch, five; Congregationalists, three; Episco­
palians, eight; American Board of Foreign Missions, one; Uni­
tarians, two; and Lutherans, one. (Scbmeckebier, oj). cit.,
5 5* note.)
er.c, Misc. Poo. No. £ 3, l|5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
1 8 3 5), 1879, 2?7* There is evidence that Grant's role with 
respect to, especially, the church nomination system and Board 
of Indian Commissioners has been overrated. Subordinates, 
particularly Secretary J. D c Cox, were the planners who made 
the "Grant Peace Policy" possible. Indeed, various reforms 
were achieved in spite of, rather than because of, Grant. He 
enlarged the church scheme to defy those who opposed military
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f o r  exam ple, th a t  p h ila n th r o p y  and C h r is t ia n iz a t io n  co u ld  n o t  
su c ceed  u n t i l  th e  sa v a g es  had been  l i c k e d  and fo r c e d  to  l i v e  
perm an en tly  on r e s e r v a t io n s  by th e  ArmyJ*0 In f a c t ,  th e  
r e l i g i o u s  a g en ts  d id  much e x c e l l e n t  w ork, b u t th e  n om in ation  
sy stem  f a i l e d  t o  ren o v a te  th e  In d ia n  s e r v ic e  to  th e  e x te n t  
th a t  refo rm ers hoped. In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  many a p p o in te e s  
knew l i t t l e  o f  In d ia n s  and la c k e d  th e  f o r t i t u d e  to  c o n t r o l  
t h e ir  ch a rg es  and agen cy  "hangers-on"  and th e  i n t e g r i t y  to  
r e s i s t  th e  tem p ta tio n  t o  m isa p p ro p r ia te  In d ia n  s u p p l ie s  and 
fu n d s . S e c o n d ly , some ch u rch es p a r t ic ip a t e d  in  th e  program  
w ith  l i t t l e  en th u siasm  b eca u se  o f  l im i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  and 
governm ent a id ,  d i s i n t e r e s t  among t h e ir  p a r is h io n e r s  and th e  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  reform in g  u n tu to r e d , n o n -E n g lish -sp e a k in g  t r i b e s ­
men, T h ir d ly , th e r e  was in te r -d e n o m in a t io n a l s t r i f e ,  in c lu d in g  
j e a lo u s y  o ver  a s s ig n m e n ts , P r o te s ta n t  d is p u te s  w ith  th e  
"Rom anists" and v i c e  v e r s a  and in tr a -c h u r c h  a l t e r c a t i o n s , ^
^ ( c o n t in u e d )  a p p o in tm en ts , b u t  l a t e r  began  to  compro­
m ise  w ith  th e  p a tro n a g e-m a n a g ers ,  A fte r  Cox r e s ig n e d  in  th e  
f a l l  o f  1 8 7 0 , C h a r lie  Cox, h is  b r o th e r , asked  him to  ex p o se  
G rant’ s h y p o c r i t i c a l  s ta n d  on In d ia n  p o l i c y .  Of a c o n v e r s a tio n  
w ith  a  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  H arper’ s  W eekly. C h a r lie  w ro te :  "I 
t o ld  Mr, N ord h off th a t  I  had heard you sa y  th a t  you had to  
f i g h t  w ith  Grant a lm o st ev ery  week w h ile  you w ere in  th e  C a b in e t , 
to  p r e v e n t  him from  abandoning th e  In d ia n  P o l ic y  o f  w hich  he 
now p r o f e s s e s  to  have b een  th e  a u th or  and e a r n e s t  s u p p o r t e r , , ,
I  remarked t o  Mr, N, th a t  o f  co u rse  i t  w ould now be th e  P r e s i ­
d e n t ’ s b e s t  p o l ic y  to  ca rry  ou t c a r e f u l ly  th e  In d ia n  program on 
w hich you were a t  w ork," (C h a r lie  Cox to  J 0 D , Cox, November 
1 2 , 1870,  Cox P a p e r s ) ,
1*0
A th ea rn , op.  c i t . .  2 ij.8-250,
^ " P r ie s t ,  0£ ,  c i t , .  3 0 -3 6 ,  An i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  in t r a -  
church  problem  was th e  co m p la in t Grant r e c e iv e d  from a Quaker 
a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a l  appoin tm en ts t o  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  th e  P r e s i ­
d en t had b een  " w ick ed ly  im posed upon" by " seced ers"  from th e  
London Y e a r ly  M eetin g , (W illia m  F , Harvey to  G rant, May 13,  1 8 6 9 ,
I .0 ,L .R , ,  M is c .,  NA, RG 7 S ) .
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Finally, several churches clashed with interior authorities 
over control of the agencies, trying to obtain the power to 
regulate and remove agents* After Secretary Carl Schurz took 
office, in 1877, church nominations were gradually and quietly 
discontinued, and, with closer restrictions, political appoint­
ments were resumed. Army criticism, to be discussed in 
connection with debate over civil or military control of the 
Indians in the late Seventies, played an important part in 
the eventual elimination of this church-state experiment,
A third phase of the peace policy was a multi-purpose 
program intended to placate and acculturate the tribes. 
Essentially, what may be termed the "acculturation process," 
entailed the fulfillment of peace treaties, not only to re­
imburse the Indians for losses of land, freedom and subsistence
but also to pacify potentially hostile tribesmen and lead the
«t ah 3red race upon a new course of life. Secretary Cox
described this as less a new policy than an enlargement and 
"enlightened application of the general principles of the 
old one,"^- The government, by various means —  locating 
the Indians permanently on limited reservations, temporarily 
subsisting and caring for them and teaching them the white 
man's language, tastes, customs, religion, views toward indi­
vidual ownership and techniques of farming, herding and self
IiP
Priest, op, cit,, 36-39,
^3CIA, 1869, 5o 
viii.
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support —  hoped to achieve lasting benefits for both races. 
While the Indians were protected and "uplifted,” frontier con­
flicts would be terminated and national expansion would be 
facilitated,^
The military was involved in this program in several 
ways. First, as already mentioned, Army officers, until July 
1, l869s supervised the settlement of tribes on new reserva­
tions, helped to build agencies and purchased and distributed 
Indian supplies. Secondly, until July, 1870, military appoint­
ees administered many agencies, experiencing the satisfactions 
and disappointments of trying to reform the red men. Al­
though they noted many signs of progress, these agents often 
complained of inadequate funds, poor facilities, unhealthful 
locations, interference by recalcitrant Indians and white 
intruders, tribal relations, the Indians’ vices and the 
intransigence of older tribesmen,
A third way in which the Army participated was through
its commissary department. Commissioner Parker argued that
the military’s subsistence branch was able to provide
supplies with "greater economy and more satisfaction" than
it 7
the Interior Department. Most of the two million appro-
^Ibid., 1*9-50; CIA, 1870, 9; SI (P), 1871, 1*78-1*79.
^CIA, 1869, passim. The Whetstone Agent, Captain De- 
Witt C. Poole, was perplexed, for example, by his charges’ 
alteration of twenty-five thousand dollars worth of pants, 
dress coats and overcoats to resemble their traditional attire, 
(DeWitt C, Poole, Among the Sioux of Dakota j f f i e w York, l88l7, 
61*—66 .).
^CIA, 1869, 5*
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priated In 1869 to fulfill new peace treaties went to the Army
for furnishing provisions at Port Sill, Camp Supply and the
k8
Missouri River agencies* The military continued to handle 
Indian requisitions until the fiscal year 1871, when, over­
taxed by its own requirements and hampered by insufficient
k9funds, the commissary department dropped this service.
Finally, in this same connection, Army officers were 
involved in the distribution of Indian rations and annuities* 
After 1869 Indian appropriation bills required department 
commanders to detail officers, not below the rank of captain, 
to witness all such issues. This responsibility was often 
criticized by Army spokesmen as an unnecessary burden and 
duplication of authority which might be eliminated by military 
control over the Indians. The system did, however, check many 
discrepancies and abuses in the Indian service. For example, 
General D. S. Stanley, commander of the Middle District, the 
Department of Dakota, reported that contractors accustomed to 
charging the government for beef at an average of thirteen 
hundred pounds a head were forced to settle for less than a 
thousand-pound average after military scales and weighing
^3SW (P), 1871, 323.
^Commissary General A. B. Eaton to Secretary Belknap, 
June 27, 1870, I.O.L.R., Misc. 1870, NA, RG 75. The Army 
continued to furnish supplies in case of emergency. Another 
factor in the 1871 change was the Improvement of purchasing 
procedures under the supervision of the Board of Indian 
Commissioners.
^®The inspection rule is cited and discussed in Parker 
to Cox, May 22, 1869, I.O.R.B. No. 18, NA, RG 75.




In general, both military and civil authorities supported
the government's efforts to control and reform the Indians
by subsisting, educating and civilizing them. A few Army
officers, such as General Stanley, complained that the more
the United States provided for the red men, the more insolent 
52
they become* But others, Including Stanley's superiors, 
General Hancock and General Sheridan, believed that the 
acculturation process, properly administered, offered the best 
possibility for eventually solving the Indian problem,^ Like­
wise, Interior officials, in their periodic reports, indicated 
that a steadily growing proportion of the native population 
was being weaned of old habits and that the younger genera­
tion, In particular, showed "encouraging evidence of the 
practicability of their elevation to the dignity of citizen­
ship...,1* ^
A fourth feature of the peace policy was the discon­
tinuance of the traditional practice of recognizing Indian 
tribes as "domestic dependent nations" through treaties. The 
Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1871, included the 
statement, "...hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
^ D s S. Stanley to Gen. H e C. Clarke, June 20, 1869,
I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75,
^2A&N Jnl. VI (May 8, 1869), 600,
S. Hancock to AAG, Division of the Missouri, June, 
1870, I . O . L . R . ,  Misc., NA, RG 75; SW (P), 1869, 38,
^CIA, 1870, 9.
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territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recog* 
nized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty. This provision, 
while leaving confirmed treaties intact, at least nominally 
abolished the basis for government-Indian relations which had 
for years caused complaint by many military officials, some 
Indian authorities and, especially, a majority of the lower 
house of Congress.
Generals Sherman, Sheridan and Pope were among the
western commanders who contended that, with powerful tribes,
it was a waste of time and money to bribe Indian leaders to
sign documents they did not understand and could not or did
56not intend to enforce* In his first annual report, Com­
missioner Parker also reproved the "cruel farce” of treaty- 
making., "A treaty Involves the idea of a compact between two 
or more sovereign powers," he contended, "each possessing 
sufficient authority and force to compel a compliance with 
the obligations incurred. The Indian tribes of the United 
States are not sovereign nations...as none of them have an 
organized government of such inherent strength as would secure 
a faithful obedience of its people in the observance of com­
pacts of this character.tt^ 7 Furthermore, the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, shortly after it was organised, recommended
-^16 Stat. L,, 566.
^See, for example, Pope to Grant, June lip, 1865,
I.O.L.R., Misc., HA, RG 75.
^7CIA, 1869, 6.
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abandonment of treaty relations "as soon as any just method
„58
can be devised,,
But some of the most vigorous demands for abolition of 
the treaty system were made in the House of Representatives, 
The House, as mentioned, was envious of the Senate's ratifica­
tion power and dissatisfied with its own legislative impotence 
regarding the "foreign" tribes and Indian land cessions. Its 
delay of Indian appropriations for 1869 was the opening round 
in the culminating battle over tribal treaties. During debate 
on March 12, 1869* Representative John F. Farnsworth of 
Illinois declared:
If we go on making treaties and recognizing the right 
of the President and Senate to make treaties with every 
little wandering tribe of naked savages in the country, 
treating with them as independent nations, treating away 
portions of the public domain and buying land from little 
wandering tribes of savages, and agreeing to give them 
annuities and clothing and agricultural implements and 
ministers and schoolmasters and everything else per­
petually, why it is becoming a great whirlpool in which 
we shall sink, A stop has got to be put to this thing 
sooner or later,59
But most members of the House were unwilling to risk an In­
dian war by withholding peace treaty funds. Instead, a 
section was included in the 1869 bill stating that appropria­
tions did not constitute approval of agreements made since 
July, 1867,60
A similar dispute arose over appropriations for the
HO
Ibid,, 50, The Peace Commission in October, 1868, 
made a similar proposal (CIA, 1868, 371*)
^ C o n g , Globe. l*lst Cong,, 1 sess., 58,
6016 Stat. L,, 1*0.
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fiscal year 1870, The Senate amended the Indian bill by adding
itemized amounts called for in peace treaties, but the House
rejected the amendment and again left the expenditures to the
President's discretion.^" The representatives' frustrations
over the Senate's treaty power were palliated, though, in
December, 1870, when the Supreme Court ruled that Congress
might refuse to provide money to implement treaties or. in
62
some cases, repeal Indian agreements. Fortified by this 
decision, the House was virtually in a position to dictate 
the termination of the treaty system in 1871, nThe conse­
quences will be far-reaching," Representative Aaron A.
Sargent of California predicted in supporting the change,
"It will save millions of money to the Treasury, It breaks 
up a most improvident system, and admits the right of the 
House of Representatives to deal with these questions by 
legislation."^
The prohibition of Indian treaties, however, did not 
immediately alter the relations between the government and 
its wards. For one thing, the United States continued to 
negotiate "agreements" with the heads of tribes and bands, 
promising them federal support and annuities for land cessions. 
In addition, because Congress did not clarify the legal status
61
Cong. Globe. ij.lst Cong., 2 sess., 5>607ff; Priest, 
op. cit,, 99, Ey an oversight, a provision repudiating the 
peace treaties was not Included in the 1870 measure,
62XI Wallace, 616,
^ C o n g . Globe, Iflst Cong., 3 sess., 1811,
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of the red men, the courts held them to be neither citizens 
nor aliens, but anomalous subjects of the white man's 
government.^-
Paradoxical as it may seem, a final integral phase of 
the peace program involved the use of military force. The 
process of civilizing backward tribes depended, to a con­
siderable extent, upon the government's ability to secure 
reservations and agencies against disrupting outside influences, 
such as hostile non-agency Indians and white intruders. The 
agency Indians also had to understand, Indian officials main­
tained, that there were negative as well as positive induce­
ments for remaining at peace on the lands set aside for them.
In a sense, the carrot and stick method was applied, with the 
Army performing a "legitimate and essential" police function.^ 
This dual approach, evident from the outset of Grant's ad­
ministration, was perhaps best explained by Commissioner 
Francis A, Walker, who took over the Indian Office in Novem­
ber, 1871* In defending the use of force to make the policy 
of peace "effective and universal," Walker asserted:
Such a use of the military constitutes no aban­
donment of the 'peace policy* and involves no dispar­
agement of it. It was not to be expected.,.that the 
entire body of wild Indians should submit to be re­
strained in their Isbmaelitish proclivities without 
a struggle on the part of the more audacious to main­
tain their traditional freedom. In the first announce­
ment of the reservation system, it was expressly 
declared that the Indians should be made as comfortable
^Schmeckebier, op. cit., 6L.-66; Friest, op. cit,. 
100-105. --
6^CIA, 1872, 6.
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on, and as uncomfortable off, th8ir reservations as it 
was in the power of the Government to make them; that 
such of them as went right should be protected and fed, 
and such as went wrong should be harassed and scourged 
without intermission*,*.Such a use of the strong arm of 
the Government is not war, but discipline. Yet It 
would seem impossible for many persona to apprehend the 
distinction between a state of general Indian war, and 
the occasional use of the regular military force of the 
country In enforcing the reservation policy, or punish­
ing the sporadic acts of outrage,on the part of dis­
affected individuals and bands,ob
Since the Army continued to play a key role in federal
Indian policy, the basic problem of civil-military relations
persisted. When Grant took office, western commanders,
through General Sherman, demanded a specific definition of
67their authority over the tribes. Grant referred the matter 
to Secretary Cox and his former military aide, Commissioner 
Parker. On May 26 Parker informed the prospective members of 
the Board of Indian Commissioners that one of their first 
duties would be to study inter-departmental relations.
"Great mischief, evils, and frequently serious results follow 
from friendly Indians leaving the reservations, producing con­
flicts between the citizens, soldiers, and Indians," he stated. 
"At wbat time and point shall the civil rule cease and the 
military begin?"88
This was probably one of the toughest questions In the 
administration of Indian affairs, and the Board had no ready
66Ibld.. 5-6.
6?Cox to Secretary of War Rawlins, June 8, 1869, filed 
with AGO L.R., 1877-1878, NA, RG 9^*
68CIA, 1869, ij-3*
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solution. For advice, the commissioners turned to an ex­
perienced staff officer, Inspector General Randolph B, Marcy. 
General Marcy expounded at length upon the history of Indian 
relations, praised the work of the philanthropists, noted the 
efficiency of military Indian control in the pre-l8ij.9 period 
and predicted eventual resolution of the Indian problem. But 
he failed to come to grips with the real issue and gave no 
formula for joint control
Finally, on June 8, Parker set forth his own recommenda­
tions on civil and military jurisdiction in a letter to 
Secretary Cox. The most troublesome tribes, he concluded, were 
the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches and 
Apaches. These Indians had been notified that the govern­
ment wanted to locate them in permanent homes on large 
reservations where they could be fed and clothed and avoid 
conflict with white man. Some obediently settled in desig­
nated areas, but others continued to commit hostile acts.
Hence, Parker proposed:
...I would respectfully recommend that for the present 
it be understood that such portions of the above-men­
tioned tribes as have or shall come in, and remain upon 
the reservations, be regarded as friendly and under the 
care of the Interior Department, and the Indians of the 
said tribes who remain out be regarded and treated as 
hostile while so remaining out, and be subject wholly 
to the supervision of the military branch of the 
Government.
69
Ibid.. 110-119* Marcy’s one proposal was to have 
civil and military authorities hold chiefs responsible for 
the acts of young hostiles —  hardly an original suggestion.
?°Parker to Cox, June 8, 1869, I.O.L.B. No. 18, NA,
RG 75*
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Meantime the Army should be cautious in dealing with indivi­
duals from friendly tribes who occasionally committed 
depredations. Tribal leaders, to keep their people eligible 
for annuities, would be required to turn criminals over to 
civil authorities. The military was to be called upon to 
intervene only as a ”last resorto”7^
This basis for dividing War and Interior authority was 
promptly adopted by both departments. It was similar to the 
civil-military understanding of 1865, except that the dis­
position of tribes was to be determined primarily by their 
location. Parker, in a June 12th circular to all Indian 
superintendents and agents, slightly modified this arrange­
ment. Military officers, he indicated, did not have to treat 
Indians off their reservations as hostile, but were free to 
use their discretion. At the same time, agents were to do 
everything possible to control their subjects without military 
assistance and were to withhold presents and provisions from 
all tribesmen whose friendship and inclination to become 
civilized were in doubt.7^
General Sherman gave a broader interpretation to this 
understanding to his division commanders. Any Indiana outside 
their reservations, he said, not just those mentioned by 
Parker, would be under original and exclusive military control. 
Department and post commanders were free to judge their
71Ibid.
72CIA, 1869, k-52.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
208
character and take any action deemed necessary. Ag a rule, 
though, it would he beat to try to arrest and return first- 
offenders to their agents, notifying the wanderers that a se­
cond offense would definitely be punished. rtThis is the first 
time within my experience that this division of powers has
been clearly made,” Sherman told General Sheridan, ”and I think
.*71it will much simplify your labors and duties. ^
The western commanders, in turn, issued general orders 
stating the obligations of field commanders regarding reserva-
7h
tion and non-reservation Indians. General Sheridan, for 
instance, ordered that, after proper warning, Indians away from 
their reservations were to be “regarded and treated as hostile, 
wherever they may be found, and particularly if they are near
■75
settlements or the great lines of communication." To avoid 
any misunderstanding, department commanders were to give “de­
tailed instructions" to troops operating in the field. Com­
missioner Parker, upon reviewing these orders in November,
1869, confidently annjunced that a "perfect understanding" 
between his officers and those of the military was producing 
"harmony of action."7^ But subsequent events disclosed that
7^Sherman to Sheridan, June 11, 1869, filed with AGO 
L . R . ,  1877-1878, NA, RG 9l|-.
7^See, for example, General Order No. 20, Division of 
the Pacific, August 8, 1870, and General Order No. 28, Depart­
ment of Dakota, September 29, 1870, filed with AGO L.R., 
1877-1878, NA, RG 9lj-.
75General Order No. 8. Division of the Missouri, June 28, 
1869, filed with AGO L.R., 1877-1878, NA, RG 94*
76CIA, 1869, 5-6.
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the entente was leas than perfect and that opportunities for 
disharmony were plentiful.
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN 1869
While some aspects of the peace policy were still in 
the planning stage, the military was busy with Its assignment, 
the punishment of roaming, recalcitrant Indians. The year 
1869, according to Commissioner Parker, witnessed widespread 
Indian hostilities, though not to the extent of war by tribes. 
Among the hostiles were: Cheyennes and Arapahoes, who mur­
dered, pillaged and captured whites along the Republican,
Smoky Hill and Saline rivers; Sioux, who committed occasional 
acts of violence in Dakota and Wyoming territories; Piegans, 
who took to the warpath in Montana; "wild and intractable" 
Apaches, who caused a "continual state of warfare and outrage" 
in Arizona; Kiowas and Comanches, who attacked and robbed
citizens of Texas and Southern Apaches and Navajoes, who were
77declared outlaws by the governor of New Mexico. While
General Sheridan considered conditions "very much better" than
78
in 1868, General Sherman paid special tribute to the 
frontier army for its continuing sacrifices In the interest 
of national security. Over half of the United States,troops 
were exposed, Sherman observed, "to labors, marches, fights, 
and dangers that amount to war," If they were withdrawn,
77Ibld.. 7-8.
78SW, 1869, 17.
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79"anarchy” would he the probable result®
The regions in which the Indians were most troublesome 
were, as in previous years, the Southwest and Great Plains. In 
Arizona and New Mexico some efforts were made to establish a 
comprehensive reservation and feeding system, but few tribes, 
except the Navajoes, Hopis, Pimas and Puebloes, resided on 
reservations or belonged to agencies® Not all of the non­
reservation tribesmen were hostile, but the Apaches, the largest 
group, were extremely warlike®^ These "Arabs of Arizona," 
wrote Brig. Gen. E.O.C. Ord, commander of the Department of 
California, "have heretofore neither given nor asked quarter; 
their hands have always been bloody; their favorite pursuits 
killing and plundering, their favorite ornaments the finger 
and toe nails, the teeth, hair, and small bones of their 
v i c t i m s B u t  to fight them was so expensive and dif-
Q*j
ficult that General Sherman at one point proposed to with­
draw settlements and military posts and "leave the country to
_82the aboriginal inhabitants."
No such drastic step was taken, but efforts to subjugate 
or conciliate the Apaches of Arizona were particularly unsuc­
cessful during the first year of the Grant administration. 
General Ord wavered between all-out war to "root out and hunt 
the Apaches as...wild animals," and an attempt to establish
79Ibid., 2 k *
80Dale, on. cit.. 95.
8lSW, 1869, 121-122.
820gle, 02* cit., 73.
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a large reservation where they might be supported and en­
couraged to plant crops. Meanwhile, the Yavapai took the 
offensive in Western Arizona, killing scores of whites, prey­
ing upon the Overland Route and interrupting the mail* In 
addition, the Tontos of the central part of the territory and 
Cochise's Chlricahuas in the southeast were so bold and 
belligerent that troops sometimes retreated to their outposts
Q ^
for cover* "The general situation at the end of 1869" one 
analyst states, proved that no substantial progress had been 
made in Apache management.
In New Mexico, on August 2, after a series of outbreaks 
by Navajo and Gila Apache bands, Governor R, B. Mitchell 
proclaimed that any of these tribesmen found off their reser­
vations without military escort were to be punished. Com­
missioner Parker protested this declaration and instructed 
Superintendent William Clinton to "disavow the pernicious 
tendency of the proclamation." The Army, not territorial 
officials, he argued, were to decide how to deal with wander-
85 „
ing Indians. Eventually, the Indian Office had its way and 
sent a new agent, Lieutenant Charles E. Drew, to try to 
placate the Southern Apaches. After eounciling with his 
charges, Drew informally agreed to request federal support for 
any Indians settling in peace at Canada Alamosa, a twenty by
8 ^
Ibid., 7l*-75. About one hundred whites were killed
in a short' time in 1869 in western Arizona.
81*
Ibid., 75.
•^Parker to W. T. Otto, August 11*, 1869, I.O.R.B.
No. 18, NA, RG 75.
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thirty mile tract between the San Mateo and Mimbres mountains* 
By winter, Indian relations in the territory were somewhat 
improved.
On the Plains, one of the most decisive military actions 
of 1869 was an expedition against hostile Cheyennes who had 
been threatening settlement and travel between the Platte and 
Arkansas rivers. On July 11, Maj. Gen# Eugene A. Carr led 
eight companies of the Fifth Cavalry and two companies of 
Major Frank North*s Pawnee scouts in a surprise attack on a 
large Cheyenne village —  Tall Bull’s Dog Soldiers and some
87
Ogallala Sioux —  near Summit Springs, in Northeast Colorado* 
The Indians, caught by surprise, were severely beaten. Carr’s 
command, which suffered only one injury, killed fifty-two 
Indians, captured seventeen women and children and confis­
cated or destroyed more than four hundred horses and mules,
eighty-four lodges and large quantities of meat, arms, amrau-
88nition and other property.
The Battle of Summit Springs, according to one author, 
had ”a marked effect upon the conduct of the whole Cheyenne 
tribeJ*89 These nomadic red men soon sued for peace and moved
860gle, o£. cit., 8 3.
87carr»s command included two hundred and forty-four 
troops, fifty Pawnees and, besides Major North, such noted 
frontier scouts as William 8Buffalo Bill” Cody and North's 
brother, Luther* For a detailed discussion see James T. King, 
"The Republican River Expedition,” Nebraska History. XLI,
Part I (September, I960), 165-199 and Part il (December,
I960), 281-297. 
ftft
Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. A. Carr to Bvt. Brig. Gen# George 
Ruggles, July 20, 1869, Division of the Missouri, Letters Re­
ceived, NA, RG 98*
89Rister, 0£. cit*. 153*
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to their reservation south of the Arkansas or joined relatives 
on the reservation in Dakota* Since the Indians' death toll 
was relatively small, the campaign? drew little more than re-
QO
gional acclaim* But both peaceable and threatening tribes 
were rendered more receptive to the government's peace pro­
gram, and travel and settlement in the Central Plains was made 
more secure*
Throughout the year, in spite of crises in Colorado, 
Arizona and other parts of the Indian country, there seemed to 
be a growing rapport between the War and Interior depart­
ments* "It is very clear," Commissioner Parker told Secretary 
Cox in November, "that where this Department receives the 
active cooperation of the military branch of the government 
comparative peace can always be maintained on the frontiers,"7 
A month later General Sherman furthered good relations with 
the Indian Bureau by ordering his western commanders to pro­
tect the Indians from outrages by whites and make full reports
92
on all inter-racial conflicts. Within a matter of weeks, 
however, there was again strife between the two departments,
THE PIEGAN "MASSACRE" AND RENEWED DISPUTE
Early in 1870, an incident in northern Montana pre-
------urp  ■■ — ..... .
King, "Republican River Expedition," II, 293*295*
^Parker to Cox, November 1, 1869, 1*0.R.B, No* 19# NA,
RG 75*
92
Circular, Headquarters of the Army, December 2, 1869,
I,0,L*R., Misc., NA, RG 75,
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cipitated another heated civil-military controversy over the 
treatment of hostile Indians® On the morning of January 23, 
in sub-zero weather, Colonel E, M. Baker struck a village of 
Piegans (a Blackfoot tribe) on Marias River, killing one hun­
dred women and children, destroying forty-four lodges and 
seizing provisions and three hundred horses^  The attack,
heralded by General Sheridan as a "complete success," pro­
duced another "massacre" outcry by the Indians' friends and 
opponents of military control over the tribes.
Since the snmmer of 1869, young renegade Piegans under
Mountain Chief, Bear Chief and Red Horn had been causing
9k
trouble around Port Benton* Intoxicated by cheap whiskey 
and armed with the latest rifles —  both acquired from lawless 
whites —  they stole stock, raided settlements and killed a 
number of frontiersmen. On August 31j Superintendent Alfred 
Sully, former commander of campaigns against the Sioux, called 
for military re-enforcements, conceding that the Indians were 
in a "state of war*"^
But the Blackfoot agency officials and the District of 
Montana commander, Brig* Gen. P. R. DeTrobriand, hesitated 
to propose an expedition against the Piegans. Lieutenant
93
HR Ex. Doc* No* 269. IjJLst Cong., 2 sess. (Serial li|.26), 
1870, 16-17.—
9li^In some cases the Indians had been agitated by unpro­
voked killings by whites. Mountain Chief was aggravated, for 
example, by an attenqpt on his life just after he had signed a 
peace treaty at Port Benton In 1868.
95
HR Ex, Doc, No. 269. lj.lat Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
llj.26), 1870,X
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William B. Pease, the acting agent, argued that the peaoeable 
Bloods and other Blackfeet might be injured, and Alexander
Culbertson, who lived with the Piegans, insisted that only a
w n 96 -
few, the "young rabble," were committing depredations. De-
Trobriand contended that most Montanans were going about their
business as usual and had a known propensity for sounding
false alarms
Commissioner Parker, however, solicited aid from the War
Department, contending that his subordinates were "powerless"
98against the hostiles of the northern frontier.7 The Bureau*s 
appeal was relayed through military channels to General Sheri­
dan, who proposed to use the same tactics which had been so 
effective against the Cheyennes in 1868. "About the 15th of 
January they /the hostiles /  will be very helpless, and if 
where they live is not too far from Shaw or Ellis," he re­
marked, "we might be able to give them a good hard blow, which
•.99 ft
will make peace a desirable object.
In December and early January, while the military laid 
its plans, Superintendent Sully made last-minute appeals to 
the Indians to turn over their criminals and make restitu­
tion for stolen stock. The chiefs* only response was the 
usual excuse that they could not restrain their young men.*00
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Consequently, General DeTrobriand determined to make an "ex­
ample" of the most conspicuous hostiles, Mountain Chief and 
his followers. He instructed Colonel Baker exactly where to 
strike to get the "chief culprit." Baker attacked as ordered, 
but Mountain Chief was elsewhere and most of the red men 
killed were members of Red Horn’s band.^°*
The controversy which followed the "Baker affair" 
centered upon two questions. First, there was a difference 
of opinion about the age and sex of the Indians killed, with 
Army and civil authorities giving contradictory versions of 
the Piegans1 losses. Secondly, there was much discussion 
about whether the expedition had been necessary.
On February 1, Superintendent Sully informed General 
DeTrobriand of disturbing reports from citizens, half-breeds
and Indians to the effect that the soldiers had killed mostly
102
women and children. DeTrobriand promptly denied this and 
warned Sully against the "idle rumors and false reports" of 
whiskey smugglers and camp "croakers," who feared that Army 
operations would disrupt their nefarious business. No doubt
these people wanted to make the Superintendent the "point
103
d ’appui" for their misrepresentations, he remarked.
But Sully continued to receive reports that the "Piegan 
war" was another Sand Creek. Agent Pease interviewed various
1 7 , 1*0.
102Ibid., 11.
103Ibid., 11-12.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
217
tribesmen who were in Red Horn’s camp when the cavalry in­
vaded, They claimed that the dead Indians included only 
thirty-three men, eighteen over "fighting age," ninety women, 
mostly aged, and fifty children, including many papooses. The 
camp, moreover, had been suffering from smallpox for two 
months, they said, with about six persons succumbing to the 
disease every day,
DeTrobriand was so infuriated when Pease publicized the
Indians’ biased account, that he ordered the agent never to
set foot inside Port Shaw unless official business made it
m a n d a t o r y T h e  district commander not only defended the
attack on the village, but recommended Colonel Baker for a
promotion "as a Just acknowledgment of his excellent conduct
in this circumstance," Baker, he explained, did his best to
spare non-combatants, destroyed the village to rid it of
smallpox and released the captives rather than taking them
10£
to Port Shaw, where there was no food for them.
Colonel Baker made an investigation of his own. After 
questioning the men of his command, he announced that approxi­
mately one hundred and twenty warriors had been killed. The 
other casualties, he insisted, were purely accidental, In­
dian authorities circulating "maliciously false" stories
1(^ Sen. Ex, Doc. No, 39, Ijlst Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial 
U440), 1871, 89.
10%bld., 90,
^°^HR Ex, Doc, No, 269. I(.lst Cong., 2 se9s. (Serial 
ll|26), 18707 I ? , ------------
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about the Piegan fight were probably trying to divert attention 
from their own "manifest irregularities," It was inconceiv­
able to him that the public would accept the assertions of
ill-informed, interested parties rather than those who were on
n t»107
the scene and had nothing to palliate.
Apparently both sides overstated their case. For cen­
sus purposes, agency authorities normally figured two fighting 
men per lodge. The death-rate of nearly five per lodge for 
the thirty-seven lodges in Red Horn’s camp, obviously included 
a high percentage of aged, young and female Indians Even 
Colonel Baker’s estimate of fifty-three non-combatant deaths 
indicted the troops for indiscriminate killing.
On the question of whether the expedition had been 
justified, the War Department had more convincing arguments.
In the first place, Superintendent Sully and Commissioner 
Parker had asked the Army to use force against the hostiles. 
Secondly, after careful investigation, Inspector General 
James A«Hardie of the Division of the Missouri held that the 
expedition had been warranted and "probably as efficacious as 
more extended operations," It was impracticable to surprise 
and capture hostiles without bloodshed, he concluded. Loss of 
life was "inevitable
107Ibid., 73,
10®One author concludes that the "fairest inference" 
was that sixty warriors and one hundred and thirteen others 
were killed. Seven of the lodges destroyed were some distance 
from the village and were unoccupied, (Dunn, op, cit., i*5l).
!09hr Doc, Ho, 269. iflst Cong,, 2 sess. (Serial 
llj.26), 1870, 19-3ET
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Still, Indian sympathizers such as Vincent Colyer of 
the Board of Indian Commissioners criticized the Baker expe­
dition and circulated Agent Pease’s version of the "massacre," 
General Sheridan was enraged by Colyer’s attempt to "deceive" 
the "kind-hearted public," and charged that the philanthro­
pist was mixed up with the old Indian ring, "So far as the 
wild Indians are concerned," he asserted, "the problem which 
the good people of the country must decide upon is, who shall 
be killed, the whites or the Indians; they can take their 
choice,"1^
General Sherman knew exactly how Sheridan felt. After 
giving Colonel Baker a vote of confidence, he summarized th9 
dilemma of the frontier army as follows:
The army cannot resist the tide of emigration that 
Is following toward these Indian lands, nor is It our 
province to determine the question of boundaries. When 
called on, we must, to the extent of our power, protect 
the settlers, and, on proper demand, we have to protect 
the Indian lands against the intrusion of the settlers.
Thus we are placed between two fires, a most unpleasant 
dilemma, from which we cannot escape, and we must sustain 
the officers on the spot who fulfill their orders,111
By coincidence, the dispute over the Piegan affair
0
occurred just at the time when congressional advocates of 
military control of Indian affairs were preparing to make 
another bid to transfer the Indian Office to the War Depart­
ment, Reports of Army brutality to diseased women and children, 
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inconclusively debated in Committee on the whole, with Repub­
licans alleging that the Democrats exaggerated the Army’s 
severity to embarrass the administration and head off reform,
and Democrats intimating that the Republicans wanted a 
112whitewash.
The Board of Indian Commissioners was convinced that the 
Piegan affair saved the Indian service from the clutches of 
the military. The commission noted that, on March 10, Repre­
sentative John A. Logan of Illinois, chairman of the House 
Committee on Military Affairs, was ready to present a bill for 
transfer when he heard of the Montana incident, IJpon reading 
an account of the "massacre," his "blood ran cold in his veins 
and he went and asked the committee to strike out that sec­
tion and let the Indian Bureau remain where it is," the Board 
reported, "and the committee agreed to that."^^
Not until the bloody Sioux war of 1876 were the 
supporters of War Department management of the Indians able 
to muster another strong effort to achieve transfer.*"^ The 
Piegan incident also had at least two other significant 
effects. Both military and Indian authorities noted that it 
had "salutary effects" upon the wild Indians of Montana.1^
112Dunn, o£. cit., l*52-!j.£3.
•^ S e n . Ex. Doc. 39. lp.st Cong., 3 sess. (Serial Hjlj.0), 
1871, 89-9“
i:^ Priest, op. cit.. 19. The Modoc War of 1873 revived 
some interest in military control.
n *SW (P), 1870, 277; CIA, 1870, 191.
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Furthermore, as one student of Indian affairs observed, ”...as 
a probable result of the criticism...there has not occurred 
since that time any such indiscriminate attack.
TEE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN COOPERATION
After the Piegan dispute, military and civil officials 
frequently clashed over procedures to use in managing the 
Indians. An exception was the Indian Bureau’s consent to 
give the military a comparative free hand to establish and
117
temporarily control new agencies in Arizona and New Mexico.
Under the supervision of Maj, Gen. George Stoneman, commander
of the newly-created Department of Arizona, an extensive area
ll8
was set apart for the Apaches in western Arizona. Stoneman, 
who contended that it was easier to feed the hostiles than to 
prevent them from stealing, provided rations and supplies for 
the red men who moved to the vicinity of Camp Crd (later Fort
Apache) and ordered a vigorous campaign against non-reserva-
v  ^ 119 tion bands.
^^Dunn, eg,, cit.. 1|55*
X17Parker to Cox, March 22, 1870, I.O.L.B. No. 19, NA,
RG 75. The new agencies were to be turned over to the Interior 
Department after peace was fully established. Apparently there 
was some dispute between civil and military officials over 
when this change-over was to take place. In April. Parker 
forwarded copies of bis instructions of June 12, 1869, to Pima 
and Maricopa Reservation to ’’remedy existing evils,” (Parker 
to COX, April 26, 1870, I.O.R.B, No. 19, NA, RG 75).
The Department of Arizona, which included southern 
California, was established on April 15, 1870.
119
Ogle, 02* cit., 77.
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Meantime a similar policy was followed in New Mexico, where
other groups were given presents and brought under the "feed-
ing policy" at a southwestern reservation. Since the Indian
Bureau was short of funds, this program depended largely upon
120
borrowed Army supplies*
Elsewhere, Army and Indian authorities quibbled over 
121
many things. The chief issue, however, was the question 
of dealing with Indians who spent much of their time away from 
the reservations or used them as a refuge or base of opera­
tions for hostile forays. Late in 1869 Maj. Gen. J . M, Scho­
field, commander of the Department of the Missouri, proposed 
that male Indians be required to report to nearby military 
posts for regular head-counts. Commissioner Parker opposed 
this scheme on the grounds that the Indians would regard It 
as an "act of oppression and designed to restrict or deprive 
them of their liberty."^"22
In the spring of 1870, the military announced its deter­
mination to act vigorously against Indians off their reserva­
tions, particularly near the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific 
123
railroads. Many observers feared trouble from the Sioux, 
Southern Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches and
120Ibid., 8I4.-8 5.
121
See, for example, Parker to Gen, W. B. Hazen, January 
10, 1870, I.O.L.B. No* 93* NA, RG 75, for discussion of Hazen1s 
efforts to issue orders to civil agents.
Parker to Cox, March 1, 1870, I.O.R.B. No. 19, NA,
RG 75.
123
Parker to Superintendent Burbank, May 20, 1870,
I.O.R.B. No. 95, NA, RG 75.
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Osages, The Sioux problem was moat pressing, for about a
third of the twenty-five thousand members of that tribe still
spent much of the year bunting buffalo in the country west
or south of their Dakota reservation. Commissioner Parker and
others feared, especially, that the "lawless and ungovernable”
Sioux would be provoked into a general uprising by a Wyoming
association, the "Big Horn mining expedition,” which was pre-
12<
paring to explore their northern hunting grounds, ^
«»
Serious trouble with these Indians was averted by a 
series of negotiations with the "notorious" chief, Red Cloud, 
and other non-agency leaders. In June, Red Cloud, with a dele­
gation of Oglala head chiefs and squaws, and Spotted Tail, with
a smaller delegation of Brule chiefs, were taken to Washington
126to council with President Grant and Interior officials. The 
Sioux leaders were feted and shown the wonders of the East,
qThe Osages were threatening because thousands of 
squatters were settling on lands which they claimed despite a 
treaty signed by some of their headmen in 1869, The treaty, 
which they called "fraudulent," ceded eight million acres to a 
railroad corporation for nineteen cents an acre. Trouble was 
finally averted when Congress increased the compensation and 
promised to assist the Osages to get re-established in Indian 
Territory, (Sen, Ex, Doe, No* 39, i^lst Cong,, 3 sess, ^Serial 
U & O J , 1871 ,“75-777.
12^CIA, 1869, k *
■L<IOThe government frequently brought Indian leaders to 
Washington to Impress them with the white man*s strength and 
advancement, Sioux Chiefs, for example, also made such trips 
in 1872, 1875 and 1877* For a discussion of the 1870 visit 
see Sen, Ex, Doc, No, 39, lj.lst Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial 14J4.O), 
1871, 38-49 and HycTe, op, cit,, 175»-l8l, A broader analysis of 
these activities is presented in Katharine Turner, Red Men 
Calling on the Great White Father (Norman, 19^1)•
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including New York City* But they still demanded concessions —  
closing of the California road on the north side of the Platte, 
abandonment of Port Fetterman. ammunition annuities and trade 
at Port Laramie —  which the government refused to make* Maj. 
Gen. W # S. Hancock, who followed these proceedings from St. Pail, 
maintained that the Indians had already been given too much 
latitude. "It...is not practical or wise to make these con­
cessions,” he declared. ”It is the cutting wedge which will 
let /in7 the horde....
In early October, several weeks after the delegations 
returned to the West, a special commission again conferred with 
Oglala leaders at Port Laramie. Another stalemate developed,
with the Indians renewing their earlier demands and rejecting 
X28
agency life. The commissioners finally dispensed several 
wagon-loads of presents, admonished the Sioux to live in peace 
and promised to resume talks in the s p r i n g . A l t h o u g h  
these negotiations were inconclusive, Interior officials were 
pleased that the Sioux had been kept from the warpath and
130
hoped that they would soon accept the peace policy,in toto.
While these diversionary tactics were being used with
■^Hancock to Sherman, June 27, 1870, Sherman Papers, 
Vol. 28.
x 28The commissioners, Felix Brunot and Robert Campbell 
even proposed an agency off the Sioux Reservation, not far 
from Port Laramie. Later, In July, 1871* a temporary agency 
was set up thirty-two miles east of the post.
129
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 39. 1+lst Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
U 4J4.O), 1871, £lffj Eyde, 0£. cit., 182-181+.
130
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 39. 1+lst Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
11+1+0), 1871, 2-3; CIA, 1^70, 1+.
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the Sioux, the Army employed more direct methods with other 
tribes. Late in May, Kiowa, Comanche and southern Cheyenne 
and Arapaha renegades, discontented witt their reservations 
and anxious to avenge past defeats by the military, began to 
attack their agencies and commit depredations in Texas and 
Kansas.*^1 General John Pope, who resumed command of the De­
partment of the Missouri in May, announced that he could not 
intervene on the southern reservation, but sent cavalry units 
under General Custer and Major Marcus Reno to punish the
marauders causing trouble along the Kansas Pacific Railroad
132
and Republican River*
On June 8 Pope criticized the existing civil-military 
division of authority in a letter to division headquarters.
The current system, he said, left him with ”mucb uneasiness 
for the future.” In his opinion, the Army could undertake 
its duties of protecting railroad and overland transportation 
in two ways. It could station strong detachments on the 
reservations, empowered to supervise and watch the Indians 
to prevent them from leaving on hostile expedition. Or, as 
was the practice, it could assemble troops at the most exposed 
settlements and lines of travel and hope to reach trouble 
spots In time. The former was clearly "most effectual.” As
131CIA, 18?0, 263-261+; Colonel A. D. Nelson to Maj.
Gen. John Pope, May 28, 1870, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
A principal source of complaint by the Cheyennes and Arapa- 
hoes was the removal of the agency from Camp Supply to the 
North Pork of the Canadian, along the road from Port Harker 
to Port Sill.
"^^Pope to Gen. G, L. Hartsuff, June 6, 1870, I.O.L.R., 
Misc., NA, RG 75.
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matters stood, the military could not repress disorder or
properly protect reservation Indians from intruders or each
other* Under this policy the Army was no more liable for
Indian crimes than the police of a city, if prevented from
acting upon burglars and murderers until after their evil
133deeds had been accomplished*
General Sherman agreed. The reservation system put 
the Army at a great disadvantage, but, for the moment, the 
Army could do nothing but grin and bear it. When Indians left 
the confines of their reserves, though, the liberal use of 
force was in order, ”1 have long been convinced that no In­
dian should be allowed to remain at rest for an hour between 
the two Railroads,” Sherman commented, ”and I understand 
that such is the policy of the Government.”13^-
The Army and Navy Journal also criticized the present 
system of Indian management. The mixed policy it stated, was 
characterized by ”ignorance, timidity and vacillation,” A 
conciliatory program impressed only "a few squaws and super­
annuated warriors,nll^ What was needed was more troops to
conquer the red men so deciseively that they would never again
136dare to venture forth from their reservations.
In spite of such protests, the joint jurisdiction
133
Pope to Hartsuff, June 8, 1870, I.O,L«R., Misc,,
NA, RG 75.
^•^■Sherman endorsement, June 9, 1870, on Nelson to Pope, 
May 28, 1870, 1*0,L.R,, Misc., NA, RG 75.
Jnl* VII (May 28, 1870), 637.
136Ibid., VII (July 2, 1870, 721.
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agreement of 1869 remained in force. In his annual report
for 1870, though, Commissioner Parker suggested that it might
become necessary to mike an exception to exclusive civil
control of the reservations in the case of the nviciou3 and
incorrigible* Kiowas and Comanches, If they did not change
their ways, the Army might have to take charge of them and
137build a rtcordontt of forts around their reservation*
General Sherman devoted most of his yearly report to
administrative problems, principally the pending reduction
138
of Army enlisted strength. But General Pope, as usual, 
had a good deal to say about Indian affairs. He approved of 
the policy of subsisting the Indians on limited reservations, 
yet felt it would be cheaper and more effective to move the 
agencies to the vicinity of navigable rivers and railroads.
As for relations between the Army and Indian Bureau, literal 
observance of the present dual policy was agreeable except 
with the wilder tribes. Common sense dictated that the Army 
be given authority to dismount and arrest bands preparing to 
leave their reservations and pursue hostiles who retreated to 
reserves to escape punishment.^39
In these remarks Pope touched upon problems which were 
to complicate the administration of Indian affairs long after 
the government ceased to formally recognize the tribes as
137
CIA, 1870, 6.
^ S W  (p), 1870, 256-258. Effective July 1, 1871, 
enlisted strength was set at thirty thousand.
139Ibid., 259-261|..
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"domestic dependent nations," During the winter of 1870-1871 
there were no major Indian conflicts or inter-departmental 
disputes. But in the spring both branches planned to bring 
pressure upon non-agency bands to accept the peace policy and 
will of the Great Father, Whether this could be accomplished 
without further War-Interior discord remained to be seen.
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CHAPTER SIX
QUEST FOR THE "DAY OF DELIVERANCE": 
MARCH, 1871, TO MARCH, l8?6
During the last seven years, under many difficulties 
of administration, there has been a set purpose to im­
prove their (the Indians’) condition, which has borne 
fruit, and has succeeded beyond any reasonable expec­
tation., .
(Board of Indian Commissioners.
January 1, 1876)
The observation of many years...has left the impression 
that this system of civilizing the wild portion of our 
Indian inhabitants has not met with success which gives 
a fair equivalent for the expense, trouble and blood­
shed which has attended it.
(Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan.
November 2, 1875'
The half decade from March, 1871, to March, 1876, 
was an important, if not distinctive, period in the history 
of United States Indian relations. Earlier frustrations con­
vinced the government that it was more economical, practical 
and just to isolate and conquer the Indians with rations, 
blankets, teachers and persuasion than with physical force.
In practice, if it was any consolation to those who opposed 
the moral suasion approach, this was a mixed policy. Concili­
atory measures had priority, but force was used when Indians 
refused to live at peace on the reservations. The peace 
policy was founded upon the civil-military division of au­
thority over the red men and its results hinged upon
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cooperation between the Interior and War departments. Con­
tinuing differences between the two branches, therefore, 
impeded the quest for what Commissioner Francis A. Walker 
called the "day of deliverance," or final solution of the 
Indian question.^
March, 1876, has been chosen as the dividing point In 
this study for two reasons* First, in that month the House 
committees on military and Indian affairs published reports 
which recommended transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War 
Department and signalized a new drive by the advocates of 
military control. Second, at about the same time, the Army 
began active operations against the Sioux in a war which not 
only had a profound impact upon governraent-Sioux relations, 
but also increased interest in military administration of the 
Indians. The present discussion takes into account a number 
of significant developments in the early Seventies which 
tested the stability and effectiveness of the peace policy 
and posed serious problems for civil and military officials.
PEACE POLICY WITHOUT PEACE
The defenders of the "poor Indian" and the peace policy 
cry "peacet peace I" a Kansan complained to President Hayes as 
late as 1878, "but there is none." Military authorities, 
westerners and proponents of a coercive Indian policy often 
expressed such sentiments in the early Seventies. Similarly,
iciA, 1872, 9.
^Thomas Hindman to President Hayes, October 13> 1878,
I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
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Tbe Nation observed that while the government theorized about
how to civilize and Christianize Its wards, it continued to
exterminate them, thus adding the "element of hypocrisy" to
*
an already unenviable record of Indian administration.^
Wars, skirmishes and lesser conflicts pitting Indians
against troops, frontiersmen and other Indians persisted in
the period 18?1 to I876. Optimistic observers noted, however,
that the number of hostile red men was diminishing. Speaking
in relative terms, civil and military officials frequently
stressed the peaceful conditions within their jurisdiction.
Western commanders used such comments as "generally quiet,"
"trifling depredations," "no...marked features," "remarkably
quiet," and "closing operations" to describe Indian affairs
14-in various annual reports. Likewise, Interior spokesmen 
announced that efforts to convert the Indians into tranquil, 
civilized subjects were having results which were "encouraging," 
"most gratifying" and "beyond expectations."^
If the picture was becoming brighter, incidents in­
volving the "irreconcilables" of a few tribes still received 
wide publicity and had a substantial effect upon the govern­
ment’s Indian program. Sioux, Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne,
Modoc and Apache tribesmen frequently caused trouble on and 
off their reservations. A brief consideration of the most 
notorious episodes will spotlight civil-military problems in
3The Nation. XIII (August 17, I87D ,  100.
^SW, 1871, 35; sw, 1872, 7 0; sw, 187*4., 21*, 6 0.
^BIC, 1872, 1*; SI (P), 1871*, 531; SI, 1875, V.
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these years.
In the Southwest, the experiment of settling the wild 
Apaches on reservations was being continued with considerable 
difficulty and inter-departmental controversy. During the 
winter of 1870-1871 several bands were controlled through 
the "medium of their bellies" at designated areas near Army 
posts in Arizona and New Mexico,^ This arrangement was jeo­
pardized, however, by the infamous "Gamp Grant Massacre" of 
the following spring. On April 30, about one hundred and 
fifty citizens of Tucson, aroused by recent Indian depreda­
tions, killed and mutilated eighty-five peaceable Arivaipas, 
all but eight women and children, and carried off twenty- 
nine children,*^ This attack, defended by most Arizonans and 
western newspapers, produced a loud outcry in the East, Con­
sequently, President Grant threatened to put Arizona under 
martial law unless the guilty parties were brought to trial; 
Department of Arizona commander Maj. Gen. George Stoneman was 
replaced by Maj. Gen, George Crook and Secretary Vincent 
Colyer of the Board of Indian Commissioners was sent to
60gle, ojD. cit., 79*
^About five hundred and fifty Arivaipas and Pinals had 
come to Camp Grant for refuge at the invitation of Lieutenant 
Royal E. Whitman and were being fed and engaged to cut hay 
for the post. White and Mexican settlers who had supplied the 
troops apparently circulated rumors that these friendly In­
dians had been Involved In raids near Tucson. The attack was 
led by prominent members of the "Committee of Safety," a 
group which advocated vigorous military action against the 
Indians. (BIC, 1871, 60-67; Ogl®» ©£* cit.. 79-81; Dale, on. 
cit.. 96; James R. Hastings, "The Tragedy at Camp Grant in 
1871," Arizona and the West. I / S u m m e r ,  19527* I4 6-I6O.)
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investigate and reorganize the reservation system of the
Q
Southwest,
While Colyer was enroute to Arizona, General Crook,
a veteran described by one author as "the greatest Indian
fighter the United States Army ever produced," prepared to
conduct a "sharp, active campaign" against the non-reservation 
q
Apaches, Like many officers, Crook believed that Array men
made the best Indian agents and that most Indian officials,
like contractors, traders and whiskey peddlers, detracted from
good relations with the red men**0 But, upon learning of the
mission of "Vincent the Good" Colyer, he reluctantly deferred
active operations***
Colyer first negotiated with Apaches in New Mexico,
arranging for the establishment of a reservation in Tulerosa
Valley, near Port Craig, By the time he reached Arizona, the
commissioner realized that the peace policy, so popular in the
12
East, was not well received In the remote territories,
3Governor A,K,P, Safferd bad one hundred and four men
tried, but all were perfunctorily acquitted, (Ogle, oj), cit,. 
8lj Dale, o£, cit,, 96) Stoneman, long criticized for opposing 
an extermination policy, was blamed in this case for failing
to prevent the incident. The Board had earlier decided to
send Colyer to the Southwest to study the possibility of en­
larging the reservation system,
*Dale, o£, cit.. 97; SW, 1871, 78,
*0See George Crook, General George Crooks His Autobio­
graphy, Edited by Martin P, Schmitt (Norman, 1914-5TT
11
Crook to Rutherford B# Hayes, January 28, 1871, R. B. 
Hayes Papers, Hayes Library, Fremont, Ohio; SW, 1871, 7 8,
*2BIC, 1871, 1|B,
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He was vilified for his conciliatory efforts in several terri­
torial newspapers* One proposed:
We ought, in justice to our murdered dead, to dump 
the old devil into the shaft of some mine, and pile 
rooks upon him until he is dead* A rascal who comes here 
to thwart the efforts of military and citizens to con­
quer a peace from our savage foe, deserves to be stoned to 
death like the treacherous, black-hearted dog that he is *3-3
Undaunted, Colyer toured the territory and decided that there
should be reservations at Camps Apache, Grant and Verde and
three temporary locations*"^
That fall the military bided its time while Colyer, 
back in Washington, submitted his proposals to conciliate and 
subsist the Apaches at these sites. His views were no more 
popular in the War Department than in the West* Of an acci­
dental meeting with Secretary Belknap, Colyer reported:
I*..was greatly troubled in speaking a word to him 
to see that he was Intent on strengthening General 
Crook*s hands for continuing the present expensive, 
utterly uncalled for, and wicked wars, against the 
poor Apache Indians of Arizona* He spoke angrily, as 
if I was interfering, and said he only awaited the 
President’s order to go on with that war more earnestly 
than ever*l5
But his recommendations, endorsed by the Interior Department, 
were approved by the President. Accordingly, the War De­
partment ordered its southwestern commanders to organize and 
supervise the Apache reservations*^
13Ibid., 57-58.
^Ibid., 73-7lf.
^Colyer to Delano, October 30, 1871, D eI*L.R., Misc., 
NA, RG 75.
l6BIC, 1871, 83-86.
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General Crook was unhappy, for he had hoped to concentrate
on the roving bands during the winter. Although some called
him nthe great North American Butcher, ** Crook did not hate
all Apaches In fact, he felt they were painted in ndarker
colors” than they deserved.1® But be bad no faith in nthe
President’s ’Pet Theory'” of bribing marauders to behave,
noting that the wilder Indians interpreted Colyer’a visit as
a sign of fear. "...I think my policy is to hold on until the
termination of the fight between ’Policy Ken’ and the citizens,”
he remarked to the Division of the Pacific commander, Maj. Gen.
Schofield, ”besides, I can accomplish nothing so long as Mr.
«19Colyer is sitting on and controlling the valves.
In 1872 Crook experienced further frustrations. He 
planned to take vigorous measures against the renegades who 
collected rations at the reservations, yet continued to raid 
surrounding communities. But this action had to be suspended 
when he was informed that Maj. Gen. Oliver 0. Howard, the 
"Christian Soldier” who formerly headed the Freedman’s Bureau, 
was to bring another olive branch to Arizona. Patiently,
Crook cooperated with Howard, who counciled with territorial, 
military and Indian leaders, revised reservation boundaries,
^Crook to Schofield, October 10, 1871, AGO L.R.,
NA, RG Crook was attacked for requiring hostiles to
bring in the heads of their leaders before being re-admitted 
to reservations*
l8sw, 1871, 78.
■^Crook to Schofield, October 10, 1871, AGO L.R.,
NA, RG 94*
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took a delegation of Apaches to Washington, then set aside
a refuge for Cochise’s Chiracahuas and ordered the concen-
20tration of small reserves*
Finally, in mid-October, 1872, after Apache bands again
took to the warpath, Crook was authorized to deal with the
21Indians in his own way* Using organized Apache scouts, he 
waged a relentless offensive, following the warriors to their 
mountain hide-outs and killing scores who refused to capitu­
late* By April, 1873# most of the hostiles had enough and
22came to Camp Verde to beg for peace* To avoid further inter­
vention by the Indians’ friends, Crook permitted them to settle 
on reservations, warning them to stay there or be killed. In 
spite of such harshness, he became known among the Indians as 
a man who kept his promises and rewarded those who lived at 
peace with fair treatment® As a result, until General Crook 
left the Department of Arizona, early in 1875# the Apaches, 
for the first time, were generally s u b m i s s i v e . ^
Meanwhile, the government became embroiled in a war 
with the heretofore peaceable Modocs of upper California and
20Howard, vested with broad powers, enlarged Fort Apache 
(White Mountain) Reservation and created San Carlos Reserva­
tion, south of Fort Apache, for Indians formerly located at 
temporary sites* (0.0. Howard, My Life and Experiences Among 
the Hostile Indians /Hartford, 1W7/# Chapters VII-XlV; CIA, 
1872, 176; ctA, 18?3# 289; Dale, og. cit., 99-100}®
210gle, 0£. cit*, 113-lllj.®
^Ibid., 116-117; Dale, o£. cit*, 101*
2^Crook, op* cit., l8l-l82; Dale, op. cit., 101-
102,
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and lover Oregon. A small tribe, which traditionallv lived on 
lake plants, camas roots and small game and inhabited conical 
mud-covered huts, these people had signed a peace treaty with 
the government in October, 1861|.. Although the treaty, be­
cause of amendments, was not confirmed until February, 1870, 
most of the tribe tried to live quietly on their assigned 
reservation in Lake County, Oregon. But they were constantly 
harassed by their old enemies, the Klamaths, who claimed that 
region. After being moved to two objectionable agency sites, 
many Modocs, under Captain Jack, deserted the reservation and 
went to their old homes on Lost Lake.^
Still the tribe caused no major trouble until late in 
1872. Meantime, their friend, Brig. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby, 
commander of the Department of Columbia, ordered his subor­
dinates to guard against Modoc-Klaraath collisions and, to­
gether with Superintendent A. B. Meacham, proposed that they
25
be given a more suitable separate reservation. In the spring 
of 1872 Meacham was replaced by T# B, Odeneal, who had in-
^ F o r  a detailed discussion of the Modocs and the 
Modoc War see Keith A. Murray, The Modocs and their War 
(Norman, 195>9)« Chapters I-III give background information.
An illustration of the Modocs1 friendship was their assistance 
to whites during the disastrous fire at Yreka, California, 
on July^., 1871.
^Canby to Acting Adjutant General, February 7* 1872, 
Military Division of the Pacific. Hereafter these records 
will be cited Div* Pac. HR Ex. Dpc. No. 122. l|3rd Cong. 1 
sess. (Serial 1607)* 1875T appendix, Official Copies of 
Correspondence Relative to the War With the Modoc Indians in 
1872-1873*” Hereafter this document is cited as "Modoc 
Correspondence."
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and lower Oregon* A small tribe, which traditional!1 lived on 
lake plants, camas roots and small game and inhabited conical 
mud-covered huts, these people had signed a peace treaty with 
the government in October, l86ij.. Although the treaty, be­
cause of amendments, was not confirmed until February, 1870, 
most of the tribe tried to live quietly on their assigned 
reservation in Lake County, Oregon. But they were constantly 
harassed by their old enemies, the Klamaths, who claimed that 
region* After being moved to two objectionable agency sites, 
many Modocs, under Captain Jack, deserted the reservation and 
went to their old homes on Lost Lake.^-
Still the tribe caused no major trouble until late in 
1872. Meantime, their friend, Brig. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby, 
commander of the Department of Columbia, ordered his subor- 
dinates to guard against Modoc-Klamath collisions and, to­
gether with Superintendent A. B. Meacham, proposed that they
29
be given a more suitable separate reservation. In the spring 
of 1872 Meacham was replaced by T. B. Odeneal, who had in-
^"For a detailed discussion of the Modocs and the 
Modoc War see Keith A. Murray, The Modocs and their War 
(Norman, 1959)* Chapters I-III give background information.
An illustration of the Modocs’ friendship was their assistance 
to whites during the disastrous fire at Yreka, California, 
on July&, 1871.
29
^Canby to Acting Adjutant General, February 7, 1872, 
Military Division of the Pacific. Hereafter these records 
will be cited Div. Pac. HR Ex. Dpc. No. 122, ij.3rd Cong. 1 
sess. (Serial 1607), 187^7 appendix, Official Copies of 
Correspondence Relative to the War With the Modoc Indians in 
1872-1873*” 5-6. Hereafter this document is cited as "Modoc 
Correspondence 0"
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structions to determine whether or not the Modocs shonld be
26
required to return to Klamath Reservation. Odeneal
decided that these "desperadoes” should be forced to go to
the reservation and asked the military to arrest them at their
27camp on Lost River. On November 29, in attempting to comply 
with the request, a detachment of troops met resistence and 
became involved in the opening battle of the Modoc War of 
1872-1873.28
After the fight on Lost River, the wily Modocs with­
drew to an almost impregnable stronghold, the lava beds on 
the south side of Tule Lake, In mid-January, four hundred 
troops, with howitzers, struck fifty to seventy-five warriors, 
with outdated small arms, and were repulsed. This experience
convinced military leaders that it would take seven hundred
29
or more men to defeat the hostiles* Hence an effort was 
made to negotiate a settlement. On April 11, after a delay 
in selecting a delegation and meeting place acceptable to the 
Indians, six Modoc chiefs, led by Captain Jack, met six 
peaee-makers, headed by General Canby. But the council ended 
in tragedy, for the Indians suddenly turned on the delegates, 
killing Canby and Dr. Eleasar Thomas and seriously wounding
l i
28Walker to T. B. Odeneal, April 12, 1872, I.O.L.B. 
(Land and Civilization),No. 106, NA, RG 75.
27
Odeneal to Lt. Col. Prank Wheaton, November 25,
1872, "Modoc Correspondence," 3^4-*
p Q
Capt. James Jackson to Major John Green, December 2, 
1872, "Modoc Correspondence," 142-Iilj..
^"Modoc Correspondence" I4.9-6 3.
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former superintendent A, B. Meacham.
Almost overnight the tragedy was In the headlines and
Indian critics and sympathizers alike demanded r e v e n g e . A
few days later a company of infantry, two companies of artillery
and a number of Warm Springs scouts set out to hunt down the
renegades, but were ambushed and driven back with heavy 
32
losses* Finally, Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis took command 
of operations, and, by bivouacing troops in the lava beds,
forced the Modocs into the open. Early in June the Modoc
? 33headmen were captured and the costly little war was over.
The Modocs paid heavily for their resistence. The
principal hostiles were tried by a military commission and
sentenced to hang. Two later had their sentences commuted to
life imprisonment at Alcatraz, but Captain Jack and three others
were executed in October at Port Klamath. The tribe, except
for a few who were confined at Port Marion, Florida, was
3k
exiled to Quapaw Agency, Indian Territory.
To military officials, notably Generals Sherman and
30
Col; Aivan C. Gillem to Adjutant General, Hqs.Army, 
April 11, 1873* "Modoc Correspondence,” 75-76. The other 
delegates were L. S. Dyar and interpreters Prank and Toby 
Riddle.
31Athearn, 0£* clt.. 300-301; Sherman to Sheridan,
June 6, 1873* Sherman tapers, Vol. 35.
32^ In one engagement thirty-six enlisted men were killed 
or wounded. (General Jefferson Davis to Acting Adjutant 
General, Div. Pac., May I4., 1873* "Modoc Correspondence,” 33-314-.) 
Hereafter Adjutant General will be cited A.G,
33
Sherman to Belknap, June 3* 1873* "Modoc Corres­
pondence,” 814.-85?; Ganoe, oj). clt., 333#
^■"Modoc Correspondence," 95-113* 133-203.
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Schofield, the Modoc War was a case of Interior Department 
bungling. It cost over a hundred and sixty white casualties 
and more than half-a million dollars, whereas a few thousand 
dollars would have provided the Modocs with a decent reserva-
35tion and agency, Schofield attacked the Indian Bureau for
rejecting General Canby’s alternative recommendations and
allowing a superintendent to take steps which were bound to 
36
start a war, Upon receiving pungent complaints from Gen­
eral Sherman, Secretary Delano, In August, 1873, sent Acting 
Commissioner H, R. Clum these instructions:
I have,,,determined that in all cases hereafter where 
it becomes necessary to require the aid of the War De­
partment in removing Indians, that a communication re­
questing such aid be sent to the War Department by this 
Department, and that no efforts to obtain this inter­
position of the military be made in any other way,37
The Modoc War was a brief, but dramatic, affair, A 
more enduring conflict, involving the Kiowas and Coraanches 
and, to a lesser extent, the Cheyennes of the Southern Plains, 
reached a climax in the Red River War of 187^-1875• On 
numerous occasions warlike braves from these tribes went on 
horse-stealing, murdering sprees in the country bordering 
their reservation. The problem was most acute in Texas, and 
# by 1870 Generals Sherman and Sheridan were beseiged with
^ F o r  a break-down of the casualties see ”Modoc Corres­
pondence,” llij.; Dunn, op. cit., lj.92. See also Athearn, op. 
clt., 30I4., for Sherman^s reactions.
^Schofield to Acting A.G., Div. Pac., July 2, 1873, 
D.I.L.R,, War Dept,, Ind. Div., NA, RG 7 5.
^Delano to Clum, August 6, 1873, I.0,L,R., Ind.
Affs., Misc., NA, RG 75.
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complaints, petitions and proposals from residents and offi-
38
cials of that state.
To obtain first-hand information, General Sherman,
together with Inspector General R. B. Marcy and other military
leaders, toured northern and central Texas in the spring of
1871. Sherman found visible evidence of Indian raids and his
39party narrowly missed an attack by a band of Kiowas. In 
May, he reached Fort Sill, where the Kiowa and Comanche agent, 
Lawrie Tatum, readily admitted his inability to control many 
of his charges.^® Upon hearing Satanta and other Kiowa head­
men boast of killing and robbing whites, Sherman ordered 
their arrest.^ Satanta and Big Tree were later tried and 
sentenced to hang* But President Grant, Secretary Delano and 
others challenged the legality of this decision and the two
42
were sent to the state penitentiary.
During the next two years, there were fewer Indian 
raids 3outh of Indian Territory. This was attributed, in 
part, to the punishment of the Kiowa c h i e f s I n  addition,
38RIster, 0£. cit., 172-173*
3^Sherman to Col* VJilliam H. Wood, May 19, 1871, Sher­
man Papers, Vol. 30.
^•°Athearn, o£. cit., 291.
^Sherman to Commanding Officer, Ft. Richardson, May 
28, 1871, Semi-Official L.S., W. T. Sherman. See also Ex­
tract Marcy Journal included with above. Marcy stated that 
the peace policy had not had the ’’slightest effect” on 
these southern tribes.
^2Rister, 0£. cit., 182-185.
^3Ibid., 186. Minor raids are mentioned in SW. 1872.
46-47*
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the Army discouraged such activities through an active cam­
paign against the Indians who left their reservations* In 
September, 1872, for example, Colonel R» S. Mackenzie attacked 
a Comanche village of two hundred and sixty lodges on a tri­
butary of the Red River, killing more than twenty warriors, 
capturing a hundred and thirty Indians and three thousand 
horses and destroying a great deal of property*
In the summer of 1873, though, the Kiowas and Comanches 
began extensive depredations. Frontier observers insisted 
that these troubles were precipitated by the release of Sa­
tanta and Big Tree, Already in 1872 Governor Edmond J,
Davis of Texas had suggested the freeing of these warriors 
on condition that they bring the remnants of their tribe to 
Fort Sill Reservation, Interior authorities at first opposed 
this idea, but in April, l873» Commissioner Edward P, Smith 
gave his consent. General Sherman protested vociferously, 
but to no avail. "I have no more faith in their /the Indians/7 
sincerity than I have in the prario /Iic/7 wolves,” he re­
marked to General Sheridan, ”and as I once risked my life to 
test their sincerity, I do not propose again to expose others 
to a like danger, and hope the Indian Bureau will manage 
them without the aid of the Army.”^
^Rupert N. Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to South 
Plains Settlement (Glendale, 1933J, 361-362.
^Walker to Delano, June 5, 1872, I.O.R.B, No, 21;
Delano to Davis, June 1872, D.I.L.S., Ind. Misc,, Smith 
to Delano, April 18, 1873, I.O.R.B. No. 22, NA, RG 75.
^6E&M*, Eqs. Army, Vol. 1, NA, RG 108.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2k3
Commissioner Smith soon realized the error of trusting
the Kiowa chiefs, but the damage was done. Within a year
after they were released, the Southern Plains Indians killed
Ii7
about four times as many persons as in 1872. In the spring
of 1874* Kiowas and Comanches, along with some Cheyennes and
Arapahoes, began raids in Texas, Kansas, Colorado and New
Mexico.^-8 In June, a Cheyenne and Comanche war party boldly
attacked a settlement on the South Canadian River inhabited
by white buffalo hunters who had intruded on the Indians’
kbhunting grounds. The following month, hostilities were so 
widespread that, as General Sherman commented, "the Indian 
agents confessed their utter Inability to manage their respec­
tive tribes by the usual humane and Christian treatment. . . . ”'’0 
On July 21, the Interior Department gave the War Department 
a free hand to deal with the Indians in and around Indian 
Territory
With this authority, the military launched the most 
comprehensive, and last, major Indian war on the Southern 
Plains. About three thousand troops from Ports Sill, Concho, 
Union and Griffin and Camp Supply, led by five commanders, 
converged on the Red River Valley. Within five months, after 
a series of hard-fought battles, most of the nomadic bands were
k7
Rister, op. cit., 191. See Smith to Brunot, De­
cember 23, l873» T.O.R.fe. (Land and Civilization), I.O.R.B.
No, 116, NA, RG 75.
^8SW, 18714., k ,  29-30.
^9Grinnell, pp. cit., 319-327.
^°SW, 18714., iu
^1Ibid., 26.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2il4I 'i;
beaten and ready to go to their reservations. But Sherman and 
Sheridan insisted on doing a thorough job. The fighting con­
tinued until the following summer, when, in accordance with a 
"punishment-must-follow-erime policy," hostile leaders were 
court-martialed and sent to prison in St. AugustiDe, Florida. 
Thus, in the opinion of many Army officers, part of the Indian
t o
problem was solved in a practical, effective manner.-^
War Department spokesmen argued that the methods which 
ended difficulties with the southern tribes -- unrestricted 
warfare on hostiles on and off the reservations —  would work 
equally as well with the troublesome Sioux in the North. De­
spite the efforts of Indian reformers and peace policy 
supporters, various Sioux bands continued to roam the country 
beyond the boundaries of their reservation, endangering white 
settlements and, in general, disregarding the government’s 
wishes. These tribesmen were probably no more guilty of 
violating treaty commitments than the white men who invaded 
their supposed sanctuary. But, by late l87£, the patience of 
civil and military officials had worn thin, and rumors of im­
pending Sioux hostilities gave point to arguments for for­
cibly "educating" these Indians in the advantages of quiet, 
sedentary life.
The Sioux problem was exacerbated by several peculiar
»
circumstances. First, some of the most "non-progressive"
Sioux frequented agencies located outside their Dakota
*2SW, 1875, 20-21; Rister, 0£. clt.. 193-197; R. N. 
Richardson, Comanche Barrier. 388-397.
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reservation,^ Second, until 1875, many of the Indians took 
advantage of a provision In their treaty of 1868 which per-
■5k
mltted them to hunt along the Platte and Republican rivers. 
Third, the northern part of the Sioux Reservation was in the 
path of the projected Northern Pacific Railroad, and the
5 5presence of survey crews agitated some of the tribesmen.
Fourth, some of the Sioux agencies were involved in much- 
publicized investigations which reaffirmed the Indians1 sus­
picions that the Great Father was not keeping faith with them. 
Finally, the gold-laden Black Hills, the heart of Sioux country, 
were a magnet to white poachers, While the Army labored with 
partial success to stem the tide of gold-seekera, the govern­
ment engaged in negotiations which finally, in September,
561876, legalized another Indian land-grab.
Hostile Sioux occasionally caused trouble during summer 
hunts and often disrupted agency affairs in the winter, but 
the Indian Bureau was slow to admit the seriousness of the 
situation, ”,,,there has /sic j  been more people killed by 
Indians during the last 12 months in my command than for any
-'-'The Red Cloud Agency, established in the summer of 
1871, was not located on the Sioux Reservation until late in 
1877* The Spotted Tail Agency, established as Whetstone Agency 
in the fall of 1868, was moved outside the reservation late 
in 1871 and was not returned until 1878,
^Happier, op, cit,, II, 998-1003, This subject is 
enlarged upon below,
55The survey was made under military escort. Construc­
tion of the road was delayed by the Panic of 1873#
56The Sioux investigations and the Black Hills prob­
lem are discussed further below, Kapler, oj>. clt,, I, 168-171.
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tlike period since 1867,” General Sheridan declared in May,
1873* ”Still the good old Peace Cornrais si oners according to
t.n
their report think Indian affairs lovely,"
The following February, large war parties stole stock 
at the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies, shot at agency 
buildings and, within a few days, killed five whites, in­
cluding two soldiers and the chief clerk at Red Cloud Agency, 
Thereupon, the agents anxiously appealed for military assis­
tance,^® In response, General Sherman directed General 
Sheridan to send troops from Fort Laramie, This action was 
strenuously opposed, however, by Felix Brunot of the Board 
of Indian Commissioners, Just a few weeks earlier Sheridan 
had expressed a desire to compel the Sioux to be counted, and 
if they resisted, to "make it lively for the squaws, papooses, 
ponies and villages?^ Sioax alarm, Brunot argued, was merely 
the "manipulation of the Telegraph," and if the Army took 
aggressive measures a general war would result,^
General Sherman assured Brunot that his apprehensions 
were unfounded. He further observed:
^Endorsement to Report of Col. P, Carlin, May 17, 
1873, E&M., Hqs, Army, Vol, I, NA, RG 108.
-*®Agent J, J. Saville to Commissioner, February 9, 1875, 
Red Cloud Agency L.R, NA, RG 75; 0. B. Unthank, "Red Cloud 
Agency and Fort Laramie, 1867-1871;," Nebraska History.VII 
(January-March, 1921}.), 28; Hyde, o£. cit,, 211,
^Brunot to Delano, November 21, 1873, I.O.L.R.,
Misc., NA, RG 7 5.
L n
Brunot to Grant, February 11)., I87I}., D.I.L.R., War 
Dept., Ind. Div., NA, RG 75.
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At present the military commanders,..know nothing 
of the orders and instructions of the Indian Bureau to 
their agents, and consequently don’t know whsn their 
.joint action is harmoneous otherwise; and...
the first thing they know is some event like the killing 
of some soldiers or citizens such as recently occurred 
...when the Indian agents.call for help, and help in 
general terms is ordered.®1
After all, he added pointedly, there was no need for this
«62
double authority.
Secretary Delano, too, seemed concerned over the Army’s
intentions. He wrote Secretary of War Delano, reminding
him that the troops were being called out to prevent, not
6 3cause, hostilities. J  To Sherman, such statements were typical 
of the two-faced approach of the Interior Department. He 
confided in General Sheridani
That letter of the Secretary of the Interior was 
meant to throw on us the blame in case of an Indian war... 
Everybody, even Mr. Delano, would be made happy if the 
troops should kill a goodly portion of those Sioux, but 
they want to keep the record to prove they didn’t do 
it. We can afford to be frank and honest, for sooner 
or later these Sioux have to. be wiped out, or made to 
stay where they are put....®^
After all this wrangling, the military expedition 
arrived at the agencies too late to deal with the hostlies, 
who had gone north to hunt buffalo. To prevent a recurrence 
of these difficulties, though, military camps were established
^Sherman to Brunot, February 17$ 1871+, Sherman Letter 
Book (February 11, 1866 to July 8, 1878)*
62Ibid.
^^Delano to Belknap, February 25, 1871+, D.I.L.S., Ind. 
Misc., NA, RG 75.
^•Sherman to Sheridan, March 6, l87i+, Sheridan Auto­
graph Letters, Vol. I.
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near Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies.^ The troops 
stationed at these posts occasionally intervened to discipline 
belligerent braves at the agencies and were generally kept 
active with patrol and escort duties. But a full-scale cam­
paign against the roving warlike Sioux was deferred by nego­
tiations for the Black Hiila*^
In November, 1875, Inspector 3?.C, Watkins reported 
that warriors under Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse were on the 
verge of an outbreak, and recommended decisive military 
action* This proposal was approved by the new Interior
officials, Secretary Zachariah Chandler and Commissioner 
67
John Q. Smith. Subsequently, the Sioux agents were told to 
notify the Indians to be on Sioux reservation by January 31, 
1876, or be considered hostile,®® Not all of the Sioux who 
were hunting in Wyoming and Montana received the govern- . 
ment's instructions, but most of those who did either
65
• Camp Sheridan was established near Spotted Tail 
Agency and Camp, later Port, Robinson near Red Cloud Agency. 
(Roger T. Grange, Jr., "Port Robinson Outpost on the Plains," 
Nebraska History. XXXIX(September, 1958), I91-23I4..)
®®A minor crisis, requiring military intervention, 
occurred at Red Cloud Agency in October, 18714.* See Report of 
the Special Commission Appointed to Investigate the Affairs of 
the Red Cloud Indian Agency. July. 1&75 (Washington, 187^), 
309-3114.. Hereafter this document is cited RSC, See also 
Saville to Commissioner, October 21*., 187)4., Red Cloud Agency, 
LeRe, NA,RG 75.
®?ciA, l875> 7-9; Smith to Delano, November 27, 1875, 
Sheridan Papers, Pile on Indian Affairs.
®®CIA, 1876, XIV-XV. General Sherman unsuccessfully 
tried to have this deadline advanced to allow for a longer and 
more effective winter campaign* (Rister, oj>. cit*. 2014.).
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disregarded them or decided not to move in bad weather* Hence, 
many were still off the reservation in early March, when Gen­
eral Crook, now commander of the Department of the Platte, 
and General A. H. Terry, commander of the Department of Dakota, 
began the first expeditions of the bloody Sioux War of 1876- 
1877. 69
DUAL AUTHORITY AND PEACE POLICY PROBLEMS
Implicit in the "peace policy” was the idea that Indian 
wars, such as those just cited,were to be minimized* The 
government sought to .place the Indians on reservations; to 
temporarily feed, clothe and equip them; to teach them to farm, 
raise livestock or engage in other industrial pursuits and 
to bring their social, cultural and religious life into con­
formity with that of white society. Under the supervision of 
the Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
advised and assisted to some extent by the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, there was an extensive system of superinten-
dencies and agencies* In the Seventies, Indians were subsisted
70
and managed at more than seventy agencies and sub-agencies. 
These establishments, generally located in remote areas, were 
like rude little towns. They usually included an office, 
one or more storehouses, a barn or stable, carpenter and black­
smith shops, traders1 stores, a school, a church or mission
69
Hyde, op. cit.* 2£l-2£3* See Chapter Seven.
7°See CIA, 187I, 606-637.
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house, residences for agency employees, corrals and various
71other structures.
The responsibility for administering these Indian cen­
ters fell primarily upon the church-nominated agents or sub­
agents, The agent, or "little father," had a multitude of 
duties. For #1,500 a year, more or less, he was expected to 
keep the Indians quiet and content, supervise the distribution 
of rations and annuities, represent the government, enforce 
treaties and Indian service regulations, settle Indian dis­
putes, check the encroachment of outsiders, look after the
Indians* morals and promote his subjects' education and civili-
72
zatlon. For assistance, most agents relied upon a sizeable 
staff, consisting, in some cases, of interpreters, a chief 
clerk, issue clerk, corral master, storekeeper, farmer, butcher, 
blacksmith, physician, in addition to teachers, engineers, 
carpenters, mill hands, herders and laborers, ^
Although conditions varied from place to place, most 
agency administrators had to contend with numerous problems.
Many agents, in the first place, were ill-equipped by training
Ik
and temperament to manage uncivilized Indians, Their
7lEverett Dick, The Vanguards of the Frontier (New 
York, 191*1), 10l*-105j I,O.L,R, Misc, 1%71-1876. passim.HA.
RG 75 *
72SI, 1876, 382; CIA, 1878, 28-29; Dick, op. cit.. 
105-117* See also Ruth H. Gallaher, "The Indian Agent," The 
Iowa Journal of History and Politics. XIV (April, 1916),
173-238.
73See, for example, quarterly payrolls, Red Cloud and 
Spotted Tail agencies, 1871-1878, NA, RG 75,
7^CIA, 1876, IV; Poole, og>. clt.. 227-229.
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position exposed them to physical hardships and "ever-ready 
suspicion, detraction and calumny0n The agencies were often 
beset by "hangers-on” —  traders, contractors, squawmen and 
half-breeds —  as well as unruly young braves and intru­
ders,*^ The Indians, moreover, were generally unenthusias-
77tic about the government’s reforms. Finally, the agents
grappled with such "hindrances" as the continuing recognition
of tribal sovereignties, the absence of clearly-defined laws
78
, and inter-tribal feuds,
While the military branch was not directly concerned 
with most of these administrative questions, it had certain 
functions essential to the maintenance and operation of the 
peace program at the reservations and agencies, Indian Com­
missioner Francis A. Walker once stated that the government,
to save its wards from extinction and degradation, should
79place them under a "rigid reformatory discipline," In a 
sense, this was attempted, with Indian officials depending 
upon the Array to keep their "inmates" at peace on the reserva­
tions and free from outside interference. But the analogy 
omits a vital point. The Indians owned the reservations, and
7*SI, 1876, 382.
7^ Ray He Mattison, "The Indian Reservation System on 
the Upper Missouri, 1865-1890," Nebraska History, XXVI (Sep­
tember, 1955)# 158,
77CIA, 1871-1876, passim. 
78CIA, 1873, 3-9. 
79ciA, 1872, 5 .
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it was also tbe duty of the military to protect their land 
and property. The story of the Army’s efforts to carry out 
the dual assignment of controlling and protecting the reserva­
tion Indians is a revealing commentary on the question of 
civil or military control of Indian affairs.
According to Secretary Delano, the "first step" in
promoting peace and civilization among the Indians was to
80keep them on the reservations* Similarly, Commissioner 
Walker suggested that the nation’s wards be made as corafor-
8l
table on, and as uncomfortable off, their lands as possible* 
Under the civil-military agreement of 1869, troops policed the 
country around the reservations, chasing or escorting wayward 
tribesmen back to their agencies. In view of these services, 
civil authorities reported "cordial and earnest co-operation" 
by the soldiers and thanked them for "prompt and efficient
O p
aid," At times, however, there was friction between mili­
tary commanders and agents, and the former were dilatory or 
uncooperative. This occurred, especially, when Indian ad­
ministrators were Indecisive or had a propensity for giving
O ^
false alarms.
After 1870 western commanders became increasingly cri­
tical of the Inter-departmental understanding which prevented
80SI, 1872, VI.
8lCIA, 1872, 6.
82SI, 1873, XI; SI, 1875, IX.
83CIA, 1875, 20, 33-A.
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them from dealing independently with Indians on the reserva­
tions. Indian raiders took advantage of this arrangement, using 
the reserved areas as refuges, sources of supply, and rest 
and recuperation centers* This was such a problem along the 
southern boundary of Indian Territory that, in 1871, Army 
officers refused to act until Commissioner Parker revised the 
instructions he had sent to Indian superintendents and agents 
on June 12, 1 8 6 9 . Given little choice, Parker informed 
Secretary Belknap that it seemed "advisable and expedient" 
to allow troops to follow criminals into Indian Territory to 
arrest them and recover stolen property*®^
Still the military was not certain of its power to pur­
sue Indians under all circumstances. "The general instruc­
tions to our troops involve the protection of Indians inside 
their reservation, by prompt and rapid pursuit of all marauders," 
General Sherman wrote in 1873# "even if their route leads
O/
inside a Reservation." Six months later, though, he com­
plained that another Indian Bureau circular on inter­
departmental jurisdiction was "merely advisory" and left many 
post commanders in doubt. A comprehensive, legal definition of 
the respective powers of the War and Interior departments was
®^See Chapter Five.
^Parker to Belknap, June 21, 1871, I.O.R.B. No. 102,
Land and Civilization, NA, RG 75*
®^End., Sherman, to letter of W.P. Carlin to Acting AG, 
Department of Dakota, May 17# 1873# NA, RG 108#
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essential.
Now and then politicians proposed solutions to the 
jurisdictional question. Early in I87I4- Representative DeWitt 
C. Giddings of Texas suggested that the War Department be 
given exclusive authority over the unruly bands living in In­
dian Territory. Commissioner E. P. Smith rejected this scheme.
To commit the control of a portion of a tribe to military con-
88 „
trol would simply bring confusion, he argued. Governor
S. P. Potts of Montana Territory offered an alternative plan.
If Indians committed crimes and others In their tribe refused
to surrender them, let the whole tribe be turned over to the
Army. This proposal was opposed by Acting Commissioner Clum,
who maintained that agency Indians could not, and should not
be expected to, control the actions of relatives living 
89
elsewhere*
The Kiowa and Comanche troubles in the summer of I87J4-
forced the issue. Commissioner E. P. Smith finally approved
unrestricted pursuit of evil Indians, insisting, however, upon
military commanders cooperation to separate the friendly In-
90dians from the hostiles. General Pope objected to this
87Sherman to Sec. War, November 2, 1873* I.O.L.R., Misc.,
NA, RG 75 .
88
Smith to Delano, January 21, 187^, I.O.R.B. No. 21},
NA, RG 7 5 .
®^Clum to Delano, May 9, 187U> I.O.R.B. No. 21}., NA,
r g  75.
9®The friendly Indians were to be enrolled and required 
to answer daily roll-call. No Indian was to be allowed to join 
them except by special permission. (Smith to Delano, July 18, 
l87i}, cited in Pope to Sheridan, July 22, l87l}» Div, Mo. L.R., 
Special Pile, NA, RG 98.)
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"carefully guarded" permission, particularly the requirement 
that the Army notify friendly Indians to go to the agencies 
before pursuing bostiles0 By giving such notice, troops would 
practically disarm themselves and defeat their object. While 
old Indians went to the agencies to create a "semblance of 
peace," hostiles would scatter to the four winds and to find 
them would be as hard as "looking for needles in a hay-stack."^ 
It should be the agents responsibility to bring In the peaceable 
Indians and discover the Identity of criminals. "What chance 
would the police of New York have," Pope asked, "if all the 
people of their vilest districts were to be notified when the 
police force was about to move upon them and /told that/ all 
who wanted protection must assemble in certain buildings and 
localities where they would be unmolested, or disperse for the 
occasion?"9^ But Interior authorities insisted that there were 
friendly Indians in every district and continued to demand 
precautions for their safety.
Another problem which stemmed from police action against 
undisciplined tribesmen was the disposition of Indian pri­
soners. In some military departments, when competent civil 
authorities were unavailable, tro^s were expected to "confine, 
hold and release" Indians upon application from the agents.
^Pope to Sheridan, July 22, 18714., Div. Mo. L.R.,
Special Pile, NA, RG 9 8.
92Ibid.
91^Instructions, Acting A.G, Pry, Dept, of Dakota, De­
cember 6, l871> Sheridan Letter Book, General Correspondence. 
Sheridan recommended these instructions for army-wide 
issuance.
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This created additional expense and extra duties which were
oh
not always appreciated by the War Department. ^ Moreover,
civil and military officials did not always agree on the proper
treatment of prisoners. For example, in 1872, Commissioner
Walker consented to the imprisonment of whole families at Fort
Sill, but opposed military suggestions that parents and child-
95ran be permanently separated* On the other hand, two years
later Commissioner E* P. Smith rejected General Sheridan*s
96
plan to confine families on military-occupied islands*
The Army might have had fewer prisoners to worry about 
if the Indians had been more effectively supplied at the 
agencies. Officials of the Indian Bureau recognized the im­
portance of feeding the Indians to keep them at the reser-
97
vations during their "transition of life." "Should the 
feeding of these Indians be stopped," Commissioner Parker said 
of the Southern Plains tribes, "...they will again scatter to 
the plains...and the labor and expense of locating them where 
they now are will have been of no use or permanent benefit,
9^When funds were available, the Indian Bureau re­
imbursed the Army for subsisting prisoners. (Walker to Delano, 
November k ,  1872, I.O.R.B. N0. 22, NA, RG 75.)
9%bid.
9^Smith to Delano, November 20, I87I4., February 2, l875>
I.O.R.B. No* 25, NA, RG 7 5* Smith argued that this would be 
too expensive and that soldiers would debauch the Indian women.
97
The prescribed daily ration for the Sioux before 1876 
was a pound and a half of fresh beef, a quarter pound of corn 
or meal, and half a pound of flour per person; four pounds of 
sugar per hundred persons and, four times a month, three- 
fourths of a pound of bacon per person. Other items, such as 
coffee and beans, were common.
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either to the Government or the Indiana.... Yet supply 
shortages were common, and, as Parker predicted, many tribes­
men left the reservations in search of food.
Several factors contributed to the 3upply problem. First, 
Congress, more correctly the House of Representatives, often
delayed and substantially reduced recommended appropriations
99
for the Indian service. Second, many of the Indians contri- 
buted to their own needs by improvident eating habits.^00 
Third, agents did not always anticipate and properly assess 
the Indians needs and tastes.10 "^ Fourth, fraud, mismanagement 
and profiteering in supply, annuity and transportatisn con­
tracts sometimes deprived the agency wards of the full benefits
102of federal support. Fifth, traders, and "hangers-on" 
pestered the Indians to exchange their food or supplies for 
non-essentials.^0^ Finally, the remoteness of the agencies 
and bad weather frequently caused delays in supply deliveries.^0^
98Parker to Delano, March 13, 1871, I.O.R.B. N0. 20,
NA, RG 75.
^Priest, o£. cit., 106-120.
10°Rations were normally issued every five to eight days, 
but the Indians often devoured them in a day or two. (Poole, 
oo. clt.. lj.5-it.6; RSC, 2I4.2 ; Priest, o]o. clt., 1114.-1 1 5).
101S e e , fo r  exam ple, CIA, 1875, 192; SW, 1871, 73.
•^O^RSC, passim. Henry G. Waltmann, "The Subsistence 
Policy with Special Reference to the Red Cloud and Spotted 
Tail Agencies," M.A. Thesis (University of Nebraska, 1959), 
120-l6Lj..
103Walker to SI, November 20, 1871; M cC„ Foot to Com­
missioner, September 9, 1876, Red Cloud Agency, L.R., NA
RG 75; RSC, 252.
^°^See, for example, SW, 1872, 8 6.
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In spite of these circumstances, though, the Indians were
109usually well supplied, v
Throughout the Seventies, commanders of military posts
near the agencies distributed emergency rations to needy In-
dians. Under military regulations and orders, bulk or
107
daily issues were forbidden. Still, many officers consid­
ered the temporary distribution of military stores a "humane 
and economical mode of preventing war," and provided as much 
relief as possible, assisting, too, such wretched, weak bands 
as the Mission Indians of California and Tonkawas and Lipans 
of Texas,108
Army officers were at times extremely critical of the 
Indian Bureau and its supply system. In 1875, Ma^, Gen, Nelson 
A, Miles complained, for instance, that the Indians of the 
Central Superintendency, "half fed and half starved," were 
forced into annual outbreaks with "accompanying horrors."109 
Commenting on the same problem, General Pope declared that
10-*Hyde, op, cit.. 260, 229, note footnote 9* This 
view does not comprehend the Indians' wanderlust and tradi­
tional hunts,
lo8In 1871-1872 about $300,000 worth of rations were 
dispensed by the Army, (Walker to Delano, January 3, 1872,
I.O.R.B. No. 21, NA, RG 75),
10?General Order No. 514-, War Dept., June 25, 18?2 in 
"Brief on the Indians at Port Griffin, I.O.L.R., War Dept., 
Misc., NA, RG 75. These rules were not always observed.
108Ibid,; SW, 1872, 86; BIC, 1871, 9, The military 
frequently complained that the Indian Bureau gave more 
rations to potential hostlles than submissive tribes.
109SW, 1875, 85,
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it was "revolting” for troops to have to commit violence on 
hapless, hungry Indians, They were charged with "assassina­
tion" If these poor people were killed and "inefficiency" if
n cthey were not. Summarizing this dilemma, Pope asserted:
It is the misfortune of the present administration of 
Indian affairs that Indians are driven by starvation at 
the agencies, where by treaty stipulations they are re­
quired to remain, to seek food in places where they are 
prohibited from going, and whilst the permits for this 
purpose given by the agents are wholly illegal and un­
authorized, common humanity dictates that no forcible ^.n 
measures be taken against them under such circumstances.
The Sioux, who by their treaty of 1868 were entitled to
hunt on the Platte and Republican "so long as the buffalo
range thereon in sufficient numbers as to justify the chase,"
112
were a special problem. By 1871 the War Department and
residents of Nebraska and Kansas were agitating for the repeal
of this privilege, because the Indians were deemed a threat to
peace on the Central Plains, General Sherman, who signed the
Sioux treaty against his better judgment, recommended that the
113buffalo be slaughtered and the meat transported to Dakota, 
Indian friends, such as William Welsh of Philadelphia, also
opposed the buffalo hunts, contending that they promoted va-
llit
grancy and postponed reform. Interior authorities agreed,
110Ibid„ 76-77.
1 1 n
Endorsement, Pope, January 23, 1876, to letter,
Lt, Edwin P, Andrus to A .G ,,  Ft, Wallace, January 17, 1876,
I .O .L .R . ,  NA, RG 75,
^%appler, oj>. cit., II, 998,
^■^Belknap to Delano, March 27, 1871, D , I , L , R , ,  War 
D ep to ,  Ind, Div,, NA, RG 7 5,
^^•Williara Welsh, "Report of a Visit to the Sioux and 
Ponka Indians on the Missouri River," (Philadelphia, 1872), 31,
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but insisted that the government keep faith with its subjects 
until they consented to forego their hunting rights*11^
An incident which gave new point to arguments for ending 
the hunts was the "massacre,*1 in early 1873, of fifty to a 
hundred and fifty Pawnees by Sioux hunters near the present 
town of Trenton, Nebraska,11^ In the exchange of reports which 
followed, Secretary Delano referred to the hunting privilege as 
part of the treaty "made in 1868 by General Sherman." Sherman 
refuted this "offensive" remark, stating that he had stead­
fastly opposed concessions to the Sioux in 1868. "I am as 
strong an advocate for peace as he /Delano7 * or any the 
attaches of the Indian Bureau,” he asserted to Adjutant Gen­
eral E. D. Townsend, "but am not in favor of a cowardly peace, 
where savage Indians remain at war, leaving our troops to be 
their victims."^^
A few  months l a t e r ,  p a r t ly  b ecau se  o f  m i l i t a r y  and 
f r o n t i e r  p r e s s u r e ,  i n t e r i o r  o f f i c i a l s  began n e g o t ia t i o n s  to  
r e s c in d  th e  S io u x  h u n tin g  p r e r o g a t i v e .  A nother c o n s id e r a t io n  
which l e d  to  t h i s  a c t io n  was the ra p id  d isa p p ea ra n ce  o f  b u f f a l o  
and sm a l l  game. In d ia n  reform ers  r e c o g n iz e d  th e  e x t i n c t i o n
n *si, 1872, 7; SI, 1873, VII.
^^Report 0f Captain Reinhold, Port McPherson, Feb­
ruary 25. 1873, BIG, Misc. Pile, Tray 2j Ashton C4 Shallen- 
berger, "The Last Pawnee-Sioux Battle and Buffalo Hunt,” 
Nebraska History. XVI (July-September, 193^), 138-Uj.9.
^^Sherman to Townsend, May 31, 1873, G.G.L.S., NA,
RG 108.
T T ftS e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  c o n tr ib u te d  t o  th e  e x t i n c t i o n  o f  
th e  a l l - i m p o r t a n t  b u f f a l o .  White h u n te r s ,  a id ed  by b u s i n e s s -  
minded I n d ia n s ,  s la u g h te r e d  m i l l i o n s  in  th e  r e g io n  between
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of the buffalo as a "blessing in disguise" for the Indians, 
whose inclination toward agency life increased as their hunt­
ing excursions yielded diminishing r e t u r n s I n  June, l87lf,
Congress appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars to liqui-
120
date the pertinent clause of the Sioux treaty* A year
later, Red Cloud and other Sioux leaders, while in Washington,
121agreed to cease hunting south of Dakota*
Besides responsibilities directly involving the Indians, 
the Army had the onerous duty of protecting the reservations 
and agencies from trespassers. "The Government cannot enforce
^  (continued) Canada and Indian Territory in the early 
Seventies, just to procure merchantable hides or tongues. 
Sportsmen, participated in the wanton slaughter. Likewise, 
nature took a heavy toll, particularly during the blizzard of 
January, 1872. Finally, the Indians' biennial hunts helped 
to make the bison scarce* (Mari Sandoz, The Buffalo Hunters 
/flew York, 195|t7» 9^-99; 128-130; Ashton' Shallenberger, rtrfhe
Last Pawnee-Sioux Battle and Buffalo Hunt," Nebraska History.
XVI /July-September, 193^> 138-H|-9; Bayard 5. Paine. Pioneers, 
Indians, and Buffaloes /Curtis,Nebraska, 193£7> 178-179*)
119The extinction of the buffalo bad a profound Impact 
upon the domestic life of the Sioux and other plains tribes. 
Buffalo —  traditionally a symbol of prowess, longevity and 
worship —  were "nature's storehouse" for them. The red men 
relied upon these migratory beasts for many necessities of 
life. The meat, including the viscera, was eaten boiled, 
dried, roasted, raw or as an ingredient in soup. In addition, 
the buffalo provided hides for bedding, tentage and clothing; 
sinews for bowstrings; bones for tools and pipes; horns and 
hooves for vessels, spoons or glue; tallow for salve; brains 
for tanning hides and even "buffalo chips" for fuel or a smoking 
mixture. (Sandoz, on. cit.. 91+-95* Paine, ojj* clt.. 137J 
Everett P. Wilson, The &tory of the Oglala and ferule Sioux 
in the Pine Ridge Country of Northwest Nebraska in the 
Middle Seventies," Nebraska History. XXII /Tanuary-March,
191*17, 16; Edgar I.' Stewart, duster's Luck /Fforman. 195^/, 8 .)
120CIA, 1871*, 87; Nebraska History. XVI (July-Sep- 
tember, 1 9 3 5), 168*
121
Nebraska History. XVI (July-September, 1935),
168-169*
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this preservation/ policy upon the Indians," Secretary Delano
remarked in 1873, "unless it is equally determined in its
policy of preventing white people from going upon Reservations
that have been solemnly guaranteed to Indians by treaties or 
122
otherwise," The intruder problem was so persistent and com­
plex, however, that military leaders sometimes despaired of 
their ability to cope with it. For example, in 1871, Gen­
eral Pope described the "most difficult and vexatious" assign­
ment of protecting reservations along the Kansas Pacific as 
follows:
,.,tbe throng of laborers and employees of the roads, 
as well as the adventurers, prospectors and squatters, 
and the fine agricultural country occupied by these reser­
vation tribes, bring about relations between the whites 
and Indians on thousands of points, which involve trouble­
some and complicated questions, and constant difficulties 
which cannot be adjudicated or settled by the military 
authorities, and which are altogether beyond the manage­
ment, or even the comprehension, of the average Indian
agent,123
Among the trespassers and agency parasites who created 
headaches for civil and military authorities were: traders, 
cattlemen, miners, hunters, freighters, speculators, railroad 
workers, squawmen and Indians from other reservations. Ex­
cept at agencies with organized Indian police, agency officials
121l
were more or less powerless against these elements, ^  The 
agents, who repeatedly solicited Army assistance to arrest or
IP?
Delano to George M, Robeson, April 2k, 1873> E.I.L,S0, 
Ind, Misc., NA, RG 7f>,
123sw, 1871, l|i.
of the agencies with Indian police in 1875 were 
Great Nemaha and Omaha, (BIC, 1875, 6k-&7.)
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expel unscrupulous outsiders were, at the same time, insistent
that such intervention be under their direction* Many
accepted Commissioner E. P. Smith's view that the presence of
soldiers on reservations brought "evils as well as benefits”
125and should be as brief as possible. ^
Perhaps the most difficult intruders to eliminate were 
the whiskey and arms traders* The illegal sale of these two 
items, General W. S. Hancock affirmed in 1872, had long been 
a fruitful source of difficulty for the Army. The Indians
had a notorious weakness for intoxicants, and regulations£
against the liquor traffic, despite the efforts of Indian re-
127formers, were weak and hard to enforce. ' Attempts to control 
the sale of arms, prohibited to Indian traders in 1873* were
complicated by the Indian Bureau's policy of arming friendly
4 A O
Indians for protection against hostile neighbors. In 1871 
Secretary Delano Indicated, for instance, that the Crows,
129
enemies of the Sioux, had more modern guns than warriors.
12*CIA, 1871*, 13.
12%ancock to Acting A. G., Div. Mo., October 10,
1872, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 7$.
■^2^Priest, op. clt.. 156-157J Sehraeckbier, op. clt.. 
I*2l*-k25; HR Ex. Doc. No. 177. l*3rd Cong., 1 sess. TSerial 
1610), 1871*, 1 ; and BYE, 1872, 19.
lpo
17 St at. L., 1*59. See Cong. Globe, l*2nd Cong.,
3 sess., 3 k 7-^*8, 379-380, 1*28-1*25. For a discussion of arms 
for the Poncas' use against the Sioux see Walker to Delano,
May 27, 1872, I.O.R.B, No. 21; Col. E. 3, Otis to Acting A.G., 
Dept, of Dakota, June 18, 1872, D.I.L.R., War Dept*, Ind.
Div., HA, RG 7 5,
129
Delano to CIA, March 20, 1871*, D.I.L.S. No. 13, 
Indian Commissioner, NA, RG 75.
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While Army officers attacked the Interior Department for
indiscriminately distributing weapons and Indian inspectors
blamed the military for failing to check the sale of arms at
military posts, warlike Indians continued to acquire weapons
130
without much difficulty.
Another persistent class of trespassers were the miners. 
"This wealth is hidden away in gorges and is doing the Red 
Man no good,” an advocate of free exploitation of mineral lands 
asserted to Commissioner Parker in 1871* "Mining parties In 
those mines could...by mutual and friendly agreement...prove 
beneficent to...the Red and the White Man.”^ ^  This argument 
appealed not only to prospectors, but most citizens, including 
federal authorities. But the government was pledged by treaties 
to defend the Indians’ interests until they agreed to further 
cessions. Furthermore, the peace policy placed special em­
phasis upon keeping faith with the tribes In this respect*
The supreme test of the government’s determination to 
prevent trespassing by prospectors began In I87IJ-, when gold- 
seekers began to infiltrate the Black Hills. For years It had
been rumored that the Sioux hill country contained gold, much
1^2to the dismay of Interior authorities. J  In the summer of
^^Hancock to Acting A.G., Div. Mo., October 10, 1872, 
It0.L.R., Misc., HA, RG 75* inspector J. W. Daniels to Smith, 
December if, 1873, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75*
131J, W. Field to Parker, April 28, I87I, I.O.L.R.,
Misc., HA, RG 75.
^■^See Walker to Delano, March 26, 1872, I.O.R.B.
No. 21, HA, RG 7 5.
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18714- Maj. Gen. George A. Custer led a "military reconnaissance” 
— twelve hundred troops and mining experts -- into the Hills. 
Custer’s report of "gold among the roots of the grass” con­
firmed earlier rumors and aroused the depression-ridden
133public* Were it not for military intervention, a full- 
scale invasion would be begun that fall.^^k
The following year hundreds of miners slipped past Army 
patrols and panned for gold along creeks in the Black Hills. 
President Grant directed the War Department to redouble its 
efforts to intercept trespassers, but the rush continued.1^  
Meanwhile, the Interior Department, bowing to the inevitable, 
negotiated with Sioux leaders and sent out a party of scien­
tists and miners to determine the accuracy of Custer’s report.^ 8  
When the Jenney mineralogical expedition substantiated the 
presence of gold in paying quantities, General Sheridan de­
nounced the Indian Bureau. Overlooking the excitement Custer 
had created, Sheridan declared that now his most conscientious 
efforts would not suffice to hold back the miners.^ -37
^^Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 32, k3rd Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 
1629), 18757~8. — "
13k
CIA, l87k» Doans Robinson, "A History of the
Dakota or Sioux Indians," South Dakota Historical Collections 
(Aberdeen, 190k), k07»kl5#
135
Sherman to Commanding General, Div. Mo., March 17,
1875, Div. Mo. L.R., Special Pile, NA, RG 98.
^ ^ Delano to Belknap, January 22, 1875, Div. Mo. L.R., 
Special File, NA, RG 9 8; Hyde, 0 0. clt., 23-k. The scientific 
expedition was headed by Professor V. P. Jenney of the New 
York School of Mines.
^^Sberidan to Sherman, July 2, 1875, C.G.L.S., NA,
RG 108.
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In September a commission headed by Senator William B. 
Allison of Iowa, held a "grand council" with some of the Sioux 
chiefs. The commission tried to lease or buy the gold fields, 
but found the Indians’ demands too taigh*^® Subsequently, the 
Army looked aside while thousands of prospectors entered the 
Sioux reservation to stake their claims. The United States' 
failure to protect the Indians' lands or achieve an amicable 
settlement was to have disastrous consequences in the spring 
of 1876.
GROWING CRITICISM OP THE PEACE POLICY 
AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Reforms introduced in the early part of President 
Grant's first term —  the Board of Indian Commissioners, church 
nomination of agents, discontinuance of the treaty system and 
enlargement of the reservation and feeding policies —  tem­
porarily alleviated criticism against the Indian service. Con­
gressional agitation for transfer abated. Military leaders, 
mindful that former general Grant was associated with the 
conciliatory Indian program, mollified their complaints. Humani­
tarians expressed satisfaction with the work of the churches 
and Indian Board. Even some westerners were optimistic about 
the Army-enforced reservation system.
Several additional reforms were adopted prior to 1876.
•^®The commission offered to lease the Black Hills 
for $i|.00,000 a year or buy the area for $6,000,000. (CIA,
1875, 183-191. Hyde, o£. cit., 21^.1 -2lj.6.)
t
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In 1871 the procedure for letting Indian contracts was placed
139under stricter regulations* Two years later the President
was empowered to appoint five Indian inspectors to investigate
Indian affairs at regular intervals.^^Moreover, in 1875, a
version of the Homestead Act was adopted to allow qualified
Indians to obtain title to one hundred and sixty acre farms
and most able-bodied male red men between the age of eighteen
and forty-five were required to work in order to receive ra­
il^
tions and annuities*
During Grant’s second term, however, there was growing 
criticism of the federal Indian policy and civil administra­
tion. Critics contended that the Indians were not becoming 
civilized and self-sufficient rapidly enough and that recurrent 
wars and administrative problems at the agencies were an in­
dictment of the existing system.1^ -* To add to these complaints, 
the Indian service was disgraced by frequent reports of fraud 
and mismanagement.
rtThe best and almost the only safeguard against pecula­
tions and frauds in these remote stations,” Acting Secretary
13916 Stat. L., 51*1}..
1 '^°17 Stat. L., U37.
U A iq Stat. L., ij.20.
^•^18 Stat. ^ L.. I4J4.9- Less civilized Indians were ex­
empted by written order from the Secretary of the Interior.
^ ^ A  special source of complaint in connection with 
supply procedures was that red tape often delayed contract 
payments for many months. See RSC, 61j.O and G.N. Goodale to 
E. P. Smith, January 18, 1875, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
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of the Interior B. R. Cowen asserted in 1872, "must be in the 
honesty of the Agents themselves....""*-^  That agents, con­
tractors and others involved in Indian affairs were not always 
honest was revealed by numerous congressional and special in­
vestigations. In 1871, for example, the House Appropriations 
Committee found Commissioner Parker guilty of "irregularities, 
neglect, and incompetency, and, in some instances, a departure 
from*, . l a w . T w o  years later, the House Committee on In­
dian Affairs conducted a hearing designed fco "rid the Indians 
and the Indian service of...heartless scoundrels...." Its 
findings cited "great frauds and wrongs" by men acting as 
Indian attorneys and condemned the activities of claim-agents 
and middle-men*"*"^ The Board of Indian Commissioners also 
found evidence of unscrupulous activities by Indian "rings." 
They insisted, however, that these groups were no more pre­
valent in the Indian service than other phases of government 
in the Grant era, observing, "Where there is a carcass, the 
vultures will gather."^-7
One of the most spectacular investigations of the 
Seventies was conducted at Red Cloud Agency in July, 1875.
■^■Cowen did make other suggestions. He recommended 
that Indian transactions be given maximum publicity and that 
funds be provided for the expenses of witnesses in Indian 
investigations. (Cowen to J. P. Shanks, December 31» 1872, 
D.I.L.S., Indian Misc., HA, RG 7 5 ).
^ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 39. lj.lst Cong., 3 aess, (Serial 
I4IJ.0 ), 1871, 11. This criticism induced Parker to resign.
^ H R  Rpt. Hp. 9 8. ij.2nd Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1578), 
1873, 1-3.
W b i c  to "the Christian Public," July 29, 1875,
B.C.M., Tray 3, NA, RG 75.
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A special commission examined charges by Professor Othniel C.
Marsh, an eminent Yale College paleontologist, that agency
T li fi
officials and contractors were guilty of ttgross frauds."^ 
Marsh alleged, among other things, that the Indians suffered 
for want of food and other supplies because they were cheated 
out of annuities and beef cattle and were issued inedible pork, 
inferior flour, poor sugar and coffee and rotten tobacco.
Upon confirming many of these accusations, the commission re­
primanded Commissioner E. P. Smith and recommended the removal 
of Agent J. J. Saville, the exclusion of various contractors
and inspectors and the adoption of remedial administrative
1? 0
and supply procedures.
The shortcomings and abuses of the Indian service re­
ceived widespread publicity and stimulated much discussion. 
Civil and military authorities, politicians, editors and self- 
appointed "experts" advanced all sorts of theories on how to 
improve Indian administration and hasten the solution of the 
Indian question. General W. B. Hazen, who believed the trouble 
with Indian affairs was simply "want of persistence," called 
for more diligent use of the combined "moral-force" and "pby- 
sical-force" a p p r o a c h . T y p i c a l  of the reaction of western
-^®Marsh visited Red Cloud Agency in l87ij. during a 
geological trip to the Badlands of Dakota. (O.C. Marsh, 
a Statement of Affairs at Red Cloud Agency Made to the 
President of the United States by Professor O.C. Marsh," 
Washington, 187^7, 3.)
^Ibid., 14.-6.
I^Or s g , ixxiv-lxxv. The Red Cloud investigation was a 
factor in the resignations of Commissioner Smith and Secre­
tary Delano.
^ ^ -The Nation. XVIII. (January 15, I87I}.), I4.O.
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extremists was a Texan’s demand that the government either
adopt the ’’Shovington /Chivington7 process” or send the In-
152
dians to state prisons east of the Mississippi, An east­
erner suggested the "agriculturalogizing” of the
nation's wards by a four-thousand-nan corps of farmers and
mechanics (Nineteenth Century Peace Corpsmen) selected to
153
live among the aborigines for five years. Several persons
petitioned the President and Interior Department to apportion
l^kthe Indians among eastern states. Finally, humanitarians, 
such as Bishop Henry Whipple of Minnesota, memorialized the 
Indian Office, suggesting that the Indians be given farms, be 
placed under state laws and be assisted to establish self- 
government.155
After 1873 the scheme discussed most, largely because 
of renewed Indian hostilities, was again transfer of the
152 j. Miles to Secretary of Interior, March llj., 1875*
1.0.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
-^’■^Thomas P. McManus to Commissioner, October 28, 1873,
1.0.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75*
for example, Gustavus Oborn to Z, Chandler, 
December 16, 1875* Chandler Papers; Duncan McPherson to 
Grant, March 1873; I.O.L.R., Misc., 1873* Obviously, the 
advocates of this and other schemes did not appreciate the 
complexity of the Indian problem. One of the most unrealis­
tic arguments received by the Indian Bureau was from a student 
of tribal origins who proposed that, in view of the Indians' 
oriental extraction, they be sent "camels, alpacca Lammas and 
Yaks" to restore them to their "hereditary serenity." (Israel 
S. Diehl to Taylor, January 10, 1868, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 75).
^^Whipple to E. P. Smith, December 5* l87lj-> I.O.L.R., 
Misc., NA, RG 75.
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Indian Bureau to the War D e p a r t m e n t A t  first, in I87I4, the 
discussion centered upon a proposal to establish Army control 
over just the hostile and semi-hostile tribes, A bill intro­
duced in the House Committee on Indian Affairs in February
1<7
proposed military authority over Fort Sill Reservation, The
only result of this measure, since it failed, was another
disagreement between civil and military leaders. General
Sheridan backed the proposal, arguing that the Army's power
and "carefully systematized machinery" could prevent war and 
158save money, ^ Commissioner E, P, Smith acknowledged the 
ineffectiveness of divided control over turbulent tribes, but 
insisted that the discretion to designate certain Indians as 
"hostile" be retained by the Interior Department.^*® Lastly, 
Secretary Delano maintained that partial transfer would be 
even more objectionable than complete military control.*^ 0
The following year, the "much-mooted" question was de­
bated in more general terms. In their annual reports for 
1875, General Schofield presented a lengthy argument in favor 
of transfer while Commissioner Smith and the Board of Indian
156
The Modoc War was a decisive factor in the revival 
of this issue. See, for example, Gen, J. M. Schofield to 
Assistant A,G., Army, D,I,L,R., War Dept,, Ind. Div., NA,
RG 75* 1*7biddings to Delano, April 29, I87I4, D.I.L.R.,
MiSCa, NA, RG 75a
■^^Sheridan to J, J. Averill, June 27, 187^, Sheridan 
Letter Book,' Vol. 1.
■^Smith to Delano, February 10, 18714., IiO.R.B. No. 2 k ,  
NA, RG 75.
^ ^ e l a n o  to Giddings, May I4, 18714, D.I.L.S., Ind.
Misc., No. H 4, NA, RG 75.
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Commissioners opposed it* Schofield stated that he advocated 
military management with "much reluctance,” because the duties 
of Indian agents were distasteful and burdensome. But the 
system of joint administration was nothing more than a nmost 
efficient mode of producing war.” The conflicts which "ir­
responsible” civil agents caused brought no glory or satis­
faction to troops. By putting the military branch in charge 
of the Indian Office, the government would not be departing 
from the peace policy, but insuring its more "economical, just, 
uniform, and consistent execution." In short:
Military management means peace and security; 
giving even a greater opportunity for the labors of Chris­
tian missionaries to civilize and Instruct the savage 
tribes. Let these worthy philanthropists be relieved 
from the responsibility and contamination of more worldly 
matters, and their influence for good cannot thereby be 
diminished.161
Commissioner Smith first reminded the proponents of 
military control that in 1868 the Peace Commission, including 
four top Army officers, had opposed transfer. At that time 
there was no definite plan for Indian civilization, civil 
management was in a "most unsatisfactory condition," and half 
the Indians of the country were .at war. If civil government 
seemed proper then, it was hard to see why it was otherwise 
now. "So far...as eleven-twelfths of the Indian agencies are 
concerned," Smith remarked, "the question of putting them 
under the control of the War Department has no more pertinency 
than of putting the alms-house and city schools under the
l At
SW, 1875, 122-123.
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metropolitan police. A standing army and an ordinary Indian
162
agency have no common end in view." On the other hand,
temporary transfer of the wilder tribes was desirable, and
rations and supplies might be handled with more "regularity
and system" by the Army’s quartermaster and commissary de- 
4. 4- 1 6 3partments.
The Board of Indian Commissioners expressed respect for 
military officers, but generalized that peacetime enlistees 
were "among the most vicious of our population." Where en­
listed men lived in close proximity with the Indians, the 
debauchery of the women and demoralization of the men was 
inevitable. Army administration would magnify these bad re­
sults. Moreover, military rule was by nature arbitrary and 
would goad the Indians into devastating wars. The Board 
emphasized:
It can hardly be a question with thoughtful men, 
whether it is not better to educate the Indians, to 
build houses and schools and churches for them, to teach 
them to cultivate the soil and acquire useful trade, to 
civilize and Christianize them, than to hand them over to 
a government that we do not choose for ourselves and our 
children....The Army is admirable in its place, but its 
function is,not that of civil government in a republic 
like ours.16i*
To support these views, the commission published the 
results of a recent survey on the role of military forces in 




l6l^ BIC, 1875, 15.
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to all Indian agents to determine whether a change in the rela­
tion of the military to the Indian service would ’’promote the 
efficiency and purity of the service,” After a preliminary 
query about the proximity of military installations, the cir­
cular asked: first, if troops served a useful purpose;
second, what the Indians thought of soldiers and what in­
fluence the latter had ”in respect to morality, good order 
and progress in civilization" and third, whether it was feasible 
to replace the military with organized and properly admin­
istered Indian police*^'’
Indian authorities from forty-six regular or special
166
agencies west of Minnesota responded to the questionnaire*
On the question of the utility of the Army, the agents had 
mixed views. Six reported that troops were needed to protect 
government employees and agency Indians; seven thought them 
occasionally useful in maintaining discipline at the agen­
cies; eleven considered soldiers only a salutary restraining 
influence; sixteen believed them ineffectual and four had no 
opinion. Answers to the questions concerning the Indians’ 
reactions and soldiers’ influence varied, to a degree, accord­
ing to the proximity of Army posts. Officials at sixteen 
agencies within thirty-five miles of a garrison were gener­
ally of the opinion that troops were tolerated by the Indians,
16*BIC, 1875, 61*.
I66tj>here were seven other replies from eastern 
agencies having little contact with the military.
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were a bad moral influence and did nothing to promote the work 
of Indian civilization, although they helped to preserve 
order. Authorities at the agencies farther from military es­
tablishments agreed that soldiers degraded, rather than reformed, 
the Indians, But they believed the Indians too fearful of 
troops to live near them and had divided opinions about whether 
the military was conducive to law and order. Finally, a ma­
jority of the agents favored the use of Indian troops, although
l67many were hesitant to begin the experiment at once.
These reports were convincing to the Board and others 
who opposed military control over Indian affairs. If soldiers 
were essential in so few places and had bad effects upon the 
Indians; if the Indians were approaching the stage where they 
could enforce law and order themselves, it would be a great 
injustice to place the Indian service under the War Depart­
ment, But transfer advocates were gathering strength in 
Congress, The next four years were to be decisive in the 
debate over civil or military control.
167
Ibid,, 614.-103, The agents included various off-hand 
comments about the military. The Santee Agent; for example, 
termed soldiers "the lowest and worst class of white men,” 
(Ibid.. 67-68), The Yankton agent said Fort Randall troops 
were "constantly in the habit of visiting Indian women for 
no good or moral purpose, disturbing the good order by coming 
on the reservation intoxicated, inducing them to drink, so 
retarding progress in civilization.” (Ibid.. 7 6). On the 
other hand, George P. Litchfield, the Alea agent, was compli­
mentary toward General 0. 0. Howard's troops; the Klamath agent 
reported that his subjects enjoyed having soldiers around to 
buy their crude products and the Uintah agent expressed grati­
fication at having troops nearby for "moral support." (Ibid., 
98, 8 0, 8 3),
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THE GREAT DEBATE: MARCH, l8?6, TO MARCH, 1879
The work of civilization of the Indians has been 
greatly hindered by the agitation of this question by 
Congress as to transfer* If you are going to consign 
them to the sword, do it...but If you are going to 
follow up this tedious life-long work of elevating 
these poor oreatures...let it be a settled policy...
(E, M. Kingsley, December k ,  1878)
The recurring debate over civil or military control of 
Indian affairs reached a climax In the period March, 1876, 
to March, 1879. Inasmuch as the "spirit" and "methods of en­
forcement" of the Indian service depended upon which branch 
was in control, the welfare of about a third of a million 
Indians was affected by this vital discussion.* Earlier, 
various transfer proposals, based upon the House of Representa­
tives' opposition to Senate treaty power, had been defeated 
in the upper house. In I87I the controversial treaty-making 
process was discontinued, and during the next few years, un­
der the peace policy of the Grant administration, the control
2
issue was suppressed. But early in 1876 transfer advocates 
launched a final energetic campaign. For many months the 
great debate over Indian management was in doubt. Although 
the drive for military rule failed and had immediate negative
*Priest, op. cit., 15.
33ee Chapter Six.
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effects upon Indian progress, it ultimately benefited Indian 
relations by drawing public attention to the Indian problem.
The present discussion takes note of, first, developments 1 
affecting civil-military relations in the period under con­
sideration and, second, congressional reactions to the transfer 
question.
WARS, POLITICS AND COMPETITION FOR CONTROL
In the late Seventies the era of the great Indian wars 
reached a climactic finale. The Army had conflicts with bands 
of Apaches until 1886 and a last battle with more than a 
hundred Teton Sioux in 1890, but after the Sioux War of 18?6- 
l877> the Nez Perce" War of 1877 and the Bannock Outbreak of 
1878 the danger of a general Indian war was over.^ These cam­
paigns of I876-I879 placed a great strain on War-Interior 
relations. Coinciding with the final strong movement to trans­
fer the Indian Bureau to the War Department, they had a con­
siderable influence upon the government’s choice between civil 
or military Indian control.
%  storians disagree as to which was the last important 
Indian war. For a discussion of the White River Ute uprising 
of 1879, see Robert Emitt, The Last War Trail (Norman, 195^)* 
Apache campaigns are treated in J'obn G7 Bourke, An A-pache Cam­
paign (New York, 1866) and George Crook, GeneralH5eorge fcrook: 
His Autobiography, edited by Martin F. Schmitt (Norman, I9J4.6 ), 
The feattle of wounded Knee of December, 1890, is described in 
Elaine Goodale Eastman, ”The Ghost Dance War and Wounded Knee 
Massacre of 1890-1891# Nebraska History. XXVI (January-Mareh, 
19i+-5>)> 26-lf2. One author dates the last'war in the Twentieth 
Century. See Forbes Parkhill, The Last of the Indian Wars 
(New York, 1961).
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Many aspects of the much-publicized Sioux War are common
knowledge. The fighting began in March, 1876, when MaJ. Gen.
Joseph J. Reynolds, in sub-zero weather, inflicted heavy damage
upon the village of Crazy Horse near the Powder River, in
southeastern Montana.^- In the spring, columns under Generals
Gibbon, Crook and Custer set out In pursuit of the Sioux in
the Big Horn region, farther west. On June 17 Crook had a
perilous engagement with an overwhelming force of warriors,
but retired with most of his command.^ Eight days later, on
June 25, the impetuous Custer made his famous "last stand" in
the Battle of the Little Big Horn. He and bis entire command,
along with fifty-two men under Major Marcus Reno, were among
the two hundred and sixty-five troops who died in the Army's
6
greatest defeat at the hands of the Indians.
After this sensational defeat, the military waged a
relentless campaign against the scattered hostile bands. In
hard-fought battles during the following fall and winter,
Generals Nelson A. Miles and R. S. Mackenzie imposed heavy
7
losses upon Sioux and Northern Cheyenne encampments.
^Mari Sandoz, Crazy Horse, the Strange Man of the 
Oglalas (New York, 191*2), 306-308; SW (P), i 6757Tj.Q5.
'’Crook, op. clt.. 193-196; SW (P), lj.06; Grinnell, 
ona clt.. 328-^ il}?; Silver Knight, Following the Indian Wars 
TNorman, 1953), 1959-193.
^Grinnell, oj>. clt., 3lf-5-358; Stewart, op. cit., 
lj.3l-lj.63; Knight, o£. cit., 193-219; SW (p), 1876, Ijio5-lj.il.
7
Sandoz, op. cit.. 352-351f; Nelson A. Miles, Serving 
the Republic (New York, 19ll), 15lj.-l£7 .
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By the spring of 1877 most of the hostiles were out of supplies 
and ammunition and surrendered at the Sioux agencies. The 
hold-outs were quickly subdued, and thus another bloody and 
costly collision of the peace policy period was ended.
The Sioux War affected relations between the War and 
Interior departments in various ways. Transfer proponents 
heralded the initial fighting, recommended by both branches, 
as an open admission that the Indian Bureau’s conciliatory 
measures were ineffectual. Subsequent military setbacks re­
inforced their determination to put the Army in charge of
Indian affairs, but, after June, they postponed legislative
q
action for the duration of the war. Military leaders were 
especially vociferous in demands f.or unlimited war and gen­
eral authority over the Indians. The only satisfaction they 
received from Congress, however, was a temporary increase of 
Army strength for what was expected to be the last Indian 
war.'1'0
The war also led to a change in administration at the 
Sioux agencies. Shortly after Custer’s defeat, military
8SW (P), 1877, 301-302; Sen. Ex. Doc. No. j!3, l^th 
Cong., 2 aess, (Serial 1780), I878, 3. ^he Sioux war -,ost 
an estimated i»3A 05>339 and four hundred and eight military 
casualties *
Q
Priest, 0£. cit.. 20.
^The Army appropriation bill of August l£, 1876, limited 
the Army’s strength to twenty-five thousand, but a joint resolu­
tion authorized the President to increase this figure by twenty- 
five hundred. (Cameron to President Pro Tempore, Senate, July 
27* 1876; Sherman to Sheridan, July 31* 1876, Div. Mo, L .R . ,  
Special Pile, NA, RG 98; Sheridan to Sherman. July 18, 1876,
I .O .L .R . , NA, RG 75; Atbearn, op> cit.. 311.)
a
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officers were put in cbarge of the agencies and served in this 
capacity at least until March, l877«^ General Sheridan re­
garded this as a welcome, if belated, change. And when the 
Army administrators were later withdrawn, he complained that 
all their fine work had ’’gone for nothing.
Another result, as in previous wars, was a dispute over 
who had been responsible for the hostilities. Military spokes­
men a rgued that civilian mismanagement was to blame. "Had our 
Centennial Commissioners offered the highest premium to the 
person who would invent the most speedy and effective Indian
j M
agent exterminator," a contributor to the Army and Navy Jour­
nal wrote, "they might have rendered the country an unspeakable 
benefit.. In addition, there was a popular outburst
against the red men who had "massacred” Custer. Many, but not 
all,of the Indians’ friends echoed this sentiment. "We ad­
mire the gallantry of General Custer and his men," one Indian 
apologist remarked, "...but who shall blame the Sioux for de­
fending themselves...?"^ Finally, when Wendell Phillips,
11Most agencies were returned to civil control on March 
15, 1877, tut some remained under Army supervision until the 
summer of 1878* (J. Q. Smith to John Burke, et.al., August 1, 
1876, I.O.L.R., Misc. and General Order No. 1, Hqs, Div. Mo., 
March 15, 1877, E.I.L.R., War Department, Indian Division, NA, 
RG 75). The Sioux War also had the important effect of per­
mitting the government to acquire the Black Hills through the 
Sioux Agreement of 1876.
12 ®
Sheridan to Sherman, July 22, 1876, I.O.L.R., NA,
RG 75; End., Sheridan, March 13, 1878, Sheridan Endorsement
Book.
•^ a&N Jnl. (November 18, 1876), 2314..
•^ The Nation. XXIII (July 20, 1 8 7 6)* l;0-lp..
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a prominent Boston reformer, characterized Sherman and his men
as assassins, the General demanded that this ”infamous and un-
1 <
warranted assault be retracted.
Shortly after peace was restored with the Sioux, a war
/
broke out in western Montana with the Nez Perce under Chief 
(Young) Joseph. This was, General Sherman later reported, "one 
of the most extraordinary Indian wars of which there is any
nl6
record. Prom June to October, 1877, Joseph's well-disci­
plined band of three to four hundred warriors fought several
pitched battles in which they were at least a match for
17heavily-armed forces of from two to ten companies.
/
The Nez Perces, like the Modocs, had lived at peace for 
many years. A treaty which they signed in 1855 granted them 
a large reservation along the Snake River, east of the Blue 
Mountains. The Nez Perce/ loved this country, especially the 
Wallowa Valley, in northeastern Oregon. In 1863, however, 
some of the headmen signed a treaty by which the tribe was 
assigned to the smaller Lapwai Reservation in Idaho. Young 
Joseph and others who did not sign the second treaty stayed in 
the Wallowa region, where they had large herds of livestock
Tg
^Sherman to Poster Tappan, July 21, 1876, W. T. Sher­
man Semi-Official Letters Sent, Vol. I,’
16sw (P), 1877, 300.
17There are several works on the Nez Perce and their 
war. , The most complete study is Francis Haines, The Nez 
Perce: Tribesmen of the Columbia Plateau (Norman, 1955)• See 
also Helen A. Howard and Dan L. McGrath, War Chief Joseph 
(Caldwell. Idaho, 19i|l)j 0. 0. Howard, Nez Perce* Joseph (Bos - 
ton, l88l), Chapters VJI-XVT; Nelson C. Titus, ^The Last 
Stand of the Nez Perces,” Washington Historical Quarterlv.
VI (July, 1915),145-153.
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and other property. But whites demanded their removal, and
late in 1876 a government commission unsuccessfully tried to
1ft
persuade them to go to Lapwai, The following May they were
given a month's notice to move. Just as the time expired, some
of the young braves began a murdering spree which drew the
whole non-treaty band into a well-fought, but ultimately dis- 
19astrous, war.
In eight or more engagements with the Army, Joseph's
followers demonstrated such bravery, strategy and skill, while
observing the rules of civilized warfare, that they earned the
respect of military leaders. General Miles, who finally
forced the Rez Perces' surrender in the Bear Paw Mountains,
recommended a liberal settlement but the Indian Bureau decided
20that the Indians had too many enemies to remain in Idaho,
Hence, more than four hundred Nez Perces were sent to Indian
Territory, There, they were reduced by malaria and other
diseases to two hundred and sixty-eight persons before being
21returned to the Northwest in 1881}.. The parallel with the
T ft s
Nez Perce occupation of Wallowa had been confirmed 
by Executive Order in 1873, but was withdrawn in 1875. See 
John A Carpenter, nGeneral Howard and the Nez Perce'War of 
l877,n Pacific Northwest Quarterly, XLIX (October, 1958), 
129-1451
19BIC, 1876, 43-65; CIA, 1877, 9-14; SW (P), 1877, 
293-294. 
20CIA, 1877, 13; SW (P), 1877, 294“300j Miles to Sherman, 
October 28, 1877, W. T. Sherman Papers, Vol. 46.
• 2^See Berlin B. Chapman, "Nez Perces in Indian Terri­
tory," Oregon Historical Quarterly. L (June. 1949), 98-121;
J. Stanley Clark, "The Nez Perces in Exile, The Pacific North­
west Quarterly, XXXVI (July, 1945), 213-232,
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Modoc War was striking, and critics of the Indian Bureau viewed
the Nez Perce^ affair as another case of civil raaladministra- 
22
tion.
Before the Nez Perce^crisis was settled, the govern­
ment had further difficulties with the Bannocks in southeast 
Idaho. The Bannocks, a small and normally quiet mountain 
tribe, shared Port Hall Reservation with the more populous 
Shoshones. In the summer of 1877, when supplies were short 
at their agency, many Bannocks left the reservation to hunt 
camas roots. One of them became intoxicated and killed two 
teamsters. Consequently, the military drove them back to 
Fort Hall, burned many of their lodges, and, that winter, exe­
cuted the murderer and another Bannock who had killed an
23
agency employee. Later, in January, 1878, when the red men 
grew threatening, troops invaded their camp, arrested several 
braves and seized many of their weapons and ponies.2^
Agitated by these events, two large war-parties left 
the reservation in June. Their outbreak, however, was quickly 
crushed. On the 23rd a cavalry detachment subdued one of the 
hostile groups not far from Fort Hall. Three weeks later, 
another force surprised the second party near Umatilla Agency,
22
Miles to Sherman, October 28, 1877, W. T. Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 1+6. See, for example, Dunn, o£. clt.. £66-567. 
General Sherman, on the other hand, agreed with the punish­
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Oregon, and, a f t e r  a b r i e f  b a t t l e ,  th e  ren egad es  were surrounded
25and tak en  p r i s o n e r .  E ig h ty  I n d ia n s ,  t h i r t y - o n e  s e t t l e r s  
and n in e  s o l d i e r s  were k i l l e d  in  t h i s  ’’l i t t l e  w ar."  Y et on ly  
th e  w o r s t  h o s t i l e s  were p u n ish e d ,  and, u n l ik e  th e  Nez P e r c e s ,
p L
th e  Bannocks were a l lo w e d  to  rem ain a t  t h e i r  r e s e r v a t io n *
Those who fa v o r e d  m i l i t a r y  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  I n d ia n s ,  
a t t r i b u t e d  th e  Bannock War t o  d e r e l i c t i o n  o f  duty and m is ­
management by th e  In d ia n  O f f i c e .  When asked what cau sed  th e  
u p r i s i n g ,  G eneral Crook a s s e r t e d ,  "Hunger, N oth ing  b u t  
h u n ger* .. .W e w i l l  c o n t in u e  t o  have t h e s e  o u tb r e a k s . . .a s  lo n g  
as th e  p r e s e n t  sy s te m  p r e v a i l s . " 27 Commissioner o f  In d ia n  
A f f a i r s  Ezra A. Hayt o b je c te d  to  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m .  "I now d e­
s i r e  to  p la c e  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  where i t  b e lo n g s ,"  he t o l d  
S e c r e ta r y  S c h u r z .  "The Department has been p o w e r le s s  to  
a f f o r d . . .a d e q u a te  r e l i e f ,  b e c a u se  o f  i n s u f f i c i e n t  a p p r o p r ia ­
t i o n s ,  and w ith  th e  meager a p p r o p r ia t io n s  f o r  th e  n e x t  f i s c a l
28y e a r . . . n o  b e t t e r  r e s u l t s  may be e x p e c te d ."
But armed c o n f l i c t s  w ith  th e  S io u x ,  Nez P e r c e s ,  Bannocks 
and o th er  t r i b e s  a cco u n ted  f o r  o n ly  p a r t  o f  th e  grow ing c i v i l -  
m i l i t a r y  d eb a te  o f  th e  l a t e  S e v e n t i e s ,  P o l i t i c a l  developm ents
25Ganoe, o]d. c i t *. 3)4.9 ; Downey, o £ .  c l t . . 2 3 1 -2 3 2 ;
For a more com p le te  d i s c u s s i o n  s e e  George F“. Brim low , The 
Bannock In d ia n  War o f  1878 ( C a ld w e l l ,  Id ah o , 1914-8).
28Downey, o g . c i t . . 2 3 2 .  The war c o s t  th e  government  
about h a l f  a m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .
27A&N J n l . .  XVI (August 1 0 ,  1878) ,  5 .
28I,0.R.B. No . 33, 1878-1882, 1+7-14-8, NA, RG 75.
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were also central to this discussion. Prom 1875 to 1879,
while Grant and Hayes occupied the White House and Republicans
controlled the Senate, the Democrats had a majority in the
House of Representatives.^^ The Democrats on several occasions
sought to transfer the Indian Bureau to the War Department to
embarrass their rivals, who generally defended the civil-
administered peace policy. As late as October, 1879, a west-
era paper reported n...Democrats have always held that the
only good Indian is a dead one. They have never tolerated the
hypocrisy that underlies the Quaker policy which came into
30
vogue with the ascendancy of the Republican party.” This 
was an exaggeration, but certain Democrats were so dis­
passionate toward Indian welfare as to urge transfer as a
political "duty,” or means of saving money for pork-barrel 
31legislation.
Another political event which affected the transfer 
question was the Belknap scandal of 1876. Early in March a 
House investigating committee revealed that Secretary of War
^Democratic and Republican representation in Congress 
for these years was as follows:
House Senate
Dem. Rep. Pern. Rep.
1875-1877 159 109 29 k 5
1877-1879 153 UfO 36 39
1879-1881 349 130 k 2  33
(Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1957 (Washington. 1960). 95T7
^^Denver Dally Rocky Mountain News (October 3, 1879). 
President Hayes proposed to carry on the Indian policy estab­
lished during Grant’s administration. (Richardson, Messages. 
VII, lj.75-lj.76T.
31^ Congressional Record, i^th Cong., 1 sess., IV,
2617, 2630.
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William W. Belknap and his deceased wife had accepted about 
twenty-five thousand dollars in bribes from Caleb P. Karsh, 
the nominal Indian trader at Port Sill, Indian Territory. Bel­
knap quickly resigned, but the House voted to impeach him.
The trial was begun in April and lasted until late in Hay, 
when the Senate voted to acquit the former Secretary by a 
narrow (impeachment) vote of 37 to 23. Belknap escaped con­
viction primarily because he was not in office when the House
32
passed the impeachment resolutions.
As a result of the Belknap affair, the House Committee 
on Expenditures conducted a general investigation of the busi­
ness transactions of the War Department. The three Democrats 
on the four-member committee attacked the "brokers of post­
traders hips" in the military branch. Among other things, they 
reported "mortifying" evidence that President Grant13 brother, 
Orville, was part of a clique which monopolized trade at forts 
on the Upper Missouri. Representative Lorenzo Danford of Ohio, 
a Republican, submitted a minority report. He insisted that 
the War Department’s business methods were not irregular and 
scolded the rest of the committee for trying to make "politi­
cal capital" for the coming election.^
Still another important political event was the
^ H R  Rpt. No. 186, Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1708),
1876; HR Rpt. No. 3U5. iliith Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709),
1876; HR Rpt. ]|o. 791. Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1713)>
1876; 3¥e also Chaffer Two.
33gR Rpt. No. 799. Ijiith Cong., 1 sess (Serial 1715)# 
1876, iv-Tx,^c, m v T T - 276.
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appointment, in 1877, of Carl Schurz as Secretary of the In­
terior* Schurz, assisted by Indian Commissioner E, A. Hayt, 
adopted many “sensational1’ reforms which in the long run dulled 
criticism of the methods and integrity of the Indian service.
By November, 1878, Hayt was able to list twenty recent im-
3k
provements in the Indian Bureau's business transactions.
Efforts were also made to systematize the work of agency em-
35ployees and encourage constructive labor by their wards.
Lastly, Secretary Schurz took an active personal interest in
36
Indian education and the use of Indian police.
Agitated by wars and political circumstances, the 
question of Indian administration was further complicated by 
a number of incidents and personal feuds. One affair which 
brought criticism upon Secretary Schurz and the Indian Bureau 
was the removal of the peaceable Poncas to Indian Territory 
in 1877* Both the Indians' friends and enemies complained 
that this action was an unwarranted concession to the warlike 
Sioux, Inadvertently, both the Poncas and the more numerous, 
powerful Sioux had been granted the same land in southeastern 
Dakota, The former had prior claim, but the latter threatened
^CIA, 1878, LXV-LXVI; Priest, 0£. cit., 22, 68-72,
See also Chapter Two, above.
^Indian Bureau Circular Book No. 1, NA, RG 7 5. A re­
form which was protested by some agents was a rule that only 
one member of a family could be on the agency payrolls. For 
one agent's defense of nepotism, see Benjamin Tatbam to E. A. 
Hayt, March 5, 1878, I.O.L,R., NA, RG 75.
^These subjects are discussed further in the next 
chapter.
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to fight for the disputed region. To avoid war, the Indian
authorities forced the Poncas to make a tragic exodus to the
South. Schurz later admitted that the Poncas had been wronged,
but, for months, he and his subordinates were reproached for
37their ill-considered action.
While the civil administrators were embarrassed by the 
Ponca affair, the Army was censured for another notorious in­
cident involving a band of Northern Cheyennes. Early in Janu­
ary, 1879, sixty-four Cheyenne prisoners were killed trying 
to escape from Fort Robinson, Nebraska. The victims were 
followers of Dull Knife who had fought their way from Indian 
Territory to northern Nebraska in the fall of I8 78, hoping 
to rejoin their old friends, the Sioux. About one hundred 
and fifty men, women and children were captured near old Red 
Cloud Agency and held at Port Robinson, At the time of the 
attempted escape, the Army was trying to force them to agree 
to return to Indian Territory by withholding food, water and 
fuel. Duringalater investigation, Indian officials condemned 
this mistreatment. "I think,” said Secretary Schurz, "that 
freezing and starving them was not the way to reconcile them
3?A summary of the Ponca dispute is found in Priest, 
op. cit.. 76-80; CIA, l877> 21-23, 96-102. Newspaper comments 
appear in the August V. Kautz and Carl Schurz scrapbooks, Manu­
scripts Division, Library of Congress.
3®CIA, 1878, XXII-XXIV. The Northern Cheyennes had been 
moved from northern Nebraska to Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency 
in the fall of 1876. Disgruntled with this location and the 
treatment they received, Dull Knife's band began their north­
ward dash in September, 1878. Before they were captured, in 
October, they killed many whites and committed other crimes, 
(Grinnell, op.* cit.. lpij-i{.16.)
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to their fate.’1"^
Disagreement about the comparative advantages rf civil 
or military administration was also evident in a number of per­
sonal disputes. In February, 1878, for example, Commissioner 
Hayt supported the Governor of Arizona in a successful cam­
paign to remove Maj. Gen. August V. Kautz from command of the 
Department of Arizona. Kautz had not endeared himself to the
Indian Bureau through his attacks upon the peace policy and
IlO „
demands for military control of the Indians. Other heated
arguments pitted Commissioner Hayt against Lt. Col. W # P.
Ill
Carlin, commander of the garrison at Standing Rock, and
Secretary Schurz against Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commander
1+2
of the District of'the Yellowstone.
Perhaps the liveliest controversy, however, was between 
Schurz and General Sheridan. The feud began in the fall of 
1878, when General Pope told Agent P. B. Hunt of the Kiowa and
^Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 6k. i+5>th Cong., 3 seas. (Serial 
1833), 1879, 1+7* The military investigation was less critical. 
See Div. Mo. L.R., Special File, Proceedings of the Board of 
Officers convened under Special Orders No. 8 , Headquarters of 
the Department of the Platte, January 21, 1879, NA, RG 98. 
kO
SW, 1877# Ik0-lk7; E. A. Hayt to the Secretary of 
Interior, February 15, 1878, I.O.R.B. No. 10, NA, RG 75;
August V. Kautz Papers, Scrapbook, 1875-1886,
^ L t .  Col. W. P. Carlin to Acting A 0G., Dept, of Dakota, 
February 19, 1878 and March 23, 16?8, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 7 5.
^Miles to Acting A.G., Dept, of Dakota, November 11, 
1878, D.I.L.R., War Dept., Indian Division; Schurz to Miles, 
December 26, I078, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75. See also A&N Jnl..
SVI (December U+, 1 8 7 8), 305» **
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Comanche Agency that his men were too busy to help move the 
agent’s subjects from Port Sill to Wichita Agency. This re­
location was undoubtedly calculated to ’’cheat and defraud the 
Indians by avoiding the presence of officers,” Sheridan 
asserted in an endorsement.^ On October 1 , Schurz retorted 
that the move was based on the bad water, poor land and de­
lapidated facilities at Port Sill. The Indian Bureau, he 
added, did not have to accommodate itself to the opinions of
officers in an "adjunct" service. "It would furthermore be
well for the Lt. Gen. to understand," the Secretary admonished, 
"that...to indulge in approbrious reflection upon.../the Indian 
officials^ motives, is an act of impropriety, so gross, that 
it cannot pass without a corresponding rebuke among gentle-
___ »y+me n....
Some time later Sheridan issued a blistering rebuttal.
In recent years, he argued, such posts as Port Randall, Camp 
Robinson, Port Sully, Port Berthold and the camps at Grand 
River and Lower Brule Agency had been built at great expense 
to convenience the Indian Bureau. In each case, the Indians
were soon removed and then appeals were made for new garri­
sons. Now excuses were being offered to get the Indians away 
from Port Sill. Anyone who had been there knew that pure water, 
rich soil and other natural advantages made Port Sill a good 
agency site. The buildings were not much worse than at
^Quoted in Schurz to Secretary of War, October 7,
1878, D.I.L.S., Indian Miscellaneous, NA, RG 75*
^Ibid., 91-92.
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Wichita, where transportation costs were much higher. If 
Schurz would check into the administration of the Kiowa and 
Comanche agent, he would learn the truth about the removal 
scheme. The only explanation for the Secretary’s criticism, 
Sheridan concluded, was "want of knowledge on the subject," 
and that did not excuse the "stilled tone and language 
used,"^
The dispute continued. On November 16 Secretary Schurz 
asked Secretary of War McCrary to have Sheridan spell out the 
"sweeping and somewhat vague" charges he made against the In­
dian Bureau in his annual report for 1878, "I do not depre­
cate criticism at all," Schurz remarked, "I rather invite 
it."^6
Sheridan reacted to this challenge by asking his subor­
dinates for full reports relative to abuses or corruption on
1l7the part of Indian a gents On December 22, he published a 
supplemental annual report containing briefs and extracts 
from civil and military reports for the past four years. These
T
reports mentioned many irregularities, particularly in the de­
livery and distribution of supplies. Although Schurz had 
"disingenuously" exaggerated his original statements, Sheridan
^End. Sheridan, November 15, 1878, Sheridan Endorse­
ment Book, 255>-2£9.
^Schurz to Secretary of War, November 16, 1878, 
D.I.L.S., Indian Miscellaneous, NA, RG 7 5,
^•7see. for example, Sheridan to General Terry, No­
vember 2£, 1878, Sheridan Letter Book General Corres­
pondence,
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asserted, the facts now spoke for themselves
In the final analysis, though, Sheridan came out second
best in this contest with Secretary Schurz. With the press
giving wide coverage to the acrimonious comments on both sides,
Sheridan presented arguments based largely upon hearsay and
li 9
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, he and many other mili­
tary leaders admitted that the Indian Office was making 
diligent efforts to correct the abuses which came to its 
attention.^®
Inter-departmental differences on the question of which 
department was best suited to manage the Indians were like­
wise evident at the lower echelons. One of the more spirited 
arguments in behalf of civil Indian control, for example, was 
made by Agent James McLaughlin of Devil's Lake Agency, Dakota. 
McLaughlin was so opposed to "mixed military interference" 
that he advocated abolition of the "humiliating" policy of
having military officers witness the distribution of Indian 
9l
supplies." At the same time, a contrary view was freely ex-
52
pressed by junior Army officers. When one young lieutenant 
sent the Secretary of War recommendations on Indian reform
^"Supplemental Report to Annual Report of Lt. Gen. 
Sheridan, for 1878," D.I.L.S., Indian Division, Vol. 20, lk2- 
162, NA, RG 58.
k 9 Ibid.j Priest, op. cit.. 22.
^"Supplemental Report," D.I.L.S., Indian Division, 
passim.: Schurz and Kautz Scrapbooks.
^CIA, 1878, 28-30.
^ S e n . Mlac. Doc. No. 53, 1^ 5th Cong., 3 aess. (Serial 
1635), 1879, 57^52, 99-110, 1^5-150, 190-193, 197-198.
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which sounded too much like Indian Bureau talk, though, his
t - 3
superiors hastened to correct him.''
Finally, before turning to congressional debate over 
proposals to put the Army in charge of Indian affairs, a 
comment is in order concerning public opinion on Indian adminis­
tration. An article on transfer in The Nation included the 
following observation:
If there can be said to be any public opinion in the 
civilized portions of the country on the Indian question 
(there is, of course, plenty of opinion of a certain 
sort on the frontier), it may be described on the one 
hand as regarding the Indian with a spirit of philan­
thropic benevolence, on the other as looking upon the 
system of government applied to him with profound dis­
trust.54-
In general, westerners supported military rule, while a majority 
of easterners opposed It. But, as one scholar states, public 
opinion was "far from steady."^ Some of the leading Indian
friends, for example, vacillated in their objection to Army
control as hostilities recurred. Moreover, political and re­
ligious affiliations caused some variation in popular senti­
ment in different parts of the country.
Public pressure for and against military control was 
brought to bear upon Congress through informal lobbying, 
petitions, private correspondence, editorials and publications 
such as the pro-transfer Army and Navy Journal and anti-
S3Lt. William Gerlach to Secretary of War, September 
8 , 1878, with endorsements, AGO L.R., NA, RG 95*
^ T h e  Nation, XXVIII (December 28, 1878), 7-8.
■^Priest, op. clt.t 2 3.
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transfer Council Fire, The legislators’ decisions were too 
partisan to warrant the conclusion that public opinion per se 
decided which department was to manage the Indians. But for 
militant opposition to transfer by religious and philanthropic 
groups, though, western proponents of the administrative change 
might have won enough support in the East to achieve their ob-
57jactive.
THE TRANSFER ISSUE IN CONGRESS
The events of the period from the outbreak of the Sioux 
War until early 1879 excited widespread discussion of the 
problem of Indian administration. Vying for authority over 
the tribes, civil and military officials frequently engaged in 
bitter arguments. The main event in this debate, however, 
took place in the congressional arena. In 1876 and 1878-1879, 
after extensive investigations and hearings, legislators intro­
duced various measures to establish Army control. The out­
come of the accompanying debates was of vital importance to 
federal Indian relations.
Early in 1876, the House Committee on Military Affairs, 
in conjunction with a study of military pay and reorganization, 
investigated the propriety of transferring the Indian Office 
to the War Department. The Committee, headed by Represents-
Efforts of a church group to "educate” Congress against 
transfer are discussed in E. A. Hayt to Reverend S. S. Cutting, 
June 11, 1878, I.O.L.B. No. U 4.8, Misc. See also Priest, op. 
cit., 26-26*
^Priest, ojo. cit., 21;.
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tive Henry B. Banning of Ohio, consulted seventy high-ranking 
Army officers through a circular-letter and personal inter­
views, Of this group, said to have greater knowledge of In­
dian affairs than any class of men, all but two advocated 
military control,
General-in-Chief Sherman key-noted the arguments of 
these military leaders. Transfer, he contended, would pro­
duce greater economy and efficiency in the Indian service.
The Army, already dispersed throughout the Indian country, 
could manage the Indians through its existing machinery and 
chain of command. Quartermaster and commissary facilities 
were available to handle supplies and annuities, and post com­
manders were in a position to serve as agents. This would not 
interrupt the civilization program, but allow the government 
to "execute any line of policy it may deem wise and pro­
per,,.." For instance, officers could compel non-progressive 
tribes to raise stock or engage in other pursuits, whereas 
civil agents yielded to their obstinance. At the same time, 
military administrators would not provoke hostilities, as
some feared, because they, more than civilians, realized that
ti q
war brought hazards, hardships and no glory, 7
An even more comprehensive and forceful case was pre­
sented by General Sheridan. The proposed change, he asserted,
^®HR Rpt. No, 35i>-. lli+th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709), 
1876, The committee’s report erroneously states that
sixty officers expressed opinions.
^9Ibld,. 8-9.
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would relieve tbe Army of “great expense and mucb annoyance," 
Fewer posts would be required; Indian wars and conflicts be­
tween military commanders and agents would cease; the Indians 
would be better supplied and gratified to deal with persons 
who did not break promises; the civilization process would be 
accelerated; the government would receive full measure for 
funds disbursed by men liable to court-martial and in other 
ways the nation and its wards would benefit. Of special ad­
vantage would be the discontinuance of agency removals which 
increased transportation costs and required the Army to con­
struct expensive new garrisons. The one objection to transfer 
was the criticism which the military was apt to incur through 
the false reports of rings and disappointed profiteers. To 
minimize this problem, it might be advisable to eliminate the 
Indian Bureau entirely and give the War Department discretion 
to delegate responsibilities to regional commanders,^*®
Among the officers questioned were four who had served
on important peace commissions, including Maj, Gen, C. C,
*
Augur, Maj. Gen, A, H, Terry and former general John B, San­
born of the Peace Commission of 1867-1868, and Maj, Gen,
0, 0, Howard, who had negotiated with the Apaches in 1872 and 
Nez Perce/ in I876. The first three advocated transfer,^
60Ibid,. 10-17, General Sheridan estimated that posts 
established for the protection of agencies cost from twenty to 
forty thousand dollars each and that about three and a half 
million could be saved annually by the Quartermaster De­
partment If the transfer was made,
6lIbid., 37, lj.8, 211-212,
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Sanborn, for example, stressed that Army administration would 
end the "constant change and vacillation" which now bewildered 
the Indians and deterred their advancement. In addition, the 
military would be in a position to prevent wars, thus saving 
the government up to eleven or twelve million a year in
6>2supplies and other expenses connected with field operations.
But General Howard opposed military control for two reasons. 
First, it would divert the Army from its "legitimate work," 
and second, it would bring public denunciation which would 
injure the reputation and morale of troops , ^
Another officer who supported Army rule was Maj, Gen, 
E,O.C. Ord, commander of the Department of Texas and veteran of 
several Indian campaigns. Nearly all Indian conflicts, Ord 
maintained, could be traced to civil mismanagement. The 
Modoc War, for instance, was begun by greedy frontiersmen and 
authorities who misjudged the needs and disposition of their 
wards. The red men had good reason to distrust civilian 
agents. Red Cloud once declared, "Here these / & genc^7 men 
tell us this, that, and the other, that we don't get our ra­
tions because the roads are bad. But the soldiers get their
„6k ,
rations. Moreover, Indians respected force "first, last,
and all the time." There were citizens who feared, however,
that military rule would increase immoral relations between
62Ibid., 212,21k.
63Ibid.. kO.
% b i d . .  ki.
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troops and Indian women. This was nothing but speculation 
which failed to take into account the Indians’ diverse charac­
ter and standards. "There is as much difference in the morality 
and good conduct of Indians," Ord affirmed, "...as there is 
among the different nations of Europe.
Finally, some of the most censorious remarks about 
civil control were made by Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley, commander 
of Middle District of Dakota. The Indian Bureau not only 
failed to civilize many Indians, said Stanley, but condoned 
appalling corruption at the agencies. It was clear to him, 
after observing tribes throughout the West for twenty years, 
that each group had at least a few who would not progress 
unless they underwent compulsory training. The Sioux, ex­
cept the Santees and Yanktons, were particularly backward.
"They have not advanced one inch," he insisted. Of the 
cheating which pervaded the Indian service, Stanley testified:
...I have seen agents and contractors get rich very 
fast, and I knew exactly how it was done. There is very 
little strict accountability on the part of the Indian 
agent....He receives a certain amount of goods and pro­
visions himselfj he has no commanding officer, he has 
no board of survey as the Army regulations require; he 
simply receipts for those goods; he is not always re­
sponsible for the quality, but he is strictly for the 
quantity. The issues are made, throughout the whole 
Indian-agent system, at random. The only thing the agent 
has to look to is to keep his papers clear...®®
Ibid., 1^ 3. General Ord argued that the Pimas, Mari-
copas and Pueblos were very strict and wholesome in their 
morals, while the Pi-Utes, for example, were "pretty degraded" 
and sold their women like Tahitians or Sandwich Islanders.
^ Ibld.. 206. Stanley cited the case of cattle receipts 
based on fall weights and numbers despite the fact that de­
liveries were made over a period of months and many animals 
died or lost weight.
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Upon the basis of these and other arguments, the House
Military Committee, in its report of March 9, urged transfer
of the Indian Bureau to the military department. Even civil
authorities, the Committee contended, were becoming aware of
the ineffectuality of the present system. Past wars, expenses,
frauds and maladministration attested to the need for a
change. With the War Department in command, this important
branch of the public service would again be ”honestly, economi-
67cally, and firmly administered and executed,1*
While the Military Committee was occupied with its 
investigation, the House Committee on Indian Affairs was 
likewise considering the transfer proposition. The eleven- 
member committee announced its findings five days after the 
other legislative group. Six members signed a report recom­
mending military control? the others submitted a negative
statement in which they raised several objections to the pro-
68posed administrative change.
The majority report stated that attention had been given 
to the relative merits of the War and Interior departments 
respecting cost of management, promptness and efficiency, 
maintenance of peace, protection of life and property, ability 
to fulfill the reservation and feeding programs and, lastly, 
conduciveness to Christianization, civilization and education. 
The decision for Army control was based on the testimony and
67Ibid., 6.
Rpt. No. 2 k 0 * Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1708),
1876, 1*7.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 0 0
statements of "distinguished, well-informed, and experienced
gentlemen" -- mostly western congressmen and territorial 
60delegates. 7 Nineteen of the twenty-six persons questioned
70supported transfer.
Most of the testimony for, as against, military rule
was based upon Indian conditions within the witnesses’
political districts. Representative John K. Luttrell of
California asserted that church-nominated agents, talented as
teachers and preachers, lacked the business sense properly to
administer the thousands of dollars entrusted to them. In
fact, such men abused the Shasta Indians and misrepresented
the progress of the Klamaths and Modocs. To make matters
worse, many of the appointees were Protestants, whereas their
71subjects espoused the Catholic faith.
Representative James W, Throckmorton of Texas com­
plained that wild Indians had been raiding settlements in bis 
state since annexation. Transfer would enable the Army to 
prevent the Comanches and Arapahoes from using the Port Sill 
Reservation as a base of operations. Of course, these savages, 
used to butchering teamsters, ravishing women and stealing
69
Ibid.. 1.
^Ibid., 2-14.0. Three of these people also presented 
views to the Military Committee.
71
Luttrell offered in evidence a letter from an in­
formant at Round Valley Agency who alleged that the agent, 
a Methodist minister, was incompetent and devoted much of 
his time to alienating the affections of a parishioner's 
wife. (Ibid.. 201;).
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property almost at will, would not appreciate the change,
"They think they can manage the preachers pretty well,” 
Throckmorton stated sarcastically, "and their lying and
72
deception succeeds better with them than with the military,”
A third transfer proponent was Delegate Thomas M. 
Patterson of Colorado Territory who pronounced the Interior 
Department’s efforts to reform the TTtes a ”great failure,”
This tribe was constantly making war on other tribes. Those 
at Los Pinos Agency worked diligently on powder-horns and 
guns, but refused to spend three hours a day as apprentices 
to the agency blacksmith. On the other hand, the Indians had 
reason to be uncooperative. When they were promised "Ameri­
can cows,,,for domestic use," the Indian Bureau furniohed 
wild Texas cows which could not be milked unless they were 
tied down. At least "ninety-nine out of a hundred" people
in Colorado, Patterson contended, wanted military rule and
73subjection of the Indians,
Two of the more outspoken transfer opponents were Ma­
jor J, W, Powell, who had conducted an extensive study of 
Indian tribes for the Smithsonian Institution, and Anson Dart, 
former Superintendent of Indian Affairs for four northwest 
territories, Powell objected to military supervision pri­
marily because enlisted men were a bad influence upon the red 
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asserted, that recruits from New York, New Orleans and other 
cities created a "pandemonium of prostitution" when they got 
near the reservations.^ Dart argued that military adminis­
trators would precipitate more hostilities than they would pre­
vent. He was convinced that Army "indiscretion" had led to 
wars in Oregon in l 8 $ k  and l85>5> in which over two hundred
75"innocent" Indians had been killed.
Such sentiments were also reflected in the Indian Com­
mittee’s minority report. The dissenters1 reasons for re­
jecting War Department authority over Indian affairs included: 
the divergence between military training and educational, 
religious and agricultural work; prior recommendations by the 
Doolittle Committee of 1865-1867 and Peace Commission of 
1867-1868; a law against employment of retired military offi­
cers as agents; the increased expense of supplies purchased 
according to Army requirements for "superior grade" goods; 
a large, growing number of peaceable and progressive red men; 
the Indians’ tendency to resist force; and the principle that 
military government was justified only in case of emergency.^ 
Closing on an emotional note, the Army’s critics admonished:
Ik
Ibid.t 7-8. Powell said he had personally treated 
"hundreds and hundreds" of cases of venereal disease among 
various tribes. Por a-discussion of Powell’s role in western 
exploration, see Wallace E, Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth 
Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the 
West (Boston. 19W F T
7^Ibld.. 32-3 3.
76
Ibid., lj.l-lj.6. Refusing to concede that civil officials 
caused Indian wars, the minority charged that the notorious 
Modoc War stemmed from the mismanagement of Captain O.C. Knapp, 
who served as temporary Modoc agent in 1869-1870.
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Divorce the Bureau from the Interior Department, if 
you choose; but don't in the name of humanity, turn it 
over again to the War Department, Don't do this cruel 
and terrible thing, but elevate the Bureau to a Depart­
ment, Emancipate it. Lift it up and place its occupant 
on a level with the President's counselors, and you will 
exalt the service,''
Despite this plea, both the military and Indian com­
mittees were on record as advocating transfer. As might be 
expected, the lower bouse, on April 21, passed a bill to im­
plement the committee's recommendations. But the vote, 130 to 
91}-, did not really indicate that most legislators were con- 
cerned about the well-being of the Indians, In 1867 and
1868 the House approved similar bills to contest the Senate's
79treaty power over Indian affairs. Once more the issue was 
decided other than on its merits, as partisan politics was 
decisive. Most of the congressmen who supported the measure 
were Democrats; most who opposed it were Republicans, For 
that matter, the committees had shown political bias. The 
military Committee, apart from its orientation and the mili­
tary background of most of its members, was composed entirely
8o
of Democrats, The split in the larger Indian Committee was 
strictly along party lines: six Democrats favored transfer
77Ibid., 1+7,
7®Cong. Record, i+l+th Cong,, 1 sess,, IV, 2868,
^^See Chapter Three,
O A
All but two of the committeemen had served as Union 
volunteer or Confederate officers. Significantly, none of 
these transfer proponents were westerners, (Biographical 
Directory of the American Congress. 177ii.—19lt9 (Washington. 
19^0). passimTT
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8land five Republicans or independents voted against it.
Judging from the debate, however, transfer was anything 
but a straw issue. This question, basic to the controversial 
Indian problem and relevant to current operations against the 
Sioux and the impeachment trial of Secretary of War Belknap, 
inspired one of the most heated, polemic arguments in the his­
tory of Congress, Many speeches, pro and con, were his.trionic, 
spiced with bitter sarcasm, personal ridicule and brilliant 
oratory; others were simply long-winded, extended by citations 
from the works of noted poets and philosophers or detailed, 
contradictory reports.
The disputed bill was introduced on March Ilf. by Repre­
sentative William A, Sparks of the Committee on Indian Affairs,
but was not discussed at length until April, when it dominated
82
the legislative scene for several days. On April 5, after 
Sparks extolled the merits of his proposal, the opposition 
called upon one of its few Democratic supporters, the eloquent 
Samuel S, Cox of New York. Prefacing his remarks with portions 
of Hiawatha and Paradise Lost. Cox exclaimed, MIf the present 
system is hell and the Indian himself is hell and the lowest 
deep is in the Interior Department, where is the lower deep, 
lower even than the lowest, threatening to devour him, unless
8l
Neither Army experience nor state origins were de­
cisive in the Indian Committee's vote, for former officers 
voted both ways and the two westerners were divided, (Ibid.).
O p
Cong, Globe, i^ .th Cong., 1 sess., IV, 1701, There 
was a vigorous dispute over whether the Military or Indian 
committee should have "precedence” in introducing the bill. 
(Ibid.. 1701-1705)•
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8  3
it be found in the War Department?” It was time to stop 
treating the red man with "whisky and trinkets, geegaws and 
cards,” to accept him as other than a "sort of chimpanzee or 
dropped stitch in the garment of humanity,” as represented by 
selfish frontiersmen.8^ The Indian Bureau must not be C a p ­
tured" by the War Department, "honeycombed with fraud," and 
the military arm, tainted by the Sand Creek, Washita and Pie- 
gan affairs. Concluding that enlightened civil control was 
the only hope for the aborigines, Cox asserted:
...if mankind is destined to make this world better 
for living in it ~  then let the very forests and plains 
of our land, where the Indian roams, echo the glad 
tidings of great joy which ushered into our fallen star 
with angelic anthems the Prince of Peace himself, by 
whom the beatitudes were so gloriously promised to the 
peace-makers
One of the first speakers to deprecate Cox’s roseate 
view of the Indians and Indian affairs was Representative 
Philip Cook of Georgia. Cook cited voluminous reports showing 
that the Indian service was impregnated with fraud and that 
various tribes were not making appreciable progress toward 
civilized life. The Sioux, for instance, did "absolutely 
nothing but eat, drink, smoke, and sleep, except indulging 
each day in the healthful exercise of horseback riding....”87
Q3lbid.. 2233.
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Interior control was not only corrupt and inefficient, but ex­
pensive, costing several times as much as it did earlier under 
the War Department. Any legislator with a realistic view of 
government-Indian relations would have to support the pro-
op
posed change. °
On April 18 transfer was championed by Representative 
Charles E. Hooker of Mississippi, who demonstrated that Cox 
bad no monopoly on prosaic oratory. Maintaining that mili­
tary control would preserve both the red race and the American 
heritage, Hooker won the applause of the House for these 
ramarks:"
Everywhere all over our land, from the ice-ribbed 
region of the north to where the fabled murmurings of 
our own Biloxi break in perpetual ripple upon the shelving 
and sloping coast of Mississippi; everywhere over the 
broad land...we hear the euphonious names which the 
Indian language has given...from where the spray of 
Niagara catches the first beam of the morning sun to where 
his last parting ray glosses itself upon the broad bosom 
of the Pacific, breaking in eternal tidal flow against 
the golden gates of California...his name and character 
...is indisolubly mingled with the history of our own 
Caucasian race, and will remain so while the Indian-named 
rivers shall flow to the ocean, and while the Indian-named 
mountains shall lift their granite peaks to the skies.
In striking contrast to Hooker's soothing eulogy were 
the scathing comments made by the next transfer advocate, 
Representative Banning of Ohio. Banning focused his attack 
upon Cox. Let the man who recently '‘brandished his tomahawk
O Q
Ibid., 2ij.61j.-21j.66. To counter the thesis that the 
Army was bent on exterminating the Indians, Cook also ob­
served that in 1875 red men killed more whites and more 
fellow tribesmen than the Army killed Indians.
89Ibid., 2571+.
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in our faces...put this in his pipe and smoke it," he declared.
It cost over six million dollars more to manage the Indian
Bureau in 18?5 than in I8I48. Also, there was evidence to show
that nine-tenths of the half-breed Indians' children were the
offspring of civilian agents and traders. "And if Tammany
is not satisfied with this unprovoked and unjust attack of
her scalping-chief upon our Army and defense of the Interior
management of the Indians," continued Banning, "... then let
Tammany send for Red Cloud, Black Kettle, or Sitting Bull,
qn
to come and take the honorable gentleman’s place.
The stormy debate continued in much the same polemic
qi
vein until the bill was passed on the 21st. Four days later
92the measure was referred to the Senate. There, as on pre­
vious occasions, the transfer proposal was pigeon-holed by the 
.Republican-controlled Committee on Indian Affairs. On June 
21, when the Indian appropriation bill was under consideration 
in the Senate, transfer opponents shrewdly introduced the 
transfer bill as an amendment. Legislation by amendment was 
not popular in the Senate. But this stratagem nearly back­
fired, for the vote to table the amendment carried by a margin




93^Cong. Record, l^th Cong., 1 sess., IV, 3963—39614-.
Three western Republicans voted with the Democrats who favored 
the amendment.
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, 9kback to the House and further consideration was postponed. ^
This in effect ended the first legislative surge for 
transfer in the period 1876-1879. As much as they hoped for 
the change in Indian administration, at least some Army leaders 
foresaw this result. General Sherman, for example, expected 
no effective action until after the presidential election of 
1876. "...our interest is to simply offer to undertake the
work," he told General Sheridan in May, "but if the Christians 
want the patronage let them have it.n<^
Democratic spokesmen sought to make an issue of the 
bill’s defeat. In August, when the overdue Indian appro­
priation bill was up before the House, Representative William 
M. Springer of Illinois complained of the Senate’s persistent 
opposition to Army control. "For the failure of this impor­
tant measure the Senate is alone responsible," he contended,
"and the Republican majority of that body have assumed this 
responsibility....The people will understand this fact and 
will not fail to bold their public servants to a strict account­
ability...."^ Indian administration, however, was not a major 
issue in the ensuing election. Moreover, the results were of 
little or no advantage to the Democrats: a slight gain was
made in the Senate, but the Republicans gained ground in the 
House and retained control of the executive branch.
9lt
Ibid.. 39144.
^Sherman to Sheridan, May 22, 1876, Sheridan Auto­
graph Letters, Vol. I.
^ C o n g . Record.' l+4th Cong., 1 sess., IV, 5602.
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The next phase of the transfer movement came after the 
Sioux and Nez Perce/ had been defeated. On February 25>, 1878, 
nine members of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, including 
two Republicans, published a report advocating Army adminis­
tration of the Indians. This group, headed by Chairman Alfred 
M. Scales of North Carolina, argued that the expenditure of 
millions and the diligent efforts by many conscientious 
missionaries, teachers and church-appointed agents had not 
achieved expected results. "The savages of thirty years ago," 
they reported, "are savages s t i l l . T h e  government seemed 
to be faced with the choice of transferring the War Department
to the Indian Bureau or the reverse, and no one proposed the
98former. Military control should purify the Indian service,
save up to a million dollars a year and end the recurrent 
99Indian wars.
A minority report was submitted by Representatives N. H. 
Van Vorhes of Ohio and J. H. Stewart of Minnesota. This pro­
position had been defeated several times in the past, they 
noted, and there was no reason why the government should change 
its mind now. To prove their point about the constancy of the 
transfer question, they published the minority report of
^ H R  Rot. No. 2lil. l+fjth Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1822), 
1878, 1-2.
98Ibid., 3.
99The majority anticipated savings in agents* salaries, 
advertising, transportation, purchases and so forth. They 
also contrasted the government’s Indian expenses before and 
after l8ij.9, showing that costs had more than doubled in the 
latter period. (Ibid., lj.-9).
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l8?6 verbatim.
Taking its cue from the Indian Committee, the House Mili­
tary Committee on May 28 introduced a transfer amendment to the 
Army appropriations bill for 1879. The amendment, which pro­
vided for Army rule over the Indians after January 1, 1879, was 
agreed upon by a vote of 130 to 1 1 5 But in the Senate even 
those who favored the change questioned the amendment. Senator 
Thomas P. Bayard of Rhode Island termed it a "crude, hasty,
ill-examined proposition," suggesting the need for careful
TO?study by a joint commission. Eventually this plan was
adopted, but not until after the supporters and opponents of 
civil control had engaged in another vigorous, protracted 
argument.
Most vociferous in defense of the present system was 
Senator William Windom of Minnesota. The House measure, Win- 
dom asserted, practically put the Secretary of War in charge 
of the Interior Department. Besides, transfer could not 
possibly improve the Indian service. Contractors and agents 
were now bonded, whereas such security would not be required 
if some "young and inexperienced" lieutenant were appointed as 
an Indian agent. In fact, rumors now had it that the Indian 
"rings" hoped for military administration so that they could 
evade new, stringent Indian Bureau regulations. Furthermore,
100Ibid., 13-2 0.
10^Cong. Record. 14.5th Cong., 2 sess., VII, 3876.
102Ibid., 14.193.
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the vital work of civilizing and Christianizing the red men 
would be set back years by military officials, who were in­
clined to return to the ”old war system."103
A contrary view was presented by Senator Richard Coke 
of Texas. The experiment of appointing church-nominated 
agents, Coke insisted, was a fiasco. Instead of elevating 
the Indians, it dragged the agents down to the Indians' 
level. Civil management was a "grotesque compound of senti­
mental and religious enthusiasm intensified by soft places, 
fat salaries, and rich perquisites, with a villainous amount 
of fraud and peculation."1^ - According to the latest figures, 
more than thirty-eight hundred persons were employed by the 
Indian Bureau. These parasites defended the peace policy for 
selfish reasons, while perpetuating romantic notions about the 
red man. Disparagingly, Coke remarked:
Speeches full of lofty eloquence, which the Indian, 
so far from making, cannot in the smallest degree com­
prehend, are ascribed to him and published through the 
country. Novelists and poets, captivated with the theme, 
have made him the hero of thrilling romance and inspiring 
song. Religious societies, Young Hen's Christian Asso­
ciations, and humanitarian theorists have bewailed the 
wrongs of the poor Indian, and with the best intentions, 
have brought their influences to the dissemination of 
morbidly sentimental ideas of Indian character. The 
public mind has been impressed and national legislation 
molded through these agencies until the interests of the 
white man have been lost sight of in an extreme solici­
tude to care tenderly for the Indians.105
103Ibid., i4l.95-ij.i9 6.
10^Con£. Record. i4.5>th Cong., 2 sess., VII, 14.237. 
1(*Ibid.
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Too few people realized, he continued, that, considering the 
Indians' extensive land holdings, trust funds and federal 
support, they were among the richest people in the world and 
paid no taxes
Further arguments were deferred by Congress’ decision
to appoint a joint commission, consisting of five Representa-
107tives and three Senators, to examine the transfer issue.
The commission, headed by Senator Alvin Saunders of Nebraska, 
spent two months in the West in the fall of I8 7 8. They studied 
conditions at various agencies and interviewed military offl­
eers, Indian officials, Indians and frontiersmen, gathering
X08more than four hundred printed pages of testimony.
A number of key witnesses recommended transfer. Gen­
eral Sherman was again in the forefront of this group.
Secretary Schurz and his subordinates bad "labored bard" for 
honest administration, Sherman acknowledged. There was no­
thing personal in this civil-military dispute, but one of the 
two "antagonistic systems" must yield. Recent Indian diffi­
culties had shown that civil government was ineffectual.
Ibid. Senator Coke calculated that, at five per­
sons per family, the Indians bad about twenty-seven hundred 
and forty acres per household. Further, the interest on 
Indian trust funds alone amounted to almost seven hundred 
thousand dollars a year.
107Cong. Record. l|5th Cong., 2 sess., VII, lf585- 
l}-586: Sen. Misc. Doc. No. £3. h g t h  Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
1835), 1879, 1.
x 08
Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 53, If-Stb Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 
1835), 1879, 1-3. —
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Military administration promised to prevent a repetition of
these troubles and expedite Indian reform at a lower cost to 
109taxpayers. A particular benefit would be the elimination
of "circumlocution” in regulating the Indians. If a red man
sold whiskey, for example, it would not be necessary for the
agent to send a letter to Washington to get inter-departmental
100
approval for military Intervention.
To Inspector General R. B. Marcy, the "ponderating 
advantage" of military control would be the unity of purpose 
achieved in management of the Indians. With dual administration, 
the government received confusing and conflicting reports.
Before l81j.9, when the War Department managed the Indians, 
there was not only unified action, but such forthright and 
honest management that fraud was non-existent
Brig. Gen. George Crook told the commission that the 
present divided responsibility over the Indians was "like having 
two captains on the same ship." By resolving this dilemma 
In favor of Army rule, the government could observe the car­
dinal principles of successful Indian management: absolute
honesty, good faith and consistent, decisive regulation. Un­
der the present system, many blunders were being made. One 
mistake was the Indian Bureau’s attempt to break up tribal re­
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and other property. Another was its effort to Christianize
^  112
the Indians before their physical needs were met.
The commission was also impressed by the views of two
lieutenants. Lieutenant S. R. Whitall of Fort Sill described
his success in the compulsory training of Indian prisoners.
Within a few months they had been taught to farm, raise stock,
build fences and houses and carry on other industrial acti- 
111vities. Lieutenant J. M. Lee, agent at Spotted Tail Agency 
during the Sioux War, revealed that the former civil agent bad 
requisitioned rations for ninety-two hundred Indians whereas a 
later Army head-count showed only forty-eight hundred were 
present.'*'^ He, too, advocated practical industrial training, 
maintaining that to offer academic studies to the Sioux was 
like "pouring water on a duck's back.,,1'L^
A number of civilians also recommended transfer. One 
influential witness was Robert Campbell of St. Louis, noted 
fur trader and former member of the Board of Indian Commis­
sioners. The only member of the original Board who preferred 
military administrators, Campbell contended that the Indian 
Bureau's improved purchasing procedures did not prevent
112
Ibid.. Appendix, 113-lllj.. Although Crook argued 
for military control, he said he would not want the job of 
Indian agent himself.
113Ibid.. 14-2—14-3«
^^"The civil agent bat.ed his requisition on the number 
of Indians on hand to receive annuities. When the military 
census was made, many of the Sioux were away hunting.
i:L%bid., Appendix, 101-102, 108.
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cheating at the agencies. Commissioned officers, however,
116
could be relied upon. Another transfer proponent was
Samuel P. Tappan, former member of the Peace Commission and
die-hard opponent of military rule. While emphasizing the
basic need for civil law for the nation’s wards, he admitted
that Army officers were preferable because of their power,
117efficiency and honor.
Heading the list of important witnesses who defended 
the status quo was the Liberal Republican reformer, Secretary 
Carl Schurz. The government’s choice, Schurz reasoned, was 
between "corraling" the Indians under Army or civilizing them 
under the Interior Department. But the former seemed "entirely 
inconsistent” with American political institutions.^® Many 
were concerned about the present system because of "myths” which 
had been circulated.
One false assumption was that "red tape" prevented de­
cisive action by the Indian Bureau. Actually, it could
119communicate with the agencies very rapidly by telegraph.
Another misconception was that Indian officials were generally 
corrupt, while Army officers were honest. There was, however, 
little dishonesty among the present agents. Moreover, the 
record of military officers’ relations with the Indians in the
ll6Ibid., Appendix, 55-56. 
^ ^ Ibid.. Appendix, 20i|.-209. 
ll8Ibid., Appendix, 258. 
119Ibid., Appendix, 259.
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pre-1849 period were not as "angelic and clean" as repre- 
120sented. Again, it was alleged that civil authorities caused
Indian wars. While civil management was far from perfect, this
X2Xassumption was "historically unfounded." On the point of
economy, some compared recent Indian service expenses with that
of the l81|0’s. "You might as well," Schurz declared, "compare
the cost of the administration of the general government under
122
President Jefferson with what it costs now...,"
Schurz systematically debunked the arguments for trans­
fer, insisting that the change would have more disadvantages 
than advantages. This whole dispute, he stressed, had nothing 
to do with the situation which was at the root of the Indian 
problem; namely, unbridled white expansion.12^ Finally, to 
illustrate the illogic of military precedence, he stated:
You might just as well say , here is the city of 
New York full of turbulent elements, and the police are 
called upon to repress trouble, as the military are some­
times to repress trouble on or near some Indian reserva­
tions; from which others might, but I would not draw 
the conclusir■■« ohat it would be well to intrust the 
general affairs of the city of New York to the police
force.124
Ibid., Appendix, 260, 263, 266. Schurz cited several 
congressional investigations which condemned Army officers for 
cheating different tribes. For instance, two officers mis­
appropriated almost seventy-seven thousand dollars during the 
removal of the Creeks in lo35>.
121
Ibid., Aopendix, 260-261. The Secretary mentioned 
the Sioux War of 1852-1854> the Chivington Massacre and other 




^ ^ ~Ibld.. Appendix, 279.
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The Secretary’s views were seconded by Commissioner
Hayt. A change in administration, he affirmed, was now more
inappropriate than ever. In the past few months the business
methods of the Indian service had been improved and were pro-
121^bably superior to those of the military service. In addi­
tion the "preacher-agents" were being replaced by more effective,
126
practical-minded officials. Lastly, a recent survey showed
that ninety-six percent of the Indians at various reserva-
127tions opposed military agents.
Several agents also testified against Army control. One 
who was questioned at length by the commission was "Father"
James H. Wilbur of Yakima Agency. Wilbur, a Methodist minis­
ter, had an impressive record. The thirty-seven hundred 
Indians under his supervision had six thousand acres under 
cultivation, raised thousands of head of livestock, pro­
duced their own lumber and shingles, lived in comfortable, 
well-furnished houses, dressed like white men, sent their 
children to school, and to a large extent, attended church.





In a circular sent to the agencies in July, 1878, 
the agents were instructed to present the question of transfer 
to their charges in general council. "Free and frank" views 
were supposed to be solicited. The Indians reportedly said 
they feared that military control would interfere with their 
progress, demoralize their women, agitate the young men and 
otherwise disrupt agency life. (1.0. Circular, July 1 8, 1878,
Book No. 2, NA, RG 75; Sen. Misc. Doc. 93« lj.5th Cong., 3 sess. 
(Serial 1835), 1879, 105-107. Military Officers thought 
that to consult the Indians in this matter was a joke. See 
Ibid., lj.6.
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to 1870, said Wilbur, and to again turn them over to the Army
126
would be a gross injustice,,
In addition, a number of philanthropists advised the 
investigators to sustain the present Indian system. Members 
of the Board of Indian Commissioners and spokesmen of organi­
zations such as the Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia and
Pennsylvania Peace Society warned against military despo- 
129tism. One of the most ardent transfer opponents was Alfred
B. Meacham, former superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon.
As chairman of the Modoc commission of April, l873> h© had heen
shot several times and narrowly escaped death at the hands of
130
Captain Jack's followers. Now an invalid, he was editor of
the pro-Indian monthly, Council Fire, and was devoting his
life to the cause of Indian civilization. Military rule was
wrong, Meacham argued, because it would antagonize the In-
131dlans and detract from their advancement.
On January 31> 1879* after analyzing voluminous, con­
flicting testimony, the joint commission published a divided 
report. The four southern Democrats —  three representatives 
and a senator —  submitted a report favoring transfer. Army 
officers, they concluded, were men of nhigh honor and strict
128Ibid.. 21-28, k > k $ .
129Ibld.. 14.8-50, Appendix, 238,251.
^■^See Chapter Six. Seymour, 0£ o cit.. 212-233.
•^■^ I bid.. 3014.. Council Fire was first published in 
1878 and featured many articles opposing transfer and de­
manding abolition of the Army. See, for example. Council 
Fire (July, 187 8) and (April, 1879).
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integrity” and would give the Indians justice at minimum ex­
pense to the government,, A failure to establish military 
jurisdiction would leave the red men at the mercy of white 
thieves and drive them out into the ”pitiiess storm of ...
injustice and inhumanity which has well-nigh extinguished a
m132
once proud and powerful people.,..
The other four commissioners, two from each house and 
all northern Republicans, issued a negative report. There 
was no doubt that the Indian could be ”Anglo-Saxonized,” 
they argued, and civilians were best suited to carry on this 
work. To improve Indian administration, Congress should em­
power the President to order temporary Army control in time 
of emergency and take steps to consolidate small reservations, 
assign the Indians' land in severalty and establish a separate 
Indian department. A permanent transfer of the Indian Office,
though, would result in no possible advantage to the red man
133or the government.
By February, 1879, although the latest congressional 
investigation was indecisive, the high-water mark of the transfer 
movement had been passed. The return of peace and the In­
terior Department's program of self-improvement silenced many 
of the complaints of the opponents of civil administration.
On February 8 the House, by a vote of 92 to 67, defeated an
^^ H R  Rpt. No. 92. \ \ $ t h  Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1866),
1879, 20.
133hr Rpt. No. 9£, 14.9th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1866),
1879, 19-20. Chairman Saunders of Nebraska, the only westerner 
on the joint committee, voted with the transfer opponents*
He had been an outspoken friend of the Indians for some time.
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Army appropriation bill amendment to authorize the President 
to proclaim temporary military rule over hostile tribes.33^ 
Pour days later, with Senator Saunders quoting scripture as 
grounds for maintaining the "quiet example and peaceful influ­
ence of civil authority," the upper house rejected a similar
11*5 H _
measure. "The failure of the transfer movement in this 
congress is probably final," Secretary Schurz remarked grate­
fully, "at least.*.as long as I am at the head of the de-
4. n!36 partment.
During the next five years, various transfer amendments
were proposed but received little support. In the House,
legislators were ruled out of order for trying to bring up
transfer in connection with the Indian appropriation bills
137of 1880 and 1881. In the second instance, the chairman 
ruled that a transfer amendment was not germane because the 
change from one department to another would not reduce ex-
T Oft
penditures. Finally, in I88I4., even a proposal to appoint 
military inspectors for the Indian Bureau was defeated be­
cause it threatened the separate jurisdiction of the civil 
branch."*-3^
13b.
Cong. Record. k S t h  Cong., 3 sess., VIII, llb.l-llij.2.
13^Ibid., 1221-1226.
-^Schurz to A. C. Barstow, February 15, 1879, Schurz 
Papers, Private Letters Sent, Vol. IX.
^3^Cong. Record. ij.6th Cong., 2 sess., X, 2ij.91-2b.93, 
2ij.97-2b.98; b-oth (Jong., 3 sess. XL, 5>38-5>b.l; Briest,o£. cit..21.
MBqod,. Record. b.6th Cong., 3 sess., XI, 5iA#
139priest, oj># cit.. 2 1.
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Authors have disagreed as to whether it was "Inertia1* 
or a "sincere conviction on the part of the public that the 
Army was not fitted to direct Indian affairs" which brought 
about the final defeat of t r a n s f e r * F o r  years this sub­
ject had been debated in Congress and in public reports, the 
press and private circles*. Representative Hooker of Mississ­
ippi found the political impact of this question most curious* 
"It*..is so utterly foreign to all*•.differences between 
existing parties," he asserted, "that it would seem it ought 
to...command the calm judgment of the Representatives of the 
people...*M^^- yet prejudices were so strong that, as General 
Sherman observed, the same facts were Interpreted from oppo­
site directions* On each, side, selfish, and emotional factors 
affected contradictory economic, moral, cultural, religious, 
military, educational and legal arguments* Unfortunately, 
while the struggle for control of the Indian service was in 
progress, Indian reform was detained* Thus the decision for 
civil control was advantageous to both the nation and its 
wards, although subsequent Indian relations involved other 
Inter-departmental problems*
l^Oprederic L. Paxson, The Last American Frontier 
(New York, 1918). 3U4: Priest, op* cit*, £6.
^^■HR Rpt. No. 1393, l+6th Cong*, 2 sess* (Serial 1937)* 
1880, 1* -
^^Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 53, Jj-5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
1835), 1879, 2277 ““
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CHAPTER EIGHT
A NEW PHASE IN AN OLD STRUGGLE: 1879-188?
The general topic of tbs relations of the ns.tIon 
to the aborigines is one of the hopeless things which 
constantly attract and as constantly baffle attempts at 
solution. All struggles between different races are 
guided by prejudice and passion more than by reason,
(Jacob D. Cox, April 5, 1880)
,,,the Indian race has reached a crisis in its his­
tory, Surrounded on all sides by the forces of 
civilization,,,the only alternative presented,,.is 




The eight-year period from the defeat of the last 
concerted transfer movement, in early 1879* to the passage of 
the celebrated Dawes Severalty Act, in February, 1887, was, 
in certain respects, a new phase in government-Indian rela­
tions.^ The Indian Bureau formerly spent much time and 
energy defending its policies and very existence; now it 
could give more attention to constructive activities. Re­
forms which had been postponed or retarded were adopted or 
promoted. In addition, the military, although not fully 
reconciled to civil management of the Indians, found more
^The Dawes Act, which authorized the President to 
divide up the Indian lands, assigning one hundred and sixty 
acre plots to families and lesser amounts to single Indians 
and children, is discussed in the next chapter.
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opportunity to assist in the important work of civilizing 
the government's wards. Through the joint efforts of the 
civil and military branches, substantial progress was made 
toward an effective solution of the Indian problem.
Yet inter-departmental disputes persisted, for the In­
terior Department's official control of the red men was not 
always practicable. Exigencies still required prompt and 
decisive action by the military. The circumstances of such 
action, however, were generally subject to differences of 
opinion. These latest difficulties, coinciding with the 
disappearance of the "Indian frontier," also had a material 
effect upon the future of Indian affairs.^ The following 
discussion takes note of both the accomplishments and failures 
of this new phase of the old struggle over Indian policy.
THE TREND TOWARD REFORM
After Congress decided against military control of the 
tribes in February, 1879, the government made many significant 
changes in its Indian policy. Whether the public "suddenly" 
realized the need for justice toward the Indians and whether 
1880 was the "turning point in the history of American Indian 
relations" may be debated.^ But there is evidence that 
2
President Cleveland announced the closing of the In­
dian frontier in December, 1886. (Richardson, Messages VIII.
518). -----
^The importance of the year 1880 is stressed by Loring
B. Priest, the leading scholar on post-Civil War Indian rela­
tions. In illustrating the "turn of the tide" of public opinion, 
however, Priest cites the passive reactions to the White River 
Ute outbreak in Colorado, erroneously dating that affair in
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concern for Indian welfare was more widespread in the early 
Eighties than in previous decades.
A number of circumstances contributed to this devolu­
tion." Clearly, Commissioner Hayt's complicity in an unethical 
bargain for an Arizona silver mine, a scandal revealed in
«
January, 1880, aroused demands for administrative reform.
Public interest was spurred, too, by a continuing discussion 
of the Ponca removal of 1877, a topic enlivened by an 1879
federal court ruling that the government could not force a
tL
band of fugitive Poncas to return to Indian Territory.
Another stimulus was the problem of encroachment upon Indian
reservations, dramatized by proclamations by Presidents Hayes
and Cleveland against invasions of Indian Territory by "Okla- 
»6homa Boomers. These and other developments, notably Con­
gress1 unwillingness to seriously reconsider military control 
of the Indians, encouraged various Indian reforms after 1879.
Much of the impetus of the reform movement came from 
new national organizations. One, the Women's National Indian 
Association, was founded in Philadelphia in 1879 and had
^(continued) in 1880 instead of 1879. (Priest, op. cit., 
XVIII-XXXVI. See CIA, 1879, XVIII-XXXVI.)
h-BIC, 1879, 68-71; Priest, oj). cit., 69-71. Hayt was 
dismissed on January 31, 1880. See Chapter Two.
^CIA, 1877» iil7-h-19. For a discussion of the Standing 
Bear case see 5 Dill, k ? 3 $  Priest, oj>. cit.. 76-8 0.
^Scbmeckebier, op. cit., 122; Priest, op. cit..
72-75. See also Roy GTttinger, The Formation of the State 
£f Oklahoma (Berkeley, 1917) and Carl C. Rister, Land feunger? 
David L. Payne and the Oklahoma Boomers (Norman, 191*2) •
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chapters in twenty-seven states by 1886* These local groups
circulated petitions, published pamphlets and corresponded
with congressmen, calling for protection of the Indians’
7
lands and rights. Another agency, the Indian Rights Asso­
ciation, was established by Herbert Welsh of Philadelphia in 
1882, Members of the I,R.A, visited Indian reservations and 
published constructive criticisms and recommendations which
g
affected Indian legislation. Also influential were the con­
ferences held each fall after 1883 at Lake Mobonk, New York, 
Many noted public officials, politicians, educators, religious 
leaders, humanitarians and publicists attended these con­
ferences and passed resolutions for practical reforms, such
9
as increased salaries for Indian service personnel. Still 
another organization, the National Indian Defense Association, 
was founded in Washington in 1885 by Dr, Theodore A, Bland 
of the Council Fire journal. Members of this association, 
including S, F, Tappan, George Manypenny and other long-time 
- Indian friends, endeavored, especially, to check federal 
action which might interfere with the personal liberties of 
the red m en.^
^Priest, 033, cit., 81-8 3,
®Ibid., 83-8i|., Welsh waa the nephew of William Welsh, 
the well-known Indian reformer and former member of the Board 
of Indian Commissioners,
9
Ibid., 8I4.-8 5. Proceedings of the Lake Mobonk con­
ferences may be followed in BIC reports.
10
Priest, op,, cit.. 86.
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In addition to the work of these Indian organizations, 
there were persistent efforts by the Board of Indian Com­
missioners and missionary boards to better the condition of 
the nation's wards* Each year the Board closed its annual re­
port with a list of legislative recommendations pertaining to
land ownership, education, citizenship, appropriations, criminal
11
laws or other subjects. Meantime, the missionary boards, 
after conferring with their constituents, held a joint confer­
ence in Washington in each January to draft memorials to 
executive officers and Congress. "For Indians," the conference 
demanded in 1882, "we want American education! We want Ameri­
can homes! We want American rights! The result of which is
»12American citizenship!
While the vigorous activities of such groups indicated
a growth of organized support for Indian advancement, public
opinion was still divided along sectional lines. Easterners,
particularly Hew Englanders, expressed strong sympathy for the
tribesmen. Often, however, there was justification for the
charge that they based their sentimental views upon concepts
of the Indian derived from the works of James Fenimore 
13Cooper. On the other hand, westerners were Inclined to 
condemn the Indians. The length to which Indian hatred could 
be carried was demonstrated by a bill introduced in the
n See, for example, BIC, 1879, 1 $ ;  BIC, l88ij., 11.
12Ibid., 1882, 79.
■^Priest, opB cit.. 86-88.
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Colorado legislature in 1881 for the ’’Destruction of Indians
and Skunks Nor was it necessary to go far west to find
enemies of the red men* "Sympathy for the Indians," an Iowan
ml$
declared in 1880, "is like milk spilled on the ground."
Among the initial manifestations of the growing, al­
though not unanimous, regard for Indian reformation were 
efforts to further changes begun in earlier years. An incon­
sistent attempt was made, first, to end tribal autonomy.
Under a provision of the Indian appropriation act of I87I,
the government was officially prohibited from recognizing the
16
tribes as domestic dependent nations. In practice, though
officials acquiesced in the old system through agreements such
as the Sioux Agreement of 1876 and Ute Agreement of 1880 and
17various transactions with tribal leaders. Thus the Indians
still occupied the anomalous position of "aliens" who were
wards of the United States. This situation was criticized
by many reformers. Some demanded immediate abolition of the
Indians’ political systems and others requested a gradual 
18
change. To confuse matters, Indian authorities disagreed
■^•House Bill 178 included in D. W. Wood to Shurz
» February ij., 1881, Schurz Papers.
^ E .  W. Eastman, Eidora, Iowa, to Carl Schurz, Novem­
ber 18, i860, Schurz Papers.
1616 Stat. L., 566.
17The basic distinction between the agreements and 
previous treaties was that the former were approved by Con­
gress as a whole rather than the Senate. (CIA. 1876, 3ii9- 
351; CIA. 1880, 193-198).
"Lfi
Priest, oj>. cit.. 102-103*
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about whether the tribal arrangement was harmful. In l88l
Secretary Samuel J. Kirkwood categorically described it as a
19
"hinderance” (kifi.#) to Indian advancement. As late as 188$-, 
however, Secretary L.Q.C. Lamar opposed a general policy of 
breaking up tribal relations because it might be "destructive” 
to some tribes. The rule of the chiefs extended beyond 
1887, but by that date the policy-makers paid less attention 
to the traditional Indian governments.
Revisions were made, too, in the longstanding annuity 
system. Treaties since the founding of the government pro­
mised the Indians yearly gifts of food, clothing and other 
items. So long as there was a real danger of Indian war, few 
questioned the maxim "it Is cheaper to feed the Indians than 
to fight them.1* Interested contractors and freighters were 
especially vocal In support of this policy. But by the mid- 
Elghties the argument for annuities had been weakened by: 
frauds and improper distribution of Indian goods, the Indians1 
inqprovidence and misuse of various items, criticism of the 
practice of dispensing more gifts to potentially-bostile than 
to peaceable tribes, congressional demands for economy and,
above all, the general belief that the era of the Indian wars 
21
was over. Hence, adjustments were made to allot more of 
the government’s “charity” for educational and industrial
19SI, 1881, VII.
20SI, 1885, 26-27.
^■Priest, op. cit.. 106-109.
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needs.22
In conjunction with efforts to de-emphasize tribal 
relations and revise the annuity system, Indian authorities 
re-examined the reservation system. This was another well- 
established federal policy based upon expediency. Segregated, 
the Indians were less apt to interfere with white expansion 
and travel and were more easily managed. At the same time, 
the Indians’ friends observed, they were safer from exploit­
ers and evil influences,2^
But in the Eighties reservations were criticized for 
various reasons. Westerners, anxious to acquire more land, 
argued that It w'as contrary to common sense and the principles 
of Christian society to allow millions of acres to lay Idle. 
Reformers, on the other hand, began to advocate inter-racial 
contact as an essential aspect of Indian progress. Instead 
of abandoning the reservations, the Interior Department gradu­
ally reduced them through closely-regulated land sales, sub­
ject to Indian approval.2** Between 1879 and I887 tribal 
land holdings were decreased by about nineteen percent. ^
The critics were only partially satisfied by smaller 
reservations. On most reservations the Indians still followed 
their ancient practice of communal ownership. Until the red
22Ibid., 112-113; BIC, 1879-1887.
2^Priest, o£. cit.. 121-123,
% b i d . »  12^-129.
2*CIA, 1879, 227; CIA, 1887, 312.
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men enjoyed the right of private property, reformers main­
tained, they could not acquire the habits of modern civili­
zation. Legislation was needed, therefore, to allot the 
Indian lands in severalty. Certain laws already provided 
for individual ownership, but were unsatisfactory. The In­
dian Homestead Act of 1875? was so complex and restrictive
26that few Indians benefited from it. Some tribes, under 
special acts or treaties, were authorized to make allotments, 
and by 1885 over eleven thousand patents had been issued. Yet 
these laws were also difficult to administer, and many of the
27owners were soon relieved of their property by greedy whites. 
The search for a general severalty act which would overcome 
these problems, already In progress in 1879, continued until 
the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887.
Another important phase of the policy adopted in the 
l880’s was an increased emphasis upon education. Officials 
had long recognized, as Secretary J. D. Cox stated in 1870,
that the training of Indian youth should be a "controlling
28and permanent feature” of Indian relations. Much of the 
dispute over transfer concerned the hypothetical question of 
whether civilians or soldiers made the best teachers. Yet as 
of 1879, the House Indian Committee announced, less than ten
26
18 Stat. L., ij.20; Priest, o£. cit.. 180-181.
^CIA, 1885, 320; Schraeckibier, on. cit.. 79s 
Priest, o^ci t . ,  178-179.
p O
SI, 1870, IX. Most Indian treaties provided for edu­
cational assistance by the government.
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29percent of the Indian children were being properly educated.
This unfortunate situation was attributable, to a large ex­
tent, to the Indians’ intransigence. But the government was 
not blameless, for, acceding to popular skepticism toward the 
Indians* iraprovability and demands for economy, it failed to 
provide adequate means for this work.^ 0
Eventually, however, the policy-makers began to recog­
nize education as a practical and economical means of mini­
mizing the Indian problem. This change in attitude was en­
couraged by the growing success of experiments with Indian
police, soldiers and freighters; the economic progress of many
31tribes and self-government of groups in Indian Territory,
In addition, many were impressed by the advancement of Indian 
students at Hampton Institute, Carlisle and other non-reserva­
tion boardin._ schools. The boarding school program, initiated 
in the late Seventies by two Army officers, Captain Richard
H, Pratt and General Samuel C# Armstrong, provided training in
32industrial arts and homeraaking for scores of youngsters.
*^HR Rpt. No. 29. i|.6th Cong*, 1 sess. (Serial 193lf.)* 
l8 8 0. The Indian Bureau reported an average school attendance 
of about twelve percent of school-age children. (CIA, l879,2ij.f>).
3°Priest, 0 2 j u cit., 132-137.
31Ibid., 137-Up..
-^Captain Pratt began to train Cheyenne and Kiowa 
prisoners at Port Marion, Florida, in 1875. Three years later 
some of these Indians were sent to Hampton Institute, a Negro 
school headed by General S # C. Armstrong. Armstrong proceeded 
to expand the project. Meantime, in 1879, Pratt opened a 
school for more than eighty Sioux at the deserted Army barracks 
at Carlisle. The government soon recognized the value of this 
work, adding schools at Forest Grove (later Salem), Oregon;
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Such promising results inspired Congress to appropriate about
six times as much for reservation and non-reservation schools
in 1887 as in 1879. Meanwhile, sixty-eight new schools were
33established and school attendance more than doubled.
Gradual progress in Indian education, together with the 
government’s tendency to discount tribal relations, spot­
lighted the need for a clearer definition of the legal status 
of the Indians. For years Indian administrators had lamented 
the absence of criminal laws affecting their wards. ”No good 
reason can be given for not placing them /the Indians/ under 
the same government as other people,” the Board of Indian Com­
missioners reasoned in 1881.^ Yet westerners, in particular, 
opposed legal equality, and many citizens contended that the 
tribesmen could not understand, much less obey, criminal
35codes.
Between 1883 and 188£, though, measures were taken to 
combat the inequity of a legal system which imposed penalties 
upon Indians for offenses against whites, but failed to punish
op
(continued) Chiloeco, Indian Territory; Lawrence, 
Kansas and Genoa, Nebraska. By 1900 twelve hundred children 
from seventy-nine tribes were being educated at these places. 
(Ibid.. llj.l-lij.3; Schmeckebler. on. cit.. 71. For a further 
discussion see Elaine Goodale Eastman, Pratt: Red Man * s Moses 
/Norman, 19357 I.R.A., Captain Pratt and Blls Work for
Indian Education /Philadelphia, 1912/).
^CIA, 1879» 2ij-5. In I887 the government appropriated 
$1,226,ljJ.5 f o r  two hundred and twenty-seven schools with an 
average attendance of over ten thousand five hundred students. 
(CIA, 1887, XVI-XVII, 313-322). For a discussion of the pro­
blems of instruction at these schools, see Schmeckebler, 
op. cit., 71-78.
3^BIC, 1881, 8.
■^Priest, op. cit.. 199-200.
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crimes by whites or other Indians against Indians. Early in 
1883* the Indian Office established extra-legal Courts of In­
dian Offenses at the agencies. These courts, presided over 
by Indian "judges," tried cases involving misdemeanors such
as immoral dances, polygamy or other violations of rules set
36down by the Bureau. J  Later in the year, the lack of laws to
check major crimes was brought out in the Supreme Court
ruling that Crow Dog, slayer of the well-known Brule Sioux
37chief Spotted Tail, was not subject to United States statues.
As a consequence, a section of the Indian appropriation act 
approved March 3, 1885, made Indians living on reservations 
liable to federal laws covering murder and several other 
serious crimes.3®
Closely related to the problem of criminal law was the 
question of constitutional rights for the Indians. "All who 
have studied the /Tndian7 question,” wrote Secretary Kirkwood 
in 1881, ”unite in the opinion that the end to be attained is
the civilization of the Indians and their final absorption into
the mass of our citizens, clothed with all the duties of citi­
zenship, The difficulty lies in devising and executing the 
36
Indian Bureau rules prohibited such ”barbaric prac­
tices" as the burying of the dead in trees, the torturous 
"sun dance" ornhighly immoral" ritual known as the "kiss 
dance" and the destruction of property to revenge minor 
quarrels, (I.O.L.B., Misc., 1879-1887.) One agent unsuccess­
fully tried to have the playing of ball on Sundays added to 
this list I (R. E. Trowbridge to Agent D. B. Dyer, Quapaw 
Agency, June 2, 1880, I.O.L.B. No. 159, Misc., NA, RG 7 5.)
37109 2aS. Reports. 556.
3823 Stat. L., 385; Priest, o£. cit.. 201-203; 
Schmeckebler, op. cit., 77*
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means by which this end shall be accomplished.” Some looked 
to the courts for an interpretation which would end this 
predicament. But in l88ij., in denying the appeal of a non­
reservation Indian who had been turned away from the polls at 
Omaha, the Supreme Court ruled:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the 
United States...although in a geographical sense born 
in the United States, are no more "born in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within 
the meaning of the...Fourteenth Amendment, than, the 
children of subjects of any foreign government.^0
Following this decision, reformers redoubled their agitation
for Indian citizenship. Their goal was at last partially
Ulachieved in the Dawes Act.
A drawback to the campaign for citizenship and other
reform movements of the Eighties was the absence of a well-
defined, comprehensive Indian policy. "The so-called ‘peace
policy,1" one modern scholar conqplains, "was more a product
of confusion regarding the proper course to pursue than of an
intelligent effort to solve Indian problems. Instead of.setting
a goal, administrators drifted aimlessly, meeting difficulties
Jj.2
as they arose without thought of the future." Such cri­
ticism was also made by contemporary observers. Secretary 
Schurz, for instance, was irritated by charges that his ad­
ministration lacked a stable, identifiable policy. "It is
39SI, 1881, III.
^°Elk vs. Wilkins, 112 U.S. Reports. 102.
^ Z k  Stat. L., 338; Priest, op. cit., 209-213.
^ 2Priest, pp. cit., 183.
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frequently said that we have no policy,” he noted, ”This is 
a mistake, at least as far as this department is concerned,”^  
Still, the following year he reported that he had reversed his 
earlier program of altering, removing and consolidating reser­
vations,^- A good deal of this inconsistency in Indian policy 
could be traced to the frequent change of Indian officials.
New leaders tended to be indecisive, and many acted upon their
2i6
personal theories about the Indians, These deviations were 
corrected, to some extent, by more precise and inclusive laws 
in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century,
Finally, another general problem pervading the reform 
movements concerned the method to be used in dealing with non­
progressive tribesmen. Civil and military spokesmen fre­
quently differed on this point. Most Army officers, together 
with a number of agents, a few Interior officials, notably 
Secretary Teller, and humanitarians, such as Bishop Henry 
Whipple, advocated compulsory Indian reformationc Taking a 
paternalistic and practical position, they argued that forcible
i|7
conversion was for the Indians' own good. On the other
hand, other Indian sympathizers and most Indian administrators
^SI, 1879, 5.
^ S I ,  1880, k,
k5
H See Chapter Two, 
k6
Compare, for example, Secretaries Teller and Lamar 
on allotments in SI, 1882, VI-VII and SI, 1885, 26.
^Priest, op. cit.. 2i|l-2lf.6,
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preferred to regenerate the nation’s wards by persuasion. In 
their opinion, President Cleveland was correct in maintain­
ing that it was more important to give the Indians justice
L8
than to rapidly convert them to the white man’s ways. By 
1887, though, the government decided that at least one vital 
reform, land allotments, could not wait upon voluntary action.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The collapse of the transfer movement in the late 
Seventies had no immediate effect upon the Army’s responsi­
bilities in connection with Indian affairs. Military his­
tories usually refer to the last more or less minor Indian 
campaigns, notably the suppression of the White River Utes 
in 1879, engagements leading to the capitulation of Sitting 
Bull’s followers in l88l, and the operations against the Apaches 
which culminated in the surrender of Geronimo in 1886. Little
attention has been given, however, to the Army’s important,
li.9if unglamorous, civil functions on the frontier.
In 1880 General Sheridan described the duties of his
"little army" in the West as follows:
To keep in advance of our settlers, to give pro­
tection to the surveying and construction parties of
k8BIC, 1885, 134.
Ji 9
See, for instance, Ganoe, op. cit., 350-363; Ameri­
can Military History (ROTC Manual, Washington, 1953), 286- 
289, 292. The second source mentions various civil functions, 
primarily in the East, but says nothing of military activi­
ties in relation to the Indian service.
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the railways, to open new paths through the mountains and 
across the plains, to open up the country and guard the 
feeble settlements and mining camps from the Indians, 
and to secure the Indian in his just rights against the 
encroachment of white men, to keep unauthorized parties 
from established Indian reservations, and generally to 
give a place^of refuge to the weak along our exposed 
frontier.,..5°
Thus, in one way or another, Indian relations were closely re­
lated to military activities. Indeed, frontier commands con­
tinued to have a wider range of Indian-oriented functions 
than Sheridan indicated. First, troops worked to deter and 
curb disturbances on or around the reservations. Second, they 
acted to enforce regulations against illegal trade with the 
tribes. Third, as a posse comitatus, soldiers protected the 
Indians1 lands from invasion by cattlemen, settlers, thieves 
and white exploiters. Fourth, at times, Army officers served 
as Indian agents. Fifth, in certain respects, the military 
helped to train red men in the white man’s ways. Sixth, when 
the agencies ran out of supplies, post commanders, without 
authority, took measures to relieve the Indians* needs.
Lastly, Army officers formally or informally advised the 
government on Indian policy.
Although most agencies developed a useful Indian police 
system in the l880's, troops were summoned whenever serious 
difficulty seemed imminent. Military intervention was neces­
sary most frequently, of course, at reservations inhabited by 
tribes just beginning the slow transition from the life of the 
nomadic hunter to that of the sedentary farmer or herder. For
^°SW, 1880, 6^.
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example, Maj. G-en. 0. B. Willcox, commander of tbe Department
of Arizona, reported in 1880 that his men had "nipped in the
Sihud" several revolts at the Apache reservations. This duty 
was complicated by recurrent rumors of outbreaks, spread by 
nervous settlers, contractors and traders who hoped to pre­
vent the withdrawal of outposts, publicists intent upon dis­
crediting the Indian Bureau and land-seekers who were eager
52
for new agreements to further delimit the reservations.
Still, General Sheridan regarded the need for maintaining troops 
to "be prepared for emergencies" as very real. As late as 
1886 he unsuccessfully requested Congress to increase the
r* *»
strength of frontier forces on these grounds,'3'*
The Army’s police duties would have been less burden­
some were it not for the disrupting influence of unscrupu­
lous traders. Those engaged in the illicit liquor traffic 
were, as always, an annoying and persistent problem. Tbe 
Indian’s demands for "ardent spirits" were almost insatiable, 
and laws against the sale of intoxicants remained, as one 
officer expressed it, a "farce."^ There was no minimum
^ Tbid.. 205-206.
-*^ In 1882 alone, the New York Herald published false 
reports of the burning of Galeyville, Arizona; a Snake and 
Bannock outbreak in Montana; a massacre in Foulk County,
Dakota Territory and a mass uprising of tbe Umatillas of 
Oregon. (Priest, 0£, cit., 91J.
q o
-^Sheridan to Senator John A Logan, March 2^, 1886,
C.G.L.S., NA, RG 108.
^ S .  S, Lawson to Price, June 27, 1882, I.O.L.R., 
Civilization, File 120^, NA RG 75. The resourcefulness of 
the liquor peddlers was almost unlimited. The physician who 
took over at Blackfeet Agency in 1882 was astounded to learn
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penalty, and frontier courts were notoriously lax on this 
matter. Nevertheless, military officials assisted the 
agents in attempting to keep whiskey from the red men, real­
izing that inebriated braves were apt to disturb the peace. 
Meanwhile, Indian authorities carried on a disappointing cam-
XlL
paign for stricter regulations against the liquor traffic.
Still a problem, too, were the arms merchants, A law 
approved in 1873 prohibited the sale of weapons and ammuni­
tion on the reservations, but prescribed only mild punishment
97for violators and failed to cover trade in other locations. 
Army authorities believed that the best way to check Indian 
outbreaks was to disarm undisciplined bands and prevent their 
r e - a r m a m e n t T h i s  scheme, Maj, Gen, John M, Schofield ad­
mitted was more plausible than practicable. But military 
watchfulness, together with the disappearance of game and
(continued) that his predecessor specialized in re­
medies consisting of a mixture of alcohol and peppermint or 
ginger. The Indians were so anxious to obtain any beverage 
with alcoholic content that the agency traders had a lucrative 
business in lemon and vanilla extracts, (Dj*. Harry Stites to 
Price, January 1, 1883, I.O.L.R., Civilization, Pile 1699*
NA, RG 79).
^Priest, op. cit., 1 9 7.
96
Commissioner Price, an ardent prohibitionist, was par­
ticularly active in the movement for stricter liquor laws in 
the period l880-l88£, (See, for example, Price to Secretary 
of the Interior, February 23, 1882, I.O.R.B. No, ifl, NA, RG 7 5). 
Yet It was 1897 until Congress established a minimum fine of 
one hundred dollars and a sentence of sixty days lru jail for 
selling alcohol to an Indian. (Schmeckebier, op. cit.. J4.2I1.— 
1^26.).
17 Stat. L., i|59.
^8SW, 1879, 86.
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and reforms at the agencies, gradually limited the dangers of 
CjQ
the arms trade*"'
Lawless traders, who transacted their nefarious business 
on or near the reservations, were not the only disquieting in­
fluences military and civil officials had to contend with* As 
the Eighties progressed, the Indians’ lands were Invaded by 
a growing number of outsiders* rtThe Indians," said General 
Pope in 1881, "are...now sandwiched between the emigration 
from the East and that from the West...The waves of emigration, 
enormously hastened by the railroads, are now beating from • 
both sides along this thin line of Indians, and,..must soon 
break through. . . . " ^ 0 Pope's estimate of the situation agreed 
with that of Commissioner E. A. Hayt, who earlier surmised that 
hardly a reservation in the country was not subject to en­
croachment,^
The intruder problem was extremely serious in a number 
of places. In 1882 the Flathead Agent requested a military 
force to protect his charges from more than seven thousand 
"camp followers, gamblers, ex-convicts, lewd women...merchants 
and traders of all descriptions" accompanying the construction
^ S W  *85, 132* Priest, op, cit.. 156. A practice which 
increased the difficulty of regulating the possession of arms 
and ammunition at certain Sioux and Apache agencies was the 
policy of allowing the Indians to stage simulated "hunts" when 
beef cattle were issued. (Secretary Teller to Commissioner, 
March 23> 1883, D.i.L.S. and Indian Bureau Circular No. 106, 
Finance, Circular Book No. 3, NA, RG 75).
60SW, 1881, 122.
61CIA, 1879, XLIV,
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crew of the Northern Pacific Railroad* Three years later
another minor crisis developed near Hoopa Valley, California,
6 ?
where whites were crowding Klamaths out of their homes, J But 
the biggest test since the mass invasion of the Black Hills in 
1875 came in Indian Territory, which was literally overrun by 
would-be settlers and ranchers from 1879 until Oklahoma Terri­
tory was opened in April, 1889*
Organized groups of ”Oklahoma Boomers” made their 
initial entry into Indian Territory in the spring of 1879 in 
spite of President Hayes’ proclamation against trespassing 
upon Indian lands. The following spring, in defiance of 
another proclamation, Captain David L. Payne led more emi­
grants into the Territory. Soldiers were detailed to expel 
the intruders, but Congress’ failure to enact effective re-
6k
strictions invited the colonists to return time after time.
To add to the confusion, the Cberokees in the spring 
of 1880 agreed to lease some of their grazing lands west of 
the ninety-sixth parallel to cattlemen from the surrounding
62
Acting Commissioner E, L. Stevens to Secretary of 
the Interior, November 17, 1682, I.O.R.B. No. 1*3, NA, RG 75.
6 ^
^The Klamaths were not on the reservation assigned to 
their tribe, but, like the Nez Perce in 1887, resided in an 
area which they had improved and occupied for many years. 
(Stevens to Secretary of the Interior, May 19» 1885. I.O.R.B. 
Ho. 52, NA, RG 75).
6k
Priest, op. cit.. 7l|.-75> 160-162. The intruders 
maintained that lands purchased from the Five Civilized 
Tribes for the settlement of hostile bands but not used for 
that purpose were public domain. (SW, l88l, 8I4.*)
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vicinity* The military somewhat reluctantly suspended efforts 
to exclude the lessees, ’’This arrangement will prove the 
Trojan Horse by which the Indian Territory will become invaded 
by settlers,” General Sherman predicted, "and it will be next 
to impossible for the Army to distinguish between the II-
B65censed grazers and employees and the unlawful intruders," The 
Indian Bureau believed, however, that the leasing system would 
provide the Indians with additional income and an opportunity 
to learn how to raise cattle without losing title to their 
land.^ The shortsightedness of this position was brought 
out by an 1883 Investigation which indicated that about a 
hundred thousand untaxed cattle were in the "Cherokee Strip" 
and that many cattlemen were building ranches, fencing and
A7
rapidly depleting the timber supply, 1 Moreover, cattle
raisers were beginning to rent pasture lands from tribes such
as the Cheyennes and Arapahoes for as little as a cent and a 
68
half an acre.
During the next two years the Army’s task of protecting 
the reservations of the Territory grew more onerous. Soldiers 
were expected not only to expel disgruntled settlers and un­
licensed cattlemen, but protect the herds from white and 
Indian raiders and restrain the tribesmen who become dissatisfied
^End., Sherman, April 15, 1880, E&M, Vol. I,
^Priest, op, cit., 160-161,
^Priee to Secretary of the Interior, March ll|., 1883,
I.O.R.B. No. 1|4, NA, RG 75.
^Teller to E. Penlon Esq., April 25, 1883, D.I.L.S.,
NA, RG 75; SI, 1883, XV-XVI. *
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because of lease violations. Circumstances became quite
critical in tbe summer of 1885, when the Cheyennes threatened
to go on the warpath against white trespassers. At the
eleventh hour General Sheridan made a special investigation
and recommended that all cattle be removed from Cheyenne and
Arapaho Reservation and that the region be temporarily placed
69
under martial law. These recommendations were adopted by 
the order of President Arthur, and the impending uprising was
7 0  n  naverted. Subsequently, troops acquired the "unprofessional* 
duty of overseeing the cattle-raising activities of the In­
dians.^
Occasionally, as in the case just mentioned, the
situation at an agency was such that an Army officer was put
in chargeo Fewer regulars acted in this capacity than in former
years —  only five in 1879 and three in 1887 —  but their ser-
72
vice was of special significance. They were chosen, as a 
rule, for their wide experience in Indian affairs and/or the 
exigencies involved. San Carlos Agency, Arizona, for in­
stance, was administered by military men because of the un-
^Sheridan to Secretary Endicott, July 1 7, 1885, 
and Sheridan to President July 18 and 26, 1885, C.G.L.S.,
na, rg 108.
Stat. L., 1023.
7^-See Sheridan's comment on the military removal of 
cattle from Uintah Agency, End., Shsridan, December 12,
I887, to Secretary of War to General of the Army, H.A.L.R.,
File 2808, NA, RG 108.
72CIA, 1879, 267-269; CIA, 1887, lj.ll-li.13.
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during the trouble at Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency in 1885, 
the government turned to Captain Jesse M. Lee, who bad ex­
perience as an agent in Nevada and at the Spotted Tail Sioux
a 7^Agency.
Some Army personnel also acted in what they believed 
to be the Indians’ best interest by training them as scouts 
or soldiers or, in a few cases, by helping to educate their 
youth. Such work, though,was not a general policy, for mili­
tary leaders were not unanimous about the value of Indian 
troops and usually believed that academic instruction should 
be left to civilians. Incidentally, the latter position did 
not represent a change in attitude since the debate over In­
dian control; only transfer opponents contended that soldiers 
wished to teach the Indians in person.
After 1879, many reformers showed an interest in the 
establishment of an Indian army to complement the agency 
police system and relieve detachments of regulars.^ This
73A special situation existed at Hoopa Valley, Cali­
fornia. Most of the property of this agency was removed to 
Round Valley in the late Seventies, but several hundred 
Hoopas and Klamaths chose to remain at Hoopa and requested 
military supervision. (CIA, 1887, 8 ).
^Sheridan to President, July 18, 1885, C.G.L.S.,
NA, RG 108. Lee helped to restore order and promptly moved 
the Indians from the vicinity of the agency to other parts of 
their reservation where they might raise stock and farm. 
(J.D.C, Atkins to Capt. J. M. Lee, September 19, 1885,
I.O.L.B. No. 70, Land Division, NA RG 75).
75
See, for example, Charles Otis to R. B. Eayes. June 
12, 1880, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
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movement was encouraged by General Crook's enthusiastic re­
ports of yeoman service by organized scouts in operations
76
against the Apaches. In 188J4. the Senate Committee on In­
dian Affairs unsuccessfully proposed the creation of a trans-
77Mississippi military academy for Indian youths. General 
Sheridan was among the Army spokesmen who attacked this scheme, 
arguing that the Indians had not yet reached "that plane in 
their evolution” where they could be relied upon for full-time
J O
service. Nevertheless, Indian auxiliaries were trained and
used in the Division of the Pacific. General Schofield, the
division commander, advocated an expansion of that program as
a means of strengthening the Army with the ”best natural
soldiers in the world” and encouraging tribes to regard them-
79selves as allies of the government.
The outstanding example of academic training by Array 
officers, the work of Captain Pratt and General Armstrong, 
has already been mentioned. Pratt's labors, in particular, 
were not appreciated by some of his superiors. He was on 
temporary duty away from his unit, the 10th Cavalry, and,upon 
requesting assistance from an officer of the 11th Infantry, 
he received the following caustic reply from General Sherman:
7^Brlg„ Gen, George Crook, "Resume of Operations 
Against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886,” (privately printed, 
1886), 5-6, 21-22.
77'Secretary Lincoln to General of the Army, February 
8, 1881]., H.A.L.R., HA, RG 108.
7^Ibld. .End.. Sheridan, February 16, 1881]..
79SW, 1885, 131-132.
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You who are absent flatter yourselves that you 
are doing work of more importance etc*, whereas the 
work a man should do, is that for which he is com­
missioned and paid*••*1 am really sorry to find that 
you, an army officer, are already so far weaned of 
your profession, as to believe the teaching of Indian 
children, under & civil bureau of the Government is a 
more important and honorable office than to command 
men in battle, for the 10th cavalry and 11th Infantry 
are today fighting the enemies of civilization*^
Still another way in which the Army indirectly, but 
somewhat begrudgingly, assisted Indian education was through 
the transfer of military facilities to the Indian Bureau*
In 1882 Congress authorized the Secretary of War to set aside 
vacant posts or barracks for Indian schools and to detail one 
or more officers to supervise the educational work at these 
locations* x The War Department took its time about turning 
buildings over to the civil branch, chiefly because many com­
manders were leery a bout renewed Indian troubles and re­
luctant to part with accommodations which had been built at 
considerable cost and effort* General Sheridan even warned 
against plots by Indian inspectors to embarrass the adminis­
tration of post commanders and speed the removal of troops*82 
Furthermore, few officers were detailed to administer Indian 
education at vacated posts for any length of tlme*8^
Sherman to Capt* R.E* Pratt, March 5* 1880, Official 
Letters Sent, W*T* Sherman, V* II* For Pratt's defense of his 
educational activities, see Eastman, Red Man's Moses, 88*
8l22 Stat* L., 181*
82Sheridan to Sherman, January 17, 1882, I.0*L*R*, 
Education, File 1888, NA, RG ?£•
^Consult the list of school personnel for 1887 in CIA, 
I887, 322-346*
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Although certain officers were opposed to Army involve­
ment in Indian education, the military was not, as a whole, 
disinterested in Indian welfare. This was clearly indicated 
in expressions of concern for, especially, the physical well­
being of the tribes. For several reasons, notably Congress1 
practice of cutting appropriations and fluctuations in the 
price of staples, the agency wards were sometimes without 
sufficient food. Western commanders protested vigorously 
about starvation or near starvation at reservations in Indian 
Territory and Arizona in 1882 and in Wyoming and Arizona in 
l881f.,®^  The bitterest complaints, as in earlier years, were 
made by Maj. Gen, John Tope, commander of the Department of 
the Missouri, In April, 1882, when the Cheyennes and Arapa- 
hoes were in need of food, Pope denounced the ’’inhuman service”
of forcing them to starve in peace and acted upon his own
85
authority to borrow beef from neighboring herds, ^ A month
later he visited Mescalero Agency in New Mexico and found
86conditions "worse than,,,with the Cheyennes," To evade 
regulations against the transfer of supplies from one depart­
ment to another, he put troops in "nominal control” of the 
Mescaleros as prisoners of war. Although criticized for
8k
SW, 1882, 97-98; Pope to Sheridan, May 18. 1882,
I.O.L.R., Education, File 9882, NA, RG 75; SW, 188k, 117, 169,
®^Pope to Maj, William Dunn, April 3, 1882, I.O.L.R., 
Education, File 6378 and Pope to Acting AG Williams, April 
17, 1882, I.O,L.R., Education, File 7837, NA, RG 75,
0/
Pope to Sheridan, May 18, 1882, I,0,L.R., Education, 
File 9882, NA, RG 75,
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R7
steadfastly defended these measures.
Finally a discussion of the role of the military in 
connection with Indian relations in period 1879 to 1887 should 
take note of the influence of Army leaders upon Indian policy. 
By virtue of their long acquaintance with frontier problems 
and contacts with numerous tribes, Generals Sherman, Sheridan, 
Crook, Miles Pope, Schofield and others were widely recog­
nized as authorities on the Indian problem. Civil officials 
often consulted them in person or by correspondence. They 
were also selected to serve on various special commissions.
For example, Crook and Miles were members of the commission
President Hayes appointed in 1880 to study the condition of 
88
the Poncas. Furthermore, the frontier commanders’ annual
reports usually included comments and recommendations on
Indian affairs which were considered, although not always
89
favorably, by legislators and policy-makers.
While the opinions of Army spokesmen differed, many 
supported the same changes in Indian policy advocated by 
civilian reform groups. For instance, General Crook dis­
cussed the need for criminal laws for the Indians and noted 
the Hhappy results” of trial by Indian juries.^ 0 Generals
8^Pope to Acting AG Williams, June 28, 1882, I.O.L.R., 
Education, File 12502 and Pope to Teller, April 27, 1882,
I.O.L.E., Education, File 8873, NA, RG 75.
Q Q
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 30. lj.6th Cong., 3 sess (Serial
191+1), l8HoT
89sw, 1879-1887, passim.
90SW, 1883, 166-167; SW, 18814., 132-133*
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Miles and Schofield pointed out the benefits of practical,
91industrial education for young tribesmen. On questions
concerning Indian lands, military views ranged from General
Pope’s argument for abandoning the frontier reservations and
removing the Indians to the East to the contention of several
officers that the reservations should be retained, but re-
92
duced and allotted to the Indians in severalty. General 
Sheridan was one of the leading exponents of allotments, and 
his scheme for half-section holdings by each family was one 
of the alternatives considered by Congress in the debate which
93led to the adoption of the Dawes Act,
LINGERING PROBLEMS
The Army's participation in the government’s program 
of reforming the Indians, together with the passing of the 
major Indian wars and decline of the transfer issue, contri­
buted toward a gradual improvement in civil-military relations. 
Inter-departmental disagreements became less common. Fewer 
agents complained of Army interference, while a growing num­
ber expressed gratitude for the "courtesy and assistance”
91SW, 1885, 132; SW, 1886, 171}.. Miles published 
various articles on military-Indian relations. See "Indian 
Problem," North American Review. CXXVIII (March, 1879), 301}.- 
311}.; "Our EElitary Past and Future," Atlantic Monthly, 
(November, 1869), 561-575*
92sw, 1881, 123; SW, 1883, 62, 131, 153-151}-.
93SW, 1885, 62; SW, 1886, 76-77; The Nation.XVII 
(March 11, 1886), 215-216.
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„ 9k
of post commanders and their gentlemanly subordinates.
Some even paid special tribute to troops for helping to elevate
their wards. ”No one of practical experience on the frontier,”
the Pine Ridge agent asserted, ”can deny the fact that the
military have exercised and are exercising an important part
*95
in civilizing these people."
Unfortunately, though, the old problem of divided 
authority continued to encumber Indian affairs in the 1880's. 
Somewhat reluctantly, military leaders acceded to the govern­
ment's decision to leave the general supervision of the tribes 
in the hands of the Interior Department. ”It may be that the 
Army can better manage these ^fontanaj Indians,” General 
Sherman remarked to General Sheridan in 1879, ”but that is
not our province to decide. The law places them under the
custody and management of Civil Agents, and it is our duty 
*96to submit. But it was easier to advocate harmony and 
cooperation than to practice it. There were still two sets
of officials acting upon some of the same Indians, with re­
sultant differences of opinion about the procedures to follow 
with especially, the less advanced red men.
Rivalry between War and Interior authorities was 
evidenced, first, by bickering over sundry matters. One
9^"CIA, 1881- 99, 103; CIA, 1882, 69, 105, 112, 125; 
CIA, 1885, 152; CIA, 1886, 262.
9^CIA, 1879, 38.
96End., Sherman, Schurz to Secretary of War, January 
11, 1879, AGO L.R., Pile 7^33, NA, RG 95*
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source of irritation was the question of how to dispose of 
Indian prisoners. The Indian Bureau declared that it lacked 
the facilities to handle tribesmen arrested for criminal 
activities. The military, on the other hand, complained of 
having to transport, guard and care for such Indians, parti­
cularly because the Bureau so often ordered their release in 
a comparatively short time. In 1379, when Commissioner Hayt 
requested the Army to send some prisoners from Oregon to a
military prison in Florida, Sherman called the proposal 
n *»97worse than a farce. Hayt finally agreed to confine them 
in Oregon.
Spokesmen of the two branches sparred verbally, too,
over the Indians’ moral status. Agents continued to condemn
99nearby detachments for debasing Indian women. Meantime,
Army leaders found fault with the religious and moral train­
ing carried on at the agencies. Sherman, a Catholic, was 
dismayed by the policy of barring the Catholic or other faiths 
from certain places. But, he lamented, the Indian Bureau was
so "jealous" of the Array that it would do no good to make sug-
• 100 
gestions on this score.
General 0. B. Willcox, moreover, denounced the Indian
*^End., Sherman, March 5, 1879, E&M, Vol. I.
98
Hayt to Secretary of the Interior, April 3, 1879,
I.O.R.B. No. 32, NA, RG 75o
"CIA, 1883, lOij..
■^^Sherman to Rt. Reverend Bishop Lamy, March 28, 1879, 
Official Letters Sent, W, T. Sherman, Vol. VII.
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system for failing to inspire virtue and sobriety among the
Arizona red men. "As the French railroads push down into
Algeria," he reflected, "the wandering natives of the desert
settle around the wells and plant date trees. Here they come
to squat and drink whisky."'*’0'*’
At times ostensibly trivial matters became the cause
of great contention. Such was the case with a heated dispute
over the use of reservation timber by garrisons stationed
near the agencies to protect and discipline the tribes. In
l88l, after numerous complaints by the agents, Commissioner
Price submitted a "serious protest" against the Army's "reck-
102less consumption" of wood. The following year, he alleged
that the Indians' timber was being wasted at ten posts and 
103camps. At first, War Department officials tried to belittle 
these charges, inferring that they represented the height of 
ingratitude for military assistance. Eventually, though, 
orders were issued for the conservation of woodlands in various 
districts
Still other misunderstandings arose over the problem 
of determining who was to give orders in a given circumstance 
and what responsibilities subordinates of one branch had toward
101SW, 1879, 165.
102CIA, 1881, XXX.
^°^Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 161. I}-7th Cong., 1 seas. (Serial 
1991), 18827"
^■^■Miscellaneous correspondence, AGO L.R., File 2292, 
NA, RG 9i^ .
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the officers of the other* Military authorities were some­
times rankled, for instance, by the Indian administrators* 
failure to keep them informed on the condition and tempera­
ment of the Indiana*10^ General Pope reiterated his familiar 
censure of the ’anomolous” position in which soldiers were 
placed* Troops were held accountable for the behavior of
reservation residents, he grumbled, but could not act without
106invitation from an agent* Conversely, some agents were 
uncertain of their relationship to high-ranking Army officers, 
who at times attempted to give them directions* ”No officer 
of the Army,” Commissioner J*D.C* Atkins assured the Colville 
agent in l88£, Bno matter what his rank may be, has any 
authority to give you orders...except /sic*7 they are received 
by you through this Office and Department*
Competition between the civil and military departments 
was indicated, further, by prolonged and stormy feuds between 
certain military commanders and Indian officials. Such a quar­
rel developed between Lt* Col* w.P. Carlin, commander of Port 
Yates, Dakota Territory, and J.A* Stephan, agent at Standing 
Rock. Carlin began a private campaign against the Indian 
Bureau in 1876 by violating current inter-departmental agree­
ments in various ways. He held ex parte councils with the
10^End., Sherman, May 20, 1879, E&M, Vol. I.
10^Pope to Acting AG, Div. Mo., October 11, 1880,
D.I.L.R., War Department, Indian Division, HA, RG 75*
107
Atkins to S.P* Moore, November 2ij., 1885, I.O.L.B.
No* 118, Finance, NA, RG 75*
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Sioux and Crows, gave them hunting passes and invited them to
"I nft
"dances" at the post against the advice of their agents*
Early in 1880, despite strenuous objections by Stephan and the 
Indian Bureau, Carlin again pre-empted control over the In­
dians by removing a number of families to the east side of the
10°Missouri, opposite Standing Rock Agency. 7
Commissioner R. E. Trowbridge asked the Secretary of War 
to stop Carlin's meddling. But the Post commander disregarded 
admonitions to respect the authority of Agent Stephans and his 
subordinates. In the fall of 1880, the acting agent reported 
still further "subversive" activities by Cajplin.1'1'0 Finally, 
after Carlin published an unsubstantiated attack against 
several Indian Office employees, General Sherman directed 
General Sheridan to take decisive measures. "The Indian Bu­
reau cannot possibly execute Its office," Sherman declared,
"if our Commanding Officers thus cavil at their authority.
Fort Yates must be abandoned, or some other officer sent to 
-111
command.... Hiram Price, the new Commissioner, was
anxious to speed Carlin's removal, observing:
108
Hayt to Secretary of the Interior, December 31,
1879, I.O.R.B. No. 35; Carlin to Acting AG, D©pt. of Dakota, 
February 19, 1878 and March 23, 1878, I.O.L.R.,; W. T. Hughes 
to Secretary Schurz, November 22, 1 878, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75>*
109
R. E, Trowbridge to Secretary of the Interior, March 
17, 1880, I.O.R.B. No. 36, NA, RG 75. Carlin maintained that 
there were evil influences at the agency.
■^^E. M. Marble to Secretary of the Interior, October 
30, 1880, I.O.R.B. No. 37, NA, RG 75.
■^•^Instructions to Sheridan, signed by AG R. C. Drum, 
December 8, 1880, I.O.L.R., Education, File 1051, NA, RG 70.
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..♦his /Carlin* s j  administration has been more remarkable 
than that of any other officer in the service, by reason 
of the difficulties created by him, with the Agents, dis­
cords among the Indians, and a constant and unwarranted 
interference in the affairs of the Indians and the 
Agency
Another instance of conflicting authority occurred at 
Malheur Reservation in Oregon in the ear?<.y Eighties, The 
military first experienced difficulty with the Malheur In­
dians in June, 1878, when some of the Piutes joined the Ban-
113
nocks then raiding nearby settlements. At that time troops 
occupied the reservation, partly dismantled the agency and 
arrested the Malheur residents as "hostiles." Subsequently, 
the Indians were removed, at considerable expense, to Father 
Wilbur’s model agency at Yakama Reserve in Washington Terri­
tory.^^ Brig. Gen. 0. 0. Howard, the department commander, 
was reportedly quite eager to ”break up” the Piutes* old 
reservation, while their agent, W. V. Rinehart, agreed that 
this step might be in the ”best interests of the service.
But among the red men sent to Yakama were about a hundred
followers of Chief Leggins who had not participated In the 
1 l6outbreak. As a result, military and civil leaders became
112price Secretary of the Interior, April 27, 1881,
1.0.R.B. No. 39» NA, RG 7 5. Not all of Carlin's superiors 
criticized his actions. (Terry to Sheridan. May 7, l88l,
1.0.L.R., Education, File 17535, NA, RG 75).
■^•^CIA, 1878, 119-120. See also preceeding chapter.
13j*-CIA, 1878, 120; CIA, 1879, 129. Wilbur, too, is 
mentioned in the foregoing chapter.
^ C I A ,  1879, 130.
^•^Ibld.; CIA, 1880, ll|0. Leggins and his people, in 
fact saved several whites during the outbreak.
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involved in a lengthy argument over what to do with Leggins 
and non-reservation remnants of the Piute tribe.
In 1880 the elderly Piute chief, Winnemucca, and bis 
daughter, "Princess" Sarah, led a "self-constituted" delegation 
on a much publicized visit to Washington, D.C. to ask for 
justice for the prisoners and their relatives. Secretary 
Schurz reluctantly agreed that Leggins’ people could return
117to Malheur if the non-reservation bands settled there, too. 
Agent Rinehart pressed for an early end to the Piutes’ "unjust 
banishment," but was disappointed. The scattered bands re­
fused to move to the reservation; Agent Wilbur contended that 
the Indians were better off at Yakama; citizens of Oregon and 
some military officers opposed the removal and, finally, Secre-
118 K H
tary Schurz changed his mind. Later, Princess Sarah, the 
wife of an Army sergeant, enlisted the support of a few mili­
tary officers in a bold and almost successful scheme to send a 
special "agent" to lead the Piutes back to their old homes, 
Before this affair was settled (Malheur Reserve was returned 
to the public domain by executive order in May, 1 8 8 3), many 
derogatory comments had been exchanged between Army and civil­
ian authorities.120
Even more overt than the War-Interior differences in
117CIA, 1880, XLVI,
ll8Ibld.: XLVI, lt|.0-llpL.
^ P r i c e  to Dolpb, November 28, I883, I.O.L.B. No,
181, Misc., NA, RG 75,
120CIA, 1883, 2 . 2 k .
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Dakota and Oregon, however, were those which occurred in Ari­
zona in the period 1882 to 1886. In the latter territory, 
dual control was a recognized policy because of intermittent 
warfare with the Apaches. This situation led to numerous 
controversies, the most notorious of which involved, on one 
hand, General George Crook and his subordinates and, on the 
other, the Indian administrators at San Carlos Agency. Crook 
had headed the Department of Arizona and conducted successful 
campaigns against the Apaches from 1871 to 1875 and afterwards
commanded the Department of the Platte, where he led troops
121in crucial battles with the Sioux. Then, in September,
122
1882, he resumed command in Arizona, After conferences
with various Apache bands, he issued a general order setting
forth the principles to be followed toward them: “Justice
to all," "strictest fidelity," "no division of responsibility"
123
and "strict accountability by each officer." Next, the 
veteran commander undertook active operations against the 
wandering hostiles, and, within a few months, most were de­
feated and located at the large White Mountain reservation in 
eastern Arizona.
At first, General Crook and his assistants got along 
quite well with Agent P. P. Wilcox, who headed San Carlos, the
■*"2^See Chapter Six.
1220gle, op., cit.. 216.
12 3
^General Order No. I4.3, Hqs, Dept. Arizona- October 5, 
1882, cited in Crook, "Operations," 2-3*
12^Ibid., I4.; SW, 1883, 163-165*
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White Mountain Agency. Although Wilcox opposed a daily In­
dian roll-call, he agreed to exclusive military control of
125
camps not in the immediate vicinity of agency headquarters.
But in the spring of 1883, when Crook proposed to bring 
Geronimo and his unruly followers to San Carlos, the agent 
protested to Secretary Teller. Thereupon, the department 
commander was called to Washington to give account of his 
activities. He defended his policy so well that, on July 7, 
officials of the War and Interior departments signed an agree­
ment giving the military complete police control over the
126
Apaches, including those at San Carlos.
Agent Wilcox soon took exception to the Army’s sweeping
authority. He wrangled with Captain Emmet Crawford, the
officer detailed to keep an eye on the agency, over the
management of farming operations and distribution of supplies.
127
He also criticized Crook for bis use of Indian juries. 
nThe policy of the Interior Department,” the agent com­
plained in February, 1881}., "...is not in harmony with the 
practice of the military officer to whom police control of 
the Reservation has been entrusted...bis acts and...his 
utterances...would deprive the agent of all voice in the 
management of Indian affairs....” in the fall, following
127
Ogle, op,, cit.. 226-227.- Wilcox alleged that an 
Indian jury had sentenced a murderer to be clubbed and stoned 
to death. (Wilcox to Price, February 9, I88I1, I.O.L.R., File 
3395, NA, RG 75}.
1280gle, pp. cit., 227-229*
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
359
further clashes over the sale of Indian property and hunting
129
permits, Wilcox resigned,,
The new agent, C. D. Ford, tried to reestablish civil
130
control, but was not supported by Secretary L.Q.C. Lamar*
Ford, too, bemoaned his powerless position, contending that 
he was outranked by any secohd lieutenant who was backed by 
the Army "calaboose."1^  Meantime, Crook waged relentless war 
on the Apaches who refused to live at peace on the reservations 
and persisted in his demand for undivided authority* Army 
officers should manage ration issues and discipline the tribes­
men, he argued, for it was said, ttthe hand that feeds should 
132
punish.” Upon leaving Arizona, in 1886, he published a 
defense of his administration, noting the obstacles and "ad­
verse elements" which had to be overcome. One of the major
hindrances, Crook concluded, was the "more or less open and
«133always covert opposition from the Indian Department.
Thus, more than two decades after the civil War, a 
veteran of many years of service in the West testified to the 
lingering difficulty of dual authority over the Indians. As
129
Ogle, o£. cit., 227-229.
^■^^Lamar to Secretary of War, January 31, 1885, D.I.L.S,, 
Indian Division, NA, RG 75*
131Cited in Acting Commissioner A. B, Upshaw to Secre­
tary of the Interior, August 6, 1885, D.I.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 75.
132
Crook to AG, Div. Pacific, June 5, 1885, Crook Papers. 
Crook discusses the problems of dual control at length in SW, 
1885, 170-178.
Crook, "Operations," 5*
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long as th© red men were not amenable to civil lawa and were 
acted upon by both the War and Interior departments, their ad­
ministration was confused and obstructed by jurisdictional 
disputes. But these circumstances were being changed. The 
Indian frontier and th© day of tribal resistance to the govern­
ment were drawing to a close; the Army was beginning to with­
draw from some of its outposts and the Indians1 way of life 
was being reformed. Once the Indian race was "out of reach of 
civilization," President Cleveland commented in his annual 
message for 1886, but now "barbarism," long fostered by a 
"defective system of control," was yielding to the march of
13|i
progress* As the President spoke, Congress was in the 
process of devising legislation which would revolutionize the 
reservation system and the Indians1 legal status.
I 3I4.
Richardson, Messages. V I I I ,  £ l 8 .
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CHAPTER NINE
1887: THE DOOR HAS BEEN OPENED
..♦the door has been opened through which every 
individual Indian by proper effort may pass from the 
savage life to the enjoyment of the fruits and privi­
leges of civilization....The way thus opened, however, 
will not be without its difficulties, its tedious pro­
gress, its slow success, its sufferings, disappoint­
ments, and failures„ It will be wholly unknown to many 




Probably many Americans would be unimpressed by the
announcement that 1962 is the seventy-fifth anniversary of
the Dawes Severalty Act, which has been called "America’s
nlfirst systematic effort to provide for Indian welfare.
While some were also indifferent toward this measure in 1887, 
others, notably those involved in Indian administration, were 
convinced that, for better or worse, it marked the beginning 
of a new era in Indian affairs. Eventually the Dawes Act, 
too, was to give way to legislation charting a different 
course in Indian policy. Yet, its adoption coincided with 
the decline of inter-departmental control of the tribes and, 
therefore, serves as an appropriate concluding point for the 
present study. A brief comment on the origin and effects of 
the severalty policy will be followed by a summarization and
■^Priest, on, cit.. 2^2.
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evaluation of the significance of War-Interior supervision 
of the Indians in the period l86f?-l887*
THE DAWES ACT AND ITS EFFECTS
The Dawes Act, approved February 8, 1887, was a mile­
stone in government-Indian relations. It empowered the 
President, at his discretion, to order the division of the 
lands of most tribes, alloting one hundred and sixty acres 
to the heads of families, eighty acres to orphans and single 
persons over eighteen and forty acres to single persons under 
eighteen, with double these amounts if the land was suitable 
only for grazing. To prevent the recipients from rapidly 
disposing of their plots, titles were to be placed in trust 
for at least twenty-five years. Surplus lands were to be 
sold, and the proceeds held by the Treasury for the education 
and civilization of the tribe concerned. Finally, as the 
tribesmen accepted allotments or voluntarily established a
a separate residence and lived in a civilized manner, they
2
were to obtain the rights of citizenship.
These provisions had a marked effect upon the status 
of the Indian and the government’s role in Indian affairs.
For many red men, private ownership was substituted for their
2
Stat, L,, 388-391• The Dawes Act did not affect 
various tribes living in Indian Territory, New York or in 
Nebraska along the southern boundary of the Sioux Reserva­
tion, In case a tribe’s lands did not suffice for such 
allotments, lesser amounts were pro-rated to members of the 
tribe.
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time-honored system of communal land-bolding, a basic aspect 
of tribal relations. For the first time, too, a large pro­
portion of the Indians were eligible to enjoy constitutional 
privileges formerly extended to but a small fraction of their 
race. At the same time, the problematic reservation system 
was subject to revision, with corresponding changes in the 
administrative duties of the civil and military departments. 
Although all reserved areas were not to be eliminated, those 
which remained were to be smaller and easier to manage.
Yet, the provision for allotment in severalty was an 
innovation only in scope, for, as was noted in the last 
chapter, tribes had individual land ownership long before 
1887, Likewise, the notion that a general allotment program 
might solve the Indian problem was not new, although it was 
not seriously considered in Congress until the Eighties, The 
first, and perhaps most comprehensive, congressional debate
on the subject came in 1880, when a bill proposing severalty
3
for the Utes of Colorado was submitted for approval.
In a discussion which followed, neither party nor sec­
tional lines, a variety of arguments were offered for and 
against the TJte proposal. Critics spoke of the Indians’
^Priest, o|>. cit,. 188-189* This bill was proposed to 
implement an agreement made with the Utes after their out­
break In the fall of 1879. (CIA, 1879, XVIII-XXXVII; CIA, 
1880, XXIV-XXV, 193-198), Among the earlier advocates of 
severalty were Bishop Henry Whipple, Senator William M. 
Stewart of Nevada, Representative Sidney Clarke of Kansas, 
Commissioner J, Q. Smith, members of the Board of Indian Com­
missioners and Society of Friends and, notably, Secretary of 
the Interior Carl Schurz.
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unpreparedness for private ownership, the probability that 
white neighbors would deprive them of their holdings, the 
social disruption which might result from such inter-racial 
economic equality and the ultimate danger of Indian extinc­
tion. Proponents described the bill as an alternative to war, 
a permanent solution to the Ute problem, a means of protect­
ing the Indians, a formal recognition of an inevitable change 
in native customs and a basis for promoting white expansion 
in Colorado.^- After the pros and cons were considered, Con­
gress approved the measure, mainly because many legislators
c
felt that It was a panacea or necessity*
Oddly enough, Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, 
chairman of the Senate Indian Committee and author of the 
severalty act of 1887, was among those who took exception to 
the Ute bill. Dawes had expressed an interest in allotments 
almost a decade earlier while serving in the House, but be­
lieved that the Utes were not sufficiently educated to benefit 
from private property.^* During the next few years, he 
gradually shifted his position, but only after careful study 
of the Indians' conditions and needs.
Meanwhile, Representative Alfred M. Scales of North
^Cong. Record. 46th Cong., 2 sess., X, 2027ffi Priest, 
on* cit., 189-193.
$
Priest, jog. cit.. 191*
^Ibid.. 193-195; Cong. Record. 46th Cong., 2 sess. X, 
2130 and 46th Cong., 3 sess,, Xl, 946; H. L. Dawes to H. M, 
Teller, September 19» 1882, Dawes Papers.
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Carolina, Senator Richard Coke of Texas and others sponsored
general severalty bills which received committee approval but
7
failed to reach a final vote. Characteristic of the views 
presented in debates on these proposals were those set forth 
in a divided report by the House Indian Committee in 1880*
The majority, in supporting a bill introduced by the chairman, 
Scales, maintained that severalty was "imperative," because 
it would stimulate the Indians to work, become self-reliant
g
and obtain a practical knowledge of the laws of property.
But the minority condemned the bill as the hobby of "specula­
tive philanthropists," declaring that the Indian would remain 
a "communist" whether he had a quarter-sectlon or not. They 
also stressed the contradiction of assuming that the Indian 
was a competent citizen with respect to property but a "ward 
in chancery" in other respects. In conclusion, the dissenters 
warned:
The sting of this animal is in its tall. When the 
Indian has got his allotments, the rest of his land is 
to be put up to the highest bidder, and he is to be 
surrounded in his allotments with a wall of fire, a 
cordon of white settlements, which will gradually but 
surely hem him in, circumscribe him, and eventually 
crowd him out,9
Cognizant of these criticisms, Senator Dawes worked on
a bill which would be practical and just for both the Indians
and frontiersmen. His measure first passed the Senate in
"^Priest, op,, cit,, 185-186,
^HR Rpt No, 1576. lj.6th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1938), 
1880, 6,
9Ibid„ 7-10.
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February, 1866, and, two months later, was endorsed by the
i n
House Indian Committee,'’'' Subsequently, however, there was a 
lengthy delay as conference committees considered various 
amendments and questions about virtually every phase of the 
proposal. The conferees debated over who should choose the 
allotments, when and where the choice should be made, what to 
do with the income from land sales and how long the assigned 
lands should be inalienable.^ So many compromises were made 
that even Dawes had misgivings about the measure which 
finally received the President's signature. More Indians 
were covered by the citizenship provision that he had intended, 
the red men had no guarantee of getting good land and many 
important matters were delegated to those who administered 
the Act,^
For the most part, though, the Dawes Act was Initially
heralded as enlightened reform. Many of the Indians' friends
were elated and began to laud Dawes as the savior of the red
race even before the bill was signed, "Your Bill," wrote
Clinton B. Fisk, chairman of the Board of Indian Commission-
13era, "is the star in the East for the Indian Tribes,"
•^HR Rpt No, 1835, l*.9th Cong,, 1 sess, (Serial 2i|i|0),
1886,
Priest, 0£. cit,. 212-213, 228-229, 233-231*., Iron­
ically, Lt, Gen. Sheridan backed an alternative plan which 
would have given each Indian family twice as large an allot­
ment as was finally decided upon. (The Nation, XVII (March 
11, 1886), 315-316. 5
•^BIC, 1886, 131; Priest, op, cit., 232; Dawes to E, 
Whittlesey, April 21*., IB87, B.C.M., NA, RG 75.
13Clinton Fisk to Dawes, December 21, 1886, Dawes
Papers.
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Captain Pratt, head of Carlisle Indian School, called the 
severalty measure "the first enactment of any law looking to 
the divorcement of the Indian from the worse than slavery of 
bis old Communistic systems. In bis annual report for 
1887, Secretary Lamar termed it the most important Indian law 
ever passed.*'’ Finally, a leading lobbyist for the Indian 
Rights Association published a eulogy in which the new law 
was compared to the Magna Charta and Declaration of Indepen­
dence,*^
On the other hand, there were those who criticized the 
Severalty Act as being too liberal or too radical, as adding 
to the Indian problem rather than solving it. Some, for example, 
especially westerners, objected to the clause which granted 
citizenship to Indian allottees, while others, including re­
formers such as Professor James B. Thayer of Harvard Law
School, complained that all Indians should have been made
17citizens immediately. Objections were raised, too, by some 
who disliked the provision which stated that if the Indians 
failed to comply with instructions to choose allotments with­
in four years from the date of notification, the government
18
would do it for them,
V  s. Pratt to Dawes, December 20, 1886, Dawes Papers,
*£si, 1887, 2 5,
*8Charles C, Painter, The Dawes Land in Severalty Bill 
and Indian Emancipation (Philadelphia, 1887), 1*
*?Priest, 0£. cit,. 212-213; J. B. Thayer to Dawes,
May 27, 1886, Dawes Papers,
*82ij. Stat, L,, 388; Priest, o£. cit,, 2Jj.0-2lj.lt
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To the disappointment of those who bad predicted great
results frcm the Severalty Act, it soon became apparent that
it was not the long-awaited panacea for the complex Indian
problem. Senator Dawes’ uneasiness about the extent to which
its effectiveness depended upon those who executed it was not
unwarranted. He had hoped that the reform groups which had
championed severalty would exert a salutary influence upon the
19Indian administrators, but their ardor soon waned. JThe 
pressure for rapid allotment to open new areas for white 
settlement proved too great for President Cleveland, Secre­
tary Lamar and their successors. nBefore half a decade had 
passed,” one author remarks, "United States officials had
clearly demonstrated that they were either unable or unwilling
20
to use the Dawes Act for Indian benefit. By 1934* more 
than sixty-two percent of the one hundred and thirty-eight
21
million acres owned by the tribes in 1887 had been alienated.
The Indians lost a vast amount of land not only through 
land sales but through abuses under the allotment policy.
Whites quickly took advantage of loopholes in the Dawes Act, 
leasing allotments at nominal figures; posing as "guardians"
•^Priest, oj3t cit., 250-251; Hagan on. cit.. llj.3*
20Priest, op. cit., 251.
21Hagan, op. cit., Hj-7. In addition, much of the 
allotted land was no longer of practical U3e to the Indians 
after a few years because of multiple heirships. In many 
cases, the only escape from this problem was to lease the 
allotments to whites in the cattle-raising or other businesses. 
(John Collier. Indians of the Americas (New York, abridged 
edition, 195 k ) * 13^; Bluraenthal, op,* cit.. 159).
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for incompetent adults, orphans and childrenj or duping the
red men into designating them as beneficiaries of wills. In
other cases, the Indians were ruined.by excessive taxation or
22
even embezzled or murdered for their lands, "Severalty
may not have civilized the Indian," another scholar concludes
sarcastically, "but it definitely corrupted most of the white
23
men who had any contact with it," Thus, although the door 
to civilization and full participation in American society was 
opened by the legislation of 1887, inter-racial problems, 
based upon earlier conflicts, continued to hamper the progress 
and welfare of the red man,
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS
The period from the end of the Civil War to the passage 
of the Dawes Severalty Act in February, 1887, was perhaps 
the most critical in the history of Indian-white relations.
In these years, white migration compressed and penetrated the 
remaining portions of the once vast "Indian country" of the 
tr&ns-Miasissippi West, giving new point to the recurrent 
question of what to do with the red man. For the first time, 
the government could not "solve" the Indian problem by re­
moving the tribes to out-of-the-way places, A majority of
Hagan, ops cit.. 3J+I4.—li+6,
2 3Ibid., U 4.6 , John Collier is even more critical, 
describing forced allotment as the culminating assault in an 
"all-out offensive against Indian land and society." (Collier, 
op. cit., 133-13^.)
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the nation's more than three hundred thousand "wards” lived 
in the path of the closing frontier, and among them were 
groups with the power and determination to fight for their 
lands and freedom. The latter, in particular, gave urgency to 
the administration of Indian affairs.
Official responsibility for Indian relations resided 
with the Indian Bureau of the Interior Department, but, for 
practical reasons, tbe Army exercised authority over the more 
uncivilized tribes. This tacit division of control was de­
plored by many military officials who argued that the Bureau 
should have remained with the War Department, where It had 
been from its inception in 1821}. until 181j.9, During tbe hectic 
post-war years, the Army and its supporters, most vociferous 
in the West, made a concerted effort to restore military 
management of the Indians. As a consequence, not one, but 
two, vital and perplexing questions were posed in connection 
with the Indians: what should be done with them and which
branch of the government should carry out the will of the 
government?
The difficulties of divided jurisdiction over the 
tribes became apparent shortly after Appomattox and lasted at 
least until the Eighties. Initially, the two departments 
acted semi-independently to achieve an optimum of peace and 
security on the Plains and in the Southwest. The Army, under­
manned and preoccupied in the South, was in no position to 
carry on full-scale operations against the hostile tribes 
which challenged westward expansion. Yet its frontier units
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labored to prevent a general war and helped to impress the 
Indians with the advisability of living at peace on assigned 
reservations. Meantime, the Interior Department, plagued 
by a shortage of funds and a host of organizational difficul­
ties, renewed its efforts to pacify the Indians through new 
treaties. Civil and military officials, jealous of their 
respective powers and in basic disagreement over whether hos­
tile tribes should be dealt with by force or negotiation, 
were frequently at odds.
Although Indian administration subsequently underwent 
numerous significant reforms —  the abolition of the treaty 
system, the selection of church-nominated agency officials, 
the creation of the Board of Indian Commissioners and the intro­
duction of new business methods —  divided control continued 
to complicate and trammel government-Indian relations. Dis­
cord between representatives of the civil and military branches 
was so persistent that, even while serving together on the 
noted Peace Commission of 1867-1868, they disputed the course 
to follow toward, especially, the uncivilized Indians. Nor 
were the policy and administrative issues settled by the "Peace 
Policy" of the Seventies, for the military incurred many im­
portant, but ill-defined, quasi-civil obligations under this 
program of isolating and acculturating the tribes. In short, 
there were controversies between the two branches as long as 
their duties overlapped.
Several attempts were made to clarify the respective 
responsibilities of Army and civilian officials. In 1865,
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an informal joint agreement stated that hostile Indians were 
to be managed by the Indian Bureau. This arrangement, however, 
left much to be desired, for it was not clear when Army rule 
should begin and end, which tribes were "hostile,” or who 
should make the final decision In these matters. Four years 
later, both branches issued directives announcing that the 
Indians on assigned reservations would be supervised exclu­
sively by their civilian agents and those off tribal lands 
by the Army. This scheme was also inadequate because some 
tribes had treaties which permitted them to leave the reser­
vations to hunt. In addition, boundary lines were often un­
marked, and Indian criminals were able to take advantage of 
their immunity from military patrols in reserved areas.
Again, in the Seventies, the division of control was altered in 
special cases to permit military pursuit and intervention on 
Indian lands. Still, no precise, legal definition of the 
authority of each department was ever established, and con­
flicts continued.
Civil-military disharmony obstructed good relations 
with the tribes in various ways. Policies devised in Wash­
ington, generally no more effective than the machinery which 
executed them, were often compromised or defeated. The 
reservation system, for example, depended upon close coordin­
ation and cooperation between the War and Interior departments 
to keep the Indians at designated locations and to satisfy 
their physical needs, safeguard their interests and protect 
them from outside Influences. Repeatedly, these objectives
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were not realized, and, as a result, the red men were ex­
ploited, mistreated or involved in disastrous conflicts with 
settlers or the Army* Although the Indians frequently caused 
their own misfortunes, costly wars such as the Modoc War of 
1872-1873 could be traced, at least in part, to inter-depart- 
mental disunity. Almost invariably, though, Indian troubles 
resulted in mutual recriminations and confusion concerning 
the responsibility of those involved.
Recognizing the disadvantages of this two-headed 
government, many contemporaries proposed to transfer the Indian 
Office to the War Department. Between 1867 and 1871 and again 
between 1876 and 1879, Congress became involved in lengthy 
investigations and heated debates over the transfer question^ 
Transfer advocates, notably military leaders and westerners, 
condemned the existing system, contending that It was ex­
pensive, inefficient, corrupt and ineffective. Military con­
trol, they argued, was the logical alternative. The Army 
had to police the frontier anyway and had the personnel and 
facilities to handle the Indians. Its superior organization 
and supply procedures could provide more dependable service 
at lower cost, and the liability of military men to court- 
martial assured honest administration. Finally, the Indians, 
who respected only force, would be better behaved and more 
content.
Those who opposed military rule, principally Indian 
service employees and easterners, presented an equally force­
ful case. Soldiers, they maintained, were a bad influence on
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the Indiana and were unqualified to Christianize and civilize 
them. Atfmy rule was by nature arbitrary and contrary to the 
freedoms espoused in the Constitution, and the Indians, 
strenuously opposed to military control, were certain to react 
against such a change of authority. It was further argued 
that the Indian Bureau was rapidly improving its supply and 
business procedures, thereby overcoming any advantages the 
military may have had in these respects. Lastly, War Depart­
ment control before I8I4.9 had not been exemplary; nor had 
military administrators distinguished themselves while serving 
as agents in the early part of GrantTs administration.
After weighing the strong and emotional arguments pre­
sented on each side, Congress decided against military manage­
ment of the Indians. Several factors contributed to the 
defeat of transfer proposals at one time or another. In the 
early Seventies, the abolition of the treaty-making system and 
President Grant’s apparent support of civilian control pla­
cated agitation for the change by members of the House of 
Representatives. After 1876 a final surge by the proponents 
of Army rule was blocked by the Republican Senate, the re­
forms inspired by Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz, the 
staunch opposition of the Indians’ friends, the abatement of 
major Indian wars and a general consensus that the military 
was not suited to govern the tribes.
By the Eighties, with the transfer issue on the decline, 
civil-military relations were beginning to Improve. The con­
test for control of Indian affairs had been too long ond
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vigorous to pass without a few further incidents and disputes, 
especially at the local level, but these disagreements were 
more than offset by joint efforts to better the condition of 
the red man* Significantly, the annual reports of both de­
partments began to devote less attention to the question of 
what to do with the Indian and more to the problem of what 
could be done for him* By 1887 even some of the most ardent 
former exponents of military management were reconciled to 
civilian administration of the Indians* Thus, when General 
Crook proposed to publish a defense of his management of the 
Arizona tribes, General Sheridan objected* "To publish the 
letter," he asserted, "would be merely to*•*re-awaken a 
discussion in the public press of a subject which now appears 
to have passed from their attention*
The evidence of this dissertation has demonstrated, 
above all, that the complications of inter-departmental control 
had a decisive and, in many respects, negative effect upon 
Indian relations in the post-Civil War era* What was de- 
rogatively referred to as the "system" was marked by a con­
flict of authority at every echelon* It was costly, inefficient, 
confusing and sometimes produced incidents which had disastrous 
consequences for the Indians* It was, at the same time, an 
arrangement dictated by circumstances which seemed to defy 
accommodation*
Those who wish to understand the origins and results
^End* , Sheridan, March I4., 1887, to H.A.L.R., Pile 52ij.*
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of the federal Indian policy in these years must consider the 
activities, reports and recommendations of both the civil and 
military departments. Although voluminous, the records of 
the Interior Department do not give sufficient attention to 
the many quasi-civil functions carried out by the Army of 
the West, Similarly, War Department sources are often in­
adequate for the study of military activities in Indian coun­
try. Many a treatise has condemned the Army or the Indian 
Bureau, largely because it has been based upon one-3ided 
evidence.
In general,the role of the War Department in the 
implementation and- indirectly, the formulation of the govern­
ment’s Indian program has been underestimated. Troops not 
only suppressed warlike tribes, but policed the reservations, 
regulated trade, Inspected supplies and provided temporary 
administrative and logistical assistance. In addition, offi­
cers who were well acquainted with the Indians served on 
special commissions, testified before Investigating commit­
tees, correspondedjwith civilian administrators and influenced 
policy-makers through their criticisms and proposals. Too 
many of their suggestions were rejected to warrant tbe conclu­
sion that the Army manipulated the Indian service. Yet there 
was more than a coincidental relation between the views of 
military spokesmen and the abolition of the treaty system, 
the establishment of limited reservations and the introduction 
of experiments such as Industrial and military training and 
compulsory land allotment.
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An examination of Indian affairs with reference to the 
concurrent responsibilities of the civil and military branches 
also sheds new light upon various traditional interpretations0 
Judged from a moral, social, legal, political, military or 
economic standpoint, the relationship between the United States 
and its wards has been almost universally repudiated. Al­
though the cliche, nthe Indian was wronged," is supported by 
overwhelming evidence, the basis for this situation cannot be 
fully appreciated apart from the practical, administrative 
aspects of the Indian question.
Perhaps the best Illustration of a view which is revised 
by a study of the dual Indian system concerns the much-dis­
cussed "Grant Peace Policy," The notion that former general 
Grant took the lead in humanitarian Indian reforms is mis­
leading, His adoption of the church nomination of agency 
officials, for example, was largely a reaction to political 
a^ nd administrative exigencies which prevented the extensive 
use of surplus Army officers as agents. Likewise, the 
assumption that the peace program was a victory of the In­
terior Department over the military branch unfairly discounts 
the activities of Army leaders who helped to plan and execute 
that policy,
A different perspective is gained, too, with regard to 
various events. The Indian wars, "massacres" and scandals 
of the Sixties and Seventies have generally been treated as 
indications of the unsettled conditions on the frontier and 
the government’s failure to find a satisfactory solution to
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the Indian problem* But these were more than isolated inci­
dents, as they commonly resulted in contradictory civil and 
military reports, followed by investigations and congressional 
debates which determined the future of Indian relations.
Although many of the mistakes of postwar Indian affairs 
may be traced to the vague division of authority over the 
tribes, the modern critic must not be too categorical in 
judging this arrangement. It is easy, in the first place, 
to exaggerate or oversimplify the divergence between the civil 
and military departments. The agents' annual reports, for in­
stance, include numerous references to the hearty cooperation 
received from post commanders and the progress achieved 
through coordinate activities. Moreover, there was, strictly 
speaking, no "Array view” or ncivilian view" on Indian policy. 
To be sure, the Indians' friends sometimes generalized that 
military men hated the red men and wished to exterminate them. 
At the same time, military spokesmen frequently characterized 
the Indian agents as simpering sentimentalists or crooks.
But few Americans were more concerned about Indian welfare
A
than officers such as Generals Pope, Howard and Kautz, and 
there were many practical-minded, honest and diligent agents, 
such as "Father” Wilbur of Yakama Agency, who were unsung 
heroes of the Indian service.
Another reason for evaluating the Indian system cir­
cumspectly was suggested by former Secretary of the Interior 
Jacob D. Cox in a review of Helen Hunt Jackson's A Century 
of Dlshono^. a work which condemned the Indian policy and
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military activities prior to tbe Eighties. "Tbe philanthropist 
who would gain the right to rebuke must show a remedy," Cox ar- 
gued, "and of remedies there has been a plentiful lack...."
Many contemporaries had opinions on how to solve the Indian 
question, but few appreciated its complexity. The Indians, 
who seldom spoke English or understood or valued the white 
man’s ways, varied considerably in their advancement and dis­
position, Remote from civilized laws and agitated by white 
intruders and evil influences, even the progressive tribes­
men occasionally caused trouble. Simple solutions, including 
undivided civil or military supervision, could not have been 
applied without difficulty.
It is also important to take into account certain fac­
tors which complicated Indian management. In the early part 
of the "Republican Era"(1869-1901), marked by reconstruction 
of the South,industrialization, partisan politics par excel­
lence. the rise of laissez falre thinking and the graft and
corruption of tbe age of "Grantism," maladministration was 
26
commonplace. Meantime, railroad construction, increasing 
overland travel and the growing tide of emigration to the 
frontier multiplied inter-racial conflicts. Although the 
earlier Negro problem differed from the Indian problem in 
scope, in the character and development of the race in ques­
tion, and in the economic, constitutional and political stakes
2^The Nation, XXXII (March 3, 1881), l£2.
26White, op. cit.. Chapter One.
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involved, both dilemmas were compounded by sectionalism and 
prejudice* Finally, it should be noted that the difficulties 
of joint administration were enlarged by the absence of or­
ganic unity, capable and experienced leadership, and consis­
tent, well-established policies in the War and Interior 
departments. Hence, the analyst who indulges in tbe "if’s” 
of Indian management in this era, extolling, for example, the 
merits of an inter-departmental staff, more precise laws or 
long-tenure officials, is confronted with less amendable 
factors such as the American political system, human nature 
and the climate of opinion*
Many who examine Nineteenth Century Indian relations 
are primarily interested in the lessons which may be found 
for modern problems concerning minority peoples and the so- 
called under-developed nations. Difficulties in respect to 
social integration, economic opportunity and political parti­
cipation are a common denominator in these cases. Indeed, 
some have found consolation in the fact that other nations, 
such as Japan, Canada and Australia have had frustrations
in dealing with subject races similar to those this country
27
has undergone with tbe Indian, The writer would stress, 
however, that the uniqueness of post-Civil War circumstances 
and the many difficulties of the government’s Indian policy 
in that period limit the vaiue of these experiences as a guide 
for the present. MWhat has been dons in the past is of no use, n
2?Hagan, 0£. cit., 170.
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Senator Dawes cautioned after studying Indian affairs for many 
years, "except to teach us that something different is needed 
in the future,"2®
Even negative lessons may be helpful, though, if they 
are learned well. Certainly the headaches of the inter­
departmental system revealed the need for unified Indian 
administration. By the turn of the century, the War Depart­
ment was, for all intents and purposes, no longer involved in 
Indian affairs. The shift to undivided civilian 'management, 
however, was the result of the exigencies of the Spanish- 
American War and improved relations with the tribes, not the 
government's conclusion that the change would benefit the 
Indian service.
Developments during tbe period of divided control also 
indicated the need for a consistent, but flexible, and strictly 
enforced policy; competent, well-informed leaders; and prompt, 
adequate financial support. Unfortunately, the government 
has continued to vacillate In its Indian program. In the 
Thirties, for example, stress was placed upon the conserva­
tion and restoration of tribal lands; during the Fifties the 
emphasis was on "terminating" government trusteeship over re­
served lands; and under the present administration tbe policy
is again the "greater development of the human and natural
29
resources on Indian reservations. As a result of civil
2®Quoted in William Barrows, The Indians' Glde of the 
Indian Question (Boston, 18 8 7), 1 32,
29Ibid., 155-162; Collier, o£. cit., I51*-l59; SI, 1961, 
277-278.
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service reforms since the passage of the Pendleton Act of 
1883, more competent and responsive Indian officials have 
been appointed. In place of the untrained agency staffs 
once chosen on.the basis of availability or political or 
religious affiliation, the Indian Bureau now employs trained 
civil servants known as guidance counselors, social workers, 
legal advisors, conservationists and the likea^O in addition, 
Congress now appropriates much more monsy for the Indian 
service than in former years*31
Although the circumstances of Indian-white relations have 
changed substantially in the seventy-five years since the 
passage of the Dawes Severalty Act, the Indian question 
persists. In many places the Indians, a growing, very diverse 
minority people, now numbering more than a half million, have 
not yet achieved the social, political, legal and economic 
equality which are recognized as basic to our democratic 
system. The Indian problem remains complex, but, like most 
problems, it is more likely to be solved if its origins and 
complications are understood.
3°SI, 1961, 286ff.
3^\Even in inflated times, the 1961 appropriation of nearly 
one hundred and twenty-seven million dollars for the Indian 
service represents a marked Increase over the four to six 
million provided in the l8 70's.
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a p p e n d i x
Key to Abbreviations in Footnotes
In addition to standard footnote abbreviations, 
the following have been used:
AGO L.R. Letters Received, Adjutant General’s
Office.
A&N Jnl Army and Navy Journal.
B.C. Correspondence, Board of Indian
Commissioners.
B.C.M. Miscellaneous Correspondence, Board
of Indian Commissioners.





P..L.3. Letters, Sent, Board of Indian Commissioners.
C.GoL.S. Letters Sent, Commanding General of the Army.
CIA Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs.
Diet. Am. Biog. Dictionary of American 31ography.
. I.A.F. Appointment File, Department of the
Interior.
D.I.L.R. Letters Received, Department of the
Interior.
D.I. Register Department of the Interior Register.
D.I.L.S. Letters Sent, Department of the Interior.
Div. Miss.' L.S. Letters Sent, Division of the Mississippi.
Div. Mo. L.R. Letters Received, Division of the Missouri,
Div. Mo. L.S. Letters Sent, Division of the Missouri.
E&M. Endorsements and Memoranda (Philip H.
Sheridan and VJilliam T. Sherman Papers).
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Letters Sent, Headquarters of the Army.
House of Representat Ives Executive 
Document.
House of RepresentatIves Miscellaneous 
Document'.
House of Representatives Report.
Letters Received, Office of Indian 
Affairs.
Record of Letters Sent, Office of 
Indian Affairs.
Report Book, Office of Indian Affairs.
Journals of the Continental Congress.
National Archives, Record Group.
Annual Report of the Secretary of the 
Interior.
Annual Report of the Secretary of War.
Letters Received, Office of the Secretary 
of War.





United States Statutes at Large.
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